- Thread starter
- #41
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Thanks Waynos! Working on the powerpoint now. Think I'll label the main points on the powerpoint, and follow up with a short write up.
Battle of Britain Presentation
- Thread starter Vassili Zaitzev
- Start date
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- Thread starter
- #42
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Okay guys. Presentation is done and over with. Did pretty well, just got some pointers to help present, I'm not good talking in front of crowd. Here's my powerpoint and write-up.
Edit: For some reason I can't upload my PP and write-up. I'll try again later.
Edit: For some reason I can't upload my PP and write-up. I'll try again later.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Here it is Vassili. I'll try and get it all on...
Operation Sealion (Seelowe):
Sealion was the proposed invasion of Great Britain by the Wehrmacht. The first phase of the operation was for the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority, or at least weaken the RAF, particularly Fighter Command, to a point that it wouldn't be much of a threat. The operation itself wasn't taken by much enthusiasm, including Hitler. The invasion was postponed until the 15th of September. In all, I don't believe Hitler was dead set on invading England, seeing how his ultimate goal was east. Even if the invasion was carried out, I can not see how it could be successful. Even if the Luftwaffe had established air superiority, the Wehrmacht did not have to capability to launch a full scale invasion. The Kriegsmarine, already outnumbered before the war began, was gutted during the Norway campaign. Even if a good chunk of the Royal Navy was conducting operations elsewhere, the Home Fleet itself outnumbered the Kriegsmarine, similar to what the High Seas Fleet faced during the First World War. There was little in specialized landing craft, mostly barges that would make easy targets.
Major Players:
Air Marshal Hugh T. Dowding was the overall commander for RAF Fighter Command.
Reichsmarschall Hermanm Goring was the overall commander of the Luftwaffe.
British Aircraft:
Though a better aircraft, there were less spitfires then hurricanes during the battle. Since the spitfire was the better aircraft to handle the 109, a common tactic was for the hurricane to go after the bombers and the spitfire's handle the fighters, if the situation was ideal. The hurricane, however, was more maneuverable then the 109, it's eight .303 guns were bunched in two four gun batteries, giving more concentrated firepower then the spitfire. During the battle, the hurricane was credited with the majority of all Luftwaffe aircraft shot down.
German Aircraft:
The main German fighters during the battle were the Me 109 and Me110. Of the two, the 109 was the better to handle the British fighters. While the speed was comparable to the spitfire, the 110 had less maneuverability then the hurricane or spitfire, putting it at a disadvantage in a dogfight. The 109 enjoyed the advantage of direct fuel injection, compared to the British engines built with float carburetors. This gave the 109 the benefit of employing negative G maneuvers without the engine cutting out. However, the 109 had a larger turning radius then its British counterparts. While all three were short range fighters, the fact that the 109 was on the offensive put strain on the limited range. The German bombers were of a medium class, not comparable to a Lancaster or a B-17. During the 30's general Walter Wever was a big proponent of employing a long range heavy bomber. However, his death in 1936 in a plane crash put a halt to this. His successors, such as Kesselring, didn't share Wever's interest in a heavy bomber.
Kanalkampf:
A series of running battles, attacking the channel convoys. The Luftwaffe enjoyed the advantage of having the bomber escorts outnumber the British interceptors. The constant need for patrols over the channel, followed by the number of transports sinking, caused the British Admiralty to cease further convoys through the channel. The Kanalkampf also showed that fighters such as the Defiant and 110 weren't up for dogfighting.
Adlerangriff:
Though Adlertag was on the 13th, there were attacks on British radar stations on the 12th. The stations, though damaged, were back up in six hours. The results showed the Luftwaffe the stations difficult to destroy. This may have not been the case had the Luftwaffe made follow up attacks that day and targeted the infrastructure of the stations, being phone lines and power stations. Adlertag opened up with attacks on coastal airfields in 11 group. Throughout the week, the attacks increased further inland. On August 15, The Greatest Day, Luftflotte 5 launched an offensive from Norway. Out of range of their 109's, the escort duty fell upon the Me 110's. Poor intelligence indicated that the majority of British fighters were with 11 Group, so the Germans were surprised when they got jumped by a strong force of British fighters. Taking heavy losses, Luftflotte did not commit planes in strength for the rest of the battle. 18 August was the largest toll of casualties. The losses in Stuka's for the day caused Goring to recall the dive-bombers, seeing them outmatched when confronted with strong aerial resistance.
Luftwaffe targets RAF airfields:
The increased attacks on 11 Group's airfields put strain on Park's command. Though there was no shortage of fighters, the loss of pilots was more alarming. Replacement pilots had their training shortened and foreign pilots helped to strengthen 11 Group. Rotation of squadrons from other Groups helped, while their German counterparts had no such luck.
Switch to British cities:
The switch to bombing cities, in particular London, can be considered a tactical blunder by the Germans. Forcing their bombers to go even further inland, and stretching the range of the 109 to the limit. This phase gave 11 Group much needed breathing room.
Aftermath: The US ambassador in England, Joseph Kennedy stated that England could not survive the battle. A further visit by Bill Donovan refuted Kennedy's claim.
