Better German Aircraft in 1943 Inflict Crucial Losses of Allied Air Power in Britain? (2 Viewers)

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Jul 12, 2008
Hi all,

maybe you remember this thread: What if lots of B-29-like bombers with glide bombs had attacked very well protected convoys?
and the endless discussion with my friend, whom some of you don't believe he exists. He does, be sure.

The next thesis he utters is this (always remember there is no Eastern Frontier, so peace or armistice bertween Germany + USSR, after Hitler was toppled in early autumn 1942):

"German air power (including in reality "nearly ready" types like He 100 and Fw 187) will prevent Allied air power to fully establish in 1943 on British ground."

I say no to this once more. Sources say, in 1943 GB built 4.270 Spitfires and some Typhoons. US built around 23.000 fighters. Surely they needed a couple for the Pacific theater, but should still be enough to concentrate an even greater fighter force in Britain than was in reality. I made a plan calculating around 5.400 fighters for Germany in 1943 (this number can be less than in reality, but the quality should be better).
My friend says, the dislocation of US fighters in Britain was already the top of what could have been expected. German attacks (by better bomber and fighter force than in reality) on the Allied fighter force would attrite it (contrary to reality).

My friend says, there were not much more than 1000 fighters in active service on British ground. I mean, in direct conflict the odds would turn against Germany, even if better aircraft were employed. The number of Allied fighters is way more than the German one, so better German quality will not have a crucial effect. And then we were back to the convoy problem. Only if there were no more gasoline, the Allied aircraft in Britain would be grounded, and the Allied side on the loose.

Please tell me a word to this, if you like, although I know the constellation is highly theoretical.

Thank you, and regards,
RT
 
They'd better come up with quality and numbers both, because they're about to get hit with a s^^t-ton of airplanes. Quoth Stalin, "Quantity has a quality all its own."

As for stopping the use of British soil for basing these numerous airplanes, hogwash. The Germans couldn't defeat the RAF in 1940 and in large part that wasn't due to the RAF having better planes, but due to the RAF having better command-and-control. Those radar stations haven't gone anywhere, and the Allies are now using them to vector better fighters than Hurris and Spit Is.
 
I doubt they were using exactly the same radars either. Like better height finding and fewer blind spots behind the main towers.

As soon as a scenario starts using ""nearly ready" types like He 100 and Fw 187" it has already gone into fantasy land.

Using a nearly ready plane that has been out of production and development for about 3 years before the scenario starts (and had been rejected for good reasons) demands too great a suspension of disbelief.
 
I doubt they were using exactly the same radars either. Like better height finding and fewer blind spots behind the main towers.

As soon as a scenario starts using ""nearly ready" types like He 100 and Fw 187" it has already gone into fantasy land.

Using a nearly ready plane that has been out of production and development for about 3 years before the scenario starts (and had been rejected for good reasons) demands too great a suspension of disbelief.
Chain Home was improved throughout the war. Ground Controlled Intercept operated behind CH and was introduced starting 1st Jan 1941. Intruder losses rose from 0.5% in Dec 1940 to 7% in May 1941.


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I doubt they were using exactly the same radars either. Like better height finding and fewer blind spots behind the main towers.

Right, it's not like the Brits invented Chain Home and suddenly everyone stopped work on anything better.

There's no way the LW, with its limited palette of short-range fighters and old bombers, can interdict the cross-Atlantic build-up in 1943. They're fighting both geography, Allied radar tech, and American industry.
 
The multiplying effect of smart munitions is strategic. Far less raw material needed.

Germany had all of the pieces for smart munition lying on the table in 1940 in labs like Agfa, etc. But I believe the thinking of the time was that of air battle as a form of jousting. Bigger guns, faster planes.

I believe Goring was of that sort, that air war was just an extension of WW1 battle. Once the war outcome begins to depend on large quantities of nitrates, fuel, metals, Germany could not have prevailed with mere incremental improvements of weapons. And once in it, sacrificing present production to develop a game changer a year or two in the future would be a very difficult decision.

Another crucial element was the magnetron. Although the magnetron was well known in Germany, its use was limited and the much weaker klystron prevailed as a radar transmitter. This hobbled Germany defensively. Instead of megawatts, they got kilowatts, much less effective radar than otherwise.

Smart munitions in the 1940's is not unreasonable. I had a USAF tech order for the operational Sidewinder in front of me in the 1950's. And Germany of the 1930's era was more advanced in areas important to the developement of these munitions. Optics, color film, rocketry, etc.

Ron
 
Coming up with the idea of smart munitions and possibly even a prototype is one thing. Mass producing it is another.

A late friend of mine was a WW2 vet and worked in a civilian capacity for a system they wanted for Korea. His job was to get more than 10/100 finished products to work. The point being - they could have experts make a handful. But it was the work of years to transform that into something that could be made in quantity.
 
That was part of the goal with the proximity fuse project.
I believe the goal to start with was to get 50% of the fuses to go off.
This isn't as bad as it sounds, regular time fuses could have a dud rate of between 10 to 20 % depending on country and time of the war.

Now figure in how much more complicated smart munitions would have to be.
Or take a look at the existing German guided missiles. They got some hits but they still had a lot of misses.
 
