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Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
I haven't planned it out yet, but I could be able to use that. Thanks Njaco.
Battle of Britain Presentation
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Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
looking at that now, looks rather weak. I do have a better pic and pics around. Just ask! 
Nice job Njaco. I've seen a ton of representations of BOB, but that's realtively smooth in it shows the graphics of what was stationed and where. All those 109s stuffed into the Calais area...
Something that always kicked around in my head, did Bomber Command, who was very active in the BOB, ever go after those bases at night, something of a harrasment/attrition type of raid. Similar to what the Japanese did at Guadalcanal?
The single engine fighters being the Luftwaffe's weak point (roughly the same number of single engine fighters in the RAF as was in the Luftwaffe), my thought would be to wear them down. "No fighter escort, no raid" type of thought.
Something that always kicked around in my head, did Bomber Command, who was very active in the BOB, ever go after those bases at night, something of a harrasment/attrition type of raid. Similar to what the Japanese did at Guadalcanal?
The single engine fighters being the Luftwaffe's weak point (roughly the same number of single engine fighters in the RAF as was in the Luftwaffe), my thought would be to wear them down. "No fighter escort, no raid" type of thought.
Hitler wanted Britain out of the war. Whether by peace treaty or conquest. When his "peace" overtures failed, he ordered the preparations for invasion.
There's no doubt those preparations were serious. They were called off because the first stage of the plan called for the Luftwaffe to defeat the RAF, and they failed to do so. The Germans then tried to win the war by bombing Britain in to submission at night.
The Germans began their main offensive on 13 August. They switched to bombing London on the 7 September.
Serviceable day fighters 13 August:
Bf109 - 853
Bf110 - 183
Spitfire - 226
Hurricane - 353
Serviceable day fighters 7 September
Bf109 - 658
Bf110 - 112
Spitfire - 223
Hurricane - 398
It wasn't the RAF that needed time to rebuild, it was the Luftwaffe.
It makes a good story but it's not true.
The Luftwaffe bombed London in daylight on 15 August, a raid on Croydon airfield also hit a perfume factory and killed about 60 civilians. A couple of days later they killed 15 civilians in a daylight raid on Wimbledon. The Luftwaffe bombed London on the night of the 19/20, the 21/22, 22/23 and 23/24. It was part of a deliberate intensification of bombing that killed 254 British civilians in July and over 1,000 in August, before the official start of the Blitz.
On the 19 August Goering ordered a "great" attack on Liverpool, to be delivered by over 100 bombers in late August.
It wasn't until the 25 August the RAF first bombed Berlin, and it wasn't due to a "mistaken" attack on London the previous night, it was due to the escalation of German bombing which had killed over 1,000 civilians.
And the Germans didn't give up their campaign against the RAF just to seek revenge for the bombing of Berlin (which was very light). Kesselring had wanted to begin the Battle with massed attacks on London, which he believed would draw the RAF in to massed battles where German numbers would be decisive. With the failure of the campaign against RAF airfields, Kesselring held sway. The Wehrmacht High Command war diary blames the failure of the BoB on the delay in getting permission to bomb London.
Hitler's directive 17 for the conduct of the war against Britain, 1 August 1940 set out the German plan:
London was the largest port and largest food storage area in the world. It was always the German attention to switch their attack to London.
There's no evidence they had any advanced warning. If you look at the 2 main changes in German operations, neither seems to have been anticipated by the RAF.
When the Luftwaffe sent a large bomber force against the north of England and Scotland, the commander of 13 Group was on a short spell of leave, and his deputy had to manage the response.
When the Luftwaffe switched to attacking London on the 7 September, Park, the commander of 11 Group, was meeting Dowding at Fighter Command headquarters, leaving the battle to be fought by his deputy. The German bombers had a pretty free run to London because the RAF kept expecting the formation to split up and target 11 Group airfields. And Park and Dowding spent the day discussing their tactics to keep up with the German attacks on their airfields.
Yes. People often look at what the RAF thought the situation was, without realising the RAF vastly overestimated the Germans.