British Strengths: The well prepared planning of the British air defense was significant.
Operation Sealion (Seelowe):
Sealion was the proposed invasion of Great Britain by the Wehrmacht. The first phase of the operation was for the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority, or at least weaken the RAF, particularly Fighter Command, to a point that it wouldn't be much of a threat. The operation itself wasn't taken by much enthusiasm, including Hitler. The invasion was postponed until the 15th of September. In all, I don't believe Hitler was dead set on invading England, seeing how his ultimate goal was east. Even if the invasion was carried out, I can not see how it could be successful. Even if the Luftwaffe had established air superiority, the Wehrmacht did not have to capability to launch a full scale invasion. The Kriegsmarine, already outnumbered before the war began, was gutted during the Norway campaign. Even if a good chunk of the Royal Navy was conducting operations elsewhere, the Home Fleet itself outnumbered the Kriegsmarine, similar to what the High Seas Fleet faced during the First World War. There was little in specialized landing craft, mostly barges that would make easy targets.
Major Players:
Air Marshal Hugh T. Dowding was the overall commander for RAF Fighter Command.
Reichsmarschall Hermanm Goring was the overall commander of the Luftwaffe.
British Aircraft:
Though a better aircraft, there were less spitfires then hurricanes during the battle. Since the spitfire was the better aircraft to handle the 109, a common tactic was for the hurricane to go after the bombers and the spitfire's handle the fighters, if the situation was ideal. The hurricane, however, was more maneuverable then the 109, it's eight .303 guns were bunched in two four gun batteries, giving more concentrated firepower then the spitfire. During the battle, the hurricane was credited with the majority of all Luftwaffe aircraft shot down.
German Aircraft:
The main German fighters during the battle were the Me 109 and Me110. Of the two, the 109 was the better to handle the British fighters. While the speed was comparable to the spitfire, the 110 had less maneuverability then the hurricane or spitfire, putting it at a disadvantage in a dogfight. The 109 enjoyed the advantage of direct fuel injection, compared to the British engines built with float carburetors. This gave the 109 the benefit of employing negative G maneuvers without the engine cutting out. However, the 109 had a larger turning radius then its British counterparts. While all three were short range fighters, the fact that the 109 was on the offensive put strain on the limited range. The German bombers were of a medium class, not comparable to a Lancaster or a B-17. During the 30's general Walter Wever was a big proponent of employing a long range heavy bomber. However, his death in 1936 in a plane crash put a halt to this. His successors, such as Kesselring, didn't share Wever's interest in a heavy bomber.
Kanalkampf:
A series of running battles, attacking the channel convoys. The Luftwaffe enjoyed the advantage of having the bomber escorts outnumber the British interceptors. The constant need for patrols over the channel, followed by the number of transports sinking, caused the British Admiralty to cease further convoys through the channel. The Kanalkampf also showed that fighters such as the Defiant and 110 weren't up for dogfighting.
Adlerangriff:
Though Adlertag was on the 13th, there were attacks on British radar stations on the 12th. The stations, though damaged, were back up in six hours. The results showed the Luftwaffe the stations difficult to destroy. This may have not been the case had the Luftwaffe made follow up attacks that day and targeted the infrastructure of the stations, being phone lines and power stations. Adlertag opened up with attacks on coastal airfields in 11 group. Throughout the week, the attacks increased further inland. On August 15, The Greatest Day, Luftflotte 5 launched an offensive from Norway. Out of range of their 109's, the escort duty fell upon the Me 110's. Poor intelligence indicated that the majority of British fighters were with 11 Group, so the Germans were surprised when they got jumped by a strong force of British fighters. Taking heavy losses, Luftflotte did not commit planes in strength for the rest of the battle. 18 August was the largest toll of casualties. The losses in Stuka's for the day caused Goring to recall the dive-bombers, seeing them outmatched when confronted with strong aerial resistance.
Luftwaffe targets RAF airfields:
The increased attacks on 11 Group's airfields put strain on Park's command. Though there was no shortage of fighters, the loss of pilots was more alarming. Replacement pilots had their training shortened and foreign pilots helped to strengthen 11 Group. Rotation of squadrons from other Groups helped, while their German counterparts had no such luck.
Switch to British cities:
The switch to bombing cities, in particular London, can be considered a tactical blunder by the Germans. Forcing their bombers to go even further inland, and stretching the range of the 109 to the limit. This phase gave 11 Group much needed breathing room.
Aftermath: The US ambassador in England, Joseph Kennedy stated that England could not survive the battle. A further visit by Bill Donovan refuted Kennedy's claim.
British Strengths: The well prepared planning of the British air defense was significant.
- Thread starter
- #44
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Thanks Njaco, I really appreciate it!
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Trying to get the ppt uploaded....
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Hope it works.
I talk in front of groups all the time and I have found that if I don't make eye contact I don't lose my thoughts. I actually look at their foreheads or scan across the the tops of the heads. Makes everyone believe you are looking at them when you really aren't. Doesn't make ya so self-consious.
