Defence of Malaya, Singapore the area: how would you do it?

[parsifal]

1934 Germany had a peacetime military 100,000 strong with no reserves. Much smaller then the peacetime British military. Yet they managed to massively expand while producing decent quality infantry divisions. Why can't the British Army expand in a similiar manner?

Yes....In complete defiance of her Versailles obligations and in the context off her navy, in complete defiance of the restrictions that applied to her. In the case of japan, they seemed to relish lying about the tonnages of their battleships so are little better than the germans in that regard. Britain on the other hand tried to stick to the letter of her treaty restrictions, and in addition did not want or plan for war in the lead up to the war.

I hardly think that holding up the german experience and behaviour in the lead up to war, is any sort of shining example of what to do, even from a purely military-economic POV. Germany basically went to war as an economic basket case. She emerged a shattered country. Britain entered the war slightly better and emerged in much better shape economically than germany. Though she seems to have lost the peace since then.....

 

[timshatz]

1934 Germany had a peacetime military 100,000 strong with no reserves. Much smaller then the peacetime British military. Yet they managed to massively expand while producing decent quality infantry divisions. Why can't the British Army expand in a similiar manner?

Very true. But it also lead them to war earlier than they wanted to. Hitler was shooting for 1945, but the failure of Western Democracies at Munich led him to the conclusion he could go with what he had. The guy always was a gambler.

On another point, all that expansion of the military put Germany in a huge debt situation. The best way to fix that was take it from somebody else. Socialist economies, be they national socialist or international socialist, are not efficient. Matter of fact, they are usually very inefficient. As such, the expansion of the Army had pretty wiped out whatever assets were left after the Hyperinflation of the Wiemar Republic and the Depression.

War was a viable solution to Hitler because he didn't have to answer to anyone. Same can be said for Stalin and the Japanese Govt in the 30s and 40s.

But I'm drifting into a totally different subject.

However, it does give perspective to why the Germans could rearm and the British couldn't. Well, not without an obvious threat.

 

[Freebird]

If Britain is unwilling to fund adequate peacetime training for their army (however small) then it's time to start selling off the empire before someone with a properly trained army takes it away by force.

Dave, there's nothing wrong with the training of the British Army, where did you get that idea?

However, it does give perspective to why the Germans could rearm and the British couldn't. Well, not without an obvious threat.

Where did this notion come from that Britian couldn't (or didn't) rearm?
Obviously the British losing several divisions worth of kit at both Dunkirk in Greece slowed down rearmament, while the German effort was enormously speeded by capturing huge quantities of British, French, Czech Polish equipment.

1934 Germany had a peacetime military 100,000 strong with no reserves. Much smaller then the peacetime British military. Yet they managed to massively expand while producing decent quality infantry divisions. Why can't the British Army expand in a similiar manner?

Well in fact they did.
Can you point to any British or Dominion infantry division in combat that you feel was poor quality or performed poorly because of lack of training?

The BEF if France?
The Australians at Tobruk?
The 2nd NZ division on Crete?
The Canadians at Hong Kong or Dieppe?

You also need to keep in mind that at the outbreak of war Germany France (land powers) started a modest increases in Naval strength and a massive increase in the size of the army. Britain (a Sea power) made huge increases in army strength, and massive increases in naval strength. In addition, Britain had hundreds of bases throughout the world, (which Germany didn't have) Gibraltar, Barbados, Ascension, Ceylon, Singapore, Fiji, Jamaica etc etc etc, which all needed increases in manpower during wartime. You also need to take into account that the "tail" of a British division is huge compared to that of the Germans, if it has to be supplied across 1,000's of miles of ocean.

If you take a look at Greater Germany (which was about 25% or 50% larger than Britiain the Dominions) at the time of Barbarossa, Germany had about 170 infantry divisions, with about 130 on the Eastern Front.

At the same time, Britain the Commonwealth have raised, trained equipped about 80 infantry divisions, + perhaps another 5 divisions worth of troops garrisoned at the various bases.

55 British (about 35 in the UK)
9 Australian
7 Canadian
2 NZ
3 South African
There are about 4 divisions of Czechs, Dutch, Poles, Belgians Free French - equipped supplied by the British

Total divisions = 80

In addition to this, there are about 10 - 12 "first line" Indian divisions that have British officers about 30 - 35% personnel British, and also use British supply equipment.
There are a further 8 or so Indian divisions that are being raised or trained during 1941.

Part of the problem here is that some of the Indian divisions were deployed far too soon before they had been trained.