This is from a Chiefs of Staff presentation to the Cabinet on 4 September:
The actual position of the Luftwaffe on 7 September (on hand/serviceable):
Level and dive bombers - 1465/931
Single and twin engined fighters - 1036/770
More importantly, the "substantial" reserves didn't exist at all. The Jagdwaffe was about 200 planes and pilots under strength. The bomber forces were in a similar position. And German production was less than half that predicted by British intelligence.
Yes. In daylight too on a couple of occasions.
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
Ah, I see Hop is spreading his myths once again. Its curious that since this was discussed many many times already, but he is still selective with the evidence. Be careful with him.
Oddly though, nobody has managed to find an approved invasion plan in the past 70 years.
The invasion was hardly a serious concept. It served to be a threat serious enough to back Hitler's political goal of getting the Brits wisen up, sack Churchill and come to terms with the reality of the Germans having won the continental war. The British of course at the time saw it as a genuine threat, and Churchill did everything to exaggrevate that in order to put himself on the pedestal as the savior of the nation in times of peril. Some older British historians kept maintaining that, because obviously it sounds much better to say that Fighter Command defeated an invasion that never were to be, than that it merely survived while the Luftwaffe was bombing Britain between July 1940 and May 1941, and only stopped doing it because the Russian operations called it elsewhere, and certainly not because of the resistance by the RAF.
There's not much to justify it, however. No invasion plan was ever accepted, or adopted by the German high Command as final, and as a one be executed. Hitler was reluctant from the start to crush Britain, as he saw no gain in it for Germany - it would only strengthen the US and Japanese, who could feast on the remnants of the British colonies. Its very telling that Hitler was considered calling it off and postponing the whole thing to 1941 already in July 1940, when the Battle had not yet even started.
The German Navy was even less enthusiastic about the idea, as they were well aware that they were simply unprepared and understrength to carry out and protect such an operation. Essentially the whole planning didn't advance any further than bickering between the Army and the Navy about the basic concept. Even by late August they couldn't agree where to land the troops, and how many. And by mid-September, we are told that they were seriously intending to actually start this operation. Without even general plans available, not to mention the huge amount of staff work involved in working out the details, not to say how to conduct the operation further once they have landed. Von Rundstedt, who was supposed to lead this 'seriously intended' operation simply referred to it as a 'joke'. The most notable German historians of the Battle, who actually study the German papers from the period, rather than make up merry theories about fictional invasion plans, simply laugh on the concept as well.
As noted the only reason some of the more conservative British historians in their books written in the 60s and 70s maintain the notion is that by that time the event now known as the Battle of Britain became part of the national consciousness, and a holy national myth. And every myth needs a 'Great Peril' more than the sobering reality, which was that the Germans in the summer of 1940 tried a number of strategies to force Britain out of the war. This as we know failed to bring its fruits, though from the militaryl viewpoint the British were neutralize and could not interfere with German plans on the continent after the fall of France. One of these, but not the only one (just read Hitlers directives on the conduct of war against England) was maintaining credible threat of an imminent invasion (something, however, could not be maintained for very long, given that it was obvious to everyone that weather would not permit such in the autumn) , along with strangulation of Britain sea imports by naval and aerial operations. It makes a very good question as to why would the Germans bother to attack merchant shipping, harbors and the industry IF they would invade in two weeks anyway? What point would there be in that?
The problem was of course that RAF fighter command was running out of both trained pilots and figher reserves. The pilot situation is well known, just about every book and historian notes the severe losses of higher rankning flying officers, ie. a large proportion (30-50%) of the Wing- Section- and Flight leaders were either killed or become unfit for duty for other reasons. Pilot losses exceeded the output of training schools by August, so the only way of providing manpower to fly the planes was to reduce the training period drastically to just six weeks, so that least the Luftwaffe would have to chew itself through this fresh cannon fodder.
The other problem was aircraft. Despite Beaverbrook's wonderous work in setting up the fighter production, British fighter reserves were rapidly decreasing after Adlertag.