I talk in front of groups all the time and I have found that if I don't make eye contact I don't lose my thoughts. I actually look at their foreheads or scan across the the tops of the heads. Makes everyone believe you are looking at them when you really aren't. Doesn't make ya so self-consious.
- Thread starter
- #47
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Thanks, sorry if the size was too big.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Nope it was ok. I recently wiped out my PC and a few programs are missing and I haven't re-installed yet.
- Thread starter
- #49
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Thanks for tip, does make sense.
It does make sense...it's an old psychology trick of avoiding eye contact. Where you research the subject material to the point of making a personal case it becomes irrelevant, for example Hop or Kurfürst I'd wager could stare down any audience to a point, one would wear before the other and that would be the one you should challenge to actually hold some small corner of personal reservation, some small measure of insecurity where the ideal is to know from beginning to end, from any angle to any confusion that absolutely every consideration has been made and accorded whilst the conclusions are self evident. Truth is always self evident and requires no explanation.
When speaking in public a cracking voice or lost place is something to be avoided, not because it makes you seem less commanding a presence or lost your rhythm, but because it suggests that moment you weren't entirely sure what you were talking about. It's the reason you lose an audience which is of concern in speaking publicly, not the fact you lost them. This is where politics departs salesmanship.
When you absolutely believe in what you say, you tend to speak clearly and boistrously even if you are wrong. But you do have to really believe it, so need a lesser IQ if being factitious to speak well. Or employ sales techniques. Or research more the subject material and form an educated, dynamic opinion. Most public speaking curriculums are designed to illustrate this.
When speaking in public a cracking voice or lost place is something to be avoided, not because it makes you seem less commanding a presence or lost your rhythm, but because it suggests that moment you weren't entirely sure what you were talking about. It's the reason you lose an audience which is of concern in speaking publicly, not the fact you lost them. This is where politics departs salesmanship.
When you absolutely believe in what you say, you tend to speak clearly and boistrously even if you are wrong. But you do have to really believe it, so need a lesser IQ if being factitious to speak well. Or employ sales techniques. Or research more the subject material and form an educated, dynamic opinion. Most public speaking curriculums are designed to illustrate this.
beaupower32
Tech Sergeant
Intresting PPT Slides, I enjoyed looking at them.
- Thread starter
- #52
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Thanks for the advice vanir.
Thanks Beau, I wanted to have a visual reference with my presentation, I find it helps with the learning process then just a write up.
Thanks Beau, I wanted to have a visual reference with my presentation, I find it helps with the learning process then just a write up.
Airframes
Benevolens Magister
Nice job Vassilli. For future use, it's worth remembering the way humans see, hear and remember. We remember around 10 to 20% of what we hear, around 30% of what we see, but more than 60% of what we see and hear at the same time. Therefore, any visual aid which accompanies the spoken (or recorded) word which is describing the object/event etc, is doubly effective at least.
beaupower32
Tech Sergeant
I just finished my speech class, and we had to have visuals for 4 of the speeches, they help alot, but yet mine didnt go into as much detail as does your PPT 
- Thread starter
- #55
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Thanks, I think for the next one I'll just put down visual aid, such as maps, photos, etc. I found myself repeating some of the text on my PPT.
One "trick" also to engaging the audience is to concentrate and elaborate on those elements of the presentation you personally found exciting. People love to hear about it when you've figured something fascinating out, we like to empathise and if you found something fascinating chances are we will too.
If you have to relate some facts and figures it sounds exciting when it is so relevent that it sets the scene.
For example, you say in (fictional) Abwehr document 431 Hitler was informed the potential of the Spitfire was less than that of the BF-109 and then they went ahead with the attack but they were wrong. Interesting, but boring. But when you set the scene, Abwehr document 431 said this...but what they didn't know was that (fictional) Royal Arms Directory 922 issued in July 1940 ordered modifications to the Spitfire...so by the height of the campaign German pilots were finding that the Spitfire was performing at least as good as the Messerschmitt...well it becomes interesting and more like a story with a start, finish and end rather than just facts and figures.
Also of historical note is the float system carburettor (stromberg type) was not in any way of as big notation among German pilots as British ones. The British complained one common theme of disadvantage that German pilots got to know they could always nose over in neg-G to escape combat, combined with a good dive speed and similar turn (given appropriate pilot skill in winding combat flaps). By contrast German pilots note their best advantage was when released to Freijäger patrols they would cruise at 7000 metres typically because they had a performance advantage at this height and Spitfires would almost always stick below 6000 metres.
In return German pilots note their biggest disadvantage was when tied to close escort missions (which was performed in order to increase bomber crew morale, who might otherwise jettison and turn back when things got hairy), under these conditions the neg-G dive was just about the only trick they had up their sleeve but frequently it didn't help much.
Certainly radar was a major player, one reason Germany underestimated its influence was because radar development in Great Britain was far more advanced than in Germany, who still relied almost entirely on FlaK as an aircraft defence system. More than 1 million personnel were assigned to FlaK regiments at this time throughout the Reich. English technicians were achieving much smaller wavelengths than German ones in 1940, experimenting with 10cm wavelengths which German researchers said was impossible.
