Do we have any encounters of P51s with A6Ms?

Greetings

From a captured Oscar II handbook found at J-aircraft.com, one can find the following for the Ki-43:

XI. Turning Performance:

Altitude / Direction / IAS / Radius / Time / RPM / AMP
1969' / Left / 205 m.p.h ./ 307.4'/ 10.8/ 2700 / 37.8
1969' / Right / 205 m.p.h ./ 301.5'/ 11.0/ 2700 / 37.8

AMP = Engine Manifold Pressure
,
And from the magazine Air Force June, 1945:

"Furthermore, there is the fact that the Oscar Mark 2 is the most maneuverable of all the present Jap fighter planes. American pilots who have tried to turn with the Zeke 52 can attest to its maneuverability. The Oscar Mark 2 can out maneuver the Zeke. The Oscar Mark 2 also has armor plate and leak proof tanks, an indication of the extent to which the Japs (sic) have improved their aircraft."

I would agree that as long as a P-51, a P-47, or P-38 stayed away from slow speed engagements, they would have their way against either an A6M or Ki-43.

Eagledad

I would agree that as long as a P-51, a P-47, or P-38 stayed away from slow speed engagements, they would have their way against either an A6M or Ki-43.

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I'd agree to a point, though they really are not going to do well climbing against a Zeke either, their best bet in the vertical is a dive.

But one problem I see is there is not a magical counter on US aircraft that would say whether they were low, medium or high speed. I'm sure some of the times US planes were shot down by Zekes even late war was not an intentional engagement at slow speed. My guess is they would follow the Zeke, initially at high speeds, burn some energy and velocity in a turn or two, and the pilot is thinking "I'm following this Zeke, and in just a few more seconds I'll be on it's 6", and probably in the excitement they have bled enough energy to be now at the Zekes favorite velocity for dog fighting.

I do indeed think as written on another thread here that the specifics of the engagements had a lot to to with Japanese fighter losses, more so than the aircraft itself. Being badly outnumbered, having US planes decide place and altitude of engagement very often, being able to effectively vector planes better against an already outnumbered foe, etc.

Not to mention things such as parts, supplies, and quality of fuel. The US had the best logistics of the war by far, and Japan had re-supply problems that only got worse as the war went on. As someone on another thread pointed out to me, and well maintained vehicle is going to perform far better than one that's close to falling apart!

I'd think given all these problems, It would not really matter what type of plane the Japanese had at their disposal, they would have been at a severe disadvantage.

Now I do think that if the early war Japanese planes would have been a bit more survivable they could have lost less pilots, at least perhaps stopping the bleeding a little bit from the pilot attrition they suffered from.

Garyt said:

I'd agree to a point, though they really are not going to do well climbing against a Zeke either.

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Depends where (altitude) and at what speed we're talking about...

Depends where (altitude) and at what speed we're talking about...

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And of course which variant.

But at about 5,000 meters and below, the A6M3 could pretty well hang with the others mentioned in a climb. And I don't mean be better than the others in a climb - I just mean that neither has a decided advantage in a climb, though the late model P38's pretty well out climb any of the others listed here. what really surprises me is the P-51's rather lethargic climb in relationship to it's top-end speed. I'd also think it's acceleration would be a bit lacking in comparison. I don't expect the P-47 to be a great climber at lower altitudes given it's weight, though it's solid at high altitude.

the same arguments.....overwhelmed by numbers.....short of airplanes....inferior aircraft...lack of trained pilots (numberwise )....spare parts...ground crews abilities to bring damaged planes back to servicable condition...etc., etc., could be said about the RAF and USAAC forces in the PTO in 41. could also be said about the polish AF in 39....and VVS in 41. the difference was the axis powers had the advantage in men and machines ( and technology somewhat ) and lost it while the allies started off behind the 8 ball but tooled up and changed that equation. the axis wouldnt or couldnt escalate their manufacturing and training to exploit their advantage and stay ahead whereas the allies were able to pick up the pace and overtake their foes. it seems everyone is quick to point out all those disadvantages the japanese and germans faced late in the war and use that as some sort of excuse whey the allies were able to bully them around. but it was the same scenario in reverse that let them enjoy all their quick gains and easy victories....but you dont really hear that as an excuse why they were that successful early on.

it seems everyone is quick to point out all those disadvantages the japanese and germans faced late in the war and use that as some sort of excuse whey the allies were able to bully them around. but it was the same scenario in reverse that let them enjoy all their quick gains and easy victories....but you dont really hear that as an excuse why they were that successful early on.

