Could the Luftwaffe survive after 1943 ... some numbers to be considered

Some time ago, forum member *Freebird* asked an interesting question:

This was one question that came to mind in another thread.

If Germany had managed to defeat Russia in the Spring/Summer of 1943, could the Luftwaffe have held off the US/UK air forces from mid 1943 onward?

Was German production pilot training high enough to keep ahead of the Allies? {with no drain on the eastern front}

Also assumes that the Italian/Rumanian air forces can be re-deployed to the Med to help boost Axis strength.

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My answer to this is definitely no, but let me explain this in the end. First, let me investigate if a transfer of Luftwaffe units from the Eastern to the Western frontier had any considerable quantitative influence on the situation. Also, let's keep the focus on daylight fighting, as there were only very few German nightfighters on the Eastern frontier, if any at all. Not respected are also assault units flying FW 190 F fighter-bombers, which theoretically could be converted to fighter units, but I expect no bigger influence if their numbers were considered.

There is an older source on the net I took as base for my numbers, it is: The Luftwaffe, 1933-45 by Michael Holm. Mr. Holm structures the numbers to the formations and also tells their main bases throughout the war. Sometimes this is a bit troublesoume to handle, e.g. if a formation transfers within a certain month from one theater to another you have to decide to which theater you attach the formation. Sometimes there are also minor troubles when sums don't really match. I used some "artist's freedom" to correct that by adding or subtracting little amounts. I think this is ok as I don't want to refer the exact situation, but concentrate to evaluate the tendency of development.

The task was to distribute the formations to the theaters West (Germany, France without the very South, Benelux), East and Other (this is Norway, Mediterranean region and Balkan Peninsula). For JG 77, in September 1943 numbers of movement are completely missing (but this doesn't matter too much, as the wing is in the "Other" scenario). I also saw problems with the so-called "Jagdgruppen", because they nearly never have losses by enemy action, but always high losses without enemy involved. Deleting their numbers would worsen the situation for the "West" theater, because they are mostly stationed there.

Mr. Holm gives numbers only for aircraft, not for pilots. The numbers are also only for German units, other Axis numbers are not given (their combat value generally would be doubtful). The grid on Mr. Holms pages could easily be transferred to Excel and then sums and relations be produced, but the whole procedure took me long hours. There are no numbers for 1945, but it is enough to focus on 1943 and 1944, because the main development happens within these two years, and respecting the limits I told above complete numbers are now available.

And this is the result: In the beginning, the distribution of daylight fighters to the three theaters is nearly equal (West around 600, east ~ 400, Other ~440). In the East theater, the number of aircraft nearly keeps being constant (always around 400, minimum 311 in January 1944, maximum 471 in May 1943) In the West, the number of aircraft keeps rising continously (1000 -1200 between June 1943 and June 1944) to a summit of 3182 in November 1944 and a little less in December 1944, but this having no influence on the air war or general war situation, as you know. In Other, the number of aircraft has a peak of nearly 600 in June 1943. From this time on, the Other theater nearly becomes stripped of aircraft (November 1944 only 137, December some more).

If you see these numbers in relations, in a crucial period between September 1943 and August 1944 the West theater holds 58-70% of the complete amount of daylight fighters, while during the same time the number for the East is 18-25%. Very interesting is also the relation for produced aircraft. In this period, the West consumes 68-78% (with some runaways, 56% in October 1943, 91 and 87% in June and July 1944), the East only gets 9-18%.

What you see id the following answer to Freebird's question: Having an amount of 20-25% more aircraft, or 10-18% more produced aircraft, the situation of the Luftwaffe never would change considerably.

