Greg of Auto and Airplanes has asked for a Debate (2 Viewers)

[SplitRz]

29 September 1939, 11 Hampden in 2 formations, the second of 5 intercepted, all shot down.
3 December 1939, 24 Wellingtons attacked warships, intercepted, no losses
14 December 1939, 12 Wellingtons, found convoy, spend 30 minutes trying to set up bombing runs in poor weather, 5 lost to flak and fighters
18 December 1939, 24 Wellingtons, bombed ships from 13,000 feet, perfect visibility, 12 Wellingtons lost, 2 fighters reported shot down.
Blenheim reconnaissance flights 20 September to 25 November 1939, 37 sorties, 7 lost.

The USAAF was aware of the early RAF raids, but noted the following would reduce casualties
1) Self sealing fuel tanks (The Wellingtons did not have them in 1939)
2) Increased defensive firepower including effective range, 6x0.303 inch versus 10 or more 0.50 inch
3) Tighter formations
4) Larger formations and/or raids.
5) Heavier airframes being harder to shoot down (Wellington Ia and Ic overload weight was 30,000 pounds)
6) Flying 10,000 feet or so higher
7) Flying faster, the Wellington Ia and Ic top speed was around that of the B-17/24 fast cruise speed.

Similar logic used when considering the Luftwaffe day raids on Britain in 1940

Without escorts present the interceptors had more performance available to trade off for firepower. A rule of thumb is in 1943 the 8th AF heavies shot down around 2 fighters for every 3 bombers shot down by fighters, in early 1944 that became 2 to 1 in favour of the fighters. The USAAF cause of damage reports reflecting an upgrade in average Luftwaffe fighter firepower. No doubt if figures could be calculated the ratio would move further in favour of the fighters during 1944 as more 30mm cannon were carried. During the Battle of Britain the exchange ratio was in the order of 1 RAF fighter to 3 Luftwaffe twin engined bombers, the RAF pilots had 8 rifle calibre machine guns firing at bombers weighing around 5 to 10 tons empty, the bombers single rifle calibre guns firing back but were in formation.

All the above ratios would require accurate bombing causing significant lasting damage to balance the bomber losses and/or enough interceptor losses to escorts. The USAAF calculation 300 heavy bombers being enough to drive average losses down to acceptable levels was done in 1942 at the latest and not revised, even as the defences were strengthened.

Nothing was static, radar made a big difference to bomber casualties once it was hooked up to a tracking and control system, in 1939 the German radar station phoned the airfield with what it was detecting and the fighters took a while to become airborne then were on their own. The Wellingtons were looking for shipping, not flying to a known location then returning. Think of the probable results in 1939 if it was 300 B-17E incoming, not worrying as much about bombs hitting non military targets alternatively the results in 1943 if it was 24 USAAF Wellington I incoming and waiting for absolutely clear weather.

Nothing was static, but all things considered, without escorts - and by dint of their success or otherwise, air superiority converting into air supremacy - even a ratio of one fighter to one supremely armed (and consequently manned) bomber was likely to be unsustainable due to the enormous difference in strategic materials, manufacturing manpower and time between the bomber and fighter... Not to mention the drain on maintenance and especially aircrew training, given it was eight+ men facing their mortality or capture, versus one.

The self defending bomber was a counterproductive WW2 myth.

The harsh teacher of war will often disprove a peacetime theory. But it seems odd to me that the penny of the ultimate lesson took so long to drop.

 

[Low Battery]

Nothing was static, but all things considered, without escorts - and by dint of their success or otherwise, air superiority converting into air supremacy - even a ratio of one fighter to one supremely armed (and consequently manned) bomber was likely to be unsustainable due to the enormous difference in strategic materials, manufacturing manpower and time between the bomber and fighter... Not to mention the drain on maintenance and especially aircrew training, given it was eight+ men facing their mortality or capture, versus one.

The self defending bomber was a counterproductive WW2 myth.

The harsh teacher of war will often disprove a peacetime theory. But it seems odd to me that the penny of the ultimate lesson took so long to drop.

Not really. Whether it worked or not depended entirely on conditions. It was hardly obvious that it would not work in general prior to testing it. Change the planes or their numbers or the enemies and you get different results. B-29s vs Japanese fighters would have gotten through without escorts. The bombers were fast enough that after the first pass the fighters struggled to catch back up and then had to come up the ass end with low closure speed of a formation of angry super forts.