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Well, this is not quite accurate.

The Japanese always had inferior radar and radio communication through out the war. Even at Midway, their planes had been flying for a long time without proper replacement and maintenance, they were even short of their full complement of planes.

I'd say that in the Pacific theatre, the US was in pretty good shape with it's carrier planes at least from the start, and from Mid 42 on I wqould not see any long term logistic problems they had.

Fuel was a major issue for both the Japanese and Germany, for Japan almost from the outset, for Germany by mid 43 I'd think. The US never had fuel shortages,other than perhaps very temporary issue with supply keeping up with the advance.

This fuel issue for Japan and Germany helped create problems for them with training new pilots. and one thing the US never had t worry about was having a war free zone for their pilots to train in - by late 43 in Germany, later in Japan, the skies over their homeland were not safe for training.

The problems Japan and Germany faced vs. the allies are not equivalent to early war allied situations. Now, it may be a bit similar to what minor countries had as disadvantages early in the war, but that's about it. The Allies had a few disadvantages that the Axis did, but certainly not all or even the majority of disadvantages late war Axis powers had. Or, if they did have these problems, like US in the Philipines in the early going, it was a rather isolated and short term issue.

the axis wouldnt or couldnt escalate their manufacturing and training to exploit their advantage and stay ahead whereas the allies were able to pick up the pace and overtake their foes.

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Could not is probably the correct term. The combined Axis powers, including Italy were about neck and neck but still behind US manufacturing from the start of the war til abut 43, with the US going up about 2/1 in 43-44, and even worse for the Axis in 1945. And that's only the US, not counting Russia and Great Britain, and China for that matter where the Japanese invested and lost a lot of their army's energies.

Aircraft production was about 620,000 for the Allies, 210,000 for the Axis.

In crude oil production the Allies had better than a 2-1 advantage.

This production disadvantage IMO is well illustrated in the Navies of the US and Japanese. Japan was fighting WW2 with a navy predominantly from the 1930's, their biggest period of buildup (plus older vessels), will the US fought the war with ships built in the 40's due to their industrial might. This period saw significant advancement in ship design, making the Japanese vessels decidedly old fashioned compared to their US opponents.

It's pretty simple - the Axis powers were pretty well doomed in World War II once the United States entered the war. It would have taken almost a miracle for the Axis to have achieved a victory unless they were able to get the Allied powers to sue for peace early, which I do not believe they ever would have done.

We can speak all we want of heroism - but in the simplest terms, the Axis powers were out produced.

It's pretty simple - the Axis powers were pretty well doomed in World War II once the United States entered the war. It would have taken almost a miracle for the Axis to have achieved a victory unless they were able to get the Allied powers to sue for peace early, which I do not believe they ever would have done.

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I think its a far more close race than that. this views the whole thing without taking into account the acute manpower issues that the US potentially faced. In overall effect, what you are saying is correct, but the suggestion there is pretty clear, the war was won by US production alone, or at worst, predominantly. in point of fact the US production capability was but one of the factoprs that led to the allied victory. it was a critical factor, but in my opinion was not even the main reason.

The single most important reason for the Axis defeat was the multiplicity of fronts that they opened up and did not finish. By 1942, the Axis were heavily engaged in the Battle Of the Atlantic, had substantial forces in the Med, had significant garrison duties in Western and Northern Europe. They were already engaged in a hevy level of air activity in western europe. they had an ongoing war against indigenous resistance movements in Europe and partisans in Russia. There was a heavy drain on manpower and machines on the Eastern Front.

In the pacific, the Japanese had large numbers of troops and aircraft locked away facing off the russians, they had large proportions locked in a stalemate in China, other significant forces in the CBI TO, and a lesser number in the SWPAC area. They did not know it, but they had already reached the limits of expansion that their limited shipping capacity would allow, which was the major reason there was no major expansion of their blue water navy after 1942.

