Could the B-36 been ready by 1945?

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If Axis forces remain in control of Petasmo (Finland) then there will be plenty of nickel for the production of high temperature steel. That should accelerate German jet engine production by at least a year. Turbochargers for piston engines also.
 
Perhaps, however, once the Navy Surface Fleet began raiding, there was nothing the Japanese could do to stop them as their surface fleet was sunk or out of fuel. The USN was more than capable of replenishing at sea, and had figured out how to combat the Kamikazes.
But what about operations inland?
They were already starving as we just about blew every rail junction and rolling stock to hell.
By July 1945 they still had a million man army as well as 8,000 combat aircraft, mind you not all full MC, but they were there and were still puttin up a fight.


Mainly because of that stupid unconditional surrender policy.
It had nothing to do with the surrender terms.

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Source please. 10 bombs a month was out of the realm of possibilies untill the end of the 40's. Maybe 10 per year, but not 10 per month.

Its Stuart's claim not mine, in any case he claimed on his FAQ before it disappeared that America OTL discontinued its production after the war to redesign it production facilities. Without doing that, several planned and building reactors would have been built and completed, boosting production to ten bombs a month.

I have no clue if that is even true as Stuart Slade rarely cites anything and responds to queries with silence or strawmans.

Despite that, I can confirm he is a licensed engineer and employed by the U.S. Military as a defense contractor.

Take it for what it is worth. Though the orignal intent of this thread was to focus on the B-36 development problems.

"Sigh" Well too late to get this back on track.
 
It may've been that Roosevelt had that in his mind when he said that at Casablance. Probably spent a couple of days listening to political haggling, realized this could be a real threat to the success of the whole project and set the terms for the final success.

Possible. But the "unconditional surrender" was one of the larger stupidities made by Roosevelt Churchill. The concept that an opposing nation (wheter nazi or not was considered equal!) was not anymore considered as a negotiating partner ignored the existence of those Germans who were opposed to the Nazi regime (Rommel, Stauffenberg) and hence also the possibility of a political peace of Germany which had rid itselfe of the nazis. It effectively deleted most anti-nazi opposition in Germany when opposition begun to increase significantly. Goebbels found it easy to exploit this blunder. Most soldiers and officers who didn´t liked the nazi leadership were driven into them in order to defend the future population as Goebbels told them. A conditional surrender would most likely have shortened the war by half a year with the nazi routed by increasing military and social opposition to Hitler and the nazi party.
A lot of lives on both sides of the Atlantic would have been saved.
 
But what about operations inland?

I assume you mean Home Islands? In which case Naval Air Power can certainly go inland and attack targets of opportunity.

By July 1945 they still had a million man army as well as 8,000 combat aircraft, mind you not all full MC, but they were there and were still puttin up a fight.

Mostly in China, the Chinese were starting to win the battles at this point and said million man army in China was cut off from retreat. China's problem, not ours. Cold, but I am a cold blooded strategist.

As for the Aircraft, they were mostly grounded due to a lack of AvGas. Rotating patrols and picket lines of Destroyers and Frigates will mitigate the kamikaze threat.

It had nothing to do with the surrender terms.

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[/QUOTE]

:lol:

What did you think my surrender terms did. It required no admittance of wrong doing, and no subjugation. This overlooks the fact that the Japanese were trying to surrender.

Key to working with the Japanese Militarist is not to use the word Surrender, that is what I did, I offered peace, not a surrender proposal. It also gives me access to the remaining Japanese Military which I can use against the Soviets should it come down to it.
 
The Allies refused these terms out of hand. They had seen Imperial Germany do the same thing in 1918 and were not about to have the war start again in 1965 due to a screwball peace treaty.
Excellent point, based on the then recent example of WWI leads to WWII in Europe, offering terms to Japan looks like a very bad deal.

And the people saying that post Mariana's conquests weren't necessary are reallying trying to have it both ways. They say Japan was [totally] defeatable by a very distant blockade (1500 miles for Mariana's to Japan) and non-Iwo Jima supported B-29 operations (but some mining by B-29's absolutely required Iwo as staging base, Iwo was a 'nice to have' for missions against the Tokyo area, but required to reach some other places). But then they talk about offering Japan terms. In fact a US reluctance to press forward from the Marianas would have made Japan all the less likely to accept terms, as well as delaying total defeat by perhaps years if that course was pursued instead (without nuking), depending a lot when the Soviets decided to take over Manchuria, Korea and possibly Japan. The Japanese were absolutely not ready to accept terms, any ones the US could also accept, in summer '44, had just decided their own govt wasn't doing a good job handling the war (fall of the Tojo cabinet). Germany accepted terms in 1918 with Allied armies closing in on its borders over land.

