Earlier British Victory in North Africa

[Admiral Beez]

After some early strong successes against the Italians, the British had an abysmal time in North Africa until 1942. Churchill finally asked his Chief of Staff, can't any of your generals win battles? Had the British army had greater success in 1940-41 they may have freed up units for the SEA campaign.

 

[Shortround6]

After some early strong successes against the Italians, the British had an abysmal time in North Africa until 1942. Churchill finally asked his Chief of Staff, can't any of your generals win battles? Had the British army had greater success in 1940-41 they may have freed up units for the SEA campaign.

Maybe not until after the Japanese attacked and then you have shipping time to get to SEA.

If the Germans/Italians are kicked out of NA in the Summer/early fall of 1941 do the British rush to send Forces to SEA where the Japanese aren't really doing a whole lot yet or do the British (and Commonwealth) start rebuilding and plan on invading Italy in 1942?

I don't see more than token reinforcements being sent to Singapore/Burma in the summer or early fall of 1941.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Maybe not until after the Japanese attacked and then you have shipping time to get to SEA.

I agree for the most part, but the two Australian divisions may be ordered home before the Japanese attacked. I do wonder if an early British success in North Africa will give the Japanese pause.

What's necessary for an earlier British success to come about? My thinking is the Brits prevent Rommel's Afrika Corps from crossing the Med in Jan 1941. Perhaps word of his movement gets to Britain in time for a RN submarine or surface attack. Manage this and the Italians will be defeated that Spring.

German General Erwin Rommel arrives in Africa | February 12, 1941 | HISTORY

German General Erwin Rommel arrives in Tripoli, Libya, with the newly formed Afrika Korps, to reinforce the beleaguered Italians’ position. In January 1941, Adolf Hitler established the Afrika Korps for the explicit purpose of helping his Italian Axis partner maintain territorial gains in North...

www.history.com

 

[EwenS]

I agree for the most part, but the two Australian divisions may be ordered home before the Japanese attacked. I do wonder if an early British success in North Africa will give the Japanese pause.

What's necessary for an earlier British success to come about? My thinking is the Brits prevent Rommel's Afrika Corps from crossing the Med in Jan 1941. Perhaps word of his movement gets to Britain in time for a RN submarine or surface attack. Manage this and the Italians will be defeated that Spring.

German General Erwin Rommel arrives in Africa | February 12, 1941 | HISTORY

German General Erwin Rommel arrives in Tripoli, Libya, with the newly formed Afrika Korps, to reinforce the beleaguered Italians’ position. In January 1941, Adolf Hitler established the Afrika Korps for the explicit purpose of helping his Italian Axis partner maintain territorial gains in North...

www.history.com

This thread generates a whole bunch of questions starting with how does Britain win in North Africa in 1941 in the first place.

Taking up your points about stopping the Afrika Korps reaching North Africa in the first place. The first reason is quite simple. Kesselring's Fliegerkorps X. It moved into Sicily in early Jan 1941 and it proceeded to cripple the carrier Illustrious on 10 Jan and sink the cruiser Southampton and damage the Gloucester the next day and leading to a blitz on Malta. That then precluded naval surface operations from Malta for some time. When Fliegerkorps X moved on to Yugoslavia and Greece in April the RN was able to briefly re-establish a destroyer force at Malta (4 ships). It had some success, annihilating one convoy on 16 April 1941. But with the Greek / Crete crisis in May those surviving ships (3) were needed in the eastern Med.

As for submarine operations, the Mediterranean was a very dangerous place to operate. In 1940 the RN lost 9 boats in the Med (from a submarine force that totalled 57 on the outbreak of war and by the end of 1940 stood at 51. By the end of 1941 it was back to 57 despite losing another 11 boats, 8 of which were lost in the Med). The 10th Sub Flotilla was formed at Malta in early 1941. But the small U class ordered on the outbreak of war, and that were most suited to the Med, had only begun to complete in Aug 1940 and could only begin to be deployed to the Med from the beginning of the year. They proved very successful operating from Malta.

And don't forget the geography. Malta and the Axis convoy routes are about 1,000 miles from the RN bases in Gibraltar & Alexandria. That is the best part of two days steaming for a cruiser/destroyer force.

The British Middle East Command had a whole bunch of areas of concern, other than the Western Desert and Rommel, in 1941 that caused diversion of attention & resources.