 

[timshatz]

:

Where did this notion come from that Britian couldn't (or didn't) rearm?

Point came up that Germany expanded it's Army in the early 30s and England did not. At the time, Britain was working under the "Ten Year Plan" (or rule or some such). Idea behind it was if there was no war on the horizon for 10 years, the defense budget would be kept to a minimum. Even with Germany rearming, Britain did not see the need for re-arming herself (at least at the Cabinet level, Churchill was a voice in the wilderness at this time). So Germany got a pretty good head start on rearming and Britain really didn't get going until '36-'37 at the earliest (and even then, it didn't really get going until 1938-39). So, ok, Britain did rearm, but later and almost against it's will (Memories of the Trenches, especially Lloyd George's version of it, were still very fresh).

Interesting part about this. The head of the Exchequar in the early 30s was Chamberlin. He stuck to the Ten Year rule as though it were Gospel. Wouldn't put any money into anything like rearming if he could help it. Later, when he got to be Prime Minister, he refused to take a hard line with Germany because (and you're gonna love this one) the British military wasn't ready for war.

Talk about having your cake and eating it too!

 

[Freebird]

So Germany got a pretty good head start on rearming and Britain really didn't get going until '36-'37 at the earliest (and even then, it didn't really get going until 1938-39). So, ok, Britain did rearm, but later and almost against it's will (Memories of the Trenches, especially Lloyd George's version of it, were still very fresh).

Interesting part about this. The head of the Exchequar in the early 30s was Chamberlin. He stuck to the Ten Year rule as though it were Gospel. Wouldn't put any money into anything like rearming if he could help it. Later, when he got to be Prime Minister, he refused to take a hard line with Germany because (and you're gonna love this one) the British military wasn't ready for war.

Talk about having your cake and eating it too!

Well if we are going back into the mid 30's yes, the army was lagging behind.
But at the time there really was no need to raise a large army, as the French outnumbered the Germans, and was far better equipped with tanks aircraft. Britain concentrated on building up it's navy, remember that from 1935 - 1939 they laid down 5 new battleships, 6 new aircraft carriers + a whole bunch of cruisers 500 or so destroyers, frigates sloops.
All of that came at some very considerable expense.

For instance, while the RAF was not absolutely, positively wiped out, it was no longer a viable force. Nor was the RAF in Singapore after the first couple of weeks of the war. They were just worn down to the point of being an annoyance and not much of a threat.

I don't think the facts justify this conclusion. The RAF in Malaya was certainly hard hit, but RAF Singapore wasn't, apart from one raid on Dec 8, it wasn't bombed during the rest of Dec, as more air units were brought in. (obviously far less than needed though). The Japanese certainly considered it a threat, as British bombers continued to raid japanese airfields in Singora and northern Malaya. In early January the Japanese began to bomb Singapore almost daily, but couldn't knock out the airfields. The Japanese have over 250 fighters bombers of the 3rd Air Group the 22nd Air Flotilla, making major raids on the 12th, 13th of January, with express instructions to eliminate the airbases.
At this point there were 60 still British Dutch fighters operational to defend Singapore.


Here's the exact quote from Falk's book on Singapore (p.164):
"Increased British air activity in early January now caused a delay in the Endau operation" (Endau landing - near Mersing) "Endau was too close to the Singapore fields to be attacked in the face of British air power." "To the dismay of the Japanese commanders, {the raids} were unable to prevent continued British air operations over Malaya the nearby South China Sea"

I think it'c clear from that the RAF were still a viable threat through the first 6 weeks of the war (at least) and the Japanese did not achieve complete air superiority during this time, and they couldn't - until they occupied the central Malayan airfields, which were some 200 miles from Singpore

As for the blockade, it is rare that a blockade is 100% effective. Something always gets in and out.

There was no blocade from Dec 8 - Feb 4.
No ships were seriously attacked, either by air or by sea.
It wasn't "something" that got through, everything got through, every ship, every convoy.
The Japanese blocade was complete only from Feb 5 - Feb 15, at which point the British have retreated onto Singapore itself. (Nothing got in after Feb 5.)
So it's hard to say that Japan had "complete superiority" at sea, if they were unable to interfere in British shipping in any way whatsoever during the first 7 weeks.

If the situation had been different, they could have used that command of the sea to go where they wanted and do as they wished. It never came to that, but the option, if needed to be used, was available.

