A little strange account of the pilot

[Odoaker]

Perhaps here is the right place to write about it:

One of the Bf 110 pilots, which participated in this campaign, recalled the specific conditions of the battles fought at that time in the following words:
"The Russians won the battle without it even taking place. They brought the war down to ground level. They didn't like the altitude – anything over 3000 metres they simply ignored. That, in turn, didn't suit us. It was only from 5000 (metres) upwards that our machines were able to show what they could really do. But he so-and-so's wouldn't play. They buzzed around in the lower regions attacking our ground troops, and didn't give a damn what was happening above them. This was all very well for our Kampfgruppen, who were going about their business completely undisturbed. But the infantry were sending up howls of protest and asking for help.
Some bright spark back in Berlin had 'discovered' that the best way to tackle a Il-2 was from Below. But how do you get underneath a machine that's flying ten metres above the ground? We couldn't dive on them either, for then we were simply shooting up our own troops below them. And from the sides the damn things seemed to be armoured like tortoises!".

So, what's strange to me about this story? I've always heard that attacking from above is the best tactic. As I heard, for Americans it was the most important doctrine: "first take control of the attic, then go down to the lower floors". Gloster Meteor - as I heard - was created for this reason. Someone came to the conclusion that the one who would quickly reach the high flight altitude and attacked from there would win the fight. And now suddenly I read that on the Eastern Front it did not work because... the Soviets "didn't give a damn what was happening above them" ?! And the Germans couldn't shoot the enemy, which was flying lower, because... there were German infantry on the ground (EVERYWHERE) ?! I don't understand any of this.

 

[pbehn]

Perhaps here is the right place to write about it:

One of the Bf 110 pilots, which participated in this campaign, recalled the specific conditions of the battles fought at that time in the following words:
"The Russians won the battle without it even taking place. They brought the war down to ground level. They didn't like the altitude – anything over 3000 metres they simply ignored. That, in turn, didn't suit us. It was only from 5000 (metres) upwards that our machines were able to show what they could really do. But he so-and-so's wouldn't play. They buzzed around in the lower regions attacking our ground troops, and didn't give a damn what was happening above them. This was all very well for our Kampfgruppen, who were going about their business completely undisturbed. But the infantry were sending up howls of protest and asking for help.
Some bright spark back in Berlin had 'discovered' that the best way to tackle a Il-2 was from Below. But how do you get underneath a machine that's flying ten metres above the ground? We couldn't dive on them either, for then we were simply shooting up our own troops below them. And from the sides the damn things seemed to be armoured like tortoises!".

So, what's strange to me about this story? I've always heard that attacking from above is the best tactic. As I heard, for Americans it was the most important doctrine: "first take control of the attic, then go down to the lower floors". Gloster Meteor - as I heard - was created for this reason. Someone came to the conclusion that the one who would quickly reach the high flight altitude and attacked from there would win the fight. And now suddenly I read that on the Eastern Front it did not work because... the Soviets "didn't give a damn what was happening above them" ?! And the Germans couldn't shoot the enemy, which was flying lower, because... there were German infantry on the ground (EVERYWHERE) ?! I don't understand any of this.

The war in the east always had a land front, the war in the west almost always had a stretch of water between forces. After D-Day in the west the conflict was similar to the east, if you cant hit any precision target from 20,000 ft there is little point in going up there, and if you are at 20,000 ft you can do nothing about an attack just above ground level.

 

[Odoaker]

The war in the east always had a land front, the war in the west almost always had a stretch of water between forces. After D-Day in the west the conflict was similar to the east, if you cant hit any precision target from 20,000 ft there is little point in going up there, and if you are at 20,000 ft you can do nothing about an attack just above ground level.

There is of course some logic in what you write. But the German pilot said the main problem was the German infantry. He claims that, for this reason, a diving attack was impossible. But the infantry was not everywhere on the ground. So it still all seems strange to me.

 

[pbehn]

There is of course some logic in what you write. But the German pilot said the main problem was the German infantry. He claims that, for this reason, a diving attack was impossible. But the infantry was not everywhere on the ground. So it still all seems strange to me.

It was a Russian military strategy to nullify German air power by holding the enemy close. In places like Stalingrad the two sides were so close that any air strike was likely to hit both or at least as much chance of hitting your side as theirs. The Russians used to make repeated runs at German lines in IL-2safter all ammunition had been used up just to keep their heads down. In investigations into American actions during raids almost all cases of reported strafing of unarmed German citizens turned out to be the result of dogfights close to the ground, if you fire enough machine gun rounds randomly around a country you will hit things. While its true that the German infantry weren't everywhere, it is almost certain any IL-2 would be close to the German infantry, its their job to attack German ground assets.

 

[MIflyer]

In the Pacific the PBY's and PB4Ys found that getting so low that the Japanese could not get underneath you was a vitally important tactic. Of course over the ocean there was not much to run into, either. But an aircraft diving on another that is very low may run into the ground.

There was case where a PB4Y-2 was jumped by Zeros and shot down near Iwo Jima. So the unit sent out three PB4Y-2 to that area and when the Zeros showed up they got low and turned into the attacks - and shot down Zero after Zero. They were never bothered again.

 

[Crimea_River]

The tactic of attacking the Il-2 from below was to a) get out of the cone of fire from the rear gunner (on the models that had one) and b) because the radiator/oil cooler, the most vulnerable part of this otherwise heavily armoured airplane, was easily hit from that position.

