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Escuadrilla Azul

Staff Sergeant
1,487
3,185
Feb 27, 2020
Recently read, regarding the campaign in Norway 1940 that "If Britain had had an effective carrier force, with better carriers and modern aircraft, they could have challenged German air superiority and provided Allied ground forces with air support".

While due to long development of a carrier a better carrier might be imposible to achive (BTW, it is not stated what a "better carrier" should be), more modern aircraft would had been achievable to the FAA.

But, what aircraft could had been (reasonably) fielded by the FAA in early 1940?
 
Probably the Hurricane. Closer to the source of manufacture and I don't think there were enough Wildcats to go around in 1940. Brewster might take the order. Probably wouldn't be able to fill the order. But they'd probably would still take the order anyway.
 
What do you consider a more modern carrier aircraft should be like?

U.S.N.
Most of the fighters were still biplane F2F & F3F. Only Saratoga had 10 monoplane F2A-1 Buffalo. Only 4 F4F.3 Wildcats had been produced by the end of June 1940 with production against the French/British order not beginning until July.

The torpedo bomber was the Douglas TBD Devastator.

The dive bombing and scouting function was shared by a variety of aircraft. Biplane Curtis SBC Helldiver, & Vought SBU and monoplane SB2U Vindicator & Northop BT-1. The Douglas SBD Dauntless was on order but didn't enter service in small numbers until late 1940.

Japan
The main carrier fighter was the 270mph Mitsubishi A5M (later codenamed Claude). The A6M Zero only completed its trials in July 1940, entering combat from land bases in China in Sept.

The main torpedo bomber was the Nakajima B5N1 Kate (max speed 229mph). The more powerful B5N2 which Japan entered the war with in Dec 1941 only flew for the first time in Dec 1939.

The main dive bomber was the biplane Aichi D1A. The Aichi D3A Val was only beginning to enter service in 1940.

RN
So the RN has the Swordfish in the Torpedo/Spotter/Recce role with the Albacore just entering production and service in early 1940. And the Barracuda Torpedo/Dive bomber was on order but ended up delayed by over a year due to development problems and low priority.

It has the Fighter/Dive bomber Blackburn Skua which proved successful in the latter role if not so much in the former.

And in the fighter role it has the Sea Gladiator, the short lived and useless Blackburn Roc turret fighter and the Fairey Fulmar which reached its first squadron in May 1940.

So in the first half if 1940 the RN is not so far behind, if at all, the other big carrier nations. In terms of better fighter aircraft they did manage to deck land hookless Hurricanes on Glorious in June so that is one option. Steps were being taken to order 100 Martlet / Wildcat, the first with folding wings, but they didn't become available until late 1941, Britain accepting a 6 month delay to get the folding wings so they would fit the carrier lifts of the newer ships.

The other option was the Spitfire. Supermarine designed a folding wing in late 1939 and an arrester hook had been successfully tested in Oct 1939.

But in mid 1940 the RAF has priority due to losses in France and the looming Battle of Britain. It is not until early 1941 that Hurricanes are made available and even later in the year before thoughts finally turn to the Spitfire due to delays in production of Fireflies and Firebrands ordered at the start of 1940.
 
Figure out a way to stuff some Hurricanes onto 'em.
Fold the wings (and find the hp to carry the extra weight), or widen the lifts. But really the Air Ministry could have avoided a lot of the uncompetitive aircraft by:

1) Demanding that whatever replaces the Blackburn Shark and Fairey Seal in the TSR role is a monocoque, folding undercarriage monoplane. Like the Douglas TBD Devastator (first flown in April 1935) or Nakajima B5N (first flown in January 1937).

2) Demanding that whatever replaces the Sea Gladiator in the fighter role is a single seat, folding undercarriage fighter with performance equal to the best fighters then known to be in development. By this time the Spitfire, Hurricane, Bf 109, A5M, Macchi C.200, etc. were all in service.

3) Demanding that the planned Skua dive bomber is focused on carrying the maximum bomb load at the highest speed and furthest distance. No dual fighter role, but instead it's a Skua optimized for bombing, like the Northrop BT-1, first flown in 1936.

The examples of best/better practices were out there, but the Air Ministry chose a different path. For starters the British need better engines, primarily an earlier introduction of the Bristol Hercules (first run 1936), and a naval optimized RR Merlin.
 