Well no, actually they couldn't. There are about 8 good ports on the West coast which would be perfect for the Japanese to land and cut off the british, but they couldn't land there.
The Japanese considered it suicide to try, as they would be trying to find their way through British minefields, passing within range of Singapore's 15" guns, subject to attack by both British Dutch submarines also subject to air attack by both the RAF and Dutch based aircraft in Sumatra.
Then there is Singapore itself, which is too heavily defended by heavy guns to try a landing.

So that really only leaves Kuantan Endau (Mersing) on the west coast, both of which the Japanese felt were not feasable until British airpower was eliminated. (especially the ability to bomb ports convoys at night)

As for negating the effect of having command of the seas, I agree with your premise that the Japanese never did another serious invasion after Khota (the invasion of Singapore Island notwithstanding), but they really didn't have to. The collapse on the penisula was so complete, that they got where they wanted to go on land.

With 20/20 hindsight it's easy to say that they didn't need to, but that's not how they saw it at the time. Had the British been halfway organized in their operations it could have spelled big trouble to the Japanese, even in mid-January

The Japanese have only 3 divisions in Malaya. (Guards, 5th 18th )

After one month of fighting the 11th Indian has been virtually wiped out, leaving the 8th Australian + one Indian division (9th) + about a half division of British Singapore fortress troops.

Now, during January the British managed to send in 2.5 divisions of reinforcements:
5 brigades (45th Ind, 44th Ind, 53rd, 54th 55th) + 10,000 replacement troops.

Unfortunately due to an absolutely appalling failure of British planning, the troops sent were either such poor quality (Indian) or else not acclimatized to the very hot conditions (the British 18th div) as to be next to useless.

On the other hand, at this time the British had three tough, veteran Australian divisions sitting in reserve in the Mideast, they could easily have been sent instead of the Indians the British troops. (put the Brits in the Mideast instead to give them time to acclimatize)

With 3.5 Australian divisions (all but one veteran) and about 1.5 divisions of Indian British, this gives 5 Allied divisions to 3 Japanese, which should be able to halt the advance in northern Johore. They also had the oppertunity to send in far more air power than they did - something the japanese couldn't know at the time.

Keep in mind that the southern 1/3 of Malaya isn't primarily jungle, it's mostly fields plantations with open spaces that would allow the Allies a much more effective use of artillery antitank - something that we were much stronger in than the Japanese.

 

[tomo pauk]

Some great info here. Thanks

 

[timshatz]

Freebird, I give up. If your line of reason is accurate, the Brits never lost Singapore. The place was indefensible from the start. Not doubting your facts but the interpetation of them all means the disaster that was the defense of Singapore never happen. It did, it was a complete cockup. Possible the worst in WW2.

Have a good one guys.

 

[Freebird]

Don't disagree. None of the Allied powers was strong enough to repulse the Japanese attacks where and when they occurred but the politicians were reluctant to get dragged into, or further into, conflict by making formal alliances. Had they made those alliances in July, it's likely the Allies would have done much better against the Japanese.

Perhaps, but I have my doubts that they would want to, given British weakness in the area.
Better perhaps to stay neutral and hope that the brewing war will take place elsewhere.

Yes but Thailand was still the pivot-point. It afforded the Japanese forces internal lines between the 2 theatres.

Agreed, I'd still like to plan an operation in Thailand, even if it's just air operations to attack Japanese shipping mine the port.

No fleet was needed if there were sufficient defences in Malaya to secure the seaward flanks. Without adequate airpower to find and interdict Japanese shipping or the ground forces to defend in depth, a fleet was vital but just wasn't there. In short, the strategy for Singapore relied on hope which is never a good planning assumption.

I don't really see the fleet as a viable option, as the size needed to outgun the Japanese in home waters is far too large.
Far easier and cheaper to quickly send air assests to match Japanese power in the area.

But how would that have stopped the Japanese. They were already moving into southern Indo-China. An embargo against a resource-poor nation like Japan was (and still is) a reasonable political response.

It's quite clear from Japanese planning that they would only go to war with the US/UK in 41/42 if they were backed into a corner by the embargo. If they could obtain oil resources to continue their war in China then they wouldn't attack the west.
(Which the British should know, as they were reading both diplonatic "JN-25" military signals)

London and Washington both failed to realise, however, that Japan's progression towards militaristic government was not going to promote peaceful resolution. Like Hitler's Germany, Japan's only response to a problem was to escalate.

That's the key point right there.

