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- #41
wuzak
Captain
"Some" may have been trying to talk up their own effort and belittle that of the RAF's.
In any case, the statistic shows that RAF expended a larger proportion of their capability on oil targets than did the 8th AF.
Bombing Germany
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"Some" may have been trying to talk up their own effort and belittle that of the RAF's.
In any case, the statistic shows that RAF expended a larger proportion of their capability on oil targets than did the 8th AF.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Germans could always managed to get fuel and oil from one source or another, but the ball-bearings were a much needed component in every single machine the German military used - from 88 mounts to U-Boats.
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- #43
wuzak
Captain
The populations worked in the factories, so that had an effect on production as well.
The point I was making, and that you seem to ignore, is that official USAAF histories seem to have whitewashed their involvement in bombing population centres. Even in the war the USAAF would couch their target as a marshalling yard rather than the centre of the city, though the yard was, indeed, in the centre of the city and that the vast majority of bombs dropped in a raid would go nowhere near the yards.
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- #44
wuzak
Captain
USAAF planners identified ball bearings as a critical product. Destroying ball bearing production in Germany would hinder production of other items, as GrauGeist noted.
What was unknown at the time was that there was a reasonable amount of stock built up, and that the attacks on Germany would leave the 8th AF incapable of repeating the raid in the following weeks.
Many machines that used ball bearings could be redesigned to take plain bearings, and that was also not considered.
btw, a BOAC Mosquito flew to Stockholm the day after the first Schweinfurt raid with a trade delegation which bought up the entire ball bearing production for export from Sweden.
As to oil, I don't think Allied planners fully appreciated the precarious supply situation the Germans had faced since quite early in the war.
Harris was up front about attacking Germany's workers, he felt that some of his seniors were at least disingenuous about what they had ordered him to do and at worst dishonest, the latter is a charge that could not be leveled at Harris, whatever else you feel about him.
Harris took an almost opposite view to the Americans regarding targeting, but he did, eventually, do what he was told to do. He would write.
"From April 1944, for nearly half a year, the German home industrial cities enjoyed a virtual respite from bombing. In the few intervals between demands for assistance to the armies, or for the attack of flying bomb targets, rail centres, oil plants, French aircraft factories, U-Boat bases, etc., or when weather prevented operations over Western Europe, I carried out attacks in Germany in accordance with the current directif. During the period May-September, 1944, however, other commitments absorbed over 85% of Bomber Command's effort. Indeed, for a period of two months, which included D-Day, it proved impossible to attack any German city in strength."
There is little doubt that Harris at least believed this diversion of effort let the Germans off the hook and lengthened the war. With the benefit of hindsight I think this is not an argument easy to support, but at the time it seemed valid. He continued.
"As a result, determined efforts by the Nazi leaders to revive vital war production by patching up bombed factories and providing emergency living conditions for thousands of homeless workers made much headway during the spring and summer."
This is a contention rejected by Zuckermann and the BBSU, but then, to paraphrase the lovely Mandy Rice Davies, 'they would, wouldn't they?'
The truth, as ever, lies somewhere in between.
As far as early attacks, bombing policy was decided by a series of plans, W.A.5 and W.A.6 were the relevant pre -war plans, W.A.8 was formulated after the outbreak of war. All sought to attack Germany's war industries in the Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar. W.A.6 specifically targeted oil, its object was
"to reduce Germany's war resources of oil as rapidly and completely as possible."
W.A.8, formulated after the war began was the first to target an abstract objective by advocating large scale attacks by night to cause dislocation and demoralisation.
It was the plans to attack industry and particularly oil which were preferred by the War Cabinet. Unfortunately Bomber Command could not find a city reliably, an industrial plant was beyond its capability.
In June 1940, when efforts to reduce the Luftwaffe were obviously required a new directif gave slightly different priorities.
i) The industry on which the GAF was dependent
ii) Certain communications targets in the Ruhr
iii) Oil targets
What is remarkable is just how similar these early (1939/40) British objectives are to those attempted by the Americans several years later. It is important to understand that the evolution of area bombing came as a result of the technological limitations of bombing forces in the early 1940s. Bomber Command could be given all the optimistic directives that could be written, but it could not carry them out.
Early raids were dictated by other priorities, the German Navy, Norway and Denmark, the Battles across the Low Countries and then France, followed by anti-invasion operations. Nonetheless, the first attack on oil targets occurred in May 1940.
Cheers
Steve
Harris took an almost opposite view to the Americans regarding targeting, but he did, eventually, do what he was told to do. He would write.
"From April 1944, for nearly half a year, the German home industrial cities enjoyed a virtual respite from bombing. In the few intervals between demands for assistance to the armies, or for the attack of flying bomb targets, rail centres, oil plants, French aircraft factories, U-Boat bases, etc., or when weather prevented operations over Western Europe, I carried out attacks in Germany in accordance with the current directif. During the period May-September, 1944, however, other commitments absorbed over 85% of Bomber Command's effort. Indeed, for a period of two months, which included D-Day, it proved impossible to attack any German city in strength."
