MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
From the USAF Museum Friends Newsletter, Winter 1995-96 Edition, an interesting little article.
Bailing Out Of A B-25 In the CBI
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glennasher
Senior Airman
Interesting stuff. We seem to ignore the CBI a lot here, but there was good work going on there. And you could die just as easily there, as you could over Europe.
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MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
In the CBI they more or less invented the concept of a FAC on the ground with the troops; previously comm between the air and ground units was via their individual headquarters. The Air Commandos realized that they need to talk to the ground troops directly to figure out what they needed for CAS, a concept so basic to us today that it sounds absurd to think about doing it any other way. The P-51A's had an advantage there since they were equipped with SCR-274-N radios and thus could talk to the ground troops on HF and in fact were equipped with an additional radio transmitter option. Presumably that was true of the A-36A's they had in the CBI as well. The RAF had gone to VHF in the CBI, thus could not talk to the ground troops and said that they had no need to do so, since the staffs in their HQ's could provide them with adequate strike instructions.
The CBI also invented the concept of SAR, the idea of having ways to go pick up downed aircrew, very important since the jungle was the worst enemy they faced. They parachuted in people to help downed aircrew and made use of L-5's and even the first helicopters to pick them up.
The CBI also invented the concept of SAR, the idea of having ways to go pick up downed aircrew, very important since the jungle was the worst enemy they faced. They parachuted in people to help downed aircrew and made use of L-5's and even the first helicopters to pick them up.
Hi
I don't think this is quite correct as the concept of 'FAC' had been used in North Africa, Sicily and Italy by this time, indeed Cochran had previously been in North Africa. The 'troops' that the Air Commando were talking to on the ground were the RAF teams that went with the Chindits (they had also gone with the first Wingate expedition but had better radios on the second), they had also used the methods to a limited extent during the 2nd Arakan (December 1943-May 1944). The RAF officers with the columns also had the job of selecting the DZs and arranging air drops. Sqn. Ldr. Thompson was one of these officer and he directed the aircraft at White City on 19th April 1944 with "devastating results". The RAF officers would have troops fire smoke onto the targets to be attacked generally using mortars and then directing the support aircraft by R/T, but as I said this sort of thing was already being done in other Theatres.
Reference the VHF a quote on this can be found on p.178 of 'The Forgotten Air Force - The Royal Air Force in the War against Japan 1941-1945' by Henry Probert, this states:
"Owing to the demands of the Imphal battle it was only the Vengeances of 84 Squadron based at Kumbhirgram that could do much to help, as they did for example by bombing enemy dugouts near White City, but they were based a long way back, needed fighter escort, and could not bomb through cloud; moreover, equipped with VHF and usually unable to communicate with the men on the ground, they were at a great disadvantage compared with ACF aircraft which were fitted with HF radio and could talk to the ground troops by R/T."
There do not appear to be problems such as this elsewhere on the whole (the CBI was generally last in line for much equipment it should be remembered), although the air support methods were continuously changing throughout the war to take account of experience of battle. However, I don't think it can be said that the concept of 'FAC' was invented by the Air Commando as it had been used in other theatres.
Mike
Interesting!
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MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
From the book "Air Commando Fighters of World War II"
"Wingate requested that RAF parties be attached to Special Force to control air supply and air support following the success of this practice during the first Chindit operation."
"The presence of these RAF detachments made possible a new form of close support that had not yet been attempted in Burma. The most fundamental change was in air-ground communications."
"At that point in the war RAF fighters and bombers were equipped with VHF radios, which could not communicate with the Army HF sets. Air strikes in support of ground forces had to be based on the use of coordinates and a thorough briefing before the mission. Once in the air, the pilots could not establish contact with anyone on the ground to guide them to the target. The Army made frequent use of mortar smoke on the target once the RAF airplanes were overhead, but without direct communication, officers on the ground could not give the pilots corrections or new instructions."