1. Campaign in East Africa which ran from June 1940 untl Nov 1941.
2. Greece & Crete from March - May 1941
3. Syria & Lebanon May-July 1941
4. Threat of German invasion of the Middle East via Turkey
5. After 21 June 1941, threat of a Soviet collapse and a German push through to Caucasus to the Middle East oil fields in Iraq & Iran.

A coup in Iraq in April 1941 brought British troops from India to that country in response. With oil fields and pipelines to the Med in Iraq that couldn't be ignored. The Germans supported the Iraqis with air strikes staging through Vichy bases in Syria. Hence Middle East Command invading those two countries.

While everyone talks about the Afrika Korps the truth is the bulk of Axis forces in Libya were Italian. The first German elements, the 5th Light Division (later renamed 21st Panzer Div), arrived between 10 Feb & 12 March followed by the 15th Panzer Div in April (which suffered losses at the hands of the RN). The 90th Light Infantry Div didn't arrive until Oct 1941.

And then you have the logistics problem that both armies have. As they advanced they both stretched their lines of communication to breaking point until forced to stop. At the same time the other side saw its LOC shorten making resupply easier. How is that to be overcome in 1941?

With regard to the Australian Corps of two divisions you only have part of the story.

Australia had a change of Government in Oct 1941. Curtin, who had stood in the Sept 1940 General Election on a platform that emphasised the defence of Australia over "contributing to a common cause" became PM. BUT his new Government confirmed in Oct 1941 the previous Government's decision to maintain a strong force in the Middle East. By the end of Nov it had been agreed that that force would consist of 3 infantry and 1 armoured division plus 1 division in Malaya. As late as the end of Dec there is an absence of any intention by the Australian Govt to withdraw troops from the Middle East.

On 13 Dec 1941 Churchill sailed on the battleship Duke of York for the USA arriving 22 Dec for talks with FDR. Immediately following that came a proposal by Churchill to transfer 2 divisions from the Middle East to the Far East, and discussions followed about exactly which divisions it should be, not all being Australian in the first instance. On 5 Jan 1942 The Australian Govt agreed to the transfer of 6th & 7th Australian Divs and various Corps troops to the Far East. At that point the intended destination was for the 7th to go to southern Sumatra and the 6th (along with the British 7th Armoured Brigade) to central Java.

It was only in the few days after the fall of Singapore and the receipt of both British and Australian Staff Appreciations that cast doubt on the ability to hold Sumatra & Java, that the Australian Govt requested that the destination of all the earmarked troops to changed to Australia itself as the threat from the Japanese to the country itself now loomed. Again geography. Singapore to Darwin is about 2,000 miles. That distance halves if Java falls, before considering the other islands in between. And Rabaul (which fell at the end of January) is also about 1,000 miles from Cairns. Britain then proposed diverting the 7th Div to Burma, while its first elements were at sea, which was refused (but the British 7th Armoured Brigade was diverted).

At the time that these decisions were being made the I Aus Corps, comprising 6th & 7th Divs was based in Lebanon/Syria against the threat of a German invasion through Turkey, both having taken part in the invasion of those countries. The 7th began to leave Suez on 30th Jan with the last elements of the 6th leaving on 12th March. They were not combat loaded as time and shipping did not permit. Then on 2 March the Australian Govt agreed to the diversion of 2 Brigades of 6th Div to Ceylon due to the imminent threat to that island and its lack of defences. Those Brigades then followed to Australia in July 1942.

So if the Afrika Korps and the Italian forces are defeated in spring/summer 1941, it doesn't remove some of the other threats to Middle East Command, nor the historical use of Commonwealth forces in Lebanon/Syria. And at that point there is no threat to Australia either geographically nor in terms of time. The threat level only begins to rise significantly from the end of July 1941 when the Japanese move into southern Indochina. And at that point there are far greater concerns about a Soviet collapse. So overall there is no reason for the Australian Govt to change its policy.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I think Britain's best chance is to defeat Italy before the Germans can arrive.

 

[EwenS]

I think Britain's best chance is to defeat Italy before the Germans can arrive.

