BoB KanalKampf (1 Viewer)

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A worthwhile bit of information but it still dances around the crux of the matter. How much effect did the German air attacks have on British seaport cargo throughput?

It has an effect, but no effect on the British war effort.

As has been said to you repeatedly, the port handling part of the supply equation was not the determining factor in the import/export equation. Because the British had an excess of cargo handling capacity in their ports, the attacks on the London docks were basically worthless. The British had the capacity to move goods all around the british isles using their rail and canal systems. The rail system was not under any significant strain either, though it was old.

You dont seem or want to understand that attacking the strongest link in a supply chain is about the dumbest thing you can do, because it has no effect on that supply chain. This discussion is merely underlining the very poor targtetting choices made by the LW during the battle.
 
As has been said to you repeatedly, the port handling part of the supply equation was not the determining factor in the import/export equation.
I'm still waiting for the historical seaport throughput data to support this claim....
 
I'm still waiting for the historical seaport throughput data to support this claim....

Dave

Great Britain geographically is an island where the maximum distance you can be fron the sea is about 75 miles there are ports everywhere on every coast. The Kanal Kampf only served to stop transport up the English Channel. If a ship didnt go into the port of London then it would go elsewhere.. If a ports through put was reduced or even eliminated that only means the ship goes somewhere else the ship doesnt remain at sea until the port is repaired. To support this I reccommend you read Winston Churchills history of the second world war, at no time does he mention port throughput as a problem, but the loss of supplies in warehouses/tank farms was, , the priority was protection of the Atlantic shipping.

In peace time a city has what it considers essential supplies like coal. Londoners used to burn huge quantities of coal to heat their houses, water etc however nobody is going to die of cold in London in Spring or Summer, only coal for power generation and some industries was actually essential like many other commodities. Another point is the population of London and its needs changed with evacuation and military service.

Post war London has ceased to be a major port at all large vessels can no longer enter due to the barrage and the UK population has increased by 50% with no supply problems.
 
I could also say that after D Day 2 ports were build within days from pre fabricated concrete blocks, in a desperate situation ships can be unloaded very quickly. During the Kanal Kampf Dowding and Park refused to be drawn into a huge confrontation preferring to conserve resources, surely that is proof that strategically it was a worry but not of huge importance.
 
I'm still waiting for the historical seaport throughput data to support this claim....

I suggest you read SG Sturmeys account on british shipping, the details of which I gave you earlier. I have provided you with a summary, indicating British ports operated well below their operating capacity throughout the war, and that 80% of cargoes were handled by the west coast ports. The remaining 20%, amounting to 17 million tons per annum were handled by all the other ports in great britain, of which London was just one. London was operating well below its maximum capacity from the beginning of the war, but any loss due to its incapacitation could be absorbed by the unused capacity of other nearby ports, or more regularly, by the other transport options like rail and river traffic.

These are the facts. I cannot help you if you lack the ability to interpret the data. Its there, and its plain to see. It conclusively shows you are pursuing a red herring on this. If you need further clarification, go do some reading
 
I suggest you read SG Sturmeys account on british shipping, the details of which I gave you earlier. I have provided you with a summary, indicating British ports operated well below their operating capacity throughout the war, and that 80% of cargoes were handled by the west coast ports. The remaining 20%, amounting to 17 million tons per annum were handled by all the other ports in great britain, of which London was just one. London was operating well below its maximum capacity from the beginning of the war, but any loss due to its incapacitation could be absorbed by the unused capacity of other nearby ports, or more regularly, by the other transport options like rail and river traffic.

These are the facts. I cannot help you if you lack the ability to interpret the data. Its there, and its plain to see. It conclusively shows you are pursuing a red herring on this. If you need further clarification, go do some reading

Dave
I think it is also fair to say that the "throughput" of London as a port was more affected by dirct raids on East London than the Kanal Kampf and as everyone knows the RAF breathed a sigh of relief when attacks went from airfields to London. The attacks on the Port of London (shown in the previous photos) wernt the Kanal Kampf. The Luftwaffe suffered unsustainable losses on daylight raids on London while the blitz was the blitz it achieved nothing in a strategic sense.
You need to be clearer as to which event you are talking about
The kanal Kampf
The Daylight raids on London.
The night time Blitz on the east end dock area

none of which had any serious effect on London anyway.
 
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I would imagine the greatest danger to shipping in British coastal waters was mines. I dont have the figures to hand but I believe almost a quarter of the fishing fleet was taken over by the Royal Navy to be converted into minesweepers. Also the RN had thousands of new Trawlers and Drifters and specially designed minesweepers built in Britain the Empire and the United States.
 
well using the official history official records the Brits suffered the following loses in shipping by year
(figures are in thousands of tons)


1939
Total (all theatres): 755
Total by Mine: 262
UK Home waters (All causes): 455.9

1940
Total (all theatres); 3991.6
Total by Mine 509.9
UK Home waters (All causes)1793.7

1941
Total (all theatres) 4328.6
Total by Mine 230.8
UK Home waters (All causes) 740.2

1942
Total (all theatres) 7.790.7
Total by Mine 104.6
UK Home waters (All causes) 244.9

1943
Total (all theatres) 3222.6
Total by Mine 108.6
UK Home waters (All causes) 52.4

1944
Total (all theatres) 1045.6
Total by Mine 95.9
UK Home waters (All causes)277.9

1945
Total (all theatres) 438.8
Total by Mine 93.7
UK Home waters (All causes) 233.3


I dont have figuresd of how many of the UK waters were due to mines, but I do have somehere the number of ships lost to U-Boat. These HMSO records give the numbers of veddeld sunkby various causes. I should be able to gusstimate losses by mine in Home waters .
 

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