The US contribution until 1944, in all TOs, including the Pacific, was actually fairly secondary, including the vaunted lend lease aid. after 1944 it was decisive, but without these supportinbg elements of Allied victory, an all american victory was a remote possiblity. The biggest single constraint preventing the US from prosecuting the war single handedly was manpower, or more specifically, trained manpower. at no point during the war were they able to train anywhere near enough manpower to support a heavy committment of land forces to a protracted battle in the way the Russians and the Chinese were. if they had tried that, they would have very quickly seen their land forces fall apart in front of their eyes.

at sea, the Americans excelled at what is referred to as blue water naval operations, which later could be expanded also to include undersea operations. But in terms of the grey water operations, needed to just stay alive, the USN came up very shoret, and contributed more to the near defeat of th allies in 1942 than any other single event during all of the war. If the Germans were not distracted by other committments in 1942, they would have unquestionably have won the Battle of the Atlantic, and that would have dragged the US down almost as badly as Britain in terms of economic collapse.

The US contribution was crucial, and victory without them was just about impossible, but so too was victory without all the others supporting them, and doing the lions share of the fighting until well into 1944. In 1942, the war was definately loseable for the allies.....In 1943 it was still possible to lose to the extent of the axis being able to secure a negotiated peace or truce, but from 1944, the end was inevitable....

Before anzone of our friends across the pond steps in, I'd like to add that US contribution was substantial way before 1944. Before 1942 ended, the Kido Butai was a shade of it's former self, with four fleet carriers at the bottom of the sea. Those don't really grow at the trees. The loss of creme de la creme, the trained and experienced air and shiop crews, was mostly a consequence of efforts of US forces.
We also might recall the efforts of the USN during Battle of Atlantic, and the Wasp CV covering Med conwoys.

parsifal said:

[...]but the suggestion there is pretty clear, the war was won by US production alone, or at worst, predominantly.

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As trivial as that might sound, I think it sums it up pretty well. We'll add geography to that. Not only was the mainland producing, it was let alone.

Dont misquote me. The US made a significant contribution to the war. without their contribution victory was impossible. but equally,without the contribution of all the allies, in particular the russians, it was imppossible for the US to win on its own either.

1942 was perhaps the critical year. in that year the Russians finally defeated the Germans in battle, the British achieved also a decisive vistory on the southern front and another substantial air victory over Germany, as well as several significant victories at sea, for which overall victory was impossible without it.

In the Pacific the US achieved a great tactical victory at Midway, and lesser less decisive ones at Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and suffred a tactical defeat at Santa Cruz. They achieved a strategic victory on guadacanal, but along the way suffered numerous tactical defeats. Hand in hand with the allied vistoiries in Papua, the containment of the Japanese was ensured.

Significant as these actions were in the Pacific,, they were not essential to final victory in the Pacific. In hindsight the Allies could simply have pulled back even further and stretched the Japanese even more than they did. Japanese collapse would have been more spectacular than it was, if the allies had not rushed forward to meet them.

Much is made of US production, but in 1942, whilst undeniably significant, was not truly decisive yet. It accounted for about 15% of allied military outputs and weapons usage in 1942. American shipbuilding was a major input, but set against that was the very heavy losses sustained off the US seaboard to German U-Boats, and the almost 1 million tons of shipping lost in the pacific as well. As for the US being a safe arsenal of production, well, to an extent yes, but US production efficiency still relied on foreign imports and seaborne transport for more than 60% of its efficiency, and the mismanagment of the US merchant marine almost wrecked that cosy feeling of security. The Americans managed, in the finish, to only lose about 2 million tons more in shipping than they built, so we ought not be too harsh on them I suppose.

As the war progressed after that time, US contribution increased and they did become the arsenalo of the allied cause, but this is simply untrue in 1942. And whilst they produced vast quantities of material, as I said, their limited amounts of trained manpower always prevented them from meeting the German army head on, until the russians had torn the heart out of the heer for them. Russian blood, over American mateiel, was the most important determinat of Allied victory, but even that is an inadequate claim, in the end, it was an allied victory, in which all players played a part, and no part was completely indispensable

I profusely apologize for that, parsifal. I took it as your position and a clear reading is it wasn't.