Deathride: Hitler Vs. Stalin - The Eastern Front, 1941-1945

[pinehilljoe]

I just finished this book. The author offers a somewhat revisionist view of the War in the East. He makes a case the War in the East was a much closer run thing than mainstream history portrays. That the Germans came very close to winning the war of attrition, based on the ratio of casualties. In the end Germany didnt have the resources to cover the Mediterranean, France, and the Air War over Germany in 1943 and that finally swayed the balance.

He also points out that that the facts and figures from Russian sources are suspect at best. Everything from casualties inflicted, losses and production.

 

[The Basket]

The Germans could have won ww2.
Yes indeed.
But didn't. So.....

 

[pbehn]

I just finished this book. The author offers a somewhat revisionist view of the War in the East. He makes a case the War in the East was a much closer run thing than mainstream history portrays. That the Germans came very close to winning the war of attrition, based on the ratio of casualties. In the end Germany didnt have the resources to cover the Mediterranean, France, and the Air War over Germany in 1943 and that finally swayed the balance.

He also points out that that the facts and figures from Russian sources are suspect at best. Everything from casualties inflicted, losses and production.

Revisionist would be a good description. If Germany did not occupy France then it would still be fighting France. France was at war with Germany from the time Germany invaded Poland. One German general remarked that if he knew how many tanks the Russians could field he would have campaigned against war with Russia. Any discussion of Germany winning relies on a knock out blow because in a slugging match Russia had more resources. To have a conflict between Russia and Germany alone and all other nations completely neutral is a fantasy scenario, it is a fantasy that requires Germany to be led by someone else than Hitler and in that case the war wouldn't have started.

 

[michaelmaltby]

... anyway you slice it, Hitler and the Nazis underestimated Stalin and Communism. Arrogance too often poisoned the atmosphere in occupied territories.

Had Moscow fallen in December-January '41/2 where in the USSR would Stalin's government retreated to ...? Behind the Urals, IMO, and from this natural defensive position they would have continued to fight the Germans to reunite the USSR.

I enjoyed this book but I have always been an Eastern Front-'junkie' after reading the books that started coming out in the mid-1950s, in English, by Germans who had experienced the Front .... men like Rudel and Guderian and novelists like Willi Heinrich .... the scale of things was so different from the Western European Fronts that I was familiar with in WWI and WWII familial context.

 

[pinehilljoe]

The author spends many pages on questioning the data that was published by the Soviet Union. Even the notion that over 40,000 T-34s were built. Also, two of the mistakes Hitler made were underestimating the amount of aid the US and UK would provide the Soviets, and the number of casualties Stalin would accept in fighting the War.

 

[pbehn]

Also, two of the mistakes Hitler made were underestimating the amount of aid the US and UK would provide the Soviets, and the number of casualties Stalin would accept in fighting the War.

When you make it perfectly clear to the enemy that surrender means death then your enemy will accept any losses to allow some to survive. When you declare war there is no referee, Hitler declared war on four major world powers and a lot of other smaller ones, did he not expect that they would work together to beat him?

 

[pinehilljoe]

I was just posting about an interesting book. The author debunks the idea of the Soviet Juggernaut rolling into Central Europe that most history books portray. An interesting read if you like to study the War in the East.

 

[pbehn]

I was just posting about an interesting book. The author debunks the idea of the Soviet Juggernaut rolling into Central Europe that most history books portray. An interesting read if you like to study the War in the East.

Fair enough but I met a few German veterans in East Germany, very few discussed the war but the ones that did described a juggernaut.

 

[mikewint]

Speculation is a wonderful thing....IF we had some Ham we could have Ham and Eggs, IF we had some eggs!
As the US found out in Vietnam a war of attrition is a very tough proposition.
Go into a village and find one NVA and kill him...You've eliminated ONE enemy but go into that village and unjustly kill ONE non-NVA and you create 10 NVA in his place.
The Germans trod this path with a vengeance. Many in the Ukraine detested the Bolsheviks and welcomed the Germans as liberators but German racial policies (undermensch) and the Hunger Plan soon turned potential allies into enemies. In addition German polices towards Russian POWs which failed to separate deserters (German leaflets dropped behind the Russian lines had encouraged desertion promising good food and treatment) from combatants, starving, beating and killing all. A natural consequence of this politically and militarily unwise treatment was not only a paralyzing of the will to desert, but a plain deadly fear to get into German captivity. I think I can say without exaggeration that the mistakes in the treatment of prisoners of war and the Slavic population are to a great extent the cause for the stiffening power of resistance of the Red Army, the increase in its numbers, and guerrilla warfare behind the lines which did much to sap the already overextended German supply lines.