Göring's concept of the Zerstörer formation was actually a tactical plan not designed as escorts as such, but to sweep ahead of the bomber stream undetected and to destroy enemy interceptors over their home airfields whilst they were still scrambling. Enemy spotters would be aware of the bomber formations, but would take little notice of small, fast moving advance attack models, the Me-110 was really designed to dive on scrambling interceptors rather than engage in aerial combat perse. For this is was very well designed, with good range, speed, heavy cannon armament and a great dive. Radar completely killed this concept, because British interceptors were already in the air when the Me-110 came over their airfields, forcing them to act as basic escorts which is something they weren't really designed for. They're really an attack model by design.
Because of the way the German bomber force was designed this was their whole strategy, they didn't have the heavy bomber fleet and long range fighter/escorts to embark a classical strategic campaign just as the Army wasn't designed for trench warfare using heavy tanks and big fields of artillery and infantry charges.
The whole German combat strategy, which worked well in France for example was tactical warfare to achieve strategic objectives. The Battle of Britain turned into strategic warfare because of radar, and the major mistake was not concentrating on and prioritising radar installations throughout the campaign as the main targets so that tactical warfare and the Zerstörer concept could be given its full opportunity to work as intended.
Germany wound up using medium bombers as heavy bombers and short range interceptors as long range escort/fighters. It was inadequate for the job at hand, considering the fight was on British terms over the radar thing and the subsequent loss of the ideal German strategy. Outside of that, as a slug match they were pretty even, although British industry was in a better state by this stage (so would get stronger whilst Germany got weaker without a reorganisation which happened in early 1942, if Germany couldn't defeat England quickly).
Germany absolutely relied upon fast tactical warfare, where the Allies held to strategic doctrine only grudgingly evolved kicking and screaming from Great War thinking. The Zerstörer concept had to work, but for this you need the British radar out of the way. Instead what happened was a slugfest by two fairly evenly matched competitors, it was anybody's game with long term advantages to the British.
If you have to relate some facts and figures it sounds exciting when it is so relevent that it sets the scene.
For example, you say in (fictional) Abwehr document 431 Hitler was informed the potential of the Spitfire was less than that of the BF-109 and then they went ahead with the attack but they were wrong. Interesting, but boring. But when you set the scene, Abwehr document 431 said this...but what they didn't know was that (fictional) Royal Arms Directory 922 issued in July 1940 ordered modifications to the Spitfire...so by the height of the campaign German pilots were finding that the Spitfire was performing at least as good as the Messerschmitt...well it becomes interesting and more like a story with a start, finish and end rather than just facts and figures.
Also of historical note is the float system carburettor (stromberg type) was not in any way of as big notation among German pilots as British ones. The British complained one common theme of disadvantage that German pilots got to know they could always nose over in neg-G to escape combat, combined with a good dive speed and similar turn (given appropriate pilot skill in winding combat flaps). By contrast German pilots note their best advantage was when released to Freijäger patrols they would cruise at 7000 metres typically because they had a performance advantage at this height and Spitfires would almost always stick below 6000 metres.
In return German pilots note their biggest disadvantage was when tied to close escort missions (which was performed in order to increase bomber crew morale, who might otherwise jettison and turn back when things got hairy), under these conditions the neg-G dive was just about the only trick they had up their sleeve but frequently it didn't help much.
Certainly radar was a major player, one reason Germany underestimated its influence was because radar development in Great Britain was far more advanced than in Germany, who still relied almost entirely on FlaK as an aircraft defence system. More than 1 million personnel were assigned to FlaK regiments at this time throughout the Reich. English technicians were achieving much smaller wavelengths than German ones in 1940, experimenting with 10cm wavelengths which German researchers said was impossible.
Göring's concept of the Zerstörer formation was actually a tactical plan not designed as escorts as such, but to sweep ahead of the bomber stream undetected and to destroy enemy interceptors over their home airfields whilst they were still scrambling. Enemy spotters would be aware of the bomber formations, but would take little notice of small, fast moving advance attack models, the Me-110 was really designed to dive on scrambling interceptors rather than engage in aerial combat perse. For this is was very well designed, with good range, speed, heavy cannon armament and a great dive. Radar completely killed this concept, because British interceptors were already in the air when the Me-110 came over their airfields, forcing them to act as basic escorts which is something they weren't really designed for. They're really an attack model by design.
Because of the way the German bomber force was designed this was their whole strategy, they didn't have the heavy bomber fleet and long range fighter/escorts to embark a classical strategic campaign just as the Army wasn't designed for trench warfare using heavy tanks and big fields of artillery and infantry charges.
The whole German combat strategy, which worked well in France for example was tactical warfare to achieve strategic objectives. The Battle of Britain turned into strategic warfare because of radar, and the major mistake was not concentrating on and prioritising radar installations throughout the campaign as the main targets so that tactical warfare and the Zerstörer concept could be given its full opportunity to work as intended.