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Ditch the Roc, stick a Pegasus on the Skua. Fit CS prop.. Rig a 1000lb bomb underneath, after you convince the RAF to actually make 1000lb bombs in 1939-early 1940.
The difference between two .303 Brownings and four .303 Brownings isn't enough to worry about.
Use it as a Dive bomber and recon plane.
Leave the Swordfish alone or stick a Pegasus on the Shark.
Put a CS propeller on the Hurricane, stick a Merlin VIII in it, fold the wing just outboard of the landing gear, or aux fuel tank attachment points.
You would do fine off Norway in 1940. Maybe not what you want for Japan in 1941 but that wasn't the Question.
 
Fold the wings (and find the hp to carry the extra weight), or widen the lifts. But really the Air Ministry could have avoided a lot of the uncompetitive aircraft by:

1) Demanding that whatever replaces the Blackburn Shark and Fairey Seal in the TSR role is a monocoque, folding undercarriage monoplane. Like the Douglas TBD Devastator (first flown in April 1935) or Nakajima B5N (first flown in January 1937).

2) Demanding that whatever replaces the Sea Gladiator in the fighter role is a single seat, folding undercarriage fighter with performance equal to the best fighters then known to be in development. By this time the Spitfire, Hurricane, Bf 109, A5M, Macchi C.200, etc. were all in service.

3) Demanding that the planned Skua dive bomber is focused on carrying the maximum bomb load at the highest speed and furthest distance. No dual fighter role, but instead it's a Skua optimized for bombing, like the Northrop BT-1, first flown in 1936.

The examples of best/better practices were out there, but the Air Ministry chose a different path. For starters the British need better engines, primarily an earlier introduction of the Bristol Hercules (first run 1936), and a naval optimized RR Merlin.

Re the successor to the Sea Gladiator, that is precisely what happened.

The Sea Gladiator was a 'Crisis purchase' in 1938 to fill a fighter gap on Furious C&G, with deliveries in late 1938 / early 1939. By the end of 1939 the RN had concluded that they needed both a two seat fighter and a single seater. From that process emerged the Firefly and the Firebrand. The spec that was written in Aug 1940 for the single seater, N.11/40, called for a speed of not less than 350 knots (403mph) for an operational height of 15-20,000ft, with good manoeuvrability and control at low and high speeds, 4 hours endurance plus an extra 2 hours with a drop tank at not less than 120 knots (140 mph). Armament 4x20mm. Engine specified to be the Sabre, although in the original proposal in Jan 1940 Blackburn had proposed the Hercules.

So not much wrong with the spec. The execution of it however left much to be desired, before even getting to the point of the engines being reprioitised for the RAF Typhoon.

The Skua gets unfairly treated in the view of many because it is its lack of performance in the fighter part of its role that grabs all the attention. As a dive bomber it's contemporaries are the Vought SB2U Vindicator and the Northrop BT-1 mentioned. They could carry a 1,000lb bomb but to what end? Their main target was to be enemy carriers for which it would have been overkill, 500lb bombs being enough to mission kill an unarmoured Carrier. In terms of range the US aircraft better it.

But on that last point, we then come back to the mix of roles in the airframe. In the RN the search (scouting) function is the territory of the Swordfish while in the USN it is in the realm of the Vindicator. So in real terms is range actually an issue? And in the USN the scout function is a two seater with the pilot doing the navigating. The second crew member was a radioman / gunner. In the generally poorer weather conditions expected in the Atlantic the RN had concluded you need a trained Observer to do the navigation full time.

The real problem for the FAA in the 1930s is that there is very little movement in the figures specified for stall speeds and take off distances despite generally increasing aircraft performance. Couple that with the generally shorter flight decks of British carriers and you compound the problems for aircraft designers.

For example the limits set for the 1936 Albacore and following 1937 Barracuda were stall speed 58 knots. The take off distance of the former was to be 200 feet. The limits for the Firebrand in 1940 were 68 knots and 350 ft. But the Vindicator was considered unsafe for use on escort carriers with a 450ft flight deck due to its take off distance.

The width of the carrier lifts can only be altered at the design stage or by major reconstruction, as their size and placement in closed hangar ships like Ark Royal and the Illustrious class impacts the strength of the whole ship. But again we run into the problem that the RN only controls the ship part of the equation with the Air Ministry / RAF controlling the aircraft part until 1938/39, and even after that the AM still controls what gets built.
 