"In contrast the Air Commando P-51's were equipped with HF radios, allowing their pilots to communicate directly with the RAF parties on the ground and enabling the RAF control officer to call in air strikes with greater accuracy and in closer proximity to the ground troops. Senior RAF officers thought that strikes controlled from the ground were too dangerous, but Cochran and Alison had a strong belief in the capabilities of their pilots and supported the idea."
This is far more definitive than the supposition that if problems with VHF-only aircraft are only mentioned once it must not have occurred elsewhere.
The attached documents show that USAAF fighters bound for Asia were to be equipped with SCR-274-N.
"Wingate requested that RAF parties be attached to Special Force to control air supply and air support following the success of this practice during the first Chindit operation."
"The presence of these RAF detachments made possible a new form of close support that had not yet been attempted in Burma. The most fundamental change was in air-ground communications."
"At that point in the war RAF fighters and bombers were equipped with VHF radios, which could not communicate with the Army HF sets. Air strikes in support of ground forces had to be based on the use of coordinates and a thorough briefing before the mission. Once in the air, the pilots could not establish contact with anyone on the ground to guide them to the target. The Army made frequent use of mortar smoke on the target once the RAF airplanes were overhead, but without direct communication, officers on the ground could not give the pilots corrections or new instructions."
"In contrast the Air Commando P-51's were equipped with HF radios, allowing their pilots to communicate directly with the RAF parties on the ground and enabling the RAF control officer to call in air strikes with greater accuracy and in closer proximity to the ground troops. Senior RAF officers thought that strikes controlled from the ground were too dangerous, but Cochran and Alison had a strong belief in the capabilities of their pilots and supported the idea."
This is far more definitive than the supposition that if problems with VHF-only aircraft are only mentioned once it must not have occurred elsewhere.
The attached documents show that USAAF fighters bound for Asia were to be equipped with SCR-274-N.
Hi
The point I was trying to make was the procedures used were not 'invented' by the Air Commando at the beginning of 1944, they were already in use in other theatres. D-Day and the Battle of Normandy started in June, just as the second Chindit expedition was about to end. The close air support with two-way wireless was not based on what had been done by the Air Commando but what had been done in North Africa, Sicily and Italy and used 'FACs' (for want of a better term). It did not depend on HF as the 'FACs' had VHF as well.
For the 14th Army's offensive in Burma during later 1944 and 1945 the RAF 'FACs' ground element were equipped with man-pack VHF R/T sets like they were in other theatres. The Visual Control Posts (VCP) at Army Brigades had a VHF set (Type 1143) and HF set (Type 22, so they were on the army brigade network), these ended up being jeep mounted and the name changed in late 1944 to 'Contact Car (Air)'. They were then in a similar position to their equivalents in Italy and Northern Europe.
As an aside we should remember that two-way contact using R/T with army co-operation aircraft (not as FAC of course) was not 'new', as the following documents show:
These 1926 and 1932 methods of using R/T were based on the WW1 experiments and trials with R/T (or rather Wireless Telephony at the time). I hope that is of interest.
Mike
The point I was trying to make was the procedures used were not 'invented' by the Air Commando at the beginning of 1944, they were already in use in other theatres. D-Day and the Battle of Normandy started in June, just as the second Chindit expedition was about to end. The close air support with two-way wireless was not based on what had been done by the Air Commando but what had been done in North Africa, Sicily and Italy and used 'FACs' (for want of a better term). It did not depend on HF as the 'FACs' had VHF as well.
For the 14th Army's offensive in Burma during later 1944 and 1945 the RAF 'FACs' ground element were equipped with man-pack VHF R/T sets like they were in other theatres. The Visual Control Posts (VCP) at Army Brigades had a VHF set (Type 1143) and HF set (Type 22, so they were on the army brigade network), these ended up being jeep mounted and the name changed in late 1944 to 'Contact Car (Air)'. They were then in a similar position to their equivalents in Italy and Northern Europe.
As an aside we should remember that two-way contact using R/T with army co-operation aircraft (not as FAC of course) was not 'new', as the following documents show:
These 1926 and 1932 methods of using R/T were based on the WW1 experiments and trials with R/T (or rather Wireless Telephony at the time). I hope that is of interest.
Mike