Impossible given the strength of the Western Desert Force up to and including the Battle of Beda Fomm (5-7 Feb 1941). That still left the distance from El Agheila to Tripoli (500 miles or just less than it had already covered since 10 Dec 1940) and on to the Tunisian border (about 100 miles) to clear. Not to mention the logistics of such a move.
Operation Compass

Operation Compass - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Churchll wrote of the 7th Armd Div
"At the end of February the 7th British Armoured Division had been withdrawn to Egypt to rest and refit. This famous unit had rendered the highest service . Its tanks had travelled far and were largely used up. Its numbers had shrunk by fighting and wear and tear. Still there was a core of the most experience hard-bitten, desert-worthy fighting men, the like of whom could not be found by us. It was a pity not to keep in being the nucleus of this unique organisation and rebuild it by drafts of officers and men arriving trained, fresh and keen from England and to send them the pick of whatever new tanks or spare parts that could be found. Thus the 7th Armoured Division would have preserved a continuity of life and been resuscitated in strength."

Rommel's first offensive began 31 March 1941.

 

[yulzari]

Operating with logistic trains over trans oceanic distances in 1941 Commonwealth forces had secured Britain against an invasion, rebuilt after losses in Belgium, France and Norway. Coped with home industry being under air attack, maintained oceanic trade links across the globe, fought and won a war with Italy to liberate Ethiopia, dealt with an Axis sponsored revolt in Iraq, fought and won a war with France to take Syria, seen off a superior Italian invasion of Egypt, provided vital war materials to buttress the Soviet Union at a critical time, forced the French fleet to withdraw to France, sent an expeditionary force to support Greece and so forth.

Meanwhile, with their third hand and in their copious spare time they should be expected to do what? Leave Italy in control of the Red Sea and East Africa generally, let Axis forces move into support of Iraq and lose the oil too, not to mention threatening losing the confidence of Turkey with the Near East coming under Axis controlled forces, leave the Soviet Union to fend for itself and possibly a Turkish threat from the south, risk Axis control of the French fleet which could, with the Italians, challenge for the sea control of the Mediterranean, never mind the risk to the war losing potential of the war in the Atlantic. Somethings had to give and the Far East and dispersed forces in the Middle East were inevitable. The early war in Libya was aggressively conducted as Commonwealth forces were too limited to make a passive defence. Whilst the change from these necessarily bold tactics to the proper doctrine of all arms battle was not made until 1942 and those forces themselves were weakened by the necessary diversions can one say that they could have done better with our hindsight coloured by the greatly improved resources of 1942?

But the wonder is more that they did so much with what they had. I do not find it curious that by 1943 the USA, with several times the population and a safe and secure industrialised economy, could pump in so much resources in materials and men in the 18 months following them being forced into the war than Britain (with the support of the rest of the Commonwealth) could in the 18 months since it had just lost a major continental war and losing a great part of it's arms, training new recruits to bulk out larger forces whilst standing against a threat of home invasion and under air bombardment (and artillery to a very limited extent) whist dependent upon overseas materials for it's food and industrial production.

 

[Shortround6]

I do not find it curious that by 1943 the USA, with several times the population and a safe and secure industrialised economy, could pump in so much resources in materials and men in the 18 months following them being forced into the war than Britain (with the support of the rest of the Commonwealth) could in the 18 months since it had just lost a major continental war and losing a great part of it's arms, training new recruits to bulk out larger forces whilst standing against a threat of home invasion and under air bombardment (and artillery to a very limited extent)

The US had been gearing up since at least the middle of 1940. Some due to domestic (US) demand and some to satisfy foreign orders. The US also started a major fleet expansion in 1939-40.
Both the British and the Americans had small armies in 1940. The Germans had something like 107 Infantry divisions and 10 Panzer divisions on paper at the start of France.
Many of the infantry divisions were under strength fortress/garrison divisions however.
But the 10 divisions of the BEF was a small force in relation to continental armies. Belgium had 22 divisions for example.
Not all divisions are the same.

the BEF was better off leaving much of it's artillery behind, it was due for replacement in any case.

 

[SaparotRob]

Can we send 'em M-777s?

 

[Shortround6]

Can we send 'em M-777s?

Just about anything the BEF had that was a bigger than a 25pdr was left over from WW I and refitted with rubber tires and brakes to make it suitable to be towed by motor vehicles.
And a fair number of the 25pdrs were not the classic 25pdr equipment but rebarreled late/post WW I 18pdrs.
and even further. Some divisions didn't have their full compliment of 25pdrs of either type and had one battalion (or one battery in each of the 25pdr battalions?) of 4.5in Howitzers to make up numbers and to provide high angle fire.
Max range of the 4.5in Howitzer was under 7000 yds.