Again, hope was the main strategy, coupled with an expectation that the Japanese would mount an overland offensive from Indo-China despite Percival's earlier assessment that landings on the east coast were feasible during the monsoon. It was hoped that the Japanese wouldn't attack until 1942 when the build-up of forces in Malaya would have been pretty much complete. Unfortunately, the Japanese weren't obliging and the PBI, particularly the Indian units, many of whom could scarcely fire a rifle, found themselves facing tanks with no way of combating them.

I think Churchill deluded himself into thinking that the US would deal with the Japanese nuisance quickly, that Japan would cower in fear at the mighty US fleet.

And here lies the rub. You don't remove "properly trained and equipped" divisions from ongoing theatres of conflict to reinforce a colonial outpost.

Malaya was more than just some "outpost" it was the key colony in the Far East, which produced vital rubber, oil tin, and on which the British taxpayer had invested some 60 million pounds to build a base for the fleet.

But I think that if you look carefully, you'll find that my proposed deployment to malaya doesn't take anything away from any "ongoing theatres of conflict", the key changes being the addition of a Canadian division, and the substitution of the Australian 9th for the Indian 11th.

 

[Freebird]

Freebird, I give up. If your line of reason is accurate, the Brits never lost Singapore. The place was indefensible from the start. Not doubting your facts but the interpetation of them all means the disaster that was the defense of Singapore never happen. It did, it was a complete cockup. Possible the worst in WW2.

Have a good one guys.

No Tim, what I'm saying is that Singapore was very defensible from seaward attack, and that a Japanese landing in Southern Malaya was very risky while the British RAF was operating. What that the Japanese needed to do was to attack Malaya overland from Thailand, capture airbases near to Singapore to allow their superior air force to neutralize the RAF - which is exactly what they did do.

Singapore was very defensible, but provided and only provided that Southern Johore was well defended.
It wasn't, for many of the reasons listed by myself Buffnut. (poor quality troops, no defensive preparations, lack of air power, etc etc)

Basically the Japanese "snuck in the back door" to Singapore.
Worst defeat in WWII? I'm inclined to agree with you, especially as it was so wasteful.

The British chiefs knew that Singapore's weakness was to an overland attack, yet unfortunately Churchill "knew better" and dismissed their advice.

Had British forces been able to interdict or repulse the Japanese invasion fleet and prevent them from taking Singora, then the situation would have been very different. The only option available to Yamashita would have been a long overland invasion from Indo-China which would have taken a long time and thus afforded time for further reinforcements to arrive.

Indeed.

So let's continue with the hypothetical "what would you do differently" shall we?
Assume that the air forces have been reinforced by about 600 aircraft. (The number authorized earlier by the Chiefs War Cabinet) I'll get in to the specifics of the aircraft later.

If I was to deploy forces (which I listed earlier) it would be something like this: (on the afternoon of the 7th)

Australian 9th HQ with two brigades at Gurun, with the 18th brigade at the border, on the Jitra-Singora road.

Australian 8th HQ with two brigades at Ipoh, with a brigade forward at Kroh.
1st Corps HQ the Australian mech brigade at Ipoh.


Canadian 3rd division HQ with a brigade on the road/rail junction at Kuala Lipis, along with thew corps HQ the mech brigade.
A Canadian brigade at Kota Bharu, and a second brigade in reserve 10 miles back near Kuala Kerai. An Indian brigade attached to the Canadian corps at Kuantan

Indian 9th HQ, Indian III corps HQ, one Indian brigade, the fortress brigade a marine brigade in Singapore.
Two Indian brigades of the 9th division in Johore

The British brigade NZ brigade in army reserve in Gemas Kuala Lumpur respectively.

How does that look?

 

[buffnut453]

Actually, in addition to having sufficient air power actually to hurt the Japanese forces, the other key capabilities that were needed were:

1. More PR aircraft.
2. Better intel staff who could stand up to political pressure - they knew the enemy's capabilities, they had identified the right indicators of impending attack but they became obsessed with "finding the invasion fleet" as an indicator when the presence of fighter aircraft in western Indo-China was the real give-away.
3. Stronger collaboration between the UK and US over defence of the Malay Barrier. The presence of one aircraft carrier, a cruiser squadron (USN ) and destroyer escorts really would have made the Japanese think twice about mounting the seaborne invasion of eastern Malaya and Singora.

 

[tomo pauk]

How much a small fleet of submarines would've hurt Japanese efforts?
Historically the IJN was not well equipped trained for anti-sub work.

