Did the 8th Air Force precision bomb or area bomb? (1 Viewer)

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I thought 617 squadron was the only user of the SABS during wartime and 9 sqn used the standard Mk XIV

I've got 9 Squadron with the SABS in late'44, after the September Tirpitz raid. The other two squadrons (whose numbers aren't on my PC, or at least I can't find them) used the Mk XIV. I'll try to dig out the source for this when I get home.

Incidentally then Air Commodore Bennett, fulminating in the lack of accuracy of Bomber Command's Main Force units, said that 50% of crews didn't bother to use their bomb sight at all!

Cheers

Steve
 
From Wiki, food for thought...

"For the U.S. Army Air Force, daylight bombing was normal based upon box formations for defence from fighters. Bombing was coordinated through a lead aircraft but although still nominally precision bombing (as opposed to the area bombing carried out by RAF Bomber Command) the result of bombing from high level was still spread over an area. Before the war on practice ranges, some USAAF crews were able to produce very accurate results, but over Europe with weather and German fighters and anti-aircraft guns and the limited training for new crews this level of accuracy was impossible to reproduce. The US defined the target area as being a 1,000 ft (300 m) radius circle around the target point - for the majority of USAAF attacks only about 20% of the bombs dropped struck in this area. The U.S. daytime bombing raids were more effective in reducing German defences by engaging the German Luftwaffe than destruction of the means of aircraft production.

In the summer of 1944, forty-seven B-29's raided Japan's Yawata Steel Works from bases in China; only one plane actually hit the target area, and only with one of its bombs. This single 500 lb (230 kg) general purpose bomb represented one quarter of one percent of the 376 bombs dropped over Yawata on that mission. It took 108 B-17 bombers, crewed by 1,080 airmen, dropping 648 bombs to guarantee a 96 percent chance of getting just two hits inside a 400 x 500 ft (150 m) German power-generation plant."


I think this sums up what defined "Precision Daylight Bombing" when you see what defined the target area and what the actual results were. Again consider the technology of that day and don't compare it with what is achievable today!

Smart-Bombs.jpg
 
It is frustrating that even today I pick up books and watch documentaries in which experts claim that unlike the RAF the Americans didn't area bomb, I hope these experts are of comfort to the survivors of area bombing. I understand the horrors of area bombing and it was a truly horrific and terrible strategy, but the stark reality was either area bomb Germany or be area bombed, invaded and then enslaved and murdered, there was no third option. The Nazis had to be stopped and stopped they were and if anyone is looking for someone to blame for the area bombing of Germany then blame the Nazis, what Bomber Harris said about sowing the seed and reaping the whirlwind was right and we need not feel ashamed of it.
 
From Wiki, food for thought...


In the summer of 1944, forty-seven B-29's raided Japan's Yawata Steel Works from bases in China; only one plane actually hit the target area, and only with one of its bombs. This single 500 lb (230 kg) general purpose bomb represented one quarter of one percent of the 376 bombs dropped over Yawata on that mission.I think this sums up what defined "Precision Daylight Bombing" when you see what defined the target area and what the actual results were. Again consider the technology of that day and don't compare it with what is achievable today!

The B-29 over Japan has serious problems with accurate bombing. Japan has a persistent, strong and unfamiliar jet stream and the B-29 got into the stratosphere. The firebombing of Tokyo at low altitude was specifically to avoid this.
 
The B-29 over Japan has serious problems with accurate bombing. Japan has a persistent, strong and unfamiliar jet stream and the B-29 got into the stratosphere. The firebombing of Tokyo at low altitude was specifically to avoid this.
That's a well known fact but was unknown prior to WW2 and even during the B-29 development. In a perfect world the B-29 should have theoretically been able to bomb accuracy at altitude.

"The Norden bombsight was a tachometric bombsight used by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and the United States Navy during World War II, and the United States Air Force in the Korean and the Vietnam Wars to aid the crew of bomber aircraft in dropping bombs accurately. Key to the operation of the Norden were two features; a mechanical computer that calculated the bomb's trajectory based on current flight conditions, and a linkage to the bomber's autopilot that let it react quickly and accurately to changes in the wind or other effects.

Together, these features allowed for unprecedented accuracy in day bombing from high altitudes; in testing the Norden demonstrated a circular error probable (CEP) of 75 feet (23 m), an astonishing performance for the era. This accuracy allowed direct attacks on ships, factories, and other point targets. Both the Navy and the AAF saw this as a means to achieve war aims through high-altitude bombing, without resorting to area bombing, as proposed by European forces. To achieve these aims, the Norden was granted the utmost secrecy well into the war, and was part of a then-unprecedented production effort on the same scale as the Manhattan Project. Carl L. Norden, Inc. ranked 46th among United States corporations in the value of World War II military production contracts.[1]

In practice it was not possible to achieve this level of accuracy in combat conditions, with the average CEP in 1943 being 1,200 feet (366 m). Both the Navy and Air Forces had to give up on the idea of pinpoint attacks during the war. The Navy turned to dive bombing and skip bombing to attack ships, while the Air Forces developed the lead bomber concept to improve accuracy. Nevertheless, the Norden's reputation as a pin-point device lived on, due in no small part to Norden's own advertising of the device after secrecy was reduced during the war."