There is little doubt that Harris at least believed this diversion of effort let the Germans off the hook and lengthened the war. With the benefit of hindsight I think this is not an argument easy to support, but at the time it seemed valid. He continued.
"As a result, determined efforts by the Nazi leaders to revive vital war production by patching up bombed factories and providing emergency living conditions for thousands of homeless workers made much headway during the spring and summer."
This is a contention rejected by Zuckermann and the BBSU, but then, to paraphrase the lovely Mandy Rice Davies, 'they would, wouldn't they?'
The truth, as ever, lies somewhere in between.
As far as early attacks, bombing policy was decided by a series of plans, W.A.5 and W.A.6 were the relevant pre -war plans, W.A.8 was formulated after the outbreak of war. All sought to attack Germany's war industries in the Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar. W.A.6 specifically targeted oil, its object was
"to reduce Germany's war resources of oil as rapidly and completely as possible."
W.A.8, formulated after the war began was the first to target an abstract objective by advocating large scale attacks by night to cause dislocation and demoralisation.
It was the plans to attack industry and particularly oil which were preferred by the War Cabinet. Unfortunately Bomber Command could not find a city reliably, an industrial plant was beyond its capability.
In June 1940, when efforts to reduce the Luftwaffe were obviously required a new directif gave slightly different priorities.
i) The industry on which the GAF was dependent
ii) Certain communications targets in the Ruhr
iii) Oil targets
What is remarkable is just how similar these early (1939/40) British objectives are to those attempted by the Americans several years later. It is important to understand that the evolution of area bombing came as a result of the technological limitations of bombing forces in the early 1940s. Bomber Command could be given all the optimistic directives that could be written, but it could not carry them out.
Early raids were dictated by other priorities, the German Navy, Norway and Denmark, the Battles across the Low Countries and then France, followed by anti-invasion operations. Nonetheless, the first attack on oil targets occurred in May 1940.
Cheers
Steve
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
its available via kindle for 20usd. paperback after shipping was almost 16 so for 4 bucks more the ebook looks good. I just sent a free sample to my ipad.
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
yes many could use a standard roller bearing and IF there is one already in production that could be swapped ( ID, OD, load rate, etc ) then its no big deal for the germans. but if there isn't, one has to be engineered and tooling has to be made before it can be mass produced. that can cause considerable delay.
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- #48
wuzak
Captain
I did say plain bearings.
Some German engines may have used rolling element bearings but could have been converted to plain bearings after Schweinfurt.
Arguably hydrostatic and hydrodynamic "plain" bearings are superior in a number of applications.
wuzak
Post #43: 8/31/16
Post #44: 8/31/16
stona
Post #45: 9/1/16
Post #43: 8/31/16
True enough, but far as I know, the Germans could have just pulled workers from one city to another.
Of course, no nation likes to admit they were deliberately killing noncombatants
I suppose it depended on the target, but you make valid points: There were definitely certain raids such as Munster and Berlin that clearly were aimed at the population despite what targets were specified to the air-crews.
Post #44: 8/31/16
Why was this not considered out of curiosity?
Deplete the reserves...
I was doing some research and there seemed to be an impression that the Germans had massive stocks that they didn't really have.
stona
Post #45: 9/1/16
Which was of course true.
What was there contention again?
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GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
You can't just arbitrarily stop engine production mid-stream and swap bearings and hope for the best. The ball-bearings and roller-bearings were an integral part of the machine's design. The DB6xx series were roller-bearing intensive and any shortage of those specific bearings meant the much needed engine supply slowed to a halt.
Another example: in winter of 1944, production of the Panther tank was slowed as they had to make a conversion from ball-bearings to sleeve-bearings because of shortages.
Some equipment may have been able to swap out different types, but the ball-bearing was a cornerstone of the German war machine.
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- #51
wuzak
Captain
Providing they would be doing the same, or similar, work.
And it takes time and money to relocate the workers, meanwhile the factory in their original city grinds to a halt as its workforce has been displaced.
It was Harris' contention, made in his 'Despatch on War Operations' that the diversion of his forces to tactical bombing in support of the invasion and away from area bombing gave the German economy respite and allowed a recovery resulting in increased production in 1944. This ran contrary to the opinion of Zuckermann and others at SHAEF and was rejected by Zuckermann in the BBSU report.
Harris contention was further challenged in the 'Air Staff Memorandum on the Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris GCB, OBE, AFC on Bomber Command's Operations 1942/45', particularly in the opening paragraphs 'General Observation' and in Part III 'Summary of the Bombing Effort and Results' and Part IV 'Conclusions'.