That was part of the goal with the proximity fuse project.
I believe the goal to start with was to get 50% of the fuses to go off.
This isn't as bad as it sounds, regular time fuses could have a dud rate of between 10 to 20 % depending on country and time of the war.

Plain old dumb bombs of the era had a dud rate in that range.
 
The British had become very proficient at defending their borders from German airpower in 1940 and 1941. That system had only been refined and improved in 1942 and 1943.

I don't think the Luftwaffe, even with a qualitative improvement in their fighter and bomber fleets, are going to have the numbers or the stamina necessary to overcome the RAF and the USAAF combined.

Fighter Command had addressed their biggest shortcoming - numbers of trained pilots - by the end of 1942. So much so that fighter pilots were being transferred across to Bomber Command, much to their dismay.

Does anyone have Fighter Command strength figures for 1943? My copies of Foreman's Fighter Command War Diaries - which have those figures - are currently about 350 km away from me.
 
No matter what "wunder waffle" the Germans could come up with, they would still fail due to infighting in the upper command structure, poor doctrine and good plans altered by the Fuhrer.

The Battle of France was one of the first failures, as the "pause" at Dunkirk (regardless of who gave the order) allowed the Allies to save a crucial amount of men.

The Battle of Britain was the next failure. The list of "what the Luftwaffe did wrong" is a long one, but to sum it up, the Allies should have awarded Goering a medal for his contribution in defeating the Luftwaffe.

The He100 had potential, yes. But it required Daimler-Benz engines which were in short supply. It had engine cooling issues (even with a conventional radiator) and it was lightly armed.

The Fw187 was a serious contender *IF* left in it's original form: single-seat fighter.

The He112B would have been a solid platform to perform ground attack during the BoB. It's performance was comparable to the Bf109 and like most fighter-bombers, could defend itself, unlike the Ju87. And this would have been before the debut of the Fw190.
 
The British had become very proficient at defending their borders from German airpower in 1940 and 1941. That system had only been refined and improved in 1942 and 1943.

I don't think the Luftwaffe, even with a qualitative improvement in their fighter and bomber fleets, are going to have the numbers or the stamina necessary to overcome the RAF and the USAAF combined.

Fighter Command had addressed their biggest shortcoming - numbers of trained pilots - by the end of 1942. So much so that fighter pilots were being transferred across to Bomber Command, much to their dismay.

Does anyone have Fighter Command strength figures for 1943? My copies of Foreman's Fighter Command War Diaries - which have those figures - are currently about 350 km away from me.
Hi
Figures from Foreman's Part 4:
WW2RAFsqnest080.jpg


WW2RAFsqnest081.jpg

Comparative aircraft production figures from Overy's 'The Air War 1939-1945':
WW2RAFsqnest079.jpg

Other comparative figures from 'German Aircraft Industry and Production 1933-1945' by Vajda & Dancey:
WW2RAFsqnest083.jpg

From the same publication Luftwaffe strengths:
WW2RAFsqnest082.jpg

For the Germans to do better during 1943 than they achieved historically they would have to have much better in their production let alone any other measure of performance.

Mike
 
Italy 1942
aircraft delivered to unit: 2893
Fighters: 1590, Bombers: 585, Recce: 257, Transport: 241, School: 220
Top 10 type
M.C.202: 612 (F)
C.R.42: 420 (F)
M.C.200: 316 (F)
Cant Z.1007 Bis: 186 (B)
S.M.79: 174 (B)
S.M.84 Bis: 164 (B)
S.M.82: 162 (T)
G.50 Bis: 114 (F)
Ca.314: 94 (R)
Re 2001: 76 (F)

from Arena book by courtesy of jwsleser of Comando Supremo Forum
 
Other comparative figures from 'German Aircraft Industry and Production 1933-1945' by Vajda & Dancey:
The Luftwaffe strength figures in Vajda & Dancey are from the Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability tables, done by the RAF post war using captured documents.
Roughly weekly 1 August 1938 to end April 1942, then roughly every 10 days to 10 January 1945, then an entry for 13 April 1945. Categories not in Vajda & Dancey, Close Reconnaissance, Long Range Reconnaissance, Night Ground Attack/Harassment, Coastal, Transports, Fighter Bombers. As well as counting the Dive Bomber and Ground Attack strengths separately until October 1943.

The documents are now back in Germany and are by unit, which would sort out how the RAF classifed the Luftwaffe units. See also The Luftwaffe, 1933-45
 
They'd better come up with quality and numbers both, because they're about to get hit with a s^^t-ton of airplanes. Quoth Stalin, "Quantity has a quality all its own."

As for stopping the use of British soil for basing these numerous airplanes, hogwash. The Germans couldn't defeat the RAF in 1940 and in large part that wasn't due to the RAF having better planes, but due to the RAF having better command-and-control. Those radar stations haven't gone anywhere, and the Allies are now using them to vector better fighters than Hurris and Spit Is.


THIS!

The RAF had the worlds first fully integrated air defence network.
No standing patrols watching the clouds and hoping to see the enemy on his way to bomb your targets, pilots took off to find an identified enemy and knew were he was.
 
Too bad Admiral King was such an Anglophobe. The RN was much better at fighter direction as well.

I remember reading somewhere that USN direction only started catching up with the Brits during and after the Sara's cruise with USS Robin. I can't say how accurate that may be -- but it couldn't be any worse than the 1942 system.
 

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