As for Korea, whether or not that's a major factor I don't know, but there would have been no 'Kingdom of Korea' with a 1918 style settlement with Japan, but a DPRK on the whole peninsula, within a few years anyway.

Joe
 
Possible. But the "unconditional surrender" was one of the larger stupidities made by Roosevelt Churchill. The concept that an opposing nation (wheter nazi or not was considered equal!) was not anymore considered as a negotiating partner ignored the existence of those Germans who were opposed to the Nazi regime (Rommel, Stauffenberg) and hence also the possibility of a political peace of Germany which had rid itselfe of the nazis. It effectively deleted most anti-nazi opposition in Germany when opposition begun to increase significantly. Goebbels found it easy to exploit this blunder. Most soldiers and officers who didn´t liked the nazi leadership were driven into them in order to defend the future population as Goebbels told them. A conditional surrender would most likely have shortened the war by half a year with the nazi routed by increasing military and social opposition to Hitler and the nazi party.
A lot of lives on both sides of the Atlantic would have been saved.

Delc, I'm not sure the Allies would've accepted anything but and unconditional surrender (or something very similar). In this point, I think the problem is less the Western Allies willingness to accept a new government than the Soviet desire to see an end to what it viewed as a threat to it's existence. While the Western Allies might've stopped to talk, the Soviets wouldn't. After losing millions and being invaded, doubtless they saw a Nazi as a German and a German as a Nazi. In short, what's the difference.

I agree that Unconditional Surrender was a gift to Goebbels and he exploited it totally. Further, any potential contact for a negotiated peace was crushed by this declaration. But I don't believe the Allies would've stopped fighting or accepted a negotiated settlement if it destroyed the coalition of nations fighting the Nazis. And to stop fighting would've played to the very paranoia inflicting Stalin. He would've seen the Western Allies in league (defacto rightly or wrongly) with Nazi Germany. Unconditional Surrender might've been part of a sop to Stalin for not getting the Second Front going in 1943.

Actually, the more you think about it, it does create an interesting alternative history for WW2 in Europe. What if Hitler is murdered and the Nazi regime overthrown in 1943, before the battle of Kursk? Maybe a bomb in Hitler's plane kills him. What if a negotiated settlement is accepted by the Western Allies, but not the Soviets?

Far fetched, but an interesting thought.
 
I assume you mean Home Islands? In which case Naval Air Power can certainly go inland and attack targets of opportunity.
Not to the extent necessary to cripple the Japanese war machine, and the B-29 did that quite well.

Mostly in China, the Chinese were starting to win the battles at this point and said million man army in China was cut off from retreat. China's problem, not ours. Cold, but I am a cold blooded strategist.
Your opinion and history dictated otherwise
As for the Aircraft, they were mostly grounded due to a lack of AvGas. Rotating patrols and picket lines of Destroyers and Frigates will mitigate the kamikaze threat.
Again, quite wrong. There were plenty of intercepts and shoot downs of American aircraft up till August 1945 - we have chapters of recorded actions by the Japanese shooting down P-51s and B-29. Although diminished, the Japanese were still able to field a fighting force

:lol:

What did you think my surrender terms did. It required no admittance of wrong doing, and no subjugation. This overlooks the fact that the Japanese were trying to surrender.
"Your" surrender terms - hypothetical and you're assuming that the Japanese military wouldn't of seen through that.
Key to working with the Japanese Militarist is not to use the word Surrender, that is what I did, I offered peace, not a surrender proposal. It also gives me access to the remaining Japanese Military which I can use against the Soviets should it come down to it.
Again, you're talking hypothetical, I'm not.
 
Possible. But the "unconditional surrender" was one of the larger stupidities made by Roosevelt Churchill. The concept that an opposing nation (wheter nazi or not was considered equal!) was not anymore considered as a negotiating partner ignored the existence of those Germans who were opposed to the Nazi regime (Rommel, Stauffenberg) and hence also the possibility of a political peace of Germany which had rid itselfe of the nazis. It effectively deleted most anti-nazi opposition in Germany when opposition begun to increase significantly. Goebbels found it easy to exploit this blunder. Most soldiers and officers who didn´t liked the nazi leadership were driven into them in order to defend the future population as Goebbels told them. A conditional surrender would most likely have shortened the war by half a year with the nazi routed by increasing military and social opposition to Hitler and the nazi party.
A lot of lives on both sides of the Atlantic would have been saved.