Production numbers of daylight fighter aircraft was not the main trouble of the Luftwaffe. In 1944, in this sector Germany caught up with USA and UK together! As a new promotion thesis shows (Ernst Stilla: "Die Luftwaffe im Kampf um die Luftherrschaft", University of Bonn 2005), the Luftwaffe suffered from the following main troubles: too late rsp. incomplete mobilization (production numbers of 1944 could be reached earlier), lack of pilot training, lack of discipline (beginning with Göring), too long staying of pilots in first-line action (otherwise the high kill scores could not have been reached) and dipsomania among pilots. The German fighter aircraft also considerably lacked production quality (many were produced in underground factories by forced labour under inhuman conditions).

It would have been a different story if USAAF (including the late RAF daylight fighting) and Luftwaffe had met on eye level or if Germany and the other Axis states had used the strategic chances they had in 1940/41.

Regards, RT

you forget the complete chaos with the shutting down of the front line radar detection systems on the front lines in France. And due to the aerial bombings both night and day the downsizing of the LW fuel reserves to nothingness. Inadequate high squadrons covering bomber destroyers both taking of and especially landing, this is also associated with inadequate AA ground defenses to cover thier "own"

Hi RT,

>The grid on Mr. Holms pages could easily be transferred to Excel and then sums and relations be produced, but the whole procedure took me long hours.

Hm, you have finished the process now? I imported his data into a database, too ... but only the strength reports, not the locations, so I couldn't do the kind of evaluation you did.

>And this is the result:

Highly interesting! Do you think it would be possible to provide some graphs (or tables) to illustrate the exact time history?

>Very interesting is also the relation for produced aircraft. In this period, the West consumes 68-78% (with some runaways, 56% in October 1943, 91 and 87% in June and July 1944), the East only gets 9-18%.

Indeed ... I think GDR historian Groehler was trying to make the point that the Luftwaffe was destroyed on the eastern front, which seems not to go well with your numbers

>dipsomania among pilots

Hm, it would be interesting to know the methodical approach used to quantify the impact of this parameter

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Yeah I thought that part was odd too. The discipline issue is interesting too.

What source refers to this? It's an interesting subject.

I recall the original thread. My view was "no" as well for three primary reasons.

1) Beginning in 44, USAAF tactics changed under Doolittle from defensive escort to offensive escort. The USAAF escorts were now to seek battle with the Luftwaffe fighters whenever and wherever they were met. According to author Donald Miller, Adolf Galland was alleged to have said that the day this switch of tactics occured, Germany lost the air war over the Reich.

2) Attrition warfare favored the Allies. While Germany could adequately replace her fighter stocks, the Allies could also do so in spades. (and keep producing reams of bombers as well) More importantly, Allied manpower reserves were up to the challenge of putting replacements into those cockpits whilst the same was not the case for the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe pilot replacement program could not keep pace with such a war and the later offensive against Big Oil worsened the situation.

3) Numbers. As mentioned in both threads.....Germany already refocused the bulk of her fighter assets to protect the homeland once the threat from the USAAF was realized. Transfer of several hundred more fighters into the mix of itself, at least to me doesn't speak to any great reversal of fortunes. Against this, must also be pitted the sheer # of Allied fighters available for the attrtion war as well. Eight AF alone eventually fielded over a 1000 fighters in 44 that could be sent on the biggest missions.

It would seem to me that a reinforcement of the home front....assuming that the infrastructure could handle such an infux in a short term, only plays into Doolittle's strategy....a bloody attrition war that the Allies were confident they would win.....eventually. This isn't to say that things would go 'all' their way.....it could be and probably would be bloodier....but the ultimate goal....crippling the LW would still be realized.

Hi friends, let me respond to HoHun and Chocks Away.

HoHun said:

Hm, you have finished the process now? I imported his data into a database, too ... but only the strength reports, not the locations, so I couldn't do the kind of evaluation you did.

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Yes, nearly. I would like to produce one more sheet comparing loss rate by enemy action, loss rate without enemy involved and a relation I call "forced rate of substitutes" (explanation on demand).

HoHun said:

Do you think it would be possible to provide some graphs (or tables) to illustrate the exact time history?

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A transfer to PowerPoint for a presentation should be possible.