Prior to Adlertag on the 9 August, they had
91 Defiants in storage, of this 80 ready to be issued
366 Hurricanes in storage, of this 160 ready to be issued, and
207 Spitfires in storage, of this 132 ready to be issued
Now, by 6 September, just prior when the Luftwaffe switched to massed attacks on London to draw the RAF into combat in numbers, the situation was the follows:
91 Defiants in storage, of this 67 ready to be issued, but by this time the type was already withdrawn as it was simply unsuited for the task at hand.
187 Hurricanes in storage, of this 86 ready to be issued, and
105 Spitfires in storage, of this 41 ready to be issued
The numbers pretty much speak for themselves.
Oddly though, nobody has managed to find an approved invasion plan in the past 70 years.
The invasion was hardly a serious concept. It served to be a threat serious enough to back Hitler's political goal of getting the Brits wisen up, sack Churchill and come to terms with the reality of the Germans having won the continental war. The British of course at the time saw it as a genuine threat, and Churchill did everything to exaggrevate that in order to put himself on the pedestal as the savior of the nation in times of peril. Some older British historians kept maintaining that, because obviously it sounds much better to say that Fighter Command defeated an invasion that never were to be, than that it merely survived while the Luftwaffe was bombing Britain between July 1940 and May 1941, and only stopped doing it because the Russian operations called it elsewhere, and certainly not because of the resistance by the RAF.There's not much to justify it, however. No invasion plan was ever accepted, or adopted by the German high Command as final, and as a one be executed. Hitler was reluctant from the start to crush Britain, as he saw no gain in it for Germany - it would only strengthen the US and Japanese, who could feast on the remnants of the British colonies. Its very telling that Hitler was considered calling it off and postponing the whole thing to 1941 already in July 1940, when the Battle had not yet even started.
The German Navy was even less enthusiastic about the idea, as they were well aware that they were simply unprepared and understrength to carry out and protect such an operation. Essentially the whole planning didn't advance any further than bickering between the Army and the Navy about the basic concept. Even by late August they couldn't agree where to land the troops, and how many. And by mid-September, we are told that they were seriously intending to actually start this operation. Without even general plans available, not to mention the huge amount of staff work involved in working out the details, not to say how to conduct the operation further once they have landed. Von Rundstedt, who was supposed to lead this 'seriously intended' operation simply referred to it as a 'joke'. The most notable German historians of the Battle, who actually study the German papers from the period, rather than make up merry theories about fictional invasion plans, simply laugh on the concept as well.
As noted the only reason some of the more conservative British historians in their books written in the 60s and 70s maintain the notion is that by that time the event now known as the Battle of Britain became part of the national consciousness, and a holy national myth. And every myth needs a 'Great Peril' more than the sobering reality, which was that the Germans in the summer of 1940 tried a number of strategies to force Britain out of the war. This as we know failed to bring its fruits, though from the militaryl viewpoint the British were neutralize and could not interfere with German plans on the continent after the fall of France. One of these, but not the only one (just read Hitlers directives on the conduct of war against England) was maintaining credible threat of an imminent invasion (something, however, could not be maintained for very long, given that it was obvious to everyone that weather would not permit such in the autumn) , along with strangulation of Britain sea imports by naval and aerial operations. It makes a very good question as to why would the Germans bother to attack merchant shipping, harbors and the industry IF they would invade in two weeks anyway? What point would there be in that?
The problem was of course that RAF fighter command was running out of both trained pilots and figher reserves. The pilot situation is well known, just about every book and historian notes the severe losses of higher rankning flying officers, ie. a large proportion (30-50%) of the Wing- Section- and Flight leaders were either killed or become unfit for duty for other reasons. Pilot losses exceeded the output of training schools by August, so the only way of providing manpower to fly the planes was to reduce the training period drastically to just six weeks, so that least the Luftwaffe would have to chew itself through this fresh cannon fodder.
The other problem was aircraft. Despite Beaverbrook's wonderous work in setting up the fighter production, British fighter reserves were rapidly decreasing after Adlertag.