Neither the BBSU nor the Memorandum give any alternative explanation for the late war spike in German production, the Memorandum actually asks that a graph demonstrating an 'estimated production loss due to bombing' produced in Harris' Despatch be 'ignored' as it was based on 'an incorrect hypothesis'.
Cheers
Steve
While we are on the subject of post war re-assessment of Bomber Command's effort, and Harris' leadership, how about this for disloyalty, also from the Air Staff Memorandum.
"6. The C-in-C states, in paragraph 3, that his main task was 'to focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers' through the attack of certain major industrial centres.
7. It will be observed that similar emphasis on the attack on industrial centres is conspicuous throughout the despatch, and it is considered that the C-in-C's brief summary of the Air Ministry's directive of February 1942 tends to obscure the fact that the Air Staff intention was always to return to the bombing of precise targets as quickly as the tactical capabilities of the bomber force, and the improving of night bombing technique, would permit."
Harris was doing exactly what the directive asked him to do, even concentrating on the areas/cities specified by the Air Ministry. The second half of paragraph 7 is about as close to BS as I've ever seen in an Air Ministry Memorandum, and the authors must have known this.
It is nearly as bad, though not quite, as Churchill's volte-face following the famous raids on Dresden.
Wanton destruction? Webster and Frankland addressed this.
"neither the Air Staff, nor Sir Arthur Harris can be justly accused of waging war in a different moral sense from that approved by the government. Moreover, it should be made equally clear that at no stage of the war was the area bombing wanton. On the contrary, it was a carefully designed strategic plan intended to contribute to the most rapid and the most economical defeat of Germany."
Area bombing was NOT an idea that sprang into being in 1942. It was adopted as a result of the inability to carry out anything else, but it predates WW2 and was regularly implemented in WW I.
In 1917 a plan developed by the joint Army-Navy Air Policy Committee entitled 'Long Distance Bombing' suggested.
"the terrorization of the civilian population through selecting targets that were located in densely populated industrial areas, so that all the bombs which failed to hit the aiming points (ostensibly industries supporting the enemy war effort) would strike at the morale of the civilian population by destroying their lives and homes."
In September 1918 Sir William Weir, Secretary of State for Air wrote to Trenchard.
"I would very much like it if you could start a really big fire in one of the German towns...I can think of nothing more terrifying to a civilian population than bombing from a low altitude and I was frequently very apprehensive that the Bosch would do this in London...
If I were you, I would not be too exacting as regards accuracy when bombing railway stations in the middle of towns."
Sound familiar?
Trenchard's reply would have pleased Weir.
"I do not think you need to be anxious about our degree of accuracy when bombing stations in the middle of towns. The accuracy is not great at present, and all the pilots drop their eggs well into the middle of the town generally."
The difference in 1944/45 (compared with 1917/18) was not the targeting but the weight of bombs which could be delivered.
Neither Harris nor the Air Staff invented area bombing with the February 1942 directive, it was something that predated this directive, in British bombing policy, by 25 years.
Cheers
Steve
"6. The C-in-C states, in paragraph 3, that his main task was 'to focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers' through the attack of certain major industrial centres.
7. It will be observed that similar emphasis on the attack on industrial centres is conspicuous throughout the despatch, and it is considered that the C-in-C's brief summary of the Air Ministry's directive of February 1942 tends to obscure the fact that the Air Staff intention was always to return to the bombing of precise targets as quickly as the tactical capabilities of the bomber force, and the improving of night bombing technique, would permit."
Harris was doing exactly what the directive asked him to do, even concentrating on the areas/cities specified by the Air Ministry. The second half of paragraph 7 is about as close to BS as I've ever seen in an Air Ministry Memorandum, and the authors must have known this.
It is nearly as bad, though not quite, as Churchill's volte-face following the famous raids on Dresden.
Wanton destruction? Webster and Frankland addressed this.
"neither the Air Staff, nor Sir Arthur Harris can be justly accused of waging war in a different moral sense from that approved by the government. Moreover, it should be made equally clear that at no stage of the war was the area bombing wanton. On the contrary, it was a carefully designed strategic plan intended to contribute to the most rapid and the most economical defeat of Germany."
Area bombing was NOT an idea that sprang into being in 1942. It was adopted as a result of the inability to carry out anything else, but it predates WW2 and was regularly implemented in WW I.
In 1917 a plan developed by the joint Army-Navy Air Policy Committee entitled 'Long Distance Bombing' suggested.
"the terrorization of the civilian population through selecting targets that were located in densely populated industrial areas, so that all the bombs which failed to hit the aiming points (ostensibly industries supporting the enemy war effort) would strike at the morale of the civilian population by destroying their lives and homes."
In September 1918 Sir William Weir, Secretary of State for Air wrote to Trenchard.