 

[parsifal]

The RNN had a number of subs deployed into the area, and the USN had something like 30 subs based at cavite. The US subs achieved very little, partly because their stock of tordpedoes was blown up in the opening rounds of the campaign. The RNN subs performed somewhat better, but were still fairly limited in their effect.

Whilst Japanese ASW was admittedlfairly poor, it didnt have to be very good to deal with the allied submarine threat at this time. Japan actually captured more shipping than she lost in the first 3 months of the campaign, and in the first year of the war, there was only a net loss of shipping to allied subs of something like 250000 tons. in comparison the allies lost about 1 million tons of shipping to japanese subs and also to capture.

One of the myths of the war was that the IJN did not engage in tonnage wars.....in point of fact they did....its just that the camapign was not as well organised as the german, and they tended to flip flop between fleet support work and convoy attacks. The effort was only eve half hearted, and particulalry later on was subverted to other tasks like transport of supplies

There were only two subs of the RN in the whole theatre, and these were some thousands of miles away. Brit subs did okay in the war, but were handicapped by short endurance and range. The weapon par excellance in the pacific was the gato class sub, but there were very vew of these available until later in the year

 

[davebender]

How is that different from Britain esculating the German-Polish border dispute into a general European war by providing Poland with a military guarantee? Or the USA basing 29 long range submarines and 4 heavy bombardment groups on Luzon in response to the Japanese occupation of Vietnam? (The four B17 groups didn't all make it by December 1941. But they were enroute along with hundreds of fighter aircraft plus a dive bomber group and a medium bomber group.)

Everyone threatened military intervention. And everyone had what they considered to be good reasons.

 

[parsifal]

Hi FB

i think your alternative plan is better than the historical one, but at the risk of harping, i think it fails to take into account the likley japanese respoonse to an increased Allied deployment into the area. My opinion is that if the allies began this heightened preparation from march 1941, this would have a big impact on the japanese. i think the likley result would be that the japanese would also begin mobilsation early. instead of five japanese divisions there would probably be about twelve to face....instead of 600 a/c, you are likley to face in excess of 1200. Its at least arguable that instead of being confronted with a neutral Thailand, you will have either an occupied, but more likley an axis thailand.

against that type of problem, this heightened allied deployment is unlikley to succeed. Churchill was right i am afraid....the only game in town for the british with two tother wars raging in Europe, was to try and bluff their way out

 

[davebender]

IMO that depends on what Britain deploys to Malaya.

Infantry divisions and short range fighter squadrons (i.e. Spitfires and Hurricanes) are defensive in nature and no threat to Japan. Long range submarines and long range bombers that can strike Japanese territory or Japanese shipping are an entirely different matter.

 

[Freebird]

Hi FB

i think your alternative plan is better than the historical one, but at the risk of harping, i think it fails to take into account the likley japanese respoonse to an increased Allied deployment into the area. My opinion is that if the allies began this heightened preparation from march 1941, this would have a big impact on the japanese. i think the likley result would be that the japanese would also begin mobilsation early.

Not harping, there's nothing wrong with critical analysis and exploring all ramifications.
However I think I should make it clear that there will be no heightened preparation in Mar '41, and nothing absolutely NOTHING additional will arrive in Malaya in Mar, April, May, June or July.
By the end of September there would be an increase of about two brigades or about 6,000 troops (76,000 vs 70,000)
I would expect that the last 3 or 4 brigades would arrive from mid-Oct to mid-Nov.

So the Japanese won't be mobilizing early, nor really have much concern until November, when they might assign an extra regiment or two to the 25th Army.

against that type of problem, this heightened allied deployment is unlikley to succeed. Churchill was right i am afraid....the only game in town for the british with two tother wars raging in Europe, was to try and bluff their way out

I don't accept the premise that bluffing could in any way succeed. The Japanese had two options; go to war or else have the Empire ( Emperor) suffer a humiliating defeat. I can't see that any knowledgable expert would think that #2 would happen.

Increased Allied defence in Malaya give the US British more time to send in needed units

instead of five japanese divisions there would probably be about twelve to face....instead of 600 a/c, you are likley to face in excess of 1200. Its at least arguable that instead of being confronted with a neutral Thailand, you will have either an occupied, but more likley an axis thailand.

Parsifal the Japanese do not have a dozen divisions to send, there are only about 12 available for the entire Southern Army Group.
Nor could they supply more than 3 or 4 divisions through Singora, as it was they were critically short of supplies at the end, and needed quick British surrender.


