The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread. (2 Viewers)

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With even a German pilot saying the Spitfire and Hurricane (early ones) were childishly easy to land compared to a 109 there had to be something to it. with roughly 1/3 of civil aviation accidents happening in the approach and landing phases of flight it is not hard to believe that the 109 could suffer a high rate of accidents in those phases. As Parsifal says, it may be due to a combination of a number of different things all adding up. While the majority of those landing accidents may have been due to pilot error there is no getting around the fact that some planes are easier to land than others and more tolerant of some pilot errors.
I think that if the landing accident rate or % of aircraft lost in landing accidents for other types were known the the 1/3 figure for the 109 might not look quite so shocking. Still on the high side perhaps.
 
21350 total day fighter (all day fighters) losses. 16400 due to combat losses (fighter/flak) 4428 due to 'other' (mechanical/pilot/etc) thats around 27% 'other' rate.
fair to say half the combat losses were Bf109's. also fair to say that a third of 'other' losses were Bf109's. so thats around 17% 'other' loss for Bf109's. sound fair?
or am I way, way, out to lunch here?
 
well you gotta remember that most likey alot of the A,B,C,D,E,F, G1-G4 models were 'recycled'. what does that account for? also, I highly doubt more then half the total losses were 109's.
maybe 55% at the most.
 
Why recycle a flyable airplane?
A,B,C,D,E and later were used as fighter trainers in fighter schools, where, I imagine, a fair number of them were reduced to recycling by student pilots. Quite possibly in take-offs and landings.

You may want to rethink the math too. If less than 1/2 the losses were 109s that just means that there are even more 109s unaccounted for.

For all I know Mustangs and F4Us may have suffered 20% or higher losses in take-off and landing accidents. How ever this is a rather vague term. what we may never know is what was the loss rate per 100,000 hours flown or loss rate per 100,000 landings. The last is probably the most accurate reflection of how hard or dangerous a plane is to land. With Mustangs flying two, three, four and more time per flight than 109s they landed a lot fewer times per 100,000 hours of use than 109s did. With 109s on the Russian front flying several missions a day at times it may have been just a matter of time before landing accidents claimed a fair number of them. Mustangs flying escort missions only flew one mission a day (mostly) and didn't fly every day of the week due to weather.
Maybe some of the people who know more about operational histories than I do can correct me but how many missions a month did some allied fighter groups fly (granted there were training missions and test/check flights of planes/equipment) compared to how many missions a month some of the 109 groups flew in the east. Or even in defense of Germany. Did the allies rotate fighter groups at all on escort missions and while the Germans may have used a regional defense system, was their a difference in use?
 
I know that few 109Es survived after 1943. Many were sent to the secondary TOs including the med where they remained the domionant type until early 1942.

It is possible that quite a few 109s were "recycled", if you want to put it that way. The LW always suffered from a shortage of newly constructed spares (for example, in 1941, operational readiness rates for the LW in the East dropped to less than 40% after the end of July, because of difficulties in obtaining spare parts for the entire fleet). Its likely that older models might have been scrapped as spare parts. Another source of spare parts might be those aircraft classified as damaged, but in fact never able to fly again. The LW had a method of classifying damage. anything above 70% was imediately scrapped. But in reality anything above 30% was unliklley to fly again. Because of gorings (and Hitlers) obsession with numbers, I believe that these aircraft in the 30-70% damage bracket were kept listed as "frontline -operational" when in fact all they were doing was sitting on the side of airfields and in hangars, being cannabalized for spares, which were always in short supply with the LW.
 
I dont have figures on the average numbers of sorties per month for allied fighters, but I do know that the average life of a P-51 was eight months in 1944
 
I'd have to agree with post #70. the manifests for III./JG 53 on December 31/44 showed for example 68 aircraft 'on hand' with 20 ready for operation service.
that theme was carried out with most JG units. so more then likely those 48 a/c served as spare parts. then when they had to move, those a/c were left behind.
 
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Where are those day fighter figures from?