But if there's one/two thing I would change for the FAA it's aircraft/aircrew numbers. Find the means to deploy each CV with a full CAG of the best FAA aircraft available and you're halfway there.
 
What do you consider a more modern carrier aircraft should be like?

U.S.N.
Most of the fighters were still biplane F2F & F3F. Only Saratoga had 10 monoplane F2A-1 Buffalo. Only 4 F4F.3 Wildcats had been produced by the end of June 1940 with production against the French/British order not beginning until July.

The torpedo bomber was the Douglas TBD Devastator.

The dive bombing and scouting function was shared by a variety of aircraft. Biplane Curtis SBC Helldiver, & Vought SBU and monoplane SB2U Vindicator & Northop BT-1. The Douglas SBD Dauntless was on order but didn't enter service in small numbers until late 1940.

Japan
The main carrier fighter was the 270mph Mitsubishi A5M (later codenamed Claude). The A6M Zero only completed its trials in July 1940, entering combat from land bases in China in Sept.

The main torpedo bomber was the Nakajima B5N1 Kate (max speed 229mph). The more powerful B5N2 which Japan entered the war with in Dec 1941 only flew for the first time in Dec 1939.

The main dive bomber was the biplane Aichi D1A. The Aichi D3A Val was only beginning to enter service in 1940.

RN
So the RN has the Swordfish in the Torpedo/Spotter/Recce role with the Albacore just entering production and service in early 1940. And the Barracuda Torpedo/Dive bomber was on order but ended up delayed by over a year due to development problems and low priority.

It has the Fighter/Dive bomber Blackburn Skua which proved successful in the latter role if not so much in the former.

And in the fighter role it has the Sea Gladiator, the short lived and useless Blackburn Roc turret fighter and the Fairey Fulmar which reached its first squadron in May 1940.

So in the first half if 1940 the RN is not so far behind, if at all, the other big carrier nations. In terms of better fighter aircraft they did manage to deck land hookless Hurricanes on Glorious in June so that is one option. Steps were being taken to order 100 Martlet / Wildcat, the first with folding wings, but they didn't become available until late 1941, Britain accepting a 6 month delay to get the folding wings so they would fit the carrier lifts of the newer ships.

The other option was the Spitfire. Supermarine designed a folding wing in late 1939 and an arrester hook had been successfully tested in Oct 1939.

But in mid 1940 the RAF has priority due to losses in France and the looming Battle of Britain. It is not until early 1941 that Hurricanes are made available and even later in the year before thoughts finally turn to the Spitfire due to delays in production of Fireflies and Firebrands ordered at the start of 1940.
So basicly there was no room for other path for the FAA?

There wasn't any prototype or design that could be chosen?
 
So basicly there was no room for other path for the FAA? There wasn't any prototype or design that could be chosen?
Don't dispair. You'll find you need to look past those who'll tell you why something couldn't, wouldn't or shouldn't have been possible or have occurred. It's not that these positions aren't often without merit or worth considering, they often are, but contrarian tendencies can be strong here. Many will tell you why not, but few how to.

So, keep digging, there's many a fork in the road where the FAA could find another path, such as the Admiralty rather than the RAF controlling the RN's aircraft procurement from 1924 to 1939. And better recognition of what other fleets are doing, such as Japan with their 270 mph A5M fighter introduced in 1936, when the FAA's Hawker Nimrod was pressed to exceed 190 mph. There would be a naval attaché in the British embassies in Tokyo and Washington who can monitor the competition in naval aviation and report back to the FAA or Air Ministry. Japan's A6M Zero, having first flown in early 1939 should not have been a surprise. Here's a timeline of the FAA, our fork in the road is likely here.

But remember, any demands the Fleet Air Arm makes, such as demands for bespoke designs, and for more aircraft, engines, flight and maintenance/handling personnel, expanded training programs, etc. will be in competition with demands elsewhere, including the RAF. Nothing occurs in a vacuum.
 
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So basicly there was no room for other path for the FAA?

There wasn't any prototype or design that could be chosen?
Well the fundamental problem is that from 1 April 1918 anything to do with aircraft became the province of the RAF, even though it was the RN that was paying the bill for naval aircraft. And as the new kid on the block the RAF tried to exclude both the Army and the RN from all aviation matters. This was less of an issue for the Army as it meant that part of the cost of policing the Empire was coming from someone else's budget, but the RN was not in that position. As time went on, the admirals became further and further distanced from aviation matters to know what was possible. So the leading position that the RN had in carrier warfare into the early 1930s, when aircraft performance remained relatively static, was lost when aircraft performance began to take off, if you will pardon the pun, in the mid-1930s.