 

[The Basket]

Reminds me of a time...a friend was reading a book about the fall of Berlin during his lunch break. I advised the Germans lost. He was jokingly annoyed because he didn't know the ending! Ruined it for him!
The butler did it.

 

[parsifal]

I don't buy the argument that Germany came close to winning on the eastern front. For one thing a glance at the respective populations shows just how much the german s were up against it. Soviet populations in 1939, prior to her 1940 conquests was 190 million people. 305 of the USSRs population came under occupation and roughly 35% of her industry was destroyed or overrun.

The Germans had a population of 67million before the war broke out. this increased to about 80 million with all the ethnic germans added to the reich. Roughly 1/3 of Germn manpower had to be kept in the west on garrison so 1/3 the population was being engaged to provide manpower for the western garrisons

The Ussr is estimated to have assigned about 10% of its resources to the far east .

Effectively then the USSR was using 90% of its population to fight the eastern front, whilst Germany had committed about 67%. That equates to net populations devoted to the war effort in the Eastern front of 160million to 55 million.

The soviets suffered 25 million casualties, including those people murdered by the germans whilst under occupation. This amounted to about 13 million people. Plus the exchange rate was improving in favour of the Soviets as the war progressed.

Hotly disputed are the german casualty figures. I believe that the number amounts to about 6million soldiers to all causes and fates. These were unsustainable loss rates on that population base .

 

[parsifal]

So, in terms of population, Germany was really behind the 8 ball. In terms of industrial potential, Germany held a decisive advantage, but they squandered that advantage with poorly managed programs and severe materials shortages.

The germans started the war with a marked advantage in military leadership, training and doctrine but this was worn away as time passed.


Were there any strategies that Germany could follow to improve the outcome. I think there were, though I doubt the Germans had the ability to win outright. Static lines without proper defences were a waste for Germany, as was the whole of the 1942 offensive and its long range deep penetration objectives. My opinion is that the heer needed to keep the Russians away from the Dnepr whilst the defences wre built and a secure anchoring point secured to the north. Integration of the Pripet into the defences would have been useful.


After 1942 static line was the only defence strategy the germans could use after their truck parks had been decimated . They needed to rest and replace the panzer units behind the line, spaced strategically to react to soviet attacks. The germans needed a military commander for the eastern front, like manstein, not afraid to give ground just at the instant before the Soviet hammer fell . the Germans until the end demonstrated a great deal of tactical flexibility which could have helped them greatly

 

[michaelmaltby]

.. .. a great post, P.
The German effort was awesome and deserves study and respect but it was flawed by ideology and arrogance and was unsustainable .... whereas the Soviets, thanks to LL transport, gained mobility that the Germans had lost ... indeed had never had -- the heer was a horse-army in large part.

 

[mikewint]

Michael, as always I tend to mostly agree with you but if we emphasize the "could" part of this then I think the answer would be a yes. So if we stick with Hitlers original plan, Number one would be starting Barbarossa on time, those extra 38 days could/would have given them more separation from the onset of the brutal Russian winter. Second, that catastrophic decision to divert their main thrust southward thus delaying the attack on Moscow. As a result Army Group Central didn't reach the outskirts (15mi) of Moscow until early December. Third, it would definitely require that the Germans radically alter their treatment of the civilian populations and their treatment of POWs. That alone gives them hundreds/thousands of allied troops and frees up troops needed to guard against guerrilla attacks in the rear.
The above then opens the door to, if not an outright collapse of Russia the possibility of Russia suing for peace and a reinstatement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Germany could then focus its efforts on defeating Britain.
Now beyond a doubt Germany was really not in a position to attack Russia and/or invade Britain. Hitler could have easily delayed his attack on Russia until 1943 or 1944 (Stalin would have been none-the-wiser). Then Germany could have continued its air assault on Britain while continuing its naval blockade around the Isles. Then, after an appropriate period of preparation, an amphibious landing could have commenced on British shores in either 1942 or 1943. This isn't ridiculous considering how long it took the Allies to prepare for its invasion of Normandy — something that wouldn't happen until mid-1944. Then, with Britain knocked out, Germany could have started its preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.