I've taken some time to diagram the Japanese armies.
Of the 16th army in Japan, it was sent to Java in Feb with the 2nd 48th divisions, with the 56th transferred to Burma along with the 18th, and the 4th 21st sent to Philippines in their place.

However, the Japanese have only about 4 regiments lift capacity, and they also don't have LCV's etc, meaning that there is a slow transfer of troops to smll craft to land on the beaches.
One regiment (143) lands in the ports in Thailand, while 3 regiments land at Singora, Patina Kota Baharu on the 8th.

I can see the Japanese transferring the 2nd to Indochina to bolster the 25th army, and perhaps cancel the landing on Dec 15th in Sarawack.

The Japanese have no choice but to invade Thailand with the 15th army. I can't see them abandoning the invasion of the Philippines either.

]

 

[parsifal]

However I think I should make it clear that there will be no heightened preparation in Mar '41, and nothing absolutely NOTHING additional will arrive in Malaya in Mar, April, May, June or July.
By the end of September there would be an increase of about two brigades or about 6,000 troops (76,000 vs 70,000)
I would expect that the last 3 or 4 brigades would arrive from mid-Oct to mid-Nov.

It would be impossible to keep an increased level of military plannig a secret. There are simply too many nations and too many military commands involved to hide this sort of thing. The Japanese knew very well from the military conferences that did occur what the allies were planning, they also knew very well what was actually deployed into the operational areas. If increased military preparations by the allies were begun in March of 1941, it would not matter that the allies tried, (with perfect hinsight I might add), to rush in reinforcements at the last minute. The Japanese would simply know of the planned accelarated expansions and react accordingly.

So the Japanese won't be mobilizing early, nor really have much concern until November, when they might assign an extra regiment or two to the 25th Army.

This is an extremely dangerous assumption, and the sort of fantasy that the japanese were guilty of in their planning in the later campaigns of the war. It expects and predicts that the Japanese will act in the manner expected and takes no account of contingencies. Sound military planning doesnt take risks like that. It hopes for the best but prepres for the worst. This plan is doing the opposite I am afraid.

I don't accept the premise that bluffing could in any way succeed. The Japanese had two options; go to war or else have the Empire ( Emperor) suffer a humiliating defeat. I can't see that any knowledgable expert would think that #2 would happen.

I tend to agree, but I dont accept that in 1941 the allies could do anything to stop the Japanese war preprations. Perhaps the best strategy therefore would be to pull back the forces for later use. If PoW and Repulse had been deployed to Trincomallee instead of Singapore, they would have posed as much of a deterrent, and not been risked as possible targets, just to look at an obvious example.

Increased Allied defence in Malaya give the US British more time to send in needed units

Not really, it just means a bigger bag of prisoners in my opinion.


Parsifal the Japanese do not have a dozen divisions to send, there are only about 12 available for the entire Southern Army Group.
Nor could they supply more than 3 or 4 divisions through Singora, as it was they were critically short of supplies at the end, and needed quick British surrender.


The additional divisions I am mentioning would come from China and Manchuria, and the Home Islands defences. These units in turn would be replaced by the mobilised Japanese army units in their original stations of China and manchukuo. Historically the Japanese began their mobilization in November, and had completed it by March 1942, having raised in excess of 16Divs by the beginning of April. If the Japanese mobilization begins in March, they complete their mobilization by July, with an additional 12-20 divs added to the IJA, fully equipped and fully trained and all with combat experience.

With regard to supply, it would be difficult to provide supply, however, with an additional 5 months over what they had historically to prepare, they are simply going to stockpile a greater amount of munitions in their forward base areas like Hainan and IndoChina. To address the logistics, and assuming a greater level of co-operation from the thais, they simply need to ship in a few more trains to the region to get the supplies from IndoChina to Malaya, or they could organize an additional Baseforce to operate out of Singora. In the initial days they will be short of supplies, but this is a transitory problem for them. As the allies fall back, as they must, the that increased allied presence will leave an increased cache of supplies for Japanese usage. Historically the Corps level of Committment by the allies yielded more than enough in captured supplies to sustain the Japanese Army in Malaya for most of its campaign. They were short of some artillery munitions by the time of the assault on Singapore, but this has tended to be overblown as an issue in post war revisionist histories.

I've taken some time to diagram the Japanese armies.
Of the 16th army in Japan, it was sent to Java in Feb with the 2nd 48th divisions, with the 56th transferred to Burma along with the 18th, and the 4th 21st sent to Philippines in their place.