The mistake that this RAF control represented was recognised in the Inskip report that was published in Dec 1937 which recommended that carrier aviation, but not maritime land based aviation, should be passed back to the RN. But that recommendation was not finally implemented until 24th May 1939, just over 3 months before the start of WW2. The RN did not waste those 17 months much work was done to prepare for the eventual transfer. But given that 50% of pilots and most maintenance personnel came from the RAF, change could not happen overnight. By the outbreak of war agreements with the RAF on pilot numbers to be supplied to the FAA were not being honoured, because the RAF too was short of pilots.

The other problem once WW2 starts is that all aircraft production became the responsibility of the Ministry of Aircraft Production from May 1940. At that point the urgency is to get more fighters to defend Britain, then it becomes bombers to be seen to be taking the fight to Germany. So the needs of the FAA are continuously pushed down the priority list. The Admiralty recognise this and look to the US for its next generation of aircraft.

And that gets compounded by the aircraft the RN had selected for production, like the Barracuda, Firefly and Firebrand all hit development problems and a lack of priority to get them fixed. In May 1939 Barracuda production was expected to start in April 1941. It eventually started in April 1942. Firebrand was designed around the Sabre engine that in 1942/43 MAP decides production of which should go to the Typhoon. (I'm not suggesting Firebrand would have been a good fighter, merely highlighting that there were matters outwith RN control).

If you want a possible plus for the RN how about a Seafire in 1940? A folding with Spitfire proposal was made in late 1939. But all production was focussed on providing for the needs of the RAF.

The problem I have with most of these what ifs is that they choose to ignore this part of the history and start from the position of blaming the RN for shortsightedness in the few years before the outbreak of war, closely followed by a lot of wishful thinking about what is possible under wartime conditions. They also tend to come at this whole subject from the perspective of the aircraft. But there is an almost symbiotic relationship between the aircraft and the carriers from which they are designed to operate.

Many also ignore the effects that radar had on the aircraft interception problem. Faster bombers from the 1930s shorten the time available for interception by fighters. Carriers can only carry limited numbers of aircraft only some of which can be fighters. So standing patrols are not possible. So single seater interceptors fall out of favour and we see the rise of the Armoured Carrier. The naval fighter then is seen as a longer range escort aircraft to the naval strikers. Other countries took different views but they were operating under different doctrines and operating conditions.

And in the 1930s the battleship is king of the ocean for all navies. That only begins to change off Norway in 1940 and does not reach a more general acceptance until 1942. Anyone who suggests that any navy should have been building more carriers from the mid1930s is depending wholly on hindsight.

So it is complicated and most of the what ifs you see posted up ignore the complications either through ignorance or by deliberate choice.

So IMHO to change the FAA position in 1939 you have to turn the clock back not a few years but 21, to the formation of the RAF in 1918.
 
So basicly there was no room for other path for the FAA?

There wasn't any prototype or design that could be chosen?
Not really when it comes to actual hardware.

The British designers came up with all kinds of designs on paper. So did the Americans. The Grumman Avenger was one of of at least 13 designs.
Trying to pick the "winner" out of a stack of paper that big takes a bit of doing.

The next problem is that British Aviation didn't really have enough design staff for all the different designs they were working on.
And few few factories actually had a design/development shop. Prototypes were worked on, generally, in a corner of the main production shop and if production was getting a bit behind a few workers or a few square feet of the prototype area got taken over until the situation eased up somewhat.

Going back the Avenger they did have a competitor, except that Vought, the original designer ran out of capacity after a few unfortunate accidents and had to concentrate on the F4U Corsair at which point they handed the design over to Consolidated but Consolidated was working on expanding Catalina production, trying to build Coronado's and get the whole build the B-24 Liberater in 5 different factories things (only 3 made it) and the Sea Wolf got put on hold while a brand new bare ground factory was built to make it. But even the United States was limited in what they could build at the same time and the while the prototype flew in Dec of 1941 the first production machine didn't fly until 1944 at which point it didn't make any difference.

now as far as
such as Japan with their 270 mph A5M fighter introduced in 1936, when the FAA's Hawker Nimrod was pressed to exceed 190 mph
goes. Things were not as bleak as that sentence makes out,
1. the A5M didn't not enter service in 1936, it entered squadron service in 1937 and that was the A5M1 with a a 580 hp engine for take off and 630hp at 1500 meters. about 252mph.
2, It takes until the A5M4 with it's 710hp take-off and 785hp at 3000 meters engine show ups in 1938 that they really had a 270mph fighter
3. The Hawker Nimrod entered service in 1932.
4. The Gladiator was entering service in Feb 1937. The Sea Gladiator would come a bit later it is true.
 