 

[Shortround6]

A few thoughts/comments.
The Greek campaign is an unknown. An old war game by Avalon Hill claimed that the Russian spring was bit late in 1941 and the conditons for an early start option (no Greece) was mud and not clear weather. I have no idea if this is true.
Without the Greek diversion the German motor pool would be in better shape. Fewer miles on the tanks/trucks used in the campaign, with the 2-3 week delay between the end of the Greek fighting and the start of the Barbarossa I am sure some maintenance/overhauls were done but that also depletes the initial stock of spare parts. I have no idea of how much fuel or artillery ammunition was used in Greece.
By the fall of 1941 the German effort was not only a shoe string, it was a frayed and often patched/tied shoestring. Any increase in initial stocks could only help. It may, however, be nowhere near decisive.

IF The Germans can capture Moscow a whole bunch of factors come into play. Yes the Russian government can evacuate to the Urals but can they evacuate a large percentage of the war industry around Moscow or will the percentage of industry captured by the Germans go up? Even if the government gets out the Army cannot be evacuated to the Urals and the army will have to be supplied where it is (or somewhere close, marching hundreds of miles in the Russian winter, even for Russians, is not an easy thing. Moscow was a major rail hub, lots of rail lines leading to Moscow from different directions. Not so many ways to bypass Moscow. Supply for the Russians over the 1941/42 winter becomes much harder. Less production from factories even if evacuated and more detours/more miles for the trains to bring supplies to the front/s.

As for Hitler waiting? Some people claim Stalin was waiting to attack Germany, I don't know but the Soviet army was only going to get stronger, The t-34 and KV tanks were already in production and would have replaced the BT tanks and the T-26s. The numbers/percentage of I-15 biplanes and I-16 monoplanes would have steadily decreased. Unless Stalin did another purge the officers would have gotten at least somewhat better with every year that passed.

 

[pinehilljoe]

the author looked at the shear numbers of Soviet dead during the War, anywhere from 25 to 30 million, and add the death from the Holodomor, and the numbers could reach 40 million. He makes a case that the numbers were so large it had indirectly led to the down fall of the Soviet Union.

 

[parsifal]

It is a much loved myth that the campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece lost the germans the war in the east. The argument goes that the six week delay in the start of the campaign in Russia was disastrous to Fall Barbarossa.

Certainly there were delays due to the operations in the Balkans. Certainly also they crunched up the timetable. But in reality the timetable in the first place was unrealistic, and the germans buggered things up irrespective of what happened in the Balkans.

In the north the armies and logistic units of AGpC and AGpN were completely unaffected by what happened in the Balkans. The units used in the conquest of Greece (except Crete), and Yugoslavia were drawn from the strategic reserves (mostly 2 armee) and some of the mobile formations of AGpS and the independent 11 armee operating out of Rumania. The main heavy lifting came from 2 Armee which was never intended to be committed to front line action until much later in Barbarossa. 2 Armee entered the frontline in Russia on time and virtually undamaged by its losses in the Balkans.

There were two arny sized organizations committed to the Balkans. 2 Armee and 12 Armee. 12 Armee was itself a composite formation, drawing units from 1st Panzer gp (taken itself from AGpS, with some units nominally attached to the 11 Armee, itself part of the so-called AGp "Antonescu", seconded to 12 Armee), and some units also drawn from the strategic reserves. The most serious implications for Barbarossa was the diversion of 1st Pz Gp.

The invasion of Crete placed demands on the 7th Airbone div and one mountain division, The mountain div was drawn from Rumania and was sorely missed , but the airborne troops came from forces earmarked for operations in the MTO anyway. Same for the Ju52 and glider forces used to take Crete. The losses at Crete probably caused the axis to abandon their planned invasion of malta, but had no effect on Barbarossa.