Prior to Adlertag on the 9 August, they had
91 Defiants in storage, of this 80 ready to be issued
366 Hurricanes in storage, of this 160 ready to be issued, and
207 Spitfires in storage, of this 132 ready to be issued
Now, by 6 September, just prior when the Luftwaffe switched to massed attacks on London to draw the RAF into combat in numbers, the situation was the follows:
91 Defiants in storage, of this 67 ready to be issued, but by this time the type was already withdrawn as it was simply unsuited for the task at hand.
187 Hurricanes in storage, of this 86 ready to be issued, and
105 Spitfires in storage, of this 41 ready to be issued
The numbers pretty much speak for themselves.
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
That's a nice conspiracy theory Hop about a 'deliberate intensification of bombing civilians', but can you explain why there's no trace of that in the German operational orders, hmm?
Furthermore, why is this alleged 15 August incident that supposedly killed "60 civillians" in "a perfume factory" has no trace anywhere? And since when bombing a RAF FC airfield is 'bombing Londond"?
For example, the RAF's own daily report says:
At 1905 hours, a bombing attack was made upon Croydon Aerodrome which resulted in the destruction of the H.E. Rollason Aircraft Works and severe damage to the British N.S.F. Factory. The terminal airport buildings were partially destroyed but no damage was caused to the aerodrome surface or to aircraft on the aerodrome. Casualties to RAF personnel were five killed and a number of injured not yet assessed.
And the loss report for the whole day, to all attacks during the day in Britian:
"Casualties on Ground by Enemy Action:
To RAF Personnel - 7 killed, 25 injured.
To others - 25 killed, 145 injured"
So the RAF reports says at the time that 25 were killed, in all Britain, as a result of all attacks by the Luftwaffe, but you say 60 out of this 25 were killed in Croydon, all in a parfume factory? Frankly after this I didn't bother to look up your other 'raids on London', because this first one needs a lot of perfume already...
That civilians were killed in the process during the bombing of legit target such as docks, airfields and factories was a sad thing, but a necessary evil, given the limitations of World War II bombing accuracy and bombs that were missing their intended targets. Certainly the Luftwaffe, nor any other airforce was going to leave an enemy military airfield alone, just because the Brits decided to put it next to a perfume factory and houses.
Now it is another example why it is very dangerous to take Hop's claims too seriously.
The term "great" attack (Grossangriff) was simply an operational terminus technicus used by the German staff, to differentiate from smaller harassing raids that were meant to confuse the air defense. A Grossangriff simply meant hundred tons plus bombs were to be dropped. Neither was that a particularly large amount, its equivalent of the load of just 50 bombers.
The other minor problem with that is that there appears to be no great attack at all on Liverpool on the 19 August.
The whole day was characterized by single recon aircraft of the LW flying over Britain. During the night there were only harassment raids by single bomber aircraft, and its very telling that the RAF plotted but two 6+ raids that penetrated inland. Liverpool isn't even mentioned for received damage.The third problem is that Hermann Göring's general order, issued on 30 June 1940, spoke very clear of the general conduct of the Luftwaffe regarding its targets:
The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... The most thorough study of the target concerned, that is vital points of the target, is a pre-requisite for success. It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary loss of life amongst the civilian population.
The fourth problem is the why Goering ordered a "great" attack on Liverpool on 19 August by himself. The answer is that Göring made it clear on that day that the chief targets are still the enemy air force and the aircraft industry, but the Luftflotten may not bomb London or Liverpool on their own initiative, ie. these two cities were forbidden targets, unless Göring gave a direct order to bomb facilities in them.
The problem again that 25 August wasn't the first time the RAF first bombed German cities either. They begun this many months ago, when in May 1940 they to systematically bombed about a dozen German cities in western Germany, hoping to provoke and draw the Luftwaffe away from the French campaign where it provided effective support, into bombing cities in retaliation. But the Luftwaffe at that point didn't retaliate -yet.