Could you guarantee that most officers would of accepted a conditional surrender? Hindsight is 20/20 and if I was Churchill or Roosevelt I would not have wanted to take that chance.

As far as the other side of the world - The Japanese would not of accepted a conditional surrender.
 
German officers would lay down their arms, as they did historically if ordered to do so. It´s not even necessary to negotiate a deal. The prospect alone would have lead to much increased innerparty differences along with opposition in within the upper and middle military leadership (think of Galland vs Goering, f.e.). There would be less effective concentration of german defensive efforts, a weakening of command structure by inner fightings and finally even the ordinary soldier would not fight laconically like they did historically. That would have shortened the war by a good margin even without a deal.
The Casablanca requirements furtherly stalled all bomber command hopes to win the war with air power alone. Area bombing against population centres does ONLY work if the prospet for negotiations is kept open (e.g. France, Belgium, Netherlands in 1940) it does work NEVER if negotiations are not considered and then even hardens the defenders willpower.
 
German officers would lay down their arms, as they did historically if ordered to do so.
I think we know that many would have, but the few that would of kept fighting were the ones on the minds of the allied leaders IMO. There was an insurgency after WW2, perhaps the unconditional surrender strengthened it but I believe it was planned prior to the surrender.
 
I think we know that many would have, but the few that would of kept fighting were the ones on the minds of the allied leaders IMO. There was an insurgency after WW2, perhaps the unconditional surrender strengthened it but I believe it was planned prior to the surrender.

The SS would be the ones that would not lay down their arms. These hardliners would certainly continue to fight.

The majority of the Wehrmacht would have obeyed and the average German soldier (we all know about the discipline standards in the German military) would have obeyed the officers as well.

I do however agree that a conditional surrender was not an option. Not with everything that happened in WW2. The tens of millions of victims alone make this impossible.
 
Guys, I don't think the Wermacht was in the position to dictate the terms of the surrender. As the Israeli's are fond of saying, when the Fox is chasing the Rabitt, it is not up to the Rabitt to call a time out. By early 1943, the option to dictate terms to anyone was questionable at best. By early 1944 it was futile. And in 1942, it just wasn't going to happen.

The problem was not the Western Allies. You can always get a democracy talking. The problem was the Soviets/Russians. They weren't going to quit. Totalitiarian states don't care what the people think. 27 million dead for the Soviets and they kept fighting to the collapse in of the Nazis. Those kind of losses were inconcievable for a western nation.

When the Nazi's attacked the Soviet Union, it was a fight to the death. Neither one would negotiate if they got a position of strength, only weakness (that one is straight out of Mao's Little Red Book but it is relevant to the Nazis and Soviets).

When it came to the ground war, in a sense, the Western Allies (who the Germans might've negotiated with if the Nazis were overthrown) were along for the ride.
 
As for the B36, there were some serious teething problems that had to be identified and fixed during actual flight testing.

Regardless of how many resources the AAF could have thrown at an accelerated flight program, it would take time to uncover them all.

I maintain that the B36 would never be operational in 1945.

Sometimes, you just cant push technology any faster than it historically unfolded.
 
That works both ways. You can make a deal with Stalin that cannot be made with the USA. Like splitting Poland down the middle during August 1939. Or offering Greece to Russia during August 1944 as an incentive to make peace.
 
That works both ways. You can make a deal with Stalin that cannot be made with the USA. Like splitting Poland down the middle during August 1939. Or offering Greece to Russia during August 1944 as an incentive to make peace.

I'm with you on the totalitarian states carving up Poland. They saw an opportunity and they took it.

But I have a lot of trouble believing Stalin would stop the Red Army, when it was on the offensive and driving into Germany, if the Nazis offered him Greece? He keeps going and he gets all of Eastern Europe (almost Greece as well) and rids himself of his greatest threat (Hitler and the Nazis).

Can't see it.
 
And even if the B-36 came around in 1945 (drumroll) WHERE IS IT GOING TO TAKE OFF AND LAND FROM!!!!!

Good point. The first generation B36's had such a heavy foorprint, no airfields had taxiways and runways strong enough to support them.
 

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