Dive bombers to Ceylon 1942

[Admiral Beez]

In Nov 1941, the Vought Chesapeakes of 811 Naval Air Squadron were withdrawn from service. The Brits operated all of fourteen of the apparently fifty ex-French aircraft Britain received, though the actual number delivered seems to be unverified. Earlier that year, in May 1941 the Blackburn Skua was withdrawn from frontline FAA service, with its crews moved over to the Fulmar and TSRs. I assume by 1941 at least a quarter of the 192 Skuas produced should still be serviceable. If we wanted to get four squadrons of divebombers in Celyon out of these two aircraft in time for Nagumo's rail in March 1942, how do we bring it about? For starters, do we transfer the aircraft to the RAF? Would they have the necessary pilots or ground crew available? And then we need to get them trained in divebombing.

I apologize if our resident contrarians feel triggered, but, if you think this would or could not have occurred; this is not the thread for you.

As for the rest of us, how can we pull it off? We've got issues with manpower and logistics to start with. Both aircraft can fold their wings, so transport to Ceylon might be a little easier.

 

[yulzari]

In Nov 1941, the Vought Chesapeakes of 811 Naval Air Squadron were withdrawn from service. The Brits operated all of fourteen of the apparently fifty ex-French aircraft Britain received, though the actual number delivered seems to be unverified. Earlier that year, in May 1941 the Blackburn Skua was withdrawn from frontline FAA service, with its crews moved over to the Fulmar and TSRs. I assume by 1941 at least a quarter of the 192 Skuas produced should still be serviceable. If we wanted to get four squadrons of divebombers in Celyon out of these two aircraft in time for Nagumo's rail in March 1942, how do we bring it about? For starters, do we transfer the aircraft to the RAF? Would they have the necessary pilots or ground crew available? And then we need to get them trained in divebombing.

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I apologize if our resident contrarians feel triggered, but, if you think this would or could not have occurred; this is not the thread for you.

As for the rest of us, how can we pull it off? We've got issues with manpower and logistics to start with. Both aircraft can fold their wings, so transport to Ceylon might be a little easier.

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I think that we would have to go back further than November 1941. Perhaps the Royal Navy decides from the beginning, to use the Chesapeake from land bases then Ceylon or Malaya become possibilities. It needs to allow for the units to be created on the ground, The spares , stores, maintenance items etc. to be assembled at the chosen port. In the meantime space on a suitable convoy has to be permitted then the vessel/s have to be loaded, personnel loaded and await the convoy being ready to depart. Then follows weeks at sea at convoy speeds and assuming none are sunk at sea they will need unloading and transported to a suitable airfield to be assembled and tested. Bombs similarly need to travel the same route sufficient for training and several sorties. The ground and air crews need to find their way around the aeroplane and how to dive bomb accurately and establish information systems to dispatch them as soon as needed. And so many other little things. I am assuming that airfields are made suitable or built, hopefully whilst awaiting the convoy.

The timing is very tight. But not impossible if Churchill was determined upon it and pushed hard. It is hard to see the poor old 'cheesecake' and crews surviving long if they met a naval fighter. How much damage would they inflict were they fortunate enough to get through?

 

[Admiral Beez]

The timing is very tight. But not impossible if Churchill was determined upon it and pushed hard. It is hard to see the poor old 'cheesecake' and crews surviving long if they met a naval fighter. How much damage would they inflict were they fortunate enough to get through?

All great points. I'm thinking of the Blenheim strike that remain undetected and unopposed until they were dropping their bombs alongside Nagumo's carriers. Nagumo failed to maintain adequate CAPs and our Pekes and Skuas may well arrive overhead unopposed. If we can cripple one or two IJN carriers the implications for Coral Sea and Midway are significant.

 

[EwenS]

Is everyone clear about the timetable for delivery of the 50 Chesapeakes?

First flight - 26 Feb 1941.
Acceptance of type for service by Britain - "by end of March" (that was in the USA)
Aircraft were test flown in the USA, then broken down and cased up for shipping to Britain.
On arrival at Liverpool the cases were taken to Burtonwood for unpacking and reassembly before delivery to the FAA. The first batch must have arrived about May. I'm not clear when the last arrived (only about 3 were "re-allotted en route" destination unknown but possibly sunk en route).
The first aircraft were being delivered to various trials units at Crail & Arbroath and incl A&AEE from early June and storage at Donibristle pending formation of 811 squadron on 15 July 1941 with 14 aircraft (and 2 Sea Hurricanes).

v-156-b1

If the majority of those aircraft are to be sent direct to the Far East, as happened with all but 3 of the Buffalos sent to Britain for trials, then additional delivery time will have to be built into your schedule, probably at least one month perhaps two.