As it was, the attack did go in late, at the end of June. However, the delays on the assault on Moscow had nothing to do with the diversions to the Balkans. After the initial frontier battles followed by the ptracted battles around Smolensk, the spearheads of AGpC had to pull up (AGpN spearheads were also blunting, but for different reasons). Rememeber that AGpC's forces were unaffected by the Balkans campaign. Nevertheless they were forced to pull up because of two main reasons. The Infantry formations needed time to regroup and recover, and the supply network needed time to consolidate. It had always been assumed in the pre-war planning that the soviets would collapse and sue for peace after the destruction of their frontier forces and the capture of Minsk/Vilnius regional centres. This didn't happen, so the Germans went another step, pressing onto Leningrad in the north and Smolensk in the centre (one more step into Russia and still working on the principal of "all we have to do is kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will collapse"). OKH had always thought it might be necessary to advance to Leningrad, but the push beyond Minsk had not been factored into the planning for the campaign. Pushing onto Smolensk strained both the combat effectiveness and logistics of the heer.

The Red Army had finished up being routed at Smolensk, but refused to surrender . most of AGpC was immobilised for more than 6 weeks as the logistics caught up with the front lines. Guderians PzGp on the southern flank was in relatively good shape and could have pushed further east as a flying column to take at least vyazama but possibly even for a surprise seizure of the capital. Or at least attempted a seizure. I think that Guderian would have been encircled and destroyed if he tried that. Contrary to the usual accounts, the Soviets still had plenty of reserves, preparing for this eventuality and bivouacked behind Moscow on the Moscow/Gorki Axis. There were about 40 divs generally in combat worthy condition.Likely that Guderian would have been immolated in a Stalingrad style battle if the capital had been rushed at.

in any event, Hitler was more concerned about the yawing gap developing on the southern flank as the delays being suffered by the overtaxed AGpS were pushing them out of sync with AGpC. It can certainly be argued that the Balkan wars had something to do with that, but not a major impact. AGpS was always the poor relation in terms of resources, and were faced with a very capable defence in the south. The diversion of Guderian's PzGp2 to the south, coinciding with the commitment of 2 Armee essentially to relieve PzGp2, led to the biggest single dfeat of the red army in the war. It is often paraded as a gigantic mistake by Hitler, but on this occasion I agree with his judgement, as did most of his professional advisers. using PxGp2 in this way solved a problem developing in the german dispositions, was low risk for the heer, did not greatly overtax the logistics of AGpC and kept up severe pressure on the Red Army. far from being a mistake, it was the best bet at the time. . .

Lets say that the Balkans wars had not been fought. Nothing would have changed in Russia. AGpC and N would have run out of puff as historical. AGpS would have been marginally stronger and taken Kiev earlier, whereupon it too would have been forced to pull up for 6-8 weeks as it recovered from operations.

AGC would have re-commenced its operations at the beginning of September with about 4 weeks before the Rasputitsa hit. But the logisitic network still wasn't good enough to take Moscow. Instead of running out of puff again in front of Moscow at the end of November, the heer would have been doing exactly the same thing (ie stalling) at the beginning of the month, in the scenario of no Balkans invasion.

The Balkans argument is a crock im afraid. It did not lose Germany the war. It didn't even lose Germany the campaign. Germany's prewar preparations did that.It was always a pipe dream that the SU could be defeated at the frontier, when that failed, it was an equally unrealistic assessment to think that the planned winter lines of Leningrad/Moscow/Stalingrad/Caucasus could be taken in one summer. You needed two summers to do that and at least 2 million more men and 1 complete additional PzGp. Resources the Germans could never hope to have.

 

[parsifal]

I also forgot to mention the issue of the weather. An earlier attack on the SU was not really feasible as the major rivers in the western SU were still in flodd from the spring rains that had come late that year,

The Austrian author H.Magenheimer writes the following in "Hitler's War" (P 83):
"What mitigated against a theoretical invasion at the end of May or in early June was the fact that many rivers in the western Soviet Union which would have to be crossed in the course of the attack, including the Bug and the Narew, were still in flood until well into June and would therefore have presented a very disagreeable obstruction .For this reason alone,an attack after 10 june appeared to be the only realistic possibility" .
Magenheimer gives the following source:
Zapantis:"Hitler's Balkan Campaign,P 86 et seq

mention of this problem also appears in Halders diary and the OKH daily situation reports.

There were further rains in the latter part of July that allowed portions of the soviet frontier forces to escape the frontier Kesselschlacht battles.

Pushing the start of the invasion would have been complicated and lessened in success because of these lingering weather issues