True enough, but freed from the limitations of Armythink, USAF was able to go beyond "robust air defense" and focus (perhaps to excess?) on "globalthink".
Cheers,
Wes
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True enough, but freed from the limitations of Armythink, USAF was able to go beyond "robust air defense" and focus (perhaps to excess?) on "globalthink".True, but one has to consider that the USAF was carved out of the USAAF. If the USAAF was still around, it would have managed a robust air defense.
Well the global aspect is the offensive side of things, the air-defense part was already starting to come together in 1940-1941, and after Pearl Harbor, it frankly put a firm boot in their ass to improve things (I would hope so!)True enough, but freed from the restrictions of Armythink, USAF was able to go beyond "robust air defense" and focus (perhaps to excess?) on "globalthink".
Of course everyone thinks of themselves as devoted to "the Big Picture" (you're too young to remember the 1950s TV series of that name that purported to be history, but was essentially US Army propaganda). But without the means to carry it out and the experience to effectively utilize those means, "big picture" thinking is essentially flawed. The Army rarely practices amphibious operations or seaborne logistics until a combat operation makes it necessary. The Marines have historically had unrealistic expectations of the Army when they got far enough inland to depend on Army logistics. Your Big Picture is apt to be based on faulty premises if you don't have an intimate grasp of all the moving parts, something, in my (prejudiced) opinion, the Navy has a broader experience of.As for offensive: Was the USN more fundamentally geared for strategic operations than the Army (when I say strategic I do not mean bombing cities, I mean simply from the standpoint of operations that are aimed at the big picture and winning the war)
Why?Your Big Picture is apt to be based on faulty premises if you don't have an intimate grasp of all the moving parts, something, in my (prejudiced) opinion, the Navy has a broader experience of.
Look at it this way: the Army's good at local logistics, such as getting troops, tanks, artillery, ammo, etc, from the dispersal yard to the battlefield. The Navy and the Air Force are daily practitioners of global logistics and intimately familiar with the practices, problems, and pitfalls that go along with it. If an F-18 on a carrier off the coast of DPRK sucks up a stray bolt off the flight deck and destroys one of its engines, the Navy can have a new engine delivered by COD flight in about twenty four hours, if they've used up their spares onboard. Same thing for the Air Force if they lose an engine in a garden spot like Diego Garcia or Bagram. They do this stuff every day and know how to make it work. Consequently their big picture is based on an accurate and detailed knowledge of their capabilities and a more realistic assessment of the outcome of an operation, IMHO.Why?
Was the Army more limited in this role due to lack of practice in peacetime?Look at it this way: the Army's good at local logistics
Yes and because they lack the means of intercontinental logistics and are a captive "customer" of the Air Force and the Navy, neither of which views Army cooperation as the top of its priority list.Was the Army more limited in this role due to lack of practice in peacetime?
I meant what I asked in context of the pre-1947 timeframe.Yes and because they lack the means of intercontinental logistics and are a captive "customer" of the Air Force and the Navy
Well then, customer of the Navy. AAF didn't have what you could call "heavy lift" capability on an intercontinental scale. Top of the line was the C-54 (DC-4) which couldn't carry tanks, half-tracks, heavy artillery, etc. That capability didn't come along till the mid 1950s with the C-124 Globemaster.I meant what I asked in context of the pre-1947 timeframe.
To be honest, only the Luftwaffe with their Me323 had "heavy lift" until transport technology improved postwar.Well then, customer of the Navy. AAF didn't have what you could call "heavy lift" capability on an intercontinental scale. Top of the line was the C-54 (DC-4) which couldn't carry tanks, half-tracks, heavy artillery, etc. That capability didn't come along till the mid 1950s with the C-124 Globemaster.
Cheers,
Wes
Boy am I glad that maritime ASW patrol in the American system rests where it belongs, with the Navy. Can you imagine getting USAF interested in subhunting? "You guys are COASTAL Command. What's with this mid-ocean BS? That's not your area of responsibility. You don't need VLR aircraft to do your job!"Regarding the refusal of the RAF to pour sufficient resources into the Battle of the atlantic, I regard this one issue enough to argue against the establishment of a separate air force. Of itself, this one failing trumps all other counter arguments.
Fascinating! Tell us more.U.S. Army and the Imperial Japanese Army both possessed considerable sea-going assets in order to move their equipment.
The IJA is one of the few armies in history that had aircraft carriers.
Regarding the refusal of the RAF to pour sufficient resources into the Battle of the atlantic, I regard this one issue enough to argue against the establishment of a separate air force. Of itself, this one failing trumps all other counter arguments. That the RAF was prepared to lose the war rather than change their priorities is indictment enough to strongly (and overwhelmingly, IMO) support the validity of having a separate independent airforce. The RAF, to the bitter end, in 1942, did not want to divert resources away from its precious (and largely ineffective at least to that point) bomber offensive rather than admit they got it wrong. it took the initial persuasion of getting Churchill and his adviser lindemann onside and then a direct intervention by Churchill to get the bomber barons to change their priorities. that, to me, is verging on the criminal.
This is a somewhat more balanced overview of the issues for people to consider....
https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol15/tnm_15_4_19-41.pdf
The IJA operated several types of Escort or sub-Escort type carriers:Fascinating! Tell us more.
With a little help from Stalin's A-bombs and his TU-4s.the True Believes, because they were loudest, absolutely certain, and got politicians' collective ears
Very interesting. Were these actually Army owned, operated, and crewed, or Navy assets assigned to Army command? I've spoken with a number of WWII sailors over the years who crewed on landing craft and minesweepers (they said) that were paid for out of the Army's budget and operated under Army command, but crewed by Navy personnel. One guy said: "The Skipper was a shavetail 2nd Louie 90 day wonder who didn't know port from starboard, and the real captain of the LST was the senior Boatswains Mate Chief who pretty much ran things. That Army guy almost got us all killed several times over."In regards to the U.S. Army, they operated 127,800 ships of varying type. From cargo and troopships to minelayers, landing (assault) ships, tugs, aircraft repair depot ships and hospital ships.
CVE's to transport fighter aircraft around?XBe02Drvr said:Well then, customer of the Navy
They did own some transports at sea (from what I remember, combat ships were USN controlled, and non-combatants were anybody's, and boats whether combatant or not were anybody's), some say more than the NavyAAF didn't have what you could call "heavy lift" capability on an intercontinental scale.
Interesting way to look at it.parsifal said:Regarding the refusal of the RAF to pour sufficient resources into the Battle of the atlantic, I regard this one issue enough to argue against the establishment of a separate air force.
Patrick Blackett had said that the RAF was on the verge of being dismembered at the rate they were going.The RAF, to the bitter end, in 1942, did not want to divert resources away from its precious (and largely ineffective at least to that point) bomber offensive rather than admit they got it wrong.
The more services past a certain point cause more bickering basically?swampyankee said:I don't think the problem with an independent air force, or independent marines, or independent special forces, or what-have-you is the independence, per se, but it's the subsequent bureaucratic battles that can end up causing either stupid decisions -- like all wars will be nuclear -- or ridiculous duplication of effort, not so much for front-line hardware but for all the back-end personnel needed to make the pointy end of the stick work.
CorrectThe reality has always been that any kind of strategic reach requires active cooperation between multiple services, be they navies and armies through centuries of history, or armies, navies, and air forces today.
The vocal minority. I'm curious why they were able to get so much support in the Army, and so little in the Navy?the True Believes, because they were loudest, absolutely certain, and got politicians' collective ears