And before the suggestion comes up about routing them via the Pacific remember the Vought factory was at East Hartford, Connecticut on the east coast of the USA. So that means transporting them (more likely than flying them to be packed on the west coast) across the USA to meet a ship someplace like San Francisco.

View: https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/axlcl2/shipping_routes_in_the_pacific_19389/

That gentlemen is the timescale you need to create your "what if" around.

 

[RCAFson]

I think that we would have to go back further than November 1941. Perhaps the Royal Navy decides from the beginning, to use the Chesapeake from land bases then Ceylon or Malaya become possibilities. It needs to allow for the units to be created on the ground, The spares , stores, maintenance items etc. to be assembled at the chosen port. In the meantime space on a suitable convoy has to be permitted then the vessel/s have to be loaded, personnel loaded and await the convoy being ready to depart. Then follows weeks at sea at convoy speeds and assuming none are sunk at sea they will need unloading and transported to a suitable airfield to be assembled and tested. Bombs similarly need to travel the same route sufficient for training and several sorties. The ground and air crews need to find their way around the aeroplane and how to dive bomb accurately and establish information systems to dispatch them as soon as needed. And so many other little things. I am assuming that airfields are made suitable or built, hopefully whilst awaiting the convoy.

The timing is very tight. But not impossible if Churchill was determined upon it and pushed hard. It is hard to see the poor old 'cheesecake' and crews surviving long if they met a naval fighter. How much damage would they inflict were they fortunate enough to get through?

IIRC the Chesapeake never operated as a DB due to faulty design of it's dive brakes and the alternative was to lower the LG to act as a dive brake, but then the dive angle had to be restricted to less than 60degs. IMHO the Fairey Battle would have done just as well in a naval strike role.

A plausible ATL would be one where an improved Skua was built in lieu of the Roc and continued on in FAA OTU squadrons and were in place, as such, on Ceylon in March and April 1942...

 

[Admiral Beez]

IIRC the Chesapeake never operated as a DB due to faulty design of it's dive brakes

Damn, well that's no good. We could also just send the Skuas, as I don't think Rocs were dive-bomber equipped. I was also thinking of the Brewster Bermuda, but Wikipedia says deliveries to the RAF did not begin until July 1942.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Damn, well that's no good. We could also just send the Skuas, as I don't think Rocs were dive-bomber equipped. I was also thinking of the Brewster Bermuda, but Wikipedia says deliveries to the RAF did not begin until July 1942.

Rocs were not, no.

The Buccaneer was a shitty airplane before it hoisted a pound of ordnance. Fly it at the end of a long supply-line, I suspect its shortcomings may become apparent mos' rickey-tick.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Rocs were not, no.

Well, it's Skuas alone. I think two or three squadrons worth of serviceable aircraft should be possible, most likely two, plus some spares. Aircrew will be trickier, but with the Skua withdrawn in the summer of 1941, we have some time.

 

[cammerjeff]

Well you could add Curtiss SBC's they were flying and available in 1940, they are as fast as a Skua but shorter ranged.

 

[RCAFson]

Well you could add Curtiss SBC's they were flying and available in 1940, they are as fast as a Skua but shorter ranged.

Yes, and I don't think they had the range to duplicate the Blenheim attack.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Well, it's Skuas alone. I think two or three squadrons worth of serviceable aircraft should be possible, most likely two, plus some spares. Aircrew will be trickier, but with the Skua withdrawn in the summer of 1941, we have some time.

Forgive my ignorance, but can the Skua fly out to where the Blenheims almost caught a break?

 

[RCAFson]

Forgive my ignorance, but can the Skua fly out to where the Blenheims almost caught a break?

The Blenheims took off at 0828 and arrived over the IJN carriers at 1048, so about 250nm or so from base. This is inside the Skuas strike radius of about 300nm with full fuel (155IG). The SBC-4 only carried 106IG of fuel when carrying a 500lb bomb, and I don't think it had the range, after allowing about 20IG for warmup, TO and climb.

 

[EwenS]

Just 5 SBC-4 left behind in Canada when the rremaining 44 (1 had been lost during delivery to Canada) of the French order went aboard Bearn in June 1940 and ended up stranded in Martinique, became RAF Cleveland I.

As for getting any SBC from the USN in 1941 it is rather unlikely. They had been on the Pacific Fleet carriers until late 1940. They were still equipping front line dive bomber / scout squadrons on Hornet from her completion in Oct 1941 into spring 1942 when she left for the Pacific, and with a USMC squadron deployed to the South Pacific in 1942.

The USN needed both SBC-3 & -4 versions to train their own crop of new dive bomber pilots for their expanding naval air force, who would progress to flying the SB2U Vindicator and slowly increasing numbers of SBD Dauntless on the front line carriers in the coming months and years.

83 SBC-3 built (69 left by Dec 1941)
174 SBC-4 built including 50 for the French (see above). This version was capable of carrying a 1,000lb bomb. About 118 left in USN by Dec 1941 of which 39 were on Hornet.