 

[EwenS]

Just about anything the BEF had that was a bigger than a 25pdr was left over from WW I and refitted with rubber tires and brakes to make it suitable to be towed by motor vehicles.
And a fair number of the 25pdrs were not the classic 25pdr equipment but rebarreled late/post WW I 18pdrs.
and even further. Some divisions didn't have their full compliment of 25pdrs of either type and had one battalion (or one battery in each of the 25pdr battalions?) of 4.5in Howitzers to make up numbers and to provide high angle fire.
Max range of the 4.5in Howitzer was under 7000 yds.

Don't underestimate the significance of the losses in France in 1940 even if much of the artillery was not the latest kit. The worst loss was the 509 2pdr anti tank guns. Full details here and how it affected the British Army in June 1940.

British Equipment losses at Dunkirk and the situation post Dunkirk

Equipment Losses at Dunkirk and the situation post Dunkirk

www.wwiiequipment.com

The details of the various field pieces here. 18pdr. 18/25pdr (the mainstay in 1940) and the 25pdr (which began production in 1940)

ORDNANCE QF 18 PDR Mk. IV & Mk. V - Quartermaster Section

www.quartermastersection.com

ORDNANCE QF 18/25 PDR Mk. I - Quartermaster Section

www.quartermastersection.com

ORDNANCE QF 25PDR Mk. II - Quartermaster Section

www.quartermastersection.com

ORDNANCE QF 4.5in Mk. IIP - Quartermaster Section

www.quartermastersection.com

The second last of these is the classic 25pdr we all recognise. Its carriage with increased elevation meant it was intended to replace both the 18/25pdr and the 4.5" howitzer. But it was only entering production in 1940 so wasn't available to the BEF when it departed for France in Sept 1939. So it wasn't a case of having to "make do" with the earlier weapons. They were the standard in 1939. The advantage of the 4.5" howitzer was its 45 degree elevation.

Perhaps the even greater loss was the 64,000 vehicles and 20,000 motorcycles. These losses took a long time to recover from.

 

[EwenS]

From the National Museum United States Army website:-

"When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, the Army' artillery units were still equipped with the venerable 75mm and 155mm French guns purchased during World War I. The French 75 or, more properly the Matériel de 75mm Mle 1897, is considered the first of the modern artillery pieces and was capable of a high rate of fire out to 8,000 meters (approximately five miles). It was designed to counter the mass infantry attacks that were typical of the tactics of the late nineteenth century by placing large numbers of time-fused shells over bodies of enemy troops."

And also:-
"By the time of Operation TORCH in November 1942, the Army had deployed an entire family of new guns. The M1 75mm pack howitzer, with a range of 8,880 meters (5.5 miles) for mountain, airborne, and jungle use, was put into service, and anything larger than a bicycle could move it. Two types of 105mm howitzers were assigned to infantry divisions. Each infantry regiment had a cannon company of short barreled M3 105mm howitzers that fired a reduced power round out to 7,600 meters (4.7 miles) for direct support.......

These new guns, especially the M2/M2A1 105mm howitzers, were superior to the French 75mm guns they replaced in part because of their longer range, but also because the larger caliber allowed a significantly larger bursting charge. They were also capable of plunging fire, which allowed the guns to engage targets in defilade, unlike the flatter trajectory of the French 75."

105mm M2/M2A1 - production started April 1941.
155mm M1 - production started Oct 1940 but didn't reach double figures per month until Dec 1941.
75mm Howitzer - production started Sept 1940.

What a difference 2 additional years of peace and another of limited US Army involvement on the battlefield made!

 

[Shortround6]

What a difference 2 additional years of peace and another of limited US Army involvement on the battlefield made!

Yes a little bit and no a lot.