Norden bombsight - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Daylight Precision Bombing
 
I realise this thread had pretty much run its course, but I remembered Davis splits his tonnages out by bomb type, so I had a look at how Incendiary attacks on Germany weigh up between Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th Air Forces.

BC and 8th were closer than I had expected, both in terms of the % of the load represented by incendiaries, and by the total tons of incendiaries dropped.

incperc_zpsf032c477.jpg


inctons_zps9ffe9d91.jpg


The 15th AF seems to have been closes to the original USAAF intentions, IIRC a much higher % of their sorties against oil targets.
 
Some comments derived from Bartsch regarding this topic as it relates to the early PTO:

During the initial air raid on Clark Field, the very well-trained, veteran IJN bombadiers flying over Clark field unopposed by USAAF Interceptors which weren't able to climb to their altitude, put virtually all their bombs on target. The airfield was rendered nearly useless and many bombs fell on individual aircraft including parked B-17s and P-40's in the process of taking off. I am sure the latter was due mainly to the fact that so many bombs were dropped directly on and distributed over the air strip itself. IIRC, all the dozen or so B-17s present were destroyed as well as most to nearly all but perhaps two of the P-40B fighters of the 20th Pursuit Squadron then on the ground.

The example gives a sense of what could be achieved under essentially ideal circumstances (no enemy opposition and crews exceptionally well trained) even without a Norden bombsight from high altitude (greater than ~25,000').

WRT the efficacy of the B-17 and its accuracy, the early experience in that theater showed (or should have shown) the limitations of the early Bomber deterrent philosophy.

1/15/42: during a strike against IJA forces in northern Malaya, 2 of 7 B-17Ds aborted. No damage reported.
1/16/42: 2 B-17Es 3 LB-30s attack on shipping Langoan airfield, no damage reported.
1/19/42: 10 B-17Es and 4 LB-30s were in theater. 8 B-17Es attack Jolo airfield, resulted in a total wx abort.
1/23/42: Unknown number of Martin 139WH (export B-10s) attack 16 IJN amphib invasion ships off Balikpapan, NEIAF reports destroying 2 transports. NEI Sub sinks 1 a Night attack by USN DDs sink 3 more. 1/24/42: 8 B-17s unk. # of Martin 139WH attack ships anchored lying off Balikpapan.
1/25/42: 8 B-17s Martin 139WH reprise prior Balikpapan attack, 6 damaged and forced to land at Singosari, Java.
1/26/42: 5 B-17s attack same targets, damaging one seaplane tender (see below)
1/27/42: 6 B-17s attack same targets
To the IJN/IJA the cumulative damage was no more than a speed bump. B-17s account for one ship known hit and damaged but probably believed sunk at the time.Of course, some sources say optimistic B-17s crews typically interpreted their bomb splashes as hits.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Sanuki Maru_t.htm

"1/27/42, Balikpapan. At 1259, from an altitude of 5.000 meters (~16,400'), five Boeing B-17E "Flying Fortresses", of the USAAF's 19th Bomb Group at Malang, attack SANUKI MARU. 's On the first run two of her F1M2 Petes are damaged. At 1309, the bombers return for a second attack. Two near-misses explode under the waterline very close off portside foreship. The outer hull planking is dented up to 6 feet between frames 120 to 132. The explosions open seams over a length of 25 deet below the waterline causing complete flooding of No. 2 hold and partial flooding of No. 1 hold. Bombs and ammunition are offloaded onto small cargo ship KUREHA MARU No. 3."

I can see the logic evolving from this early experience: If a raid by half a dozen B-17's fails to make a dent then clearly an attack by 60 or 600 must be needed.
The B-17 in small numbers was evidently no more effective from (I assume typically) high altitude against fixed and anchored targets than were the lower altitude P-35's P-40's (attacking IJN ships off Vigan), ancient Martins and RAF, RAAF and NZ Hudsons attacking invasion ships off Malaya at not much more than mast head height.
 
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It is frustrating that even today I pick up books and watch documentaries in which experts claim that unlike the RAF the Americans didn't area bomb,

It is a myth that has arisen, like the RAF refusing to take part in the late war bombing of oil targets.