HoHun said:

I think GDR historian Groehler was trying to make the point that the Luftwaffe was destroyed on the eastern front, which seems not to go well with your numbers

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I also have a book of Groehler. Of course he is influended, not to say controlled, by the political impacts of his location and time. But he himself reports about an (otherwise forgotten) air battle over Lower Silesia in early 1945 which the Luftwaffe won over the VVS, although he stated here the Luftwaffe gained superiority in numbers.

Chocks away! said:

What source refers to this?

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Stilla takes a whole subchapter to describe "die abnehmende Moral" = "the decreasing moral standards". Like common in any promotion thesis, he underlays every argument with quotations over quotations. Here some very little excerpts especially for you:

Combat morale: "Das Umkehren wegen 'zu rauh laufenden Motors', 'wegen Kerzenschadens' oder 'niedrigem Öldruck' war an der Tagesordung." (p. 234, quote #1314)
Meaning: "Returning because of 'engine running too rough', 'fuse defect' or 'low oil pressure' was part of the daily agenda."

Nightlife: "Seinen Biographen vertraute Galland über seine Zeit als Geschwaderkommodore am Kanal mit einigem Stolz an, dass seine Männer und er regelmäßig schlechtes Wetter nutzten, um sich, wann immer möglich, in den Bars Paris und Lilles zu vergnügen. "Die Nachtschwärmerei war zwar mit Morgeneinsätzen nicht gut zu vereinbaren; doch die abendlichen Ausflüge bedeuteten eine zwar kurze, aber unbezahlbare Atempause im Kampfgeschehen."" (p. 241, quote #1355)
Meaning: "Galland confided with some pride to his biographers about his time as group captain on the Channel coast, that he and his men on a regular base used bad weather conditions to enjoy themselves in the taverns of Paris and Lille. "The night owl habit was not well to coordinate with sorties in the morning; but the trips in the evening meant a short, but priceless breather during the events of fighting.""

Common discipline from the very start: "In einem Teilbericht der Kommission kam der Verfasser Major Grote nach einer Dienstreise zu drei verschiedenen Ausbildungsgeschwadern gleich zu Beginn auf die Disziplin und das Selbstbildnis der Jagdflieger zu sprechen: "Die Flugschüler einschließlich Offiziersanwärter sind zu gleichgültig.Sie wissen, dass ihnen alles nachgeworfen wird. Der Anzug lässt sehr zu wünschen übrig. Die alten Jagdfliegerallüren sind immer noch nicht beseitigt."" (p. 246 quote #1386)
Meaning: "In a contribution to the report of the commission the author, Major Grote, who had done a duty trip to three different training groups, started at the very beginning to tell about discipline and self-image of the fighter pilots: The aviator students, including the officer cadets, are too indifferent. They know they are given everything from the cheap. Uniforms leave a lot to be desired. The old fighter pilot airs are still not deleted.""

#1314: Steinhoff: In letzter Stunde, p. 61.
#1355: Toliver/Constable: Adolf Galland, p. 114.
#1386: Bericht über die Dienstreise Major Grotes zu J.G. 101, 3./J.G. 105, I. u. 7./J.G. 108 für den Führungsstab Ia/Ausb., Zweck: Feststellung der tieferen Ursachen der hohen Flugzeugunfälle ohne Feindeinwirkung, 14.9.1944, S. 1, in: BA-MA RL 2II/181, abgedruckt weiter unten Anlage Nr. 1, S. 293-295.
Meaning: Report about the duty trip of Major Grote to J.G. 101, 3./J.G. 105, I. u. 7./J.G. 108 on the behalf of headquarter staff Ia/training, purpose: Investigating the deeper reasons for the high rate off losses without enemy involved.