 

[swampyankee]

Perhaps here is the right place to write about it:

One of the Bf 110 pilots, which participated in this campaign, recalled the specific conditions of the battles fought at that time in the following words:
"The Russians won the battle without it even taking place. They brought the war down to ground level. They didn't like the altitude – anything over 3000 metres they simply ignored. That, in turn, didn't suit us. It was only from 5000 (metres) upwards that our machines were able to show what they could really do. But he so-and-so's wouldn't play. They buzzed around in the lower regions attacking our ground troops, and didn't give a damn what was happening above them. This was all very well for our Kampfgruppen, who were going about their business completely undisturbed. But the infantry were sending up howls of protest and asking for help.
Some bright spark back in Berlin had 'discovered' that the best way to tackle a Il-2 was from Below. But how do you get underneath a machine that's flying ten metres above the ground? We couldn't dive on them either, for then we were simply shooting up our own troops below them. And from the sides the damn things seemed to be armoured like tortoises!".

So, what's strange to me about this story? I've always heard that attacking from above is the best tactic. As I heard, for Americans it was the most important doctrine: "first take control of the attic, then go down to the lower floors". Gloster Meteor - as I heard - was created for this reason. Someone came to the conclusion that the one who would quickly reach the high flight altitude and attacked from there would win the fight. And now suddenly I read that on the Eastern Front it did not work because... the Soviets "didn't give a damn what was happening above them" ?! And the Germans couldn't shoot the enemy, which was flying lower, because... there were German infantry on the ground (EVERYWHERE) ?! I don't understand any of this.

In other words, the Soviets didn't play to the German aircraft's strengths? Of course, the answers to this are a) fix your aircraft or b) force them to operate in that environment. The Soviets apparently made sure that option b didn't work. Option a would result in aircraft that couldn't function in the air war in the West.

 

[MIflyer]

One account said that they removed the supercharger from the IL-2 engine, which would have made it a real slug at any altitude above grass cutting height. But I doubt that; superchargers provide extra power at low altitude as well.

 

[pbehn]

In other words, the Soviets didn't play to the German aircraft's strengths? Of course, the answers to this are a) fix your aircraft or b) force them to operate in that environment. The Soviets apparently made sure that option b didn't work. Option a would result in aircraft that couldn't function in the air war in the West.

Reminds me of the complaints at Stalingrad about the Russians using the sewer system, as if people being bombed and killed by a foreign power should put up "caution men at work" signs to make it a fair fight.

 

[Snautzer01]

Soviets very well knew were the strengths of their aircraft lay. Yes you took losses but on the whole front that was not that bad. Later on they had the aircraft but not that much of an opponent left. Dominance that the Luftwaffe could have were only spots on the big picture of the combined eastern fronts. That is i think a steam roller works, yes you lose some but strategically if your production is not hurt, it is only loss of expendable men power and material. And big battles won.

In the air why invest in super planes you had no engines for nor the strategy nor the eduction to mold a fine blade if you have a ( and i say with the most respect!) a blunt object that could do the same in mass?
On a side note we in the west were told untill quite recently about the hundreds of Luftwaffe kills by the aces in the East. Now it seams that for what reasons this is not true. Comparing victories with the actual losses. They do not add up. Not even close. Pleas look into this Hartmann: claims vs. victories - Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum The Hartmann claims.

So as an armchair general i would say the soviets adapted very well in (be it costly in men and material) to absorb losses drain the enemy and steam fisted into to dangly parts.

 

[Odoaker]

But an aircraft diving on another that is very low may run into the ground.

But there is another strange sentence in this story: "And from the sides the damn things seemed to be armored like tortoises!" Yes, of course, the Il-2 were (partly) armored, but the Bf 110 had two 20mm cannons (in addition, the second crew member could change the magazine in these guns - which is so emphasized by "Bismarck" from "Military Aviation History"). Were the Soviets really "immune" to fire with such weapons from the side ?!

 

[swampyankee]

But there is another strange sentence in this story: "And from the sides the damn things seemed to be armored like tortoises!" Yes, of course, the Il-2 were (partly) armored, but the Bf 110 had two 20mm cannons (in addition, the second crew member could change the magazine in these guns - which is so emphasized by "Bismarck" from "Military Aviation History"). Were the Soviets really "immune" to fire with such weapons from the side ?!

It's going to be very difficult to get anything resembling a normal impact on the side of a moving aircraft, so it's not completely implausible that the Il-2 could have near-immunity.

 

[pbehn]

But there is another strange sentence in this story: "And from the sides the damn things seemed to be armored like tortoises!" Yes, of course, the Il-2 were (partly) armored, but the Bf 110 had two 20mm cannons (in addition, the second crew member could change the magazine in these guns - which is so emphasized by "Bismarck" from "Military Aviation History"). Were the Soviets really "immune" to fire with such weapons from the side ?!

How many Bf110s were used as fighters on the eastern front? Germany's problem was it was massively outnumbered on a huge front. Where it could contest Russian activity the LW shot down many planes and lost many too but made no real difference to the outcome.

 

[GreenKnight121]

Besides, the BF-110 would be vulnerable to Soviet fighters conducting "bounce" attacks - since the Bf-110s would be attacking the IL-2s over the German-held side of the front, there would not be that "might hit our guys on the ground" calculation to hinder the Soviets from using that tactic.

 

[pbehn]

As I understand it, the Bf110 was withdrawn after initial successes and was basically done as a fighter at the end of 1942.

 

[swampyankee]

Besides, the BF-110 would be vulnerable to Soviet fighters conducting "bounce" attacks - since the Bf-110s would be attacking the IL-2s over the German-held side of the front, there would not be that "might hit our guys on the ground" calculation to hinder the Soviets from using that tactic.

Given the Soviet attitude towards its troops, I would suspect "friendly fire" wouldn't be much of a concern.

 

[Glider]

I have read a couple of books written by Il2 Pilots and a number of things struck me and one was that the considered the 20mm guns carried by the Luftwaffe to be far less dangerous than the ones used as AA guns by the German Army. The difference being the relative lack of penetration.