Don Caldwell gives 17,023 Luftwaffe day fighter losses between September 1943 and December 1944 alone.
 
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It all gets down to what is a loss. Not all losses were aircraft spinning uncontrollably out of the sky. Some losses are aircraft with engines gradually seizing, oil everywhere, but the aircraft still able to make it home, perhaps to belly land, only to be scrapped or "recycled" sometime down the track.....when is a loss actually a loss????

And further, when is a loss a combat loss and a non-combat loss. is an aircraft dmaged in combat, but destroyed whilst not in combat, say on landing , or scrapped after landing, a combat loss, or a noncombat loss. The demarkation lines can rapidly become very blurred, very quickly.

A breeding ground for lies, damn lies and statistics....
 
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Quick run through of JG2 losses between July 1940 and the beginning of 1942 – thanks to Tony Wood's excellent loss lists – to determine losses by cause. Stopped at the end of 1941, as FW-190A losses begin about February.

Out of 350 Bf 109 losses, I counted 37 total losses or partial damaged due solely to take-off or landing accidents or mechanical failures of the landing gear. About two thirds of these were total losses, the rest varying between 10% and 80%.

There were another eight damage/losses due to failed/burst tyres on take-off/landing – mostly light damage (20-40%).

I also counted another 17 landing accidents that could be related to either combat or landing gear problems or a combination of – there was not enough information to clarify. Most of these were total losses.

So, of 350 losses that gives a maximum of 62 that could be attributed to landing gear – roughly 18%.

Of this, I'd guesstimate a maximum of 70% were total losses.

That gives me a maximum of about 14% of Bf 109 losses due to landing gear problems.

Going through the loss lists, what did jump out at me were the number of aircraft losses/damaged due to engine failure. These would outnumber landing gear related accidents by at least 2 to 1, probably more. Particularly with the E7 and F2.
 
I did a similar excercise, but just for April 1941, using John Foremans book "1941 - The Blitz to the non-stop offensive". It gives a day by day account of the losses and the reasons. I came up with five main categories of losses:
(1) lost in combat (or away from the airfield)
(2) lost in TO or landing (I suspect some of the losses on landing may be already damaged aircraft and/or wounded pilot),
(3) lost for reasons unknown
(4) lost in noncombat circumstances (such as training),
(5) lost on the ground (usually strafing)


The results are markedly different to those you have posted:

(1) 23
(2) 40
(3) 5
(4) 4
(5) 6

Thats a total of 72 fighter losses. 31% were lost whilst airborne, in or after combat. 55.5% were lost either landing or taking off. how many of these were attempting this in a damaged condition I dont know, and the cause of the crash is also unknown. The remainder were for the other causes.

How comparable these are to your figures is unknown. My source does not give the reasons for the individual losses, so I cannot tell if the cause of the loss was pilot killed, gear failure, engine failure, structural failure, fire, or what. All I can tell you are those losses recorded whilst landing or takingt off, whilst way from the airfield etc.
 
I know that few 109Es survived after 1943. Many were sent to the secondary TOs including the med where they remained the domionant type until early 1942.

It is possible that quite a few 109s were "recycled", if you want to put it that way. The LW always suffered from a shortage of newly constructed spares (for example, in 1941, operational readiness rates for the LW in the East dropped to less than 40% after the end of July, because of difficulties in obtaining spare parts for the entire fleet). Its likely that older models might have been scrapped as spare parts. Another source of spare parts might be those aircraft classified as damaged, but in fact never able to fly again.

Cannibalization is common with air force. Any air force. Simple reason - repair is uneconomical above certain point. Think fighter or bomber moderately crashed in Kiev. What is cost of ship back aircraft to Germany, repair it, ship it back to Russia, also same time, ship spare parts like engine, wings, guns for other aircraft? Many time more easy to take plane apart, use it for spares, and ship a new plane.. German do not had shortage of machines of war. Big industry - but they lack fuel and men.