Germany wound up using medium bombers as heavy bombers and short range interceptors as long range escort/fighters. It was inadequate for the job at hand, considering the fight was on British terms over the radar thing and the subsequent loss of the ideal German strategy. Outside of that, as a slug match they were pretty even, although British industry was in a better state by this stage (so would get stronger whilst Germany got weaker without a reorganisation which happened in early 1942, if Germany couldn't defeat England quickly).
Germany absolutely relied upon fast tactical warfare, where the Allies held to strategic doctrine only grudgingly evolved kicking and screaming from Great War thinking. The Zerstörer concept had to work, but for this you need the British radar out of the way. Instead what happened was a slugfest by two fairly evenly matched competitors, it was anybody's game with long term advantages to the British.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
I would agree with this and only when one side changed its focus was the other side able to gain the upper hand.
- Thread starter
- #58
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Once again, thanks for the help guys. I have a research paper due in April. After talking to my teacher and getting the ok, I'm going to do my paper on the BoB. I'll keep all this in mind.
- Thread starter
- #59
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Well, I had my second presentation today. This time I was covering the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the New Guinea campaign. I didn't get to cover the New Guinea campaign though, the teacher speaking(my politics teacher) skimmed over this. I did pretty good with my Coral Sea cover. I'll post my write ups, and follow up with the powerpoints.
Edit: seems my documents are too big for the forum attachments, I'll copy and paste. Coral Sea first. Mind the grammar errors, I wrote this up for my personal use.
Battle of the Coral Sea
Backdrop: Fought between May 4th and May 8th, the battle of the Coral Sea is considered a tactical victory for the Japanese, but a strategic victory for the Allies. It was also the first naval battle where the two fleets never sighted each other.
Japanese conquest: During the opening months of the war in Pacific, the Japanese had inflicted heavy losses upon the allies. A way was devised to neutralize Australia's threat to Japanese conquest. A proposed invasion invasion of Northern Australia was rejected by the Imperial Japanese Army. Another proposal was to occupy Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, and Port Moresby in New Guinea. These actions would put land-based Japanese aircraft in range of Northern Australia; this plan was accepted by the IJA. The operation, titled Operation MO called for the occupation of Tulagi and Port Moresby. The overall commander of the operation was Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the IJN 4th fleet.
Allied Response: Unknown to the Japanese, the Allies had been successful in deciphering some of the Japanese code, and sent two task's forces, plus a joint American-Australian cruiser force to stop the IJN's 4th fleet.
Japanese Carrier Strength: Supporting the Task Force MO was the Carrier Striking Force, composed of Carrier Division 5. The Shokaku and Zuikaku were the newest carriers at that point, and were part of the Kido Butai that attacked Pearl Harbor. The Shokaku's air group was composed of 21 fighters, 20 dive bombers, and 19 torpedo bombers. The Zuikaku's air group was 25 fighters, 22 dive bombers, and 20 torpedo bombers. The Carrier force was also composed of a few cruisers, destroyers, and an oilier. The commander of the Carrier Striking Force was Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi.
Allied Forces makeup: Overall, Task Force 17 was comprised of various groups, including a joint American-Australian cruiser group. Task Group 17.5 was the Carrier air group, center around the USS Yorktown (CV-5) and USS Lexington (CV-2). Yorktown's air group composed of 17 fighters, 35 dive bombers, and 13 torpedo bombers. Lexington's air group was composed of 21 fighters, 35 dive bombers, and 12 torpedo bombers. The overall commander of Task Force 17 was Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher.
Prelude: On May 1st, the IJN Carrier Striking Force sortied from Truk, while at the same time TF 17 met up with TF 11 300 miles northwest of New Caledonia. Because of it's refueling, Fletcher ordered TF 11 to meet up with TF 44(the joint Australian-American cruiser force). The invasion force meant for Tulagi was met with almost no resistance, those Allied troops having evacuated prior. The Japanese immediately set up a seaplane base. On May 4th, TF 17 launched consecutive strikes on the Japanese forces at Tulagi. Aircraft from the Yorktown sank a destroyer plus three minesweepers. Despites this, the Japanese continued to use Tulagi as a seaplane base. Later, TF 11 and TF 44 were absorbed into TF 17.
Carrier battles: On May 7th, Fletcher detached TF 17.3(TF44) to block the advance of the Port Moresby Invasion Force, despite knowing that this will reduce his AA cover. During the morning, both carrier fleets sent out scout planes to look for each other. Both sides misidentified each other. Around 7:00 AM, the Japanese mistook the fleet oilier Neosho and the destroyer Sims as one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers. The Americans, for their error, incorrectly identified the support force comprised of the light IJN carrier Shoho as two carriers and four cruisers. Both fleets launched strikes against the two mislabeled forces. The Japanese for their part, detached their fighters and torpedo planes, leaving the dive bombers to sink the Sims, and cripple the Neosho (it will sink two days later). The American, launching a strike force of over 90 aircraft, literally blew the Shoho out the water with multiple bomb and torpedo hits. On May 8th, the two carrier forces found each other. The Americans struck first, the Shokaku received three hits from 1,000 bombs, and was forced to retire. The Zuikaku was hidden by a rain squall, and was spared from the attack. However, the Japanese had launched their strike force before the attack, and were able to hit both the Yorktown and the Lexington (the Lexington had to be abandoned later and was scuttled). While the Zuikaku escaped damage, her air group was gutted, and she too had to retire. The Yorktown, while damaged, was able to be repaired in time for the battle of Midway.