The French were supplied with aircraft from USN reserves to speed delivery. The USN then received 50 new aircraft originally ordered by France. This last batch were built Feb- May 1941 and were the only SBC to receive self sealing fuel tanks with capacity reduced from 135 to 126 US gal (112 to 105 Imp gal).

 

[yulzari]

If we accept less than vertical diving bombing a larger pool of possible Ceylon based dive bombers are Fairey Battles. Same bombload and similar range to Chesapeakes but a bit faster with more aeroplanes available and a known type on which many of the pilots will have probably trained. It gets around the time frame squeeze and removes some of the training and support issues. 4x250lb bombs on extendable dive bombing racks in the wing. You could push the bombload to 1500lb but that means external carriage and a performance loss.

The decision to deploy Battles and to use them as dive bombers can be taken in late 1940 or very early 1941 and there would be enough spare to form a multi squadron force in both Ceylon and Malaya/Burma. Given that India is still using Hawker Hart types and Malaya Vickers Vildebeests the Battle is hardly the leading edge of light bombing but they are still a considerable step forwards. I am aware that there would be an impact upon aircrew training with significant numbers of Battles deployed to the Indian Ocean.

If you want accurate vertical dive bombing then you are left with redundant Skuas. Rocs did dive bomb thus around the Dunkirk perimeter but have no crutch and bomb recess for the single 500lb bomb but can do the usual 250lb under the wings.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Vought Chesapeake 50 accepted March to July 1941 (exactly the same time period as 57 SB2U-3 Vindicator for USN) imports to UK, May to November 1941, 9, 14, 12, 4, 6, 2, 1, total 48, after 2 lost at sea.

Brewster Bermuda first acceptance in US in July 1942, another 12 in August. Rapidly declared non combat worthy at least. First arrival in UK in September 1942. K J Meekcoms reports 750 ordered by British, 468 accepted, of which 98 transferred to US as ground instruction airframes, 152 reduced to produce in USA, leaving 206 to UK, 3 to Canada, 3 to Nassau, 1 crashed after export, 2 crashed in US, 3 lost at sea. The USN says 1 prototype then 1 SB2A-1, 80 SB2A-2 and 59 SB2A-3 for US, 630 export version SB2A-4, which translates to 468 for Britain and 162 for the Netherlands. All up 1 prototype and 770 production examples.

The USN reports two contracts for British, for 450 and 18, the second presumably after cancellations, 1 for Netherlands, neither dated. The USN contract for 203 SB2A-1 dated 24 December 1940, revised 10 December 1943, had 3 additions but 66 cancellations.

There were the 15 Douglas 8A-4 for Iraq, accepted April to June 1940 and the 36 8A-5/A-33 for Norway accepted October 1940 to February 1941. Vultee Vengeance acceptances began in January 1942.

The wing cells in the Battle could release their bombs safely in an 85 degree dive. Skua production October 1938 to January 1940, Roc production February 1939 to August 1940. Hawker Henley October 1938 to April 1940 plus 2 in September 1940.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I think we'll need to keep some FAA pilots for the Skuas, since we need experience dive bomber operators rather than RAF chaps trying it out. I wonder if after the day, and assuming they successfully cripple an IJN carrier if Sommerville might want the remaining Skuas back for his fast fleets. Though considering that the final Skua was produced nearly three years earlier in the summer of 1939, they must be rather worn.

 

[EwenS]

I think we'll need to keep some FAA pilots for the Skuas, since we need experience dive bomber operators rather than RAF chaps trying it out. I wonder if after the day, and assuming they successfully cripple an IJN carrier if Sommerville might want the remaining Skuas back for his fast fleets. Though considering that the final Skua was produced nearly three years earlier in the summer of 1939, they must be rather worn.

Skua squadrons
800 - converted to Fulmars in April 1941. Deployed on various carriers through the summer before joining Indomitable on 15 Oct.
801 - disbanded into 800 X Flight in May 1941 on Fulmars. Initially used as guides for Hurricanes being delivered by carrier to Malta, then based there to conduct night intruder ops over Sicily until Nov 1941 when disbanded.
803 - converted onto Fulmars in Oct 1940 and joined Formidable in Nov 1940. From May 1941 it remained shore based in the Med helping out the RAF until re-equipped and sent to Ceylon in early 1942.
806 - converted onto Fulmars July 1940 (it only had Skuas / Rocs for 5 months from formation so how many experienced Skua pilots?), went to the Med on Illustrious in Aug with some joining Formidable off Crete in 1941. It remained in the Med area until early 1942 when it went to Ceylon.