The US Army had figured out in 1916 that it didn't really want the French 75.
However the US Army had truly screwed up their own 3in/75mm gun of 1916 to point where it was sometimes known as the crime of 1916.
In order to equip the rapidly expanding American Army they simply adopted the French 75 Because for some reason the Americans had fallen in love with all things French as far as military equipment went. Must have been because the French had done so well in the first 3 years of the war (sarcasm).
Since some American factories were already tooled up to make French 75s for the French (and other factories were tooled up to make 18lbrs for the British) and the US gun was a piece of rubbish The US jumped on the French 75. They also bought some 18pdrs with 75mm tubes.
However in 1919 the US Army, with the war over, and some experience of their own, decided to figure out what they want for the future and the Westervelt Board was convened to study the Artillery problem and issued it's report in May of 1919. A number of the Board's recommendations were adopted and design of a 105mm was started by 1920 and trials models constructed. After a number of modifications to the gun, recoil system and upper and lower carriage the Army was satisfied in 1928 with the result and standardized the result as the Howitzer M1 on Carriage M1. Only trouble was that the Carriage M1 was designed for horse traction.
There was also the usual budget problems and the budget (money) only got worse in the 1930s so no production was undertaken, The Army continued to tweak things like a new carriage for motor traction. The 105mm Howitzer M2A1 was standardized in March of 1940.

Same for most of the other US artillery. Design and prototype work had been going on for up to two decades before the orders were placed. The US did screw up a few things but general artillery was so right that the weapons (mostly) stayed in service with many nations for decades after WW II.
The Experience of French and British in 1939-40-41 had nothing at all to do with American Field and Heavy artillery, The US had their designs, they were happy with them, the only thing was to produce them in large numbers.
And the US was NOT going to get sucked into making French or British designs like they did in WW I with no factory space for US designs.

The US adopted one British design, the 57mm AT gun.
They designed one barrel to fit in a US carriage in order to use interchange ammo (a mistake and waste of effort) that saw limited use.
They provided some barrels to fit British ammo for a late war heavy artillery piece on the standard US artillery carriage, but all of those went to the British.

all the 2 years of peace and one year of limited involvement did was allow the Army to start producing existing designs.

 

[Frog]

...
''The US adopted one British design, the 57mm AT gun.
They designed one barrel to fit in a US carriage in order to use interchange ammo (a mistake and waste of effort) that saw limited use.
They provided some barrels to fit British ammo for a late war heavy artillery piece on the standard US artillery carriage, but all of those went to the British. ''

The mistake was not only to adopt the 57 mm, as it was of limited value against the new german tank generation.
The other error, from the US, was not adopting an explosive round along with the AP one.
The British were more clever, as the adopted an HE round for the AT 6 pounder, that could at least be use as a direct support infantry gun.
The 57 mm AT guns in armored infantry battalions AT platoons were sometimes purely deleted as useless and the platoon used as a 4th rifle platoon of the relevant company.

 

[WARSPITER]

Interestingly, the US Army Infantry Board didn't want the M1 57mm gun as they said it was too heavy so they wanted to keep the 37mm. The
ordnance board overruled this as they wanted a gun with more firepower. Since there were US companies already pricing the gun for British use
it was an easy decision compared to what else was available.

For infantry use they were always found useful when defending against German attacks.

 

[Shortround6]

The mistake was not only to adopt the 57 mm, as it was of limited value against the new german tank generation.
The other error, from the US, was not adopting an explosive round along with the AP one.
The British were more clever, as the adopted an HE round for the AT 6 pounder, that could at least be use as a direct support infantry gun.
The 57 mm AT guns in armored infantry battalions AT platoons were sometimes purely deleted as useless and the platoon used as a 4th rifle platoon of the relevant company.

The 6pdr/57mm saga is a bit complicated. There was also a strange time factor.

The British had designed the 6pdr in 1938, built a test model and fired it 1939 and then put the plans aside and waited for production space.
After Dunkirk plans got pushed aside in the rush to build more 2pdrs in order to have something-anything for the re-equipping army.

The Americans, not sitting back fat, dumb and happy in 1940-41 as is so often supposed, had figured out that the US 37mm (or anybody's 37mm) was obsolete in 1940 and was looking around for something better. Looking for something better quickly somebody in Britain said "hey, we got this 57nn, want to take a look" by Feb 20th 1941 the US Ordnance committee authorized the the preparation of production drawings. Now in the Spring of 1941 the new German tank Generation only existed in a few peoples imagination, so we can cut the US a little slack on this. It did take about year to actually get the gun into production however.

British were a little slow on the draw with HE ammo themselves and they (the British) only built 201 barrels in 1941 (for 419 carriages, sometimes it took a while to match up production) and 160,000 AP rounds and no HE. HE showed up for the British in 1942 but they made 396,000 rounds of HE compared to just under 8 million rounds of AP.