However, the Japanese have only about 4 regiments lift capacity, and they also don't have LCV's etc, meaning that there is a slow transfer of troops to smll craft to land on the beaches.
One regiment (143) lands in the ports in Thailand, while 3 regiments land at Singora, Patina Kota Baharu on the 8th.

I can see the Japanese transferring the 2nd to Indochina to bolster the 25th army, and perhaps cancel the landing on Dec 15th in Sarawack.

The Japanese have no choice but to invade Thailand with the 15th army. I can't see them abandoning the invasion of the Philippines either.

The Japanese in their initial campaigns had a roughly 8 division lift, because they stripped out their coastal shipping fleet temporarily to bolster their lift capacity. In 1941 the Japanese had the most comprehensive and effective amphibious force in the world, and whilst it looks quaint and inneffective compared to the later US capability, in 1941 it was as revolutionary as the German Parachute arm. Even though your revised deployment for the British does thicken up the defences, it is still relatively weak and inadequate. You are attempting to defend a front that is about 300 miles long with about 8 divs, which is about 40 miles per div of frontage. I assume the Japanese are not going to be artifically constrained to the historical landing points....their Khota Baru landings may well occur at another point on the coast.....Against a concentrated assault by a divisional sized assault force, the defnders, which instead of defending in company strength will now have twice that amount at the landing point, are still going to be forced back in detail.

With regard to Thailand, there may not be a necessity to invade Thailand. If Thailand is more co-operative, for the reasons I have previously suggested, they may in fact be a more co-operative ally of the japanese. The japanese may even begin their war deployed in Thailand.

Your planning is imaginative, and I am not saying that it is completely impossible, however the exercise you have embarked on is far to optimistic in its expectations of how the Japanese might have reacted. You are assuming that things are not possible when they are, and also assuming that the Japanese are going to act in a certain way, when at this time one of the advantages they possessed was acting in ways that had not been predicted by the allies. Why all of a sudden are the allies being assumed this quality to a greater extent than any other protagonist since probably Alexander the Great, whilst the japanese are reduced to the foresight of a group of Luddites???? This is the ultimate inconsistency of your plan IMO....

 

[buffnut453]

Increased Allied defence in Malaya give the US British more time to send in needed units

Not really, it just means a bigger bag of prisoners in my opinion.

It rather depends on where and how Allied reinforcements are used. Removing access to Singora would remove the only major port on the east cost of the Kra Isthmus which would force the Japanese to undertake an overland assault from Indochina which would take much longer, extend the Japanese logistic lines and make their forces more susceptible to aerial interdiction (note that, according to Tsuji, strafing by RAF fighters was the thing they most feared because it was the most effective form of Allied attack). I also believe that Malaya was defensible, just not with the quality and employment of forces used in 1941-42.

Parsifal the Japanese do not have a dozen divisions to send, there are only about 12 available for the entire Southern Army Group. Nor could they supply more than 3 or 4 divisions through Singora, as it was they were critically short of supplies at the end, and needed quick British surrender.

The additional divisions I am mentioning would come from China and Manchuria, and the Home Islands defences. These units in turn would be replaced by the mobilised Japanese army units in their original stations of China and manchukuo. Historically the Japanese began their mobilization in November, and had completed it by March 1942, having raised in excess of 16Divs by the beginning of April. If the Japanese mobilization begins in March, they complete their mobilization by July, with an additional 12-20 divs added to the IJA, fully equipped and fully trained and all with combat experience.

However, bear in mind that Yamashita didn't initially deploy all his divisions in the assault on Malaya because he was concerned about the combat effectiveness of one formation. I rather doubt your assessment of a uniformly trained and combat-experienced cadre of divisions available for operations in Malaya. The combat effectiveness of these formations would also be reduced if Allied defensive preparations forced an overland assault through Indochina.

With regard to Thailand, there may not be a necessity to invade Thailand. If Thailand is more co-operative, for the reasons I have previously suggested, they may in fact be a more co-operative ally of the japanese. The japanese may even begin their war deployed in Thailand.

But we know that Thailand wanted to remain neutral. There were Japanese-leaning elements within the Government, but there were also senior officials who maintained an anti-Japanese policy. Thailand was unique in being the only Asian nation, other than Japan, that had retained independence. As such, I don't see it simply folding until such time as it was attacked.