Conclusion: While the Japanese inflicted more damage on the Allies, the IJN did turn back and had to forgo their invasion of Port Moresby. The battle is considered to be a tactical victory for the Japanese, and a strategic victory for the Allies. Both the Shokaku and the Zuikaku were unable to participate in the battle of Midway, to Shokaku's damage and Zuikaku's loss of aircraft.
Casualties: the Allies lost 1 fleet carrier (Lexington), one fleet oilier, 1 destroyer, 69 aircraft lost, and over 650 casualties. The Japanese lost one light carrier, one destroyer, 3 minesweepers, 92 aircraft lost, plus 966 casualties.
Edit: seems my documents are too big for the forum attachments, I'll copy and paste. Coral Sea first. Mind the grammar errors, I wrote this up for my personal use.
Battle of the Coral Sea
Backdrop: Fought between May 4th and May 8th, the battle of the Coral Sea is considered a tactical victory for the Japanese, but a strategic victory for the Allies. It was also the first naval battle where the two fleets never sighted each other.
Japanese conquest: During the opening months of the war in Pacific, the Japanese had inflicted heavy losses upon the allies. A way was devised to neutralize Australia's threat to Japanese conquest. A proposed invasion invasion of Northern Australia was rejected by the Imperial Japanese Army. Another proposal was to occupy Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, and Port Moresby in New Guinea. These actions would put land-based Japanese aircraft in range of Northern Australia; this plan was accepted by the IJA. The operation, titled Operation MO called for the occupation of Tulagi and Port Moresby. The overall commander of the operation was Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the IJN 4th fleet.
Allied Response: Unknown to the Japanese, the Allies had been successful in deciphering some of the Japanese code, and sent two task's forces, plus a joint American-Australian cruiser force to stop the IJN's 4th fleet.
Japanese Carrier Strength: Supporting the Task Force MO was the Carrier Striking Force, composed of Carrier Division 5. The Shokaku and Zuikaku were the newest carriers at that point, and were part of the Kido Butai that attacked Pearl Harbor. The Shokaku's air group was composed of 21 fighters, 20 dive bombers, and 19 torpedo bombers. The Zuikaku's air group was 25 fighters, 22 dive bombers, and 20 torpedo bombers. The Carrier force was also composed of a few cruisers, destroyers, and an oilier. The commander of the Carrier Striking Force was Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi.
Allied Forces makeup: Overall, Task Force 17 was comprised of various groups, including a joint American-Australian cruiser group. Task Group 17.5 was the Carrier air group, center around the USS Yorktown (CV-5) and USS Lexington (CV-2). Yorktown's air group composed of 17 fighters, 35 dive bombers, and 13 torpedo bombers. Lexington's air group was composed of 21 fighters, 35 dive bombers, and 12 torpedo bombers. The overall commander of Task Force 17 was Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher.
Prelude: On May 1st, the IJN Carrier Striking Force sortied from Truk, while at the same time TF 17 met up with TF 11 300 miles northwest of New Caledonia. Because of it's refueling, Fletcher ordered TF 11 to meet up with TF 44(the joint Australian-American cruiser force). The invasion force meant for Tulagi was met with almost no resistance, those Allied troops having evacuated prior. The Japanese immediately set up a seaplane base. On May 4th, TF 17 launched consecutive strikes on the Japanese forces at Tulagi. Aircraft from the Yorktown sank a destroyer plus three minesweepers. Despites this, the Japanese continued to use Tulagi as a seaplane base. Later, TF 11 and TF 44 were absorbed into TF 17.
Carrier battles: On May 7th, Fletcher detached TF 17.3(TF44) to block the advance of the Port Moresby Invasion Force, despite knowing that this will reduce his AA cover. During the morning, both carrier fleets sent out scout planes to look for each other. Both sides misidentified each other. Around 7:00 AM, the Japanese mistook the fleet oilier Neosho and the destroyer Sims as one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers. The Americans, for their error, incorrectly identified the support force comprised of the light IJN carrier Shoho as two carriers and four cruisers. Both fleets launched strikes against the two mislabeled forces. The Japanese for their part, detached their fighters and torpedo planes, leaving the dive bombers to sink the Sims, and cripple the Neosho (it will sink two days later). The American, launching a strike force of over 90 aircraft, literally blew the Shoho out the water with multiple bomb and torpedo hits. On May 8th, the two carrier forces found each other. The Americans struck first, the Shokaku received three hits from 1,000 bombs, and was forced to retire. The Zuikaku was hidden by a rain squall, and was spared from the attack. However, the Japanese had launched their strike force before the attack, and were able to hit both the Yorktown and the Lexington (the Lexington had to be abandoned later and was scuttled). While the Zuikaku escaped damage, her air group was gutted, and she too had to retire. The Yorktown, while damaged, was able to be repaired in time for the battle of Midway.
