Did the 8th Air Force precision bomb or area bomb? (1 Viewer)

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Did BC suffer higher flak losses due to bombing at lower altitudes?
 
Did BC suffer higher flak losses due to bombing at lower altitudes?

No. Flak accounted for around 40% of Bomber Command operational losses at night compared to over 50% of 8th Air Force operational losses by day.

The night fighter was Bomber Command's worst enemy until close to the end.

Cheers

Steve
 
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Did BC suffer higher flak losses due to bombing at lower altitudes?

Won't answer your question.

Aircraft Total Sorties Losses Sorties flown per loss
Lancaster 156,192 3,832 40.76
Halifax 82,773 2,232 37.08
Wellington 47,409 1,709 27.74
Mosquito 39,795 396 100.5
Hampden 16,541 607 27.25
Blenheim 12,214 534 22.87
Stirling 18,440 769 23.98
Whitley 9,858 431 22.87
Boston 1,609 46 34.98
Ventura 997 42 23.74
Manchester 1,269 76 16.70

WW2 RAF Bomber Command Stats
 
What flak was very good at , far exceeding fighters, day or night, in this respect, was damaging the bombers. Tens of thousands of bombers from both the USAAF and RAF were damaged, sometimes terminally, by flak throughout the war.
A damaged bomber requires repair, uses valuable resources in the process, and may well be grounded for some time.
Cheers
Steve
 
No. Flak accounted for around 40% of Bomber Command operational losses at night compared to over 50% of 8th Air Force operational losses by day.

The night fighter was Bomber Command's worst enemy until close to the end.

Cheers

Steve

So I'm going to assume that flak is more effective during daylight.

This is making me wonder if the US would have been more effective flying lower, at night, and in single file like BC.

I used to assume that the purpose of the US bombing campaign was, well, to bomb.
But it seems that somewhere along the line the goal changed to luring the Axis day fighters up into a war of attrition.
If true, then bombing lower at night, while likely improving bombing effectiveness, doesn't contribute to the attrition of Axis day fighters.

This opens a can of worms...
Would the US indeed have been more effective using BC tactics?
What was more important, bombing effectiveness or shooting down Axis day fighters?
 
I believe that the two different methods used inadvertently complimented each other. Don't forget that night bombing was forced on the RAF by the Luftwaffe.

Even as an Englishman I must concede that the two unequivocal achievements of the allied strategic air offensive belong to the Americans. The defeat of the Luftwaffe, principally by the escort fighters of the 8th Air Force and, towards the end, the inception of the oil plan which proved deadly to the Reich's economy. If the USAAF had followed the RAF and bombed by night the first of these, which led directly to a virtually unmolested invasion of the European mainland in 1944, would not have been achieved. The second might have proven more difficult.

This doesn't mean that the smashing of German cities and all the effects this caused in terms of German production and defensive resources were meaningless. It had a significant effect, an effect still hotly debated today, however, it wasn't going to win the war in 1945. The destruction of the Luftwaffe and the assault on the German oil industry did.

Was flak more effective in daylight? Not necessarily. It was more effective at engaging the tight defensive formations flown by the US bombers.

Cheers

Steve
 
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This opens a can of worms...
Would the US indeed have been more effective using BC tactics?
What was more important, bombing effectiveness or shooting down Axis day fighters?

I guess I can flip this around...
Would BC have been more effective using USAAF targeting?
Perhaps not initially. But later on, as accuracy improved.
 
Well Bomber Command had developed some very sophisticated tactics and techniques to bomb accurately by night. The unpredictable weather in Western Europe, particularly from October to March, is often over looked by people from across the pond (nothing personal:) ). Many day light raids were more blinded by the weather than Bomber Command's night time raids. A 'good' RAF night time raid was at least as accurate as a 'good' USAAF day time raid. Both air forces were at the mercy of the weather and their various technical aids.

I don't think it would have been sensible or even possible for Bomber Command to undertake routine day time bombing in the face of Luftwaffe resistance. In the last months of the war, when the Luftwaffe threat had been virtually eliminated by the Americans, Bomber Command did operate more frequently by day.

I have nothing but admiration for the men of both air forces who persevered in the face of appalling losses. Whatever the debates about the most effective tactics, the morality of the bombing and the difficult to quantify effects on the German war economy it would be hard to argue that their efforts did not shorten the war and save the lives of many of their earth and sea bound comrades. The men of Bomber Command and the various American air forces did what they were told and what had to be done to ensure an Allied victory.

Cheers

Steve
 
I don't think it would have been sensible or even possible for Bomber Command to undertake routine day time bombing in the face of Luftwaffe resistance. In the last months of the war, when the Luftwaffe threat had been virtually eliminated by the Americans, Bomber Command did operate more frequently by day.

I was thinking more in terms of the targets selected, not day vs. night.
 