And, and, and. Only little excerpts, as I told. I would like to add the following:

"Günther Rall, einer der erfolgreichsten deutschen Jagdflieger, gestand dem amerikanischen Luftfahrthistoriker McFarland, dass ihm spätestens, als er im Mai 1944 von der Ostfront abgezogen und ohne jegliche Schulung zum Kommandeur der II./J.G. 11 in Norddeutschland ernannt wurde, bewusst geworden sei, dass der Luftkrieg nicht mehr gewonnen werden könne (quote #1305) . Zum allgemeinen Mangel fähiger Verbandsführer gesellte sich zusätzlich die langsame moralische Aushöhlung der erfahrenen Flieger, deren realistische interne Lageeinschätzungen sich negativ auf den anfangs hochmotivierten Nachwuchs auswirkten(quote #1306).Immer mehr amerikanische Flieger bemerkten, dass die Zahl der deutschen Jagdflieger, die ihr Heil in der Vermeidung von Luftkämpfen und in der Flucht suchten, statt sich zum Kampf zu stellen, beständig stieg(quote #1307). Warum auch immer einzelne Piloten oder Verbände Luftkämpfe vermieden oder abbrachen, die Folge war, dass die amerikanischen Jagdflieger, die ihren deutschen Gegnern bis dahin mit großer Vorsicht begegnet waren, während der Abnutzungskämpfe des Frühjahrs 1944 reichlich Selbstvertrauen hinzugewannen, zunehmend angriffslustiger agierten und die Verluste der Luftwaffe dadurch weiter anstiegen(quote #1308 )."
Meaning: "Günter Rall, one of the most successfull German fighter pilots, confessed to the American aviation historian McFarland, that at the latest point of time, when in May 1944 he was wirthdrawn from the Eastern frontier and without any preparation was appointed wing commander of II./JG 11 in Northern Germany, he became aware that the air war was impossible to be won any longer. To the common lack of able formation leaders there came the slow moral undermining of the experienced aviators, whose realistic internal assessments of the situation badly influenced the offspring that had been highly motivated in the beginning. More and more American aviators noticed, that the number of German fighter pilots, who seeked their fortune in avoiding aerial combat and escape, instead of going into fight, continuously rose. Why ever single pilots avoided or interrupted aerial combats, subsequently the American fighter pilots, which until then had met their German opponents with a lot of caution, during the attrition fights of spring 1944 gained plenty of trust in themselves and acted more and more aggressive, what caused the losses of the Luftwaffe further to increase."

#1305 McFarland, Evolution of the American Strategic Fighter in Europe, S. 204. Realistische Selbsteinschätzungen finden sich auch bei anderen damaligen Jagdfliegern (=realistic self-assessments are also found reading other fighter pilots of that time): Dickfeld, Fährte des Jägers, p. 221; Lotze, Luftjagd über der Normandie und in der Reichsverteidigung, p. 157f.

#1306 Lotze, Luftjagd über der Normandie und in der Reichsverteidigung, p. 149f.; Niederschrift über Divisionskommandeur-Besprechung (=protocol about division-commander conference) am 4.11.1943, Kriegsgeschichte (=war history) des I. Jagdkorps, 25.10.-20.11.1943, in: BA-MA RL 8/92; Niederschrift über Kommandeur-Besprechung am 20.11.1943, Kriegsgeschichte des I. Jagdkorps, 25.10.-20.11.1943, in: BA-MA RL 8/92. Die Entwicklung der individuellen Kampfmoral hing natürlich auch unmittelbar mit der Höhe der bis dahin eingetretenen Verluste und der wahrscheinlichen Höhe weiterer Verluste zusammen. Für den Grad des Rückgangs, so das Ergebnis einer Studie der amerikanischen Luftwaffe, die sich mit den deutschen und amerikanischen Erfahrungen befasst, war jedoch nicht die Höhe der Verluste an sich entscheidend, sondern der Kontext, in dem sie standen. Wurden die Opfer von den Beteiligten als sinnvoll gewertet, fiel die Veränderung nur gering aus und stärkte sogar in manchen Fällen den Kampfgeist. Fühlte sich der Einzelne allerdings, ohne dass ein militärischer Vorteil aus seinem Verlust gewonnen würde, geopfert, ging dessen Moral entsprechend stark zurück.
Meaning of explanation: The development of the individual combat moral also of course was directly influenced by the number of losses already suffered and the probable number of further losses as well. For the degree of decrease, reading the result of a study of the American air force, which deals with German and American experiences, not the number of losses itself was crucial, but it's context was. If the sacrifices were estimated as useful by the persons involved, the change turned out little or even enforced the combat spirit in some cases. If the single person thought he was expended without any military advantage gained by this, his moral standards sunk correspondingly to this.