Conclusion: While the Japanese inflicted more damage on the Allies, the IJN did turn back and had to forgo their invasion of Port Moresby. The battle is considered to be a tactical victory for the Japanese, and a strategic victory for the Allies. Both the Shokaku and the Zuikaku were unable to participate in the battle of Midway, to Shokaku's damage and Zuikaku's loss of aircraft.
Casualties: the Allies lost 1 fleet carrier (Lexington), one fleet oilier, 1 destroyer, 69 aircraft lost, and over 650 casualties. The Japanese lost one light carrier, one destroyer, 3 minesweepers, 92 aircraft lost, plus 966 casualties.
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Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Here's my write up on the New Guinea campaign.
The New Guinea Campaign
Overview: the New Guinea campaign was one of the major campaigns during the Second World War, lasting from 1942 to 1945.
Sequence: the first major battle in the campaign would be the battle for Rabaul. The Japanese attackers, outnumbered the Australian defenders, and had air support from the Kaga and Akagi of the Kido Butai. Rabual was first attacked on 21st of January; eight Wirraway aircraft met the attacking IJN force of 109 aircraft. By February, the Japanese had taken control of Rabaul, providing the stage of a major Naval and Air base.
During the year 1942, there were a few air raids directed at Rabaul by the USN and the RAAF. The first raiding force, with the carrier USS Lexington, was turned back on the 20th of February, but not before destroying 23 Japanese aircraft, five credited to Lieutenant Edward "Butch" O'Hare (MOH). The USN again struck in March during the Japanese landings at Lae-Salumaua, inflicting severe damage and delaying Japanese reinforcements for East New Guinea. The RAAF launched several strikes against Rabaul at low altitudes, destroying the majority of Japanese fighter aircraft on the ground. This problem though was alleviated when the IJN carrier Shoho and Auxiliary cruiser Kasuga Maru delivered additional Zero fighters.
The next phase of the campaign was Operation RI, or the invasion of the Buna-Gona area in New Guinea. Set between the 21st and the 24th July 1942, the landings themselves were largely uncontested on the ground, though one transport was sunk by the USAAF and the RAAF. However, the Allies secured themselves a strategic victory between the 21st of July and the 16th of November during the Kokoda Track campaign. The Allies, mostly Australian, were forced back early in the fighting, they managed to launch a counteroffensive and push the Japanese back. The strategic victory was costly though, over 5,000 allied killed, wounded, or sick. The sick alone were over half of the casualties sustained. The Japanese suffered over 6,500 casualties, some from malnutrition and disease.
The Australians scored a decisive over the Japanese during the battle of Milne Bay. This was first time that the attacking Japanese had to abandon all of their objectives. The attacking Japanese were the marines, a higher caliber then their IJA counterparts. While the defending Allies (mostly Australian) outnumbered the attacking Japanese, half of their troops were non-combat personnel. The Japanese also had armor support in the form of light tanks, to which the Allies had no response to. One advantage though was that the 75th, 76th, and 6th squadrons from the RAAF (flying P-40's and Hudson's respectively) were largely uncontested during the battle. While at first making progress, the Japanese failed to take all of their objectives. Harassment by the RAAF, followed by a counteroffensive pushed the Japanese back. Overall, the Japanese were forced to withdraw, having failed in taking the Allied airfields. The Japanese lost 650 troops to the Allies 165.
A decisive victory scored by the Allies over the Japanese was the battle of the Bismarck Sea. The USAAF and the RAAF were tipped off by Ultra intelligence of a large Japanese convoy heading through the Bismarck Sea. The convoy, coming from Rabaul, was bound for New Guinea to send reinforcements. Heavily armed B-25's and Bristol Beaufighters further trained in the art of skip-bombing, inflicted heavy losses on the convoy. From March 2nd to March 4th, 1943, both air forces hammered the convoy. At the cost of two bombers and three fighters, four Japanese destroyers and all eight transports were sunk, with the loss of three to five thousand troops. Only around 800 soldiers made it to Lae, a paltry amount compared to the 6,900 the convoy originally had.
On April 18, 1943, during a visit to Bougainville to inspect the IJN air forces stationed there, Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto was killed when his G4M1 Betty was bounced by a flight of 18 P-38 Lightings
The next major campaign would be the Salamaua-Lae campaign. The overall commander of the Allies was Douglas MacArthur, the Japanese forces under the command of Hatazo Adachi. The Japanese garrison of 10,000 was outnumbered 3-1 by the American-Australian forces. Overall, the Allies took both locations with lower losses then they anticipated. However, a bulk of the Japanese forces escaped North of Lae to fight another day.
Operation Cartwheel lasted from 1943 to 1944 was planned to capture Tulagi (later Guadalcanal), the Northeast coast of New Guinea and the central Solomon Islands. Finally, it called for the reduction of Rabaul and nearby Japanese bases. Further actions taking Lae, Salamaua, and Buna further reduced Japanese effectiveness in the region. The campaign showed the effectiveness of bypassing Japanese strong points.