It is worth taking a moment and looking at RN fighter development in the 1930s and early 1940s.

Hawker Nimrod - single seater replacement for the Fairey Flycatcher. Search began in 1926. Development of RAF Hawker Fury that had entered service in 1931. Service entry 1932.

Hawker Osprey - two seat spotter and recce aircraft based on the Hawker Hart. Service entry 1932.

Blackburn Skua - two seater combining fighter and dive bomber roles. Spec dated 1934. First flight Feb 1937, service entry Dec 1938.

Blackburn Roc - two seat turret fighter based on the Skua. Spec issued Dec 1935. Ordered April 1937. Blackburn was so busy that it had to sub-contract the design work and subsequent production to Boulton Paul who also had orders for the Defiant turret fighter for the RAF. First flight Dec 1938. Even before that some realised its performance would be less than desired but production went ahead anyway because to do otherwise would be disruptive to industry. Service entry in late 1939 alongside Skuas. Withdrawn from front line service in summer 1940. Even more useless was the proposed floatplane version which was expected in front line service in mid-1940.

1938 - specs issued for new two seat fighter and a new two seat turret fighter. Cancelled and replaced by the spec for an "interim" fighter (see below).

Fairey Fulmar - April 1938 Spec issued for an "interim" two seat fighter needed in service by Sept 1939. Speed is of the essence so it is based on a Fairey offering. This was based on the P.4/34 light bomber design, a fighter development of which Fairey had demonstrated in 1937. First production aircraft in Jan 1940 effectively serves as prototype with full production from May and service entry in June 1940.

Sea Gladiator - Hobbs describes this as a "crisis" purchase due to delays with Skua and Roc. It was intended for only 3 squadrons to be based on Furious, C & G. Contract placed June 1938. Dec 1938 to Jan 1939, 38 aircraft taken from an RAF contract and modified with arrester hooks on production line as the Sea Gladiator Interim. Feb/ March 1939 60 full spec Sea Gladiators delivered with dinghy stowage an catapult points. Service entry Feb 1939.

1939 - in mid-1939 specs were issued for a new two seat fighter and a two seat turret fighter. Various companies submit proposals. Meanwhile Admiralty begin to change their minds about the requirements based on the few months war experience. Confusion all round. Turret fighter scrapped altogether. Dec everything submitted to date rejected. Message goes out that what is now wanted are a two seater and a single seater BUT to be based on same airframe. It is around this time that Supermarine first pitch a folding wing Spitfire.

Jan 1940 Admiralty chooses a two seat Fairey design and a single seat Blackburn design for development and new specs are written around these proposals. These emerge, after much delay, as the Firefly and Firebrand respectively. Firefly enters operational service in Sept 1943. The Firebrand enters service, after two major redesigns, in a wholly different role in Sept 1945.

1940 - Admiralty recognises that there will be a fighter gap and that it needs higher performance single seaters. Turns to the USA and selects Grumman G-36 Martlet/Wildcat design and orders 100. Meanwhile it takes over the French order for the same type which are delivered Aug-Nov 1940. They also pick up a Greek order for 30 in 1941. The first 10 from the British order are delivered April 1941 with fixed wings. Britain agrees to delay delivery of the remaining 90 so they can be fitted with the newly designed folding wing. They are then delivered Oct 1941 to April 1942 with the first going to operational squadrons on Formidable and Illustrious at the beginning of 1942 before they head to the Indian Ocean. Lend Lease deliveries then begin later in 1942.

Sea Hurricane - Unhooked RAF Hurricanes had been successfully deck landed on Glorious in June 1940 during the withdrawal from Norway. In Oct the Admiralty approached Hawker about a fully navalised version. Airframes are made available to the FAA for conversion in early 1941 first for use as Catafighters (Sea Hurricane Ia) then as hooked carrier aircraft (Sea Hurricane Ib and later models).