John J. Zentner, The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Moral in Combat, CADRE Paper No. 11, Maxwell AFB 2001, p. 16f.

#1307 Vgl. (=compare) Michael O'Leary (Hrsg.), VIII Fighter Command at War, Oxford 2000, p. 43, 68, 108.

#1308 Vernehmungsprotokoll (=interrogation protocol) von Oberstleutnant Kogler, Geschwaderkommodore J.G. 6, durch den britischen Nachrichtendienst (=British Intelligence Service) vom 15.3.1945. C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.), G.G. Report, S.R.G.G. 1140, Top Secret, 1.1.1945, p. 8, in: PRO WO 208/4169. Siehe auch (=also see): Engau, Frontal durch die Bomberpulks, p 81.

p. 232/233.

Became a bit much in the end. Hope you still were entertained.

Regards, RT

Hi RT,

>Stilla takes a whole subchapter to describe "die abnehmende Moral" = "the decreasing moral standards".

I think it's not really "moral standards", but rather "fighting morale". Maybe you've heard the British expression "LMF", "lack of morale fibre", applied to pilots who had lost the fighting spirit necessary for successful air combat.

>"The night owl habit was not well to coordinate with sorties in the morning; but the trips in the evening meant a short, but priceless breather during the events of fighting.""[/I]

Hm, but what's the impact on fighting effectiviness? There is no shortage of identical anecdotes about Allied pilots ...

>The old fighter pilot airs are still not deleted.

Conscious disregard of military dress standards was not exactly uncommon among Allied airmen either

>Zum allgemeinen Mangel fähiger Verbandsführer gesellte sich zusätzlich die langsame moralische Aushöhlung der erfahrenen Flieger, deren realistische interne Lageeinschätzungen sich negativ auf den anfangs hochmotivierten Nachwuchs auswirkten(quote #1306).

This seems to be somewhat of a cause-and-effect confusion ... they didn't lose the air war because their fighting spirit was lacking, their fighting spirit was lacking because they were objectively losing the air war, and realistically recognized it. The "initially high-spirited replacements" bit shows that there the lack of high spirits was not doctrine-induced, but defeat-induced.

>Immer mehr amerikanische Flieger bemerkten, dass die Zahl der deutschen Jagdflieger, die ihr Heil in der Vermeidung von Luftkämpfen und in der Flucht suchten, statt sich zum Kampf zu stellen, beständig stieg(quote #1307).

Maybe the orders to engage bombers and to avoid dogfights against fighters had something to do with this?

>Warum auch immer einzelne Piloten oder Verbände Luftkämpfe vermieden oder abbrachen, die Folge war, dass die amerikanischen Jagdflieger, die ihren deutschen Gegnern bis dahin mit großer Vorsicht begegnet waren, während der Abnutzungskämpfe des Frühjahrs 1944 reichlich Selbstvertrauen hinzugewannen, zunehmend angriffslustiger agierten und die Verluste der Luftwaffe dadurch weiter anstiegen(quote #1308 )."

Nikademus has already mentioned the orders "unleashing" the US fighter arm as well as the factor of numbers that made this possible.

Of course, the origin of the quote as interrogation result of a Luftwaffe POW means that the quoted officer was not aware of the conscious change of operative strategy on part of the USAAF. This change in strategy was not caused, as the POW seems to think, by a lack of fighting spirit on part of the Luftwaffe pilots, but rather made possible by the rapidly increasing numerical strength of the 8th Air Force in Europe. Note that the POW refers to a war of attrition, too ...