There wasn't that much of a campaign against RAF airfields either. It only lasted for a short period, and not too many airfields were effected. As far as failure, it was rather successfull, for those airfields that were singled out for the Luftwaffe's attention were successfully paralyzed time and time after, but this wasnt that effective in destroying the fighter pilot force. Iindeed it was a better tactic, formulated much earlier on the 19th August by Göring, who said: "Our first aim is the destruction of the enemy's fighters. If they no longer take the air, we shall attack them on the ground, or force them into battle by directing bomber attacks against targets within the range of our fighters."
This tactic was actually quite successful. By massing large raids against targets the RAF absolutely had to defend and could not ignore, they had to send up large formations to counter which the Luftwaffe could destroy. It pretty much worked that way, once the big Luftwaffe formations showed up, German bomber losses went down, British fighter losses went up.
Now IMHO its particularly good to give some attention to this claim, because this shows particularly how Hop makes his arguements - he is never too shy to be selective, and never lets the facts get in the way of a little Jerry bashing. 8) ie. Hitler's directive 17's reads further, but Hop doesn't bother to quote:
"5. I reserve to myself the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal."
Moreover Hop's claims that London was to be singled out from the start is also contradicted by Gorings already quoted 19 August order, which notes that Liverpool and London cannot be bombed under normal circumstances.
Yes. People often look at what the RAF thought the situation was, without realising the RAF vastly overestimated the Germans.
This is from a Chiefs of Staff presentation to the Cabinet on 4 September:
The actual position of the Luftwaffe on 7 September (on hand/serviceable):
Level and dive bombers - 1465/931
Single and twin engined fighters - 1036/770
More importantly, the "substantial" reserves didn't exist at all. The Jagdwaffe was about 200 planes and pilots under strength. The bomber forces were in a similar position. And German production was less than half that predicted by British intelligence.
Of course the Germans had very substantial reserves, both in case of fighters and bombers. You see, the biggest problem of the RAF was that the Germans kept coming, no matter what they did. The bomber forces, that were the primary target for RAF's fighters, essentially operated at the same strenght through the entire battle, ie. the Luftwaffe had 1,380 bombers on 29 June 1940, and by 2 November 1940 this increased to 1,423 level bombers.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
There will be no personal attacks. There is no need to accuss anyone of myths and making cr@p up. If you disagree with someone, just say so and post your sources. Otherwise, as you well know, its only opinion and not fact. This thread will NOT deterioriate as others have done.
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
"Approved" plan? The German plan was to call the invasion with 10 days notice. The dates set for when the invasion would be called came and went because the Luftwaffe never achieved stage 1 of all the plans: air superiority.
From Karl Klee, USAF historical study:
No, it was a perfectly serious concept. Look at the record and you will see all preparations were in earnest until 17 September. From that date onwards the readiness was pushed back to 15 days and forces began to disperse.
Of course, 15 September was the main reason for this change. The German high command had been told the RAF was on the ropes. Massed raids were launched on the 15th and the Luftwaffe suffered their second highest losses of the battle, 60 aircraft. The 15th taught them that air superiority was as far away as ever.
No, the general plans were available. The army's original insistence on a broad front had been over-ruled, the forces to be landed, and the landing sites themselves, had been agreed.
The situation was the same for the Luftwaffe, though. The number of German s/e fighter pilots fit for duty, from Overy:
1 June - 906
1 August - 869
1 September - 733
1 November - 673
And the quality issue was just the same. When Milch toured the front in late August and early September, the front line units complained they were being sent replacements who had done less than 10 landings on 109s, and who hadn't fired a cannon in training.
Steinhilper goes in to detail about the poor quality of the replacement pilots:
Well, bear in mind front line strength increased over the period and over 50 Hurricanes were exported to the ME.
But the fact remains that by 7 September the Luftwaffe front line strength had declined dramatically, the RAF's had increased slightly.
Colin1
Senior Master Sergeant
Don't put quotation marks around things I didn't say.
I said "a deliberate intensification of bombing that killed 254 British civilians in July and over 1,000 in August".
That remains the case. The Luftwaffe greatly increased the number of night sorties, the British civilian deaths went up accordingly.
