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Another consideration - could you smoke in the Wildcat??
= Tim
Aircraft attacking the German bombers should be flying at about 20,000 feet. How did the Hurricane and F4F compare at this altitude?
The Hurricane would climb faster by some 500ft/min which would make a difference over a comparatively small combat arena like SE England in terms of getting to altitude quickly enough, or not and getting bounced
As someone said earlier in the the thread I don't think there would be enough Wildcats produced in time.
In the first 12 months of the war, 3 September 1939 to 3 September 1940, the RAF took delivery of 1,782 Hurricanes.
I'm showing initial climb rates of 2,000ft/min for the early (read lighter) versions of the F4F and 2,529ft/min for the Hurricane I. Service ceiling of 35,000ft for the F4F (more for the earlier, lighter versions) and 36,000ft for the Hurricane I.Her initial climb rate is app. 1,000ft lower than a Wildcats. How much time did she need to 20,000ft? I found info on two websides and they say at least 9 minutes. That would make her a slower climber than the -3 Wildcat
And in 1944 3103 FM-3s were built for the USN and the RAN. The point is just as many, if not more F4Fs' could have been built as Hurricanes under the same given time.
The F4F wasn't accepted by the USN until July 1940In time for the BoB? ... ...The Wildcat might have been ready to play a large role in 1941, but not in the summer of 1940.
In time for the BoB? With the pre-war production, about 2,300 Hurricanes had been built by the start of September 1940. With the best will in the world, I can't see 2,300 Wildcats being built in the first few months of production.
It takes time to go from prototype to production to large scale deployment. The Wildcat might have been ready to play a large role in 1941, but not in the summer of 1940.
Depends where and when production would be fully engaged to support this hypothetical effort
The F4F wasn't accepted by the USN until July 1940
Even if F4Fs were ready to ship in time for the battle, the logistic lines would have proved a near-insurmountable headache; Britain had no real answer to the Atlantic problem in 1940, if F4Fs were to replace Hurricanes plane for plane then roughly 2/3 of RAF Fighter Command would have been decorating the ocean floor between Ireland and the eastern seaboard of the US.
I'm showing initial climb rates of 2,000ft/min for the early (read lighter) versions of the F4F and 2,529ft/min for the Hurricane I. Service ceiling of 35,000ft for the F4F (more for the earlier, lighter versions) and 36,000ft for the Hurricane I.
This is a hypothetical question so we shall assume 2 things
1. there were enough F4F3's to supply the RAF and
T hank you for the voice from on high , however it sounds like a good plan to me harrassing aircraft that are low on fuel , as for beyond the capabilities of tha RAF it was beyond the capabilities for the whole warSome (not you) are also saying the F4f had the range advantage over the hurricane, and this would allow them to take the battle to the germans in France....bad idea, and a fundamental misunderstanding about what the essntials of the battle really were. The BoB for the RAF was not about defeating the LW outright.....to pursue the LW, continue the engagement and seek to destroy the LW was an objective quite beyond the RAFs capabilities in 1940. It fails, in a fundamental way to appreciate the brilliance of Dowdings strategy, and merely mouths that idiots mallorys concepts of the big wing. All the RAF could hope to do in 1940 was to remain in the fight and deny outright air sup[eriority to the Germans. any deviation from that objective would have destroyed the RAF. Keeping the engagement going after that defensive mission had been achieved was simply going to fatigue the pilots even more and lead to losses that would worsen the balance against the RAF even more than it was.
I would agreeSome (not you) are also saying the F4F had the range advantage over the Hurricane, and this would allow them to take the battle to the germans in France....bad idea... ...Keeping the engagement going after that defensive mission had been achieved was simply going to fatigue the pilots even more and lead to losses that would worsen the balance against the RAF even more than it was.
yes there would be welcoming committees but those same committes would not be swanning about the UK , but to have the ability could not fail to change the application of resourcesI would agree
rhubarbs cost the RAF pilots and machines for next to zero gain in the months after the battle, and these were organised sorties.
Hot-headed pursuits back in to occupied France would play straight into the Luftwaffe's hands - it wouldn't take long for them to organising 'welcoming committees' - another avenue for bleeding the RAF to death and this one would have the distinction of almost certainly depriving the RAF of a surviving pilot.