Seafire - Spitfire airframes were made available to the FAA from late 1941 for conversion, with the first deck landing of a hooked Spitfire Vb in early 1942. Service entry is from mid-1942. The first production line model, the Seafire IIc appeared in mid-1942.

Look at the lead times on many of these designs from issue of the spec to squadron service. Now ask what could the RN do to change the position in Sept 1939 when it was only beginning to get control of the FAA back at the beginning of 1938.


On the subject of the Hart, just look at how many aircraft came to be based on it through the 1930s and the variety of roles they performed. Hart itself (requested 1926, service entry 1930 in light bomber role). Audax (army co-Operation version). Hartebeest (for SAAF, light bomber based on Audax). Demon (2 seat fighter for the RAF). Hardy (general purpose version of the Hart for use overseas). Hind (service entry 1935. Replacement for the Hart). Hector (service entry 1937. Replacement for the Audax). And of course the Osprey. Many of these types were still serving into the early years of WW2.
 
I think we need to add 3 more items to E EwenS 's list as a result of the Abssyanian Crisis.
During the crisis, the RA flies its bombers over the RN Mediterranean fleet on its way from Italy to Ethiopia. By time the carrier has spotted the Italian bombers, readied aircraft, turned into wind and launched her fighters, the Italians could have bombed the fleet. You have a similar situation where RM destroyers arrive at dawn withing range of the carrier. The immediate solution is to withdraw the fleet to the western Mediterranean.​
  • The effect is to change the specification for carrier: RN will armour them to defend against bombers/destroyers which get within range, which cost carrier size - both flight deck and hanger.
  • The fighter (you want a fighter which can maintain a standing patrol for several hours and participate in at least a couple intercepts. Which means lots of fuel, lots of ammo which combined with 10% increase in weight for folding wings, catapult spools, arrestor gear, dingy, etc). Also when you are flying for long distances above the clouds, you need some way to communicate with the carrier and find it... Given the technology of the day, that is a 2nd crew member. As your carrier fighter shouldn't ever be within range of shore based fighters, not an issue.* So, AM specification O8.38 orders the Fulmar.
  • The Mark VIII torpedo needs to be dropped from 60' at 60kn to reliably work. Why have faster landing speed than torpedo drop speed? Increasing landing speed by just 15kn results in 50% more energy, which means changing out the arrestor gear on all existing carriers**
But in mid '38, there is this top secret death ray (OK, its just RADAR) which allows cruiser to identify inbound ships/aircraft in dark/through clouds. Which combined with improvements in IFF and IDF allow the use of single seater interceptors/planes to make it home without navigator/radio operator.

The Mark XI torpedo can be dropped at 135 kn, which allows for much different TB design.

There is still the issue of suitable engine, but there are a couple options even beside the Merlin. And we want to ditch the 0.303" for at least a 0.5" (naval targets are almost always armoured to some extent).

If your crystal ball can see the fall of France in 6 weeks and that RADAR would improve to point where a. it would be small enough to put on a ship, and b. have enough range to allow defensive action, you beat all those historically.

*If another thread, the question was asked: What would a fighter for BoB look like without RADAR - IMHO, the Fairey Fulmar. You need 90% of the Fulmar to maintain standing patrols/make multiple intercepts/find way back home. You would be able to reduce the wing a little (no folding wing/arrestor gear/etc and RAF would accept higher take off/landing speed) and you would want an engine tuned for higher altitudes, but the basis air frame would be the same.

** USN was in the process of upgrading all their CVs arrestor gear at time of PH to handle the heavier, faster landing aircraft.
 
An option within a reasonable POD timescale for 1940 service would be the Vickers Venom. The Aquila is a questionable item but a Mercury is just over 100kg heavier and a few inches wider which may not be insuperable. With a Blenheim type output and 2 position propellor the extra fuel and hook may help with the centre of gravity in this case. However, it ought to cool better than it's two row double Taurus and the supercharger better matched to the naval need for lower altitude performance so development could be more reliable than the OTL Taurus. Not to mention 100 octane fuel allowing more boost pressure.

Otherwise, with the rate of climb being a key requirement, one might look to take the Gladiator further. They had provision for six guns and a Pegasus in lieu of a Mercury is not that far a stretch. As such, with a two position propeller suited to the extra torque from the capacity increase, it should climb like a thing that climbs fast.

At least both go down the lifts without needing folding wings.
 

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