This is a myth. There's no evidence to say the Zero "wouldn't have lasted long" in Europe. Let's not forget that Bf 109s and Spitfires and Hurricanes were flying around Europe without self-sealing tanks and armour plating throughout 1940. Until that experience, no-one had armour plating and self-sealing tanks installed on the production line and besides, the Japanese added these things to the Zero following combat experience, just like everyone else, so that really doesn't apply at all.
Let's not forget that all Horikoshi's subsequent designs had these things.
Throughout 1940?
As I understand it, the urgent need to fit bullet-proof windscreens, self sealing tanks and armour had been recognised during The Battle of France, and there was a rolling programme to retro-fit these as quickly as possible. How quickly I don;t know. I do know the Hurricane seemed particularly vulnerable because of that tank between the engine and cockpit. But in fairness, despite their own combat experience over China, the Japanese had no such programme did they? - and the Zero didn't even have its first operational combat until 13 September 1940. 15th of September is Battle Of Britain day - and marks the effective end of massed daylight raids as the Germans passed their efforts over to night time bombing.
Its an interesting 'what if'.
The Japanese certainly didn't face radar coordinated interception for much of the early part of the war in the Pacific, did they? And the Hurricanes and Spitfires over the UK would also have other significant advantages they didn't have in the east:
#1 Not being fitted with the Vokes filters which robbed them of performance
#2 Being able to be vectored to interception with height advantage. With the Zero having a
Vne of only 370mph and RAF pilots being specifically briefed to ignore escorts and destroy bombers, I suspect in that context, RAF pilots may have learned much more quickly not to dogfight a zero?
#3 Much of the combat taking place at much higher altitude than in the PTO
I think most of that indicates that it would not have been anymore effective opposition than the 109s and 110s.
The nightmare scenario might more believably have been if they'd been used in the Mediterranean the following year. That really might have been the final nail in the coffin for the Royal Navy