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For example, as successful as the Merchant raiders were, they came too late and were too few when the time was right (as well as the Fw 200 Condor).
As for the KM merchant raiders, I don't follow why you say they came too late. The first, Atlantis, completed her conversion in Dec 1939 and sailed, after being delayed by ice in the Baltic, at the end of March 1940. She was followed by Orion in April & Widder in May. So I don't really see how their operations could have begun much earlier, unless conversions had been undertaken pre-war. Numbers were limited by lack of suitable shipping, both for conversions, and for the supply ships needed to support them.
I think the argument about merchant raiders being too late is that the window of opportunity for using them successfully was cut short when the Allies built up their maritime recon capability. So to have a big impact on the war they would have needed lots of them out at sea already early in the war.A major problem for the Germans was simply that technology had overtaken some of the old historic ways of using sea power. Things like Hudsons and Catalinias (Much like Fw 200s) could pinpoint raiders faster and/or search much wider areas of the sea than surface ships even if they could not safely attack raiders. The aircraft were advancing much faster than the ships. The 3-4 years it took to build a large surface ship in the mid 30s saw large increases in the capabilities of maritime recon aircraft.
The other factor to cut short their period of viability was the entry of Japan into WW2. That eliminated much of their Indian Ocean and Pacific hunting grounds due toI think the argument about merchant raiders being too late is that the window of opportunity for using them successfully was cut short when the Allies built up their maritime recon capability. So to have a big impact on the war they would have needed lots of them out at sea already early in the war.
Interesting scenario. Maybe something likeHow about the German surface fleet is optimized to support an amphibious invasion of Britain. Other than taking Norway, lb for lb and $ for $ invested, the surface fleet can't do anything for the war effort the U-Boats can't do better. But breaking through the RN to land and support 100,000 German troops across the Channel, now that's a navy making a contribution worthy of the expense. So, how does Germany's combined surface and u-boat force do this, and what sorts of vessels do they need? You can't win a gunfight in a confined space against a dozen RN battleships, so you need to be innovative.
To pick on one part of the plan or most of the aspects of one part of the plan.Close off the English channel with massive minefields, patrols by the LW, as well as S-boats, torpedo boats (like, say, the Elbing classin), destroyers. Also including ASW assets to prevent to RN from penetrating into the channel with subs.
While successful in Germany taking the country, the Norway campaign was a disaster for the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet, with three cruisers (Blücher, Karlsruhe and Königsberg) and at least ten destroyers sunk, and Scharnhorst and Lutzow badly damaged by British torpedoes. It was a costly victory for Germany for a small gain against a nation with little naval opposition. To repeat this success against the UK the KM will need to be much larger and luckier.And how to build the KM to push it home? Even before Norway, sinking KM heavy units and then unleashing destroyers and MTBs/MGBs against vulnerable and mostly unpowered barges seems obvious.
While successful in Germany taking the country, the Norway campaign was a disaster for the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet, with three cruisers (Blücher, Karlsruhe and Königsberg) and at least ten destroyers sunk, and Scharnhorst and Lutzow badly damaged by British torpedoes. It was a costly victory for Germany for a small gain against a nation with little naval opposition. To repeat this success against the UK the KM will need to be much larger and luckier.
In the end the best German naval plan is to focus on building a much more powerful u-boat fleet to be in service in Sept 1939. Focus on this while skipping the Scharnhorsts, Bismarcks and Huttens and Graf Zeppelins.
Italian and Japanese fleet planners will be pleased when Britain's decides to cut 3/5 of their fast battleships. With four Littorios, three Yamatos plus four Richelieus and a fleet of North Carolinas and SoDaks on order or building, can Britain really make such a cut?Probably, but if the Germans had taken this course, no doubt the British would have cut a couple or three KGVs off the shopping list and added a hundred or so Flowers.
Italian and Japanese fleet planners will be pleased when Britain's decides to cut 3/5 of their fast battleships. With four Littorios, three Yamatos plus four Richelieus and a fleet of North Carolinas and SoDaks on order or building, can Britain really make such a cut?
The Japanese were able to review the German preparations for the German invasion and they quickly recognised that it had no chance of success. I doubt that the Daihatsu landing craft would have made any difference.The Germans needed to make an arrangement with Japan for their Daihatsu landing craft (the same type that Higgins copied) and having the IJN Special Landing Force give them training before even considering an invasion.
The Japanese were able to review the German preparations for the German invasion and they quickly recognised that it had no chance of success. I doubt that the Daihatsu landing craft wouldn't have made any difference.
Been a while since I read about Sea Lion, but the Luftwaffe was planned to aerial drop mines in predetermined corridors to protect that invasion fleet with Uboats and Torpedo boats creating an extended buffer.Even without Norway losses, the KM couldn't protect Sealion sufficiently. And while the ranges were shorter than BoB, I doubt the LW could protect those barges or beachheads either.
The Landing Craft would have been a far better option than what the Germans had on hand.The Japanese were able to review the German preparations for the German invasion and they quickly recognised that it had no chance of success. I doubt that the Daihatsu landing craft would have made any difference.
Been a while since I read about Sea Lion, but the Luftwaffe was planned to aerial drop mines in predetermined corridors to protect that invasion fleet with Uboats and Torpedo boats creating an extended buffer.
The Luftwaffe was also tasked with creating a clear operating zone and while all this looked good on paper, the actual execution would have most likely fallen short of the mark.
At that point in time, only the Japanese could have pulled off such a plan since they had experience in beach assaults.
The Germans needed to make an arrangement with Japan for their Daihatsu landing craft (the same type that Higgins copied) and having the IJN Special Landing Force give them training before even considering an invasion.