Another major victory for the Allies was the air raids on Rabaul. From the 2nd of November to the 11th November 1943, land and carrier based aircraft pounded Rabaul, suffering light casualties, while heavily damaging five cruisers and destroying 52 enemy aircraft. After that point, Rabaul no longer became a huge threat to the Allies, and effectively suppressed. Though while most of New Guinea was secured, fighting in Western New Guinea continued until the end of the war.
The New Guinea Campaign
Overview: the New Guinea campaign was one of the major campaigns during the Second World War, lasting from 1942 to 1945.
Sequence: the first major battle in the campaign would be the battle for Rabaul. The Japanese attackers, outnumbered the Australian defenders, and had air support from the Kaga and Akagi of the Kido Butai. Rabual was first attacked on 21st of January; eight Wirraway aircraft met the attacking IJN force of 109 aircraft. By February, the Japanese had taken control of Rabaul, providing the stage of a major Naval and Air base.
During the year 1942, there were a few air raids directed at Rabaul by the USN and the RAAF. The first raiding force, with the carrier USS Lexington, was turned back on the 20th of February, but not before destroying 23 Japanese aircraft, five credited to Lieutenant Edward "Butch" O'Hare (MOH). The USN again struck in March during the Japanese landings at Lae-Salumaua, inflicting severe damage and delaying Japanese reinforcements for East New Guinea. The RAAF launched several strikes against Rabaul at low altitudes, destroying the majority of Japanese fighter aircraft on the ground. This problem though was alleviated when the IJN carrier Shoho and Auxiliary cruiser Kasuga Maru delivered additional Zero fighters.
The next phase of the campaign was Operation RI, or the invasion of the Buna-Gona area in New Guinea. Set between the 21st and the 24th July 1942, the landings themselves were largely uncontested on the ground, though one transport was sunk by the USAAF and the RAAF. However, the Allies secured themselves a strategic victory between the 21st of July and the 16th of November during the Kokoda Track campaign. The Allies, mostly Australian, were forced back early in the fighting, they managed to launch a counteroffensive and push the Japanese back. The strategic victory was costly though, over 5,000 allied killed, wounded, or sick. The sick alone were over half of the casualties sustained. The Japanese suffered over 6,500 casualties, some from malnutrition and disease.
The Australians scored a decisive over the Japanese during the battle of Milne Bay. This was first time that the attacking Japanese had to abandon all of their objectives. The attacking Japanese were the marines, a higher caliber then their IJA counterparts. While the defending Allies (mostly Australian) outnumbered the attacking Japanese, half of their troops were non-combat personnel. The Japanese also had armor support in the form of light tanks, to which the Allies had no response to. One advantage though was that the 75th, 76th, and 6th squadrons from the RAAF (flying P-40's and Hudson's respectively) were largely uncontested during the battle. While at first making progress, the Japanese failed to take all of their objectives. Harassment by the RAAF, followed by a counteroffensive pushed the Japanese back. Overall, the Japanese were forced to withdraw, having failed in taking the Allied airfields. The Japanese lost 650 troops to the Allies 165.
A decisive victory scored by the Allies over the Japanese was the battle of the Bismarck Sea. The USAAF and the RAAF were tipped off by Ultra intelligence of a large Japanese convoy heading through the Bismarck Sea. The convoy, coming from Rabaul, was bound for New Guinea to send reinforcements. Heavily armed B-25's and Bristol Beaufighters further trained in the art of skip-bombing, inflicted heavy losses on the convoy. From March 2nd to March 4th, 1943, both air forces hammered the convoy. At the cost of two bombers and three fighters, four Japanese destroyers and all eight transports were sunk, with the loss of three to five thousand troops. Only around 800 soldiers made it to Lae, a paltry amount compared to the 6,900 the convoy originally had.
On April 18, 1943, during a visit to Bougainville to inspect the IJN air forces stationed there, Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto was killed when his G4M1 Betty was bounced by a flight of 18 P-38 Lightings
The next major campaign would be the Salamaua-Lae campaign. The overall commander of the Allies was Douglas MacArthur, the Japanese forces under the command of Hatazo Adachi. The Japanese garrison of 10,000 was outnumbered 3-1 by the American-Australian forces. Overall, the Allies took both locations with lower losses then they anticipated. However, a bulk of the Japanese forces escaped North of Lae to fight another day.
Operation Cartwheel lasted from 1943 to 1944 was planned to capture Tulagi (later Guadalcanal), the Northeast coast of New Guinea and the central Solomon Islands. Finally, it called for the reduction of Rabaul and nearby Japanese bases. Further actions taking Lae, Salamaua, and Buna further reduced Japanese effectiveness in the region. The campaign showed the effectiveness of bypassing Japanese strong points.
Another major victory for the Allies was the air raids on Rabaul. From the 2nd of November to the 11th November 1943, land and carrier based aircraft pounded Rabaul, suffering light casualties, while heavily damaging five cruisers and destroying 52 enemy aircraft. After that point, Rabaul no longer became a huge threat to the Allies, and effectively suppressed. Though while most of New Guinea was secured, fighting in Western New Guinea continued until the end of the war.