>If the sacrifices were estimated as useful by the persons involved, the change turned out little or even enforced the combat spirit in some cases.

Again, as applied to the Luftwaffe, a confusion of cause and effect - if you're winning the air war, the sacrifices will be seen as justified because they lead to victory, if you're losing, they will appear useless because they don't stop defeat.

Poor operative strategy would be a factor that Galland has pointed out as one of the key contributors to the German defeat, and of course a fighter arm feeling inadequately led would lose some fighting spirit. However, that doesn't mean that the loss of fighting spirit was the reason for the defeat - more likely it was inadequate leadership.

>Became a bit much in the end. Hope you still were entertained.

Certainly! Thanks for providing the quotes - that I don't think any of them can be used to seriously support the hypothesis that lack of fighting spirit was a key factor in the Luftwaffe's defeat doesn't mean I don't appreciate them!

(I don't even know if the author of the thesis actually argues in favour of the hypothesis I suggested, I simply responded to the implication he might.)

Oh, here is the thesis:

http://hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de/diss_online/phil_fak/2005/stilla_ernst/0581.pdf

If you read German, that might be worth a look ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Reichsverteidigung, p. 149f.; Niederschrift über Divisionskommandeur-Besprechung (=protocol about division-commander conference) am 4.11.1943, Kriegsgeschichte (=war history) des I. Jagdkorps, 25.10.-20.11.1943, in: BA-MA RL 8/92; Niederschrift über Kommandeur-Besprechung am 20.11.1943, Kriegsgeschichte des I. Jagdkorps, 25.10.-20.11.1943, in: BA-MA RL 8/92. Die Entwicklung der individuellen Kampfmoral hing natürlich auch unmittelbar mit der Höhe der bis dahin eingetretenen Verluste und der wahrscheinlichen Höhe weiterer Verluste zusammen. Für den Grad des Rückgangs, so das Ergebnis einer Studie der amerikanischen Luftwaffe, die sich mit den deutschen und amerikanischen Erfahrungen befasst, war jedoch nicht die Höhe der Verluste an sich entscheidend, sondern der Kontext, in dem sie standen. Wurden die Opfer von den Beteiligten als sinnvoll gewertet, fiel die Veränderung nur gering aus und stärkte sogar in manchen Fällen den Kampfgeist. Fühlte sich der Einzelne allerdings, ohne dass ein militäri

I guess I made a mistake in my last post =) What intended to say is that the Lufwaffe had little chances by 1943, by that year the VVS was recovering quickly and the United States was working at full power working with the RAF, many historians agree that the real chances for Hitler were in 1941 during the Battle of Britain when decided to invade the USSR he lost the war.

Also not exploiting long range aviation early enough..remember how many japanese fighter units where held in reserve for home defense with such a light attack.(Doolittle's)

One or two Me264's dropping light bombs and leaflets on US soil would keep or return fighter units from going to the european theatre. But that is another thread!!!

The greatest generals of history have warned us, over and over again: there are no certainities in war.

That having been said...I think survival of the Luftwaffe after 1943 was highly unlikely. But remember the sentence above.

If the USSR had fallen in very early 1943, would the lack of materials and of production facilities that slowed development of the Jumo 004 http://www.enginehistory.org/German/Me-262/Me262_Engine_2.pdf have been alleviated? Unless other problems such as vibration slowed development, might the Me 262 enter service in early 1944? Even worse for the allies, might higher priority for air defense have produced the R4M at the same time? If "Big Week" meets R4M equipped 262s, nobody is likely to believe the Luftwaffe is beaten and the escorts might remain tied to the bombers.

Germany would have to on the offensive...odds are against you if you have to defend all the time....

Germany would have to take out the allies aircraft at their bases to stop the onslaught....would be no mean feat a a giant gamble.....

Need to bomb the US though.....