This opens a can of worms...
Would the US indeed have been more effective using BC tactics?
What was more important, bombing effectiveness or shooting down Axis day fighters?

The two objectives are probably complementary in the intermediate term. By attacking the LW interceptors anywhere from takeoff to landing, the escort fighters were able to disrupt the LW organization, and were particularly able to destroy the old hare, alte hasen, experienced LW pilot resource. It has been thought that the bombers were being used as bait –this was the view of the crews. However, Doolittle's experience in the Mediterranean convinced him that escorts were much more effective on the offense. Of course it helped that long range P-47s and P-51s were available at the same time. And Hitler decided to go with FLAK rather than fighters. It was a sea change in the bombing campaign.
 
Not really like they had a choice.

They could refuse to fly. Some did. In the RAF this resulted in being labelled as LMF (lack of moral fibre). This was very unfair, most people have a limit and some are lower than others, that's not my opinion but the opinion of veterans who saw good men stigmatised in this way. I don't know how the US system worked.
Cheers
Steve
 
They could refuse to fly. Some did. In the RAF this resulted in being labelled as LMF (lack of moral fibre). This was very unfair, most people have a limit and some are lower than others, that's not my opinion but the opinion of veterans who saw good men stigmatised in this way. I don't know how the US system worked.
Cheers
Steve

Considering the horrible social stigmatization from the LMF, it was as good as social death, even after the war IIRC. I'm not sure about the US system either, but I know they only executed one man in the army for refusing to fight (Pvt. Slovik). I think otherwise it was arrest and dishonorable discharge.
 
The two objectives are probably complementary in the intermediate term. By attacking the LW interceptors anywhere from takeoff to landing, the escort fighters were able to disrupt the LW organization, and were particularly able to destroy the old hare, alte hasen, experienced LW pilot resource. It has been thought that the bombers were being used as bait –this was the view of the crews. However, Doolittle's experience in the Mediterranean convinced him that escorts were much more effective on the offense. Of course it helped that long range P-47s and P-51s were available at the same time. And Hitler decided to go with FLAK rather than fighters. It was a sea change in the bombing campaign.

Actually the two complimentary elements were the destruction of the Luftwaffe and its pilots by the escort fighters and the oil campaign. The latter complimenting the former by not only reducing the effectiveness of front line Luftwaffe units but also making it impossible to replace the losses of personnel by denying the means to train new pilots. These achievements must be credited to the USAAF.

Hitler's rant or decision (depending whose account you believe) abandoning the fighter arm and placing more emphasis on flak defences came in August 1944 at a time when the Jagdwaffe was already on the verge of defeat and struggling to exert any meaningful pressure on USAAF campaigns. Some would argue that it was already defeated and Hitler clearly felt the same way. In September 1944 the Luftwaffe still had over 1,600 fighters, more than in January of the same year and comparable to the 1,849 of July 1943. Production of single engine fighters continued unabated virtually until the end but there was no fuel or trained pilots to fly them.

In the last two quarters of 1944 the production of flak guns did increase. What the guns lacked was ammunition, partly another result of the oil campaign. In late 1944 batteries were compelled to hold their fire in anything but ideal firing conditions.

Cheers

Steve
 
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Actually the two complimentary elements were the destruction of the Luftwaffe and its pilots by the escort fighters and the oil campaign. The latter complimenting the former by not only reducing the effectiveness of front line Luftwaffe units but also making it impossible to replace the losses of personnel by denying the means to train new pilots. These achievements must be credited to the USAAF.

Hitler's rant or decision (depending whose account you believe) abandoning the fighter arm and placing more emphasis on flak defences came in August 1944 at a time when the Jagdwaffe was already on the verge of defeat and struggling to exert any meaningful pressure on USAAF campaigns. Some would argue that it was already defeated and Hitler clearly felt the same way. In September 1944 the Luftwaffe still had over 1,600 fighters, more than in January of the same year and comparable to the 1,849 of July 1943. Production of single engine fighters continued unabated virtually until the end but there was no fuel or trained pilots to fly them.

In the last two quarters of 1944 the production of flak guns did increase. What the guns lacked was ammunition, partly another result of the oil campaign. In late 1944 batteries were compelled to hold their fire in anything but ideal firing conditions.

Cheers

Steve

With regard to ammunition shortages, Westermann ("Flak - German Anti Aircraft Defences"), states on page 273, Despite increased output of weapons, the flak arm faced a number of serious problems. Without a doubt, the most pressing was the ammunition shortage. by the fall of 1944, the Luftwaffe consumption of flak peskerd at over 3.5 million rounds of heasvy AA and 12.5 million rounds of Light AA. The shortage in ammunition supply arose for several reasons. First allied attacks on the chemical industry affected the production of explosives particularly nitrogen, leading to ever increased usage of inert fillers,which in turn affected the explosive capabilities of the shells fired. Second the attacks on the allied transport targets led to significant distribution problems. The attacks on the transport network in turn led to a disipation of flak barrels to protect new targets of the bomber offensive". Westermann also goes on to document lesser but still significant shortagers in radar and communications, again a priority target of mostly BC attacks.