An HE round is useful for an AT gun but it was more important for a tank gun. In a defensive position the infantry unit/s with the AT guns has a number of other weapons to bang away with at non armored targets.
Theory and doctrine can get pushed aside in combat and troops often want to fire whatever they have regardless of how suitable it is for the job.
Trying to stop enemy tanks with worn out AT guns that won't shoot accurately because you have been burning out the barrels firing HE rounds for infantry support may not be the best idea. May depend of the supply of spare AT gun barrels.

The 57mm gun was about the biggest gun that could be manhandled over shortish distances. The US gun went about 2800lbs, the US 3in AT gun went 4875lbs to 5870lbs depending on carriage. It wasn't going anywhere without an engine.
A lot of armies had figured out how to use small AT guns in camouflaged positions to take out tanks from the side and not in head to head head gun duals. More than one US unit that had left it's "useless" 57mm guns behind regretted it when the German armor showed up and US tanks and tracked tank destroyers were nowhere to be found.
German MK IV tanks and Stugs were vulnerable from the front. Panthers were vulnerable from the sides/rear. British 6pdrs had taken out German Tigers in Tunisia. Not easy but but in built up and forested areas the 57mm/6pdr was a dangerous opponent.

The US also never adopted the British APCR and APDS ammunition.
the APDS would put a hole into just about anything less than the front of a King Tiger. Assuming you could hit it the APDS would go through a side of a King Tiger at 2000yds.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Interestingly, the US Army Infantry Board… wanted to keep the 37mm.

The Canadian built Valentines should have used the US M2 37mm rather than the 2 pounder. The US 37mm was available with HE and canister. This would be have useful when the Valentine fought the Japanese.

History of the 3rd NZ Division Tank Squadron

They had US Diesel engines. Why not US guns? The British were already using the M2 in their Grant/Lee tanks.

 

[Shortround6]

The Canadian built Valentines should have used the US M2 37mm rather than the 2 pounder. The US 37mm was available with HE and canister. This would be have useful when the Valentine fought the Japanese.

History of the 3rd NZ Division Tank Squadron

They had US Diesel engines. Why not US guns? The British were already using the M2 in their Grant/Lee tanks.

Complicated to solution to a simple problem.

The UK manufactured 40,000rounds of 2pdr HE ammo in 1942, 474,000 rounds in 1943 and 304,000 rounds in 1944.
Drop in the bucket compared to the AP rounds but ammo existed, drawings existed.
For some reason only understood by the British the AT guns got a bit of HE ammo, the tanks didn't get any and some armored cars got a bit in 1943-44.

The 2pdr gets no respect.
The gun itself was a good a gun and it was almost in a class by itself compared to most 37mm guns (US included).
It was the cheap projectiles and lack of production of HE ammo in the early years that were the problems.
The US 37mm was much less powerful and the difference in HE is astonishing.
US 37mm AT/tank gun HE ammo holds about 38-39 grams of HE.
40mm HE can hold around 64 Grams of HE.
If there was a production problem then you could probably fit 40mm Bofors projectiles in the cartridge cases.

Doesn't solve the cannister question but you had 3150 rounds of machine gun ammo at full load. You probably weren't going to carry more than 5-10 cannister in any case.

 

[EwenS]

The Canadian built Valentines should have used the US M2 37mm rather than the 2 pounder. The US 37mm was available with HE and canister. This would be have useful when the Valentine fought the Japanese.

History of the 3rd NZ Division Tank Squadron

They had US Diesel engines. Why not US guns? The British were already using the M2 in their Grant/Lee tanks.

Why?

All bar 30 from the Canadian production were Lend-Leased to the USSR. Those 30 were only used in Canada for training.

As for the Valentines in New Zealand Service, all came from British production deliveries starting in Oct 1941 (255 + 3 bridgelayers and were a mix of Mk.II/III/V). To obtain a better HE capability New Zealand up-gunned 18 Mk.III to Mk.III(CS) with the 3" gun capable of firing HE and smoke. Those guns came out of Matildas they already possessed. The first 9 were ready by Aug 1943 and were allocated to the tank squadron in 3rd NZ Div.

At that time the New Zealand tank units in NZ for home defence were also partially equipped with Stuarts armed with your favourite 37mm gun. But when it came to up-gunning the Valentine they preferred the more powerful 3"

 

[Timppa]

Churchill finally asked his Chief of Staff, can't any of your generals win battles?

Montgomery had overhelming superioty in all his battles. Wawell and Auchinleck had not.