No trace? Go and do a Google search for bombing croydon Bourjois
When it's in London. After all, bombing Tempelhof is apparently bombing Berlin.
You do understand that the RAF's daily casualty reports were compiled on the day, and they may not have had all the civilian casualty figures?
From The first day of the blitz: September 7, 1940 By Peter Stansky:
From the weekly Cabinet military summary, 15 - 22 August:
The Most Dangerous Enemy, by Stephen Bungay:
Fair enough. Though when the war started the British government banned the RAF from attacking any targets in Germany, even warships in port, because they knew that any bombing risked causing civilian casualties. They had not attacked targets in Berlin by mid August 1940 for that reason.
No, the attack was ordered on the 19th. It was ordered for late August.
The war diary of the Wehrmacht High Command says on the 29th August:
The raid was actually a fiasco, scattering bombs over the Midlands, with the British unaware there had been a special effort against Liverpool. But the fact remains, Goering, on the 19 August, ordered a great attack on Liverpool.
Ah, but that's when Goering thought he could defeat the RAF. A week or so of combat, victory for the mighty Luftwaffe, Goering wins the war for Germany. It didn't quite turn out like that, which is why the Luftwaffe gradually switched to terror bombing.
Yes, he reserved the right to order attacks on Liverpool and London. And immediately ordered an attack on Liverpool.
No, what the RAF did beginning on the 15 May was begin bombing strategic targets in Germany, as the Germans had already begun bombing strategic targets in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The orders from the Cabinet underline the word "military" targets in the orders issued.
Letter from Dowding:
Source? Williamson Murray says there was never enough production to devote to reserves, and logic bears that out. The front line squadrons were seriously under strength, spares were short, serviceability was low and plans were made to re-equip JG 77 with Bloch's. Why, if there were plenty of aircraft in reserve?
Do you have any source for these German reserves? How about some numbers?
John Vasco
Senior Airman
To correct Kurfürst in post #27 of this thread. I quote from a book on the unit which carried out the raid on Croydon on 15th August 1940, second edition, page 64, right-hand column.
"...In 1949 Croydon Council produced a book entitled 'Croydon and the Second World War' and it deals with the 15th August raid in some detail. It was moved to record that: 'From the cold military point of view the attack was an enemy success. Bombs fell upon the airfield but it seems not to have received major damage and this and such casualties as may have occurred there were not revealed. The neighbourhood suffered certainly. At right angles to the airfield, running along its edge, were the several hangars and workshops of aircraft companies; and beyond them to the north the main factory area of Croydon lying along Purley Way; while on the opposite side of the Way lies the large Waddon housing estate. The bombs that overshot the aerodrome these received; they hit the Redwing Aircraft Factory and the NSF factory which were destroyed. and in the latter the Board of Management, which was meeting, had all its members killed. The premises of the Bourjois scent factory and of Philips', Mullards' and of other firms were also hit. On the housing estate bombs fell in Crowley Crescent and Coldharbour Way with fatal casualties, and in Foss Way and Waddon Way. The human results of the raid were the deaths of sixty-two persons, serious injury to thirty-seven and light injuries to 137'..."
So, the factual evidence is there from Croydon Council that the Bourjois scent factory was hit, and the death count in Croydon was 62. As can be seen the casualties were spread over several locations, not just a single one.
By the way, that raid on Croydon, was an error. The correct target was Kenley. Factual evidence for this is found in the 'Namentliche Verlustmeldungen' (personnel loss returns) of the attacking unit, which clearly gives the target as Kenley, and from witness accounts from members of the unit that took part in the raid.
It will probably be too late, Vassili, but if you want to get an accurate picture of the Luftwaffe preparations for the invasion in 1940, and a true picture of losses and strengths throughout the Battle of Britain from start to finish, I would recommend 'Duel of Eagles' by Peter Townsend for the former, and 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' by Stephen Bungay for the latter. Both impeccably researched.
Hope this helps.