I would surprise me if US for example would be senting any major damage B-17 or P-51 for USA back to repair in factory.. US were not stupid. German were not stupid, which is why GPW took so long and costly to won in end.. undersestimate enemy - greatest fault, Zhukov said. Also Chin Szun Cu many thousend year before.. you do not fight believe enemy is stupid.. you fight know his strenght, and your strenght. Make him fight your strenght, so he loose..

The LW had a method of classifying damage. anything above 70% was imediately scrapped.

Yes. 60-99% was scrapped. 100% was what went into ground and was aluminium dust.. 30-60% - repairable by factory. 10% - repairable by immediate unit, like few bullet holes non important places. 10-30% - repairable by mother unit, like Gruppe or Geschwader. This was so.

Also, keep mind: % of damage was written where aircraft was destined, not aircraft destination dependant on % of damage.. % of damage was decided on base what need to be done with aircraft. Also % damage was decided by what was hit - say major component hit, no replace possibility - immindiate classify 60%.

But in reality anything above 30% was unliklley to fly again.

Aircraft above 30% was not flying, was sent to repair centrers, repairt, rebuilt, flown again.

Because of gorings (and Hitlers) obsession with numbers, I believe that these aircraft in the 30-70% damage bracket were kept listed as "frontline -operational" when in fact all they were doing was sitting on the side of airfields and in hangars,

Sorry this sounds very incorrect... what obsession? Just above you write operational readiness rates were reported to fall below 40% towards 1941 on Eastern Front campaign.. contradict, is not?

Beside - 30-60% damage was to be sent to factory, if repairable.

being cannabalized for spares, which were always in short supply with the LW.

I do not think there was special shortage. LW service rate - very similiar to USSR, UK, USA air forces - roughly 70% typical in war. Better when unit doing nothing, less, when far from supply chain and in hard action. Normal. Fighter Command had 60% readiness in Combat of England. Shortage of spares, too? I think there is theoriy of conspiration here...
 
Flyboy,

sorry, that would be in reference to the Bf109. In order to control fuse sway, the pilots used the left/right brakes to keep the a/c in a straight line more or less.
It was nessesary do to the castering tailwheel. once enough ground speed was aquired for the smallish rudder to become effective, brakes were released, or when
it was obviouse the a/c was tracking straight. later, they used a 'locking tailwheel', which helped some, and a taller fin/rudder.

two things with a 109. keep the tail down control the sway, until the rudder became effective. hope this made sense(?).

It still doesn't. I'd liketo see if that's out of the POH or maybe the writer is confusing the use of the brakes for the use of the rudder. I do know that rudder effectivness happened a lot earlier than may have been advertised, this coming from a pilot who flew "white 14" when it was out at Mojave. For the most part the rudder should become pretty effective as soon as there's airflow over it (20, 30 mph?) and the nose should be able to be brought up within 5 seconds of starting a take off role. maybe Bill M (Dragondog) can chime in here as he has time in a P-51 and can give a comparison.
 
well the rudder will work with the engine running at 1800rpm and 5mph too. thats not the point. 1400+hp + 9m diameter prop + 6600lb a/c +
smallish rudder = all kinds of pilots accounts for having to use the brakes to control sway on take off.

Where are those day fighter figures from?

Don Caldwell gives 17,023 Luftwaffe day fighter losses between September 1943 and December 1944 alone.
Claes Sundin, Jochen Prien, Peter Rodeike. as far as I'm concerened, the upmost authority on the subject

13,000 combat losses in the West (approx), 4000 losses in the East (approx). can break it down by years if you want.
 
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Are those 1000+hp a/c and how do you keep the a/c pointing in the right direction during the initial take of roll until the rudder becomes effective?

They are not, but the principal is the same whether it be a -109 or a cub. You're continually "dancing" on the rudder as most tail draggers do have a tie in between the rudder and tail wheels. Those aircraft with out tailwheel steering are kept on center line with rudder and the rudder becomes effected a lot quicker than you would think (as previously mentioned). The big difference on the higher HP aircraft is the amount of torque you're going to get at take off rpm. Combine that with a crosswind and a green pilot and it can get interesting.
 

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