"I would very much like it if you could start a really big fire in one of the German towns...I can think of nothing more terrifying to a civilian population than bombing from a low altitude and I was frequently very apprehensive that the Bosch would do this in London...
If I were you, I would not be too exacting as regards accuracy when bombing railway stations in the middle of towns."
Sound familiar?
Trenchard's reply would have pleased Weir.
"I do not think you need to be anxious about our degree of accuracy when bombing stations in the middle of towns. The accuracy is not great at present, and all the pilots drop their eggs well into the middle of the town generally."
The difference in 1944/45 (compared with 1917/18) was not the targeting but the weight of bombs which could be delivered.
Neither Harris nor the Air Staff invented area bombing with the February 1942 directive, it was something that predated this directive, in British bombing policy, by 25 years.
Cheers
Steve
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wuzak
stona
Post #52: 9/12/16
Post #53: 9/12/16
The Germans did actually manage to keep rebuilding makeshift factories all over the place, sometimes in the wreckage.
stona
Post #52: 9/12/16
How much did production increase from 1942-1943, and from 1943-1944?
And what was Zuckermann's reasoning behind this?
Post #53: 9/12/16
The "in particular, the working population", as I understand it was merely added to make it seem a little more acceptable than just bombing civilians for it's own sake.
Of course, but politics is like making sausages -- it's best when you don't see the process, and just the product.
Actually before WWI if you count the Zeppelin raids: The plans predated the war.
It sounds exactly like the pretexts used to bomb cities in WWII.
I'm not so sure about that -- in fact I'm not sure what the CEP was in WWI, so I couldn't compare.
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This is the graph we are supposed to ignore. You can draw your own conclusions about German production, those figures are not in dispute.
I have never seen the argument as to why we should ignore this graph, just the statement that it
"...is based on an incorrect hypothesis, and must be ignored. Final judgements on the effects of the bombing - a highly intricate subject - can only be made in the light of the British and American Bombing Survey Reports."
I have previously explained that the British Report is heavily biased, something not seriously disputed today.
The exact bombing errors of WW1 are not relevant. The principle was established of bombing the 'middle of the town generally' a term meaning the same as that used in WW2 'the centre of the built up area'. Portal wrote on 15th February 1942, the day after the directive was issued
"Ref. the new bombing directive: I suppose it is clear that the aiming-points are to be built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories... This must be made quite clear if it is not already understood."
The difference, as I said, was not so much accuracy as the weight of ordnance delivered into this area.
Cheers
Steve
I have never seen the argument as to why we should ignore this graph, just the statement that it
"...is based on an incorrect hypothesis, and must be ignored. Final judgements on the effects of the bombing - a highly intricate subject - can only be made in the light of the British and American Bombing Survey Reports."
I have previously explained that the British Report is heavily biased, something not seriously disputed today.
The exact bombing errors of WW1 are not relevant. The principle was established of bombing the 'middle of the town generally' a term meaning the same as that used in WW2 'the centre of the built up area'. Portal wrote on 15th February 1942, the day after the directive was issued
"Ref. the new bombing directive: I suppose it is clear that the aiming-points are to be built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories... This must be made quite clear if it is not already understood."
The difference, as I said, was not so much accuracy as the weight of ordnance delivered into this area.
Cheers
Steve
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
production is going to stop anyways if there are no bearings as you noted with the panthers. so, I am not talking about an arbitrary stop but if ball bearings became unavailable due to bombing. if there was a compatible substitute already available then you are looking at a minor hic-cup. there were several instances on automobiles where both a ball bearing and a tapered roller bearing had been designed as suitable replacements to OEM. I would ask the customer which they preferred. if this were the case in Germany then it is just a matter of where the bearings are coming from.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
I know that outfits like Bower/BCA and Timkin offered alternatives for the option to transition from ball-type bearings to roller bearings...however, this was done in a relaxed time frame in a peacetime market.
In Germany, they didn't have that leisure and, remember, the majority of bearing manufacturing was done in the Schweinfurt area until the area was heavily bombed. There were four primary manufacturers there:
Kugelfischer-Georg-Schäfer
Fichtel & Sachs
Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken AG
Deutsche Star GmbH
After they raids, the Germans dispersed a great deal of the surviving machinery to other areas, but the output from that time onward was roughly 85% of the pre-bombing capacity.
The result was manufacturing delays all across the board for German equipment manufacturing.
In Germany, they didn't have that leisure and, remember, the majority of bearing manufacturing was done in the Schweinfurt area until the area was heavily bombed. There were four primary manufacturers there:
Kugelfischer-Georg-Schäfer
Fichtel & Sachs
Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken AG
Deutsche Star GmbH
After they raids, the Germans dispersed a great deal of the surviving machinery to other areas, but the output from that time onward was roughly 85% of the pre-bombing capacity.
The result was manufacturing delays all across the board for German equipment manufacturing.
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