"...In 1949 Croydon Council produced a book entitled 'Croydon and the Second World War' and it deals with the 15th August raid in some detail. It was moved to record that: 'From the cold military point of view the attack was an enemy success. Bombs fell upon the airfield but it seems not to have received major damage and this and such casualties as may have occurred there were not revealed. The neighbourhood suffered certainly. At right angles to the airfield, running along its edge, were the several hangars and workshops of aircraft companies; and beyond them to the north the main factory area of Croydon lying along Purley Way; while on the opposite side of the Way lies the large Waddon housing estate. The bombs that overshot the aerodrome these received; they hit the Redwing Aircraft Factory and the NSF factory which were destroyed. and in the latter the Board of Management, which was meeting, had all its members killed. The premises of the Bourjois scent factory and of Philips', Mullards' and of other firms were also hit. On the housing estate bombs fell in Crowley Crescent and Coldharbour Way with fatal casualties, and in Foss Way and Waddon Way. The human results of the raid were the deaths of sixty-two persons, serious injury to thirty-seven and light injuries to 137'..."
So, the factual evidence is there from Croydon Council that the Bourjois scent factory was hit, and the death count in Croydon was 62. As can be seen the casualties were spread over several locations, not just a single one.
By the way, that raid on Croydon, was an error. The correct target was Kenley. Factual evidence for this is found in the 'Namentliche Verlustmeldungen' (personnel loss returns) of the attacking unit, which clearly gives the target as Kenley, and from witness accounts from members of the unit that took part in the raid.
It will probably be too late, Vassili, but if you want to get an accurate picture of the Luftwaffe preparations for the invasion in 1940, and a true picture of losses and strengths throughout the Battle of Britain from start to finish, I would recommend 'Duel of Eagles' by Peter Townsend for the former, and 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' by Stephen Bungay for the latter. Both impeccably researched.
Hope this helps.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Vassili is doing a short presentation on the BoB (hence the name of the thread) and I really can't expect him to wade through all the stones you guys are throwing at each other. If you want to debate the myths and merits of the BoB I suggest start another thread. Same old freakin' song and dance.
I'm gonna start a thread to argue the merits of camouflage - whether its green or a mixture of blue/yellow.
I'm gonna start a thread to argue the merits of camouflage - whether its green or a mixture of blue/yellow.
Airframes
Benevolens Magister
Totally agree Chris. Whether or not the points put forward as suggestions are good, bad, or indifferent, they are all relevant to Vassilli's needs, and have been offered by members for those needs, not as bl**dy debating topics to score points!
John Vasco
Senior Airman
I don't see most of it as throwing stones. More a case of aiming to get things right for him. The raid on Croydon was the first raid that hit the civilian population in any big way, resulting in 62 civilian deaths, outwith any military casualties. That is a point worth working into any BoB presentation. And the books I quoted, which just might be instantly available from a library, DO give a background to Operation Sealion on the one hand, and do give an easily readable set of statistics regarding strengths of both sides at the start and acknowledged finish of the BoB on the other. They are therefore well worth the effort to get hold of, if possible.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
The Luftwaffe didnt lose the BOB they just came second
runs and hides
runs and hides
That is not what he is talking about, nor was he referring to you.
He is referring to the personal attacks that these two always make against each other. It ruins threads and we are all sick and tired of it. Warnings were issued and if they continue to destroy threads with personal attacks at each other they can go someplace else.
These discussions can be debated in an adult like manner without throwing stones at each other.
- Thread starter
- #39
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Haven't been to this thread in awhile, start to work on my presentation tommorow. Interesting info guys, although Kurfurst and Hop, no disrepect, but please watch the personal attacks. You're both very knowledgable in this field, and I hate to see you two get in trouble because of a petty squabble.
Vasco- As a matter of fact I have Townsend's book right next to me. Won't be able to read the whole thing before Wednesday, but I'll take a look through it.
Thanks again guys, I'll let you know after my class on Wednesday how it went.
Vasco- As a matter of fact I have Townsend's book right next to me. Won't be able to read the whole thing before Wednesday, but I'll take a look through it.
Thanks again guys, I'll let you know after my class on Wednesday how it went.