If you have more of the same bombers you also get a different results. Like a said before, not having enough bombers in the 8th was a big factor. Does anyone in their right mind that that if the AAF had started the war with a huge fleet of bombers they could not have made it to the target?

It didn't take much either to move the needle of attrition in the bombers favor either. Just a token number of fighter groups in early 1944 (2 P-51 2 P-38) swung the pendulum in the entire other direction.

 

[wuzak]

B-29s vs Japanese fighters would have gotten through without escorts. The bombers were fast enough that after the first pass the fighters struggled to catch back up and then had to come up the ass end with low closure speed of a formation of angry super forts.

It also depends on how they were used.

A B-17 flying alone could cruise at a higher speed than it could when in the formations used by the Eighth AF.

 

[MiTasol]

And B-24s were forced to fly as slow as the B-17s

 

[SaparotRob]

And B-24s were forced to fly as slow as the B-17s

And without out the flair, style and panache of the B-17s.

 

[Engineman]

If you have more of the same bombers you also get a different results. Like a said before, not having enough bombers in the 8th was a big factor. Does anyone in their right mind that that if the AAF had started the war with a huge fleet of bombers they could not have made it to the target?

It didn't take much either to move the needle of attrition in the bombers favor either. Just a token number of fighter groups in early 1944 (2 P-51 2 P-38) swung the pendulum in the entire other direction.

Even if you take an imaginary "huge fleet" of early B-17's to Germany in 1939, then you have to give the Germans an equally strong defence and the early B-17's would be shot to bits.

Your description of the fighter Groups as "Token" is incorrect. The fact is that in the circumstances, their superb capability was sufficient to disrupt the operations of the German Air Defence fighters.

Eng

 

[SplitRz]

Not really. Whether it worked or not depended entirely on conditions. It was hardly obvious that it would not work in general prior to testing it. Change the planes or their numbers or the enemies and you get different results. B-29s vs Japanese fighters would have gotten through without escorts. The bombers were fast enough that after the first pass the fighters struggled to catch back up and then had to come up the ass end with low closure speed of a formation of angry super forts.

If you have more of the same bombers you also get a different results. Like a said before, not having enough bombers in the 8th was a big factor. Does anyone in their right mind that that if the AAF had started the war with a huge fleet of bombers they could not have made it to the target?

It didn't take much either to move the needle of attrition in the bombers favor either. Just a token number of fighter groups in early 1944 (2 P-51 2 P-38) swung the pendulum in the entire other direction.

Remember, we (and the debate) was referencing bombers that are relying on their armament as their primary defence - not their superior altitude or speed

#1. Well, it was pretty obvious to the RAF by early 1940 that it would not work in general (and that was backed up by post BoB operational experience over the continent). It was equally obvious to the Luftwaffe too by the end of the same year: Unless your opponents had insufficient fighters or fighters of particularly poor performance, armament and organisation, daylight unescorted raids by large numbers of bombers would result in unsustainable losses.

#2 Touch of strawman there, the issue isn't about bombers not making it though to their target at all, is it? Very few raiding forces were ever completely annihilated by defending fighters. The issue was unsustainable, impractical attrition through combat damage or losses, regardless of how many aircraft you're fielding. When Schweinfurt 1 and 2 were undertaken in strength and the loss percentage was some of the highest ever seen. If the AAF had started its war with a full compliment of contemporary B17b or B17c, and undertook unescorted raids, they would have been absolutely hacked out of the sky. These lacked power operated turrets, even a tail position and would have been utterly easy meat for the experienced Luftwaffe and a Germany that had not yet started to see its fortunes reversed on the Eastern Front.

#3 It took two years, grim experience, ESCORTS and the lives of thousands of aircrew to reduce that level of attrition down to strategically acceptable and then highly favourable levels. But the odds of victory to loss in direct unescorted air combat was almost never in the favour of the bombers in the ETO. To have matched airframe to airframe in manufacturing time , materiel and aircrew, it would have needed to be a loss ration of something like at least 3 fighters for every 1 B17.

No amount of extra turrets and .50s were ever going to achieve that (and never did).