IIRC FAA fighter pilot losses in the Med were heavy in 1941. The survivors from 803 & 806 augmented the RAF fighter force as the RN Fighter Squadron in the Western Desert flying Hurricanes from May / June 1941 until withdrawn to re-equip with Fulmars in early 1942 to await the arrival of Illustrious & Formidable from their US repairs. Instead they were sent to Ceylon to join the defences there in March 1942 before joining carriers again from late April 1942 to augment their fighter complements.

So questions to be answered:-
1. How many pilots are still left in the above squadrons that ever flew a Skua?
2. If you take those pilots with Skua experience, who are likely to have more experience generally, from the above squadrons how do you fill both the vacancies and the experience gap in those front line squadrons in 1942?
3. How many pilots can be found around the various other front line or training squadrons that have Skua experience?

I have no idea how many pilots fall into each category before you ask. A fair number of experienced pilots were being withdrawn from existing squadrons in 1940/41 to form the core of new FAA fighter squadrons being created. From mid 1940 we have 802, 805, 807, 808, 809, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884 & 885 through to the end of 1941 and even more in 1942. This becomes possible as the training pipeline begins to improve but these squadrons need experienced COs, Senior Pilots and flight leaders who were drawn from those FAA pilots from pre-war and very early war days.

This isn't being contrarian by the way. These are the practical problems that you need to solve to achieve your "what if" aims.

 

[Admiral Beez]

So questions to be answered:-
1. How many pilots are still left in the above squadrons that ever flew a Skua?
2. If you take those pilots with Skua experience, who are likely to have more experience generally, from the above squadrons how do you fill both the vacancies and the experience gap in those front line squadrons in 1942?
3. How many pilots can be found around the various other front line or training squadrons that have Skua experience?

Good questions. Perhaps we can grab only a few experienced Skua men to train up the squadron(s). How did the RAF learn to operate the Vultee Vengeance?

My bigger question is where are the 192 Skuas produced up to end of 1939? ChatGPT suggests that by mid-1941 there were 150 or so left, with all these being scrapped in 1942. But that's often an unreliable source.

My goal is to come to a means of the RAF (or FAA) using reserve or unwanted aircraft to add precision strikes to the uncontested Blenheim attack so that we can hit at least one IJN carrier.

 

[EwenS]

Good questions. Perhaps we can grab only a few experienced Skua men to train up the squadron(s). How did the RAF learn to operate the Vultee Vengeance?

Basically these new aircraft were given to the squadrons (82 in Aug, 110 in Oct and 45 & 84 in Dec 1942) and they had to get on and learn how to first fly and then fight the aircraft. I assume some Pilots Notes were available.

82 initially operated anti-submarine patrols along the Indian coast.

The senior flying officer in 110 got two rides in the back seat before being sent off solo. Over the first 8 days the squadron had the type he flew local, formation and low flying and carried out 7 dives. On day 5 he was, in his own words, "pronounced fit to fly and teach the Vengeance!".

Basically they first squadrons had to work everything out for themselves. In Feb 1943:-

"Group Captain Hunt, CO of 168 Wing [responsible for 110, 45 & 82 squadrons by then] prepared a secret memo on his unit's progress on 25 February 1943. In this the Wing's future training instructions and tactics were spelt out as far as they could be, and details of progress to date were recorded. As he pointed out: 'The tactics have been decided upon after considerable experiment by 110 Squadron, although it must be confessed that no trials were carried out with 9 and 12 aircraft, owing to unservicability. The pilots have, however, had considerable success with the Vic of three, which is the basic formation'.

It was only through training that the bombing accuracy of individual pilots was improved.

Information from "Vengeance! The Vultee Vengeance Dive Bomber" by Peter C Smith.

My bigger question is where are the 192 Skuas produced up to end of 1939? ChatGPT suggests that by mid-1941 there were 150 or so left, with all these being scrapped in 1942. But that's often an unreliable source.

I had a quick look though the "Fleet Airm Aircraft 1939 to 1945" book the other day and counted about 60 destroyed or w/o or reduced to ground instructional airframes by the end of 1941 IIRC. Others were under repair. There were a lot of losses in 1940. But the survivors were spread through a myriad of second line units of in Britian with some overseas.

They were certainly not being scrapped in 1942. They remained in service in those second line squadrons in ever reducing numbers through into 1944 and even in some cases into 1945. So it is not like there were hangars full of unused Skuas in Britain to send. It is also worth noting that the last batch were completed as, and earlier aircraft converted to, target tugs. That included the fitting of target towing gear including a wind powered winch in the rear cockpit. So those aircraft would need converted back to the dive bomber role. Probably not difficult but certainly time consuming in your emergency timeline.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Probably not difficult but certainly time consuming in your emergency timeline.

The decision to send dive bombers to Ceylon would have to be part of the overall decision to send Hurricanes, Blenheims, PBYs, etc. and for that matter Sommerville's fleet to the island.