I left the story at the front on the 22nd May, with the 121st Motorized inf rgt of the 25th Div, under direct command of the gallant General Moline launching a much reduced offensive in the direction of Cambrai. This attack, despite its modest size had made creditable progress, though towards the end of the day, the spearheads had come under sustained and heavy pressure from German airstrikes. It was clear that the regimental sized forces currently engaged, the allies could not take the city. Molines forces dug in and were successful in repulsing the ferocious counterattacks launched by elements of the German 32 ID late in the afternoon. Though the germans attacked ferociously, their effectiveness was reduced by the wide dispersal in the dispositions of the forces. 32ID had only recently moved up to the southern side of the Sensee canal. 32 ID emerged from the days fighting in rather worse for wear than their opponents. Round 1, to the French........
Moline consulted with Altmayer French V Corps commander. It was agreed that in the early evening the two other regiments of the 25th Div would move into position that night, in time for a divisional sized assault the next day. The french had been cautious, but this had meant that casualties were low, and the division in good shape to continue their attack the next day.
However, as previously stated, later that night orders were received from 1st army HQ to discontinue the assault, and pull back to the start lines. this flabbergasted the two frontline commanders.
Meanwhile the British attack at Arras was also faltering. With the main attack already faltering, the defenders of the city ("Petreforce", built around the welsh guards, the green howards elements of the west yorks and some artillery and tank detachments, basically a brigade sized battlegroup,were being steadily squeezed by 5th and 7th Panzer Divs. The position was being steadily outflanked, such that by morning of the 23rd there were only two roads linking the city to the north. At 7am, on the 23rd, Gort ordered the abandonment of the city. It took time to implement this order, during which time the city came in for a sustained and heavy air attack from the Luftwaffe. There were some losses to vehicles, though not catastrophic, and light personnel casualties, as the units retreated with difficulty. Some units received the wrong route orders and stumbled into German ambushes, resulting in the loss of vehicles and about 125 men.
In fact it was not just Petreforce that was retreating, the entire 50th and 5th divs were retreating to new positions north of Douai, to a line behind the Haute Deule canal. The withdrawal left the french V coprs dangerously exposed along the sebsee canal, and the French reaction was very bitter and recriminatory. The French blamed the British for the failure of the offensive, and resulted in a sharp note from Reynaud to Churchill
"you wired me this morning that you had instructed Gort to continue to carry out the Weygand plan. General Weygand now informs me that according to general Blanchard, the british Army had carried out on its own initiative, a retreat of 23miles ( a gross exageration) towards the ports at a time when our troops from the south are gaining groundwhere they were to meet their allies (this also was an exageration....as yet apart from the cancelled attacks by General moline, now cancelled, there had been no movement from the other elements of the French Army).
This action of the British Army is in direct to the formal orders this morning by General Weygand, The retreat has naturally obliged the general to change all his arrangements and he is compelled to give up the idea of closing the gapand restoring the continuous front...."
Subsequent investigations by Churchills envoy showed all these claims by the afrench government to be baseless....ther was no attack, no real preprations as yet. It was a case of weygand seeking a nonFrench scapegoat. Gort was having none of it, as his actions showed.