 

[parsifal]

It rather depends on where and how Allied reinforcements are used. Removing access to Singora would remove the only major port on the east cost of the Kra Isthmus which would force the Japanese to undertake an overland assault from Indochina which would take much longer, extend the Japanese logistic lines and make their forces more susceptible to aerial interdiction (note that, according to Tsuji, strafing by RAF fighters was the thing they most feared because it was the most effective form of Allied attack). I also believe that Malaya was defensible, just not with the quality and employment of forces used in 1941-42.

I agree with this assessment, but do not agree that increasing the ground forces in the Peninsula is going to make much of a difference. For every ground forces card the allies play, the japanese are going to be able to trump that with greater forces, and better trained and motivated to boot. The only way that the Japanese ground forces can be stopped is if they can be challenged and defeated in the air, and at sea. and in 1941 the british just couldnt do this, not with 188 a/c, and realistically, not even with 566 a/c.


However, bear in mind that Yamashita didn't initially deploy all his divisions in the assault on Malaya because he was concerned about the combat effectiveness of one formation. I rather doubt your assessment of a uniformly trained and combat-experienced cadre of divisions available for operations in Malaya. The combat effectiveness of these formations would also be reduced if Allied defensive preparations forced an overland assault through Indochina.

I thought the division you are referring to was held back mostly as a strategic reserve. The Japanese were expecting to be held up on at least one of the fronts they were pressing, and wanted a ready reserve to cover such an eventuality. As it turns out the reserve was hardly needed until the very end.

With regard to the combat effectiveness of the units, you do understand I am proposing the Japanese would replace existing, battlehardened divisions from China and Manchuria with reservist Divisions, as they did historically, and send these battle hardened veterans so relieved to Malaya instead. In 1941 the Japanese Infantry formations were superior to even the AIF formations, because of superior training, tactics, experienced leadership, and equipment more suited to the Jungle than the allies. According to DuPuy a US colonel from the 70's who specialised in determining the relative effectiveness of the various protagonists, and finding out their various weaknesses....in December 19421, even against fully trained allied vets, each Japanese soldier was equivalent to 2.37 Allied soldiers. Against untrained levies like the filipinos, the force multipliers are even worse, around 4.5 soldiers per japanese soldier. This explains why the japanese could conduct such offensives as they did with such slender margins of superiority, and still win comfortably

But we know that Thailand wanted to remain neutral. There were Japanese-leaning elements within the Government, but there were also senior officials who maintained an anti-Japanese policy. Thailand was unique in being the only Asian nation, other than Japan, that had retained independence. As such, I don't see it simply folding until such time as it was attacked.

Dont agree with that. Thailand had fought a war with the Vichy in January 1941, but were prevented from pursuing the full program of conquests that they had wanted by the japanese, who essentially intervened and took Cochin for themselves. The only persons that mattered at that time in the thai administration were the King and Phibul. The King was ambivalent essentially, and Phibul was opportunistic. A US intelligence estimate of the time suggested that the Thais were likley to go pro-Japanese if given enough time and enough incentive. They suggested the British needed to counter Japanese influence by applying some gentle pressure and making gurantees for Thai security. Britain never gave those gurantees. But neither did the Japanese apply much sustained pressure, and they certainly did not wave any real carrots in front of the thais. Thailand had wanted a greater share of Cochin and some of the states of Eastern Burma and also some of the northern provinces of Malaya. They were given only a fraction of those claims, and in the case of the Northern Malayan states were only given agreement after the invasion by the japanese. In other words, japanese timing in their "diplomacy" was attrocious

Its not hard to extrapolate what might have happened if the protagonists had organised their relations with the Thais a bit better (which was possible if more time and attention was given to the issue). A sort of bidding war would have been entered into, to try and woo the thais one way or another. Whilst i agree that a likley outcome is that Thailand might simply shut down under such pressure, another is that they might be wooed by the carrots being offered. Since the japanese had more carrots to offer the Thais at that time, it is much more likley they would follow the Japanese path rather than the allied path.

If the Thais remain neutral as is likley, I agree, the Japanese have a harder task but by no means an impossible one. In that situation I would begin the invasion of Thailand a few days before the main assault, including an invasion of the isthmus. If the allies do react, the japanese are at war two days earlier than scheduled....the US Pacific fleet puts to sea, and is promply sunk at sea, all the better from a japanese perspective.....in the Phillipines Mac has a few more days to dither and procrastinate as he did historically, whilst in Malaya, the british would attempt to implement their Matador strategy, which I think would be a disaster.

 

[stug3]

Men of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders training with a Lanchester six-wheeled armoured car in the Malayan jungle, 13 November 1941.