The RAF was responsible for many of the attacks that led to these shortages and failures, so to an extent the allied victory in 1944 should be assigned to BCs very tangible efforts
 
The RAF was responsible for many of the attacks that led to these shortages and failures, so to an extent the allied victory in 1944 should be assigned to BCs very tangible efforts

Absolutely agree. In high lighting the two most obvious and quantifiable successes of the strategic air offensive (the USAAF's defeat of the Luftwaffe and the oil campaign) I did not intend to ignore or deny the substantial contribution in all sorts of ways of Bomber Command's effort.

Cheers

Steve
 
Maybe oversimplifying, but would it be possible to paste together the best of USAAF and BC efforts into one unified effort?

USAAF: More emphasis on night time, lower altitude, heavier bombs
BC: More emphasis on oil and transportation

(Just an example)
 
Bomber Command did make an all out effort in support of the transport plan. Sadly the same can't be said for the oil plan and the blame for this rests squarely with Harris who, post invasion, gradually drifted back to his city smashing raids.
Portal didn't seem to realise just how blatantly Harris was disregarding the September directives relating to the oil plan. In October only 6% of Bomber Command's sorties were directed against oil targets. Between October and December 11% were sent against oil targets, 54% against cities. It wasn't until November, and several interventions from Portal, that Bomber Command finally made a real effort against oil targets, despatching 25% of sorties against them and finally exceeding the tonnage dropped on them by the USAAF.
The difference between the actual and potential effort made by Bomber Command against oil targets is debateable. Most sources reckon that somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 more sorties could have been made. This might not seem many in the overall context of the oil plan but such a marginal increase in effort might have had dramatic consequences.

Professor Milward (economist) referring to the oil plan.
"By the narrowest of margins, the strategic air offensive failed to smash Germany's economy by this one method of attack."

Galland (I'm sure we all know him)
"The most successful operation of the entire allied strategic air warfare was against Germany's fuel supply...Looking back, it is difficult to understand why they started this undertaking so late."

Speer, writing about the abandoning of the initial, pre oil plan, attacks on some oil targets as early as the spring of 1944.
"Had they continued the attacks of March and April with the same energy, we would quickly have been at our last gasp."

Blame also lies with Portal. It was he who had fought for Bomber Command's independence from SHAEF at Quebec and who then failed to impose his will on the command structure he had created. I for one do not believe that had Bomber Command continued under SHAEF's orders, that Tedder would have accepted the same defiance to its overall policies as was accepted by Portal. This last point is crucial. Had Bomber Command implemented a coherent and consistent policy, directed by SHAEF and aimed at the strategic targets required by that command, there is a chance that the war in Europe might have ended somewhat sooner with all the consequences that might have had for a post war Europe. Now that's a realistic 'what if?' for another place and time!

Cheers

Steve
 
still, the city smashing raids after June were probably more successful , and certainly less costly than the earlier efforts September '43 to April'44. These were very coslty and of limited value really , but the raids after June were really quite accurate and really were flattening the cities.....
 
Yes, they were, but the question is whether that effort might have been better applied in support of a coordinated plan in tandem with the Americans against targets decided at SHAEF rather than at High Wycombe. I think it would have been. Much has been made of the post war treatment of Harris, the lack of a peerage etc and it is often simplistically suggested that he was made a scapegoat for Dresden. This is nonsense. Had he been more flexible in the second half of 1944 and acknowledged, as many others did, that the usefulness of area bombing as a war winning tool was past and that Bomber Command was capable of better things then he might have been judged more kindly.

The official British history is not exactly fulsome with its praise for him.

"Sir Arthur Harris had a habit of seeing only one side of a question and then exaggerating it. He had a tendency to confuse advice with interference, criticism with sabotage and evidence with propaganda. He resisted innovations and was seldom open to persuasion. He was sceptical of the Air Staff in general, and of many officers who served on it he was openly contemptuous. Seeing all issues in terms of black and white he was impatient of any other possibility, and having taken upon himself tremendous responsibilities, he expected similar powers to be conferred."

Ouch!

It begs the question, raised by someone earlier, why Portal didn't get rid of him. The failure to do so, and the failure to force him to carry out the Air Staff's directives reflects badly on Portal too.

Writing in 1959 Portal attempted a rather feeble justification.

"His [Harris'] good qualities as a commander far outweighed his defects, and it would have been monstrously unjust to him and his command to have tried to have him replaced on the ground that while assuring me of his intention to carry out his orders, he persisted in trying to convince me that different orders would have produced better results."

I don't buy that and neither did many of their war time contemporaries.

Cheers

Steve
 

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