Between June 1944 and the end of the war in Europe the 8th Air Force devoted 16% of its sorties to area or 'area type' raids. This is a significant proportion, though less than the RAF's 36% for the same period.

In this period the RAF devoted 15% of it's total sorties to attacks on oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures are larger than the 8th Air Forces efforts (13% and 73,000 tons respectively).

Sometimes the facts just get in the way of a good story :)

Cheers

Steve
 
It is a myth that has arisen, like the RAF refusing to take part in the late war bombing of oil targets.

One of the interesting things about Davis' work on the bombing war is that he says, quite plainly, that it's less a myth that has arisen than a deliberate revision of the facts in the immediate post-war period.

This is taken from the sheet key included with the book:

cities.jpg


(Note also what Davis has to say about BC playing coy with the truth about bombing France.)

You'll note Davis has reviewed the original orders, to contrast them with post-war reports, and also, I think quite importantly, to distinguish between area raids by order from "area-like" raids by effect:

AreaType.jpg


There's various ways to slice it, but I've done it as below, since 8th and 15th really only area-bombed versus Germany and Austria:

areaexcel3.jpg


Davis' view is that the area raids were "revised" to become raids on Industrial Areas - as you can see from one of the reports of the USSBS, Davis' area figures correspond closely to what was described post-war as attacks on industrial areas. (I've included the relevant link in the graphic.)

IndAreas.jpg


The thing is, the area raids were acknowledged as such during the war itself by the USAAF - the following are taken from the various bomb damage files I've posted here before:

areaAck1.png


AreaAck2.jpg


AreaAck3.jpg


As Steve's mentioned, the USAAF area-bombed far less frequently than the RAF. That said, arguing the relative proportions between air forces is radically different than arguing that only one air force did it.
 
In this period the RAF devoted 15% of it's total sorties to attacks on oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures are larger than the 8th Air Forces efforts (13% and 73,000 tons respectively).

Do you have any data on the types of bombs the RAF used on oil targets?

My understanding is that the USAAF used 500lb and smaller bombs - more bombs meant a better chance of hitting something.
 
Theoretically, from that altitude, is it not possible for all planes to sight on the same target?
 
They can "sight" on it but unless they fly over it exactly they can't hit it. There is no way to move the bomb laterally, or impart a sideways vector.

The idea of linking the bombsight through the autopilot was to allow the bombardier to "fly" the aircraft over the target.
 
Do you have any data on the types of bombs the RAF used on oil targets?

My understanding is that the USAAF used 500lb and smaller bombs - more bombs meant a better chance of hitting something.

Hi Wuzak,

Thanks to the efforts of Australian archivists, it's actually possible to determine for oneself what bombloads were carried on which raids, from original documents.

The Official History of the RAAF describes which of its squadrons (460, 462, 463, 466 and 467) participated on which raids in the Oil Campaign in this chapter:

http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/pdf/RCDIG1070709--1-.PDF

With the raid / date information in hand, one can then go to the Australian National Archives website to have a look at scans of the relevant squadrons' Operations Record Books.

Search the collection ? National Archives of Australia

For example, the RAAF history says that 460 Sqn dispatched 18 Lancasters on the raid against Scholven-Buer on 18/19 July 1944. If you type "460 Squadron" into the search box, you come up with a results page. Click on the "digitised item" heading to see which records have been scanned. Click the "paper sheaf" icon for the item labeled " A9186 147 Unit history of number 460 Squadron - January 1944 to October 1945", and you'll get something which looks like this (I hope):

http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=1359212

Click the "Enlarge" radio button for a better view.

Enter "365" in the Page box and you'll come to the relevant scan, in which the squadron archivist has recorded that the squadron that night despatched 18x4,000 lb cookies and 288x500 lb bombs to Gelsenkirchen.

On page 417 you'll see that 460 was involved in the raid on the oil tankage at Aire, despatching 300x1,000 lb-ers and 100x500 lbs.

Takes a little time, but it's worth a look.

I believe the post-war debriefings (along with studies undertaken during the war itself) indicated that a few hits from heavy bombs caused more damage than the same weight of hits by smaller bombs. Have more info on this, will post in another thread.
 
Thanks mhuxt.

I will check that out later.

From those numbers, I take it that there were 18 aircraft in that squadron, each carrying 1 x 4000lb HC "Cookie" and 16 x 500lb MC/GP bombs. A total load of 12,000lb each.
 
Thanks mhuxt.

I will check that out later.

From those numbers, I take it that there were 18 aircraft in that squadron, each carrying 1 x 4000lb HC "Cookie" and 16 x 500lb MC/GP bombs. A total load of 12,000lb each.

No worries. Yes, I think your calculations are correct.
 

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