England's fighter strength in Battle of Britain (1 Viewer)

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I don't know if the term, "force multiplier" applies here but the raw numbers of fighters available doesn't really reflect the relative strength because of two factors. The LW single seat fighters had to go a considerable distance to get into the fight and then go home where they were pretty much finished for that day. The RAF did not have to go far and then they could go home and refuel and rearm and fight again that day. Also the British radar helped the RAF to concentrate and not waste too much of the fighter force in empty air. The LW did not have that luxury as they needed to defend almost every bomber whether they were attacked or not. Wear and tear and fatigue took place against the LW fighter force whether they were engaged or not.
 
Certainly things had already started to turn the RAF's way by this point. Luftwaffe fighter strength had already begun its precipitous decline.

Very wishful. :lol:

After the first month or so of fighting, Luftwaffe front line strength was down by about 50 109s. The RAF was up by about 150 or so.

Nope, the Luftwaffe front line strength was certainly not down by about 50 109s. The RAF was increasing its strenght while the Luftwaffe was not attacking it with concentrated effort, that is not very surprising is it?

You are pulling another statistical stunt, comparing the 29 June figures for the entire Tagjagd (which soon 'lost' a unit of 109 that was transferred to the Nachtjagd) with the 10 August figures that only include units engaged against England only.. I am sure the RAF would have loved your method of getting rid of 109s, should it would actually remove 109s from strenghts, but it does not do that. Its just playing, and misleading with statistics.

As for the RAF strenght, 3/4 days after Adlertag and a week after the 9/10 August, the servicealbe fighters fell by some 45, and even more telling are the state of reserves, Hurricanes in storage/reserve going down from 356 to 270, Spitfires from 207 to 179.

In other words, the Luftwaffe started hammering the RAF after lull in July.

Only the Wood and Dempster figures aren't sourced, and are quite close to the RAF's estimates of German sorties.

Hooton, who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records, shows 4,050 Luftwaffe fighter sorties 2 - 8 September.

Actually Wood and Dempster's sources are also matching the figures by Hooton, 'who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records', and the only reason of difference is that W+D counts 'fighter' sorties which are that, sorties flown by fighters (SE and TE) in an air superiority role, and counting Jabo's amongst bomber sorties (properly, IMHO) while Hooton counts the Luftwaffe air superiority and fighter-bomber sorties as 'fighter' sorties.

Are you suggesting perhaps that LW Jabo operations also contributed heavily to escorting bombers and winning air superiority..? Another statistical stunt, Hoppie?

RAF sorties of course included those in the north, not in the battle area, as well as a lot of standing patrols.

So do the Luftwaffe's sorties.
 
but some units were transferred to others arms (nightfighters, for example)

No, I think we went over this before. The night fighter units were being transitioned away from the 109 during the battle.

From The Other Battle, Luftwaffe Night Aces vs Bomber Command, by Peter Hinchcliffe:
It was becoming clear there was no place in the new night fighter organisation for the Bf 109, and gradually the pilots of III/NG 1 [renamed from II/NG 1] converted to the Bf 110, only 1 staffel of single seaters remaining until October [1940], when that was itself disbanded.

From German Air Force Air Defence Operations by Walter Grabmann:
Initially this group had Me 109 aircraft. Since they were found unsuitable for the purpose because of their small time in air capacities and their inadequate equipment for blind navigation, re-equipment of the group's squadrons with Me 110 aircraft commenced in December 1940.
 
None of this transition to the 110 seems to have occured in the time period we are discussing, though.

There were certainly 109 equipped night fighter units during the Battle, usually operating a mix of 110s and 109s. These were transformed from existing daylight fighter units, 109 units as well. So those 109s 'missing' from the daylight fighter lists were not 'lost', but sent to other duties.
 
Nope, the Luftwaffe front line strength was certainly not down by about 50 109s. The RAF was increasing its strenght while the Luftwaffe was not attacking it with concentrated effort, that is not very surprising is it?

You are pulling another statistical stunt, comparing the 29 June figures for the entire Tagjagd (which soon 'lost' a unit of 109 that was transferred to the Nachtjagd)

No, they didn't lose a unit that was transferred to the nachtjagd. Some units went from the JGs on 22nd June, before the figures we are comparing against.

with the 10 August figures that only include units engaged against England only.

Which was all the 109s, I believe.

Pilot numbers tell the same story. 29th June the Luftwaffe had 906 109 pilots fit for duty. 1st of August they had 869. (1st September it was down to 735)

In other words, the Luftwaffe started hammering the RAF after lull in July.

In July the RAF got stronger as the Luftwaffe got weaker. In August, the RAF briefly got a bit weaker, the Luftwaffe got a lot weaker.

RAF serviceable aircraft 13th August - 579 Spitfires and Hurricanes
7th September - 621 Spitfires and Hurricanes

Fighter Command aircrew 10th August - 1,396
7th September - 1,381

In contrast the Luftwaffe. Serviceable SE fighters 13th August - 853
7th September - 658

Bf 109 pilots fit for duty 1st August - 869
1st September - 735

So, between Adlertag and the switch to London, RAF serviceable Spitfire and Hurricane strength increased by 42, Luftwaffe 109 strength decreased by 195.

In terms of pilots, FC aircrew (not just pilots) decreased by 15, Luftwaffe 109 pilots by 134.

Who was getting hammered?

Hmm, the German bomber strenghts stayed pretty much the same during the whole Battle, starting it with almost 1400 bombers on strenght, and finishing it with a little over 1400.

It wasn't just the Luftwaffe fighters that were getting hammered.

KG strength 13th August, 1,482 on hand, 1,008 serviceable
7th September 1,291 on hand, 798 serviceable.

That's a decline in bomber strength of 191 total, 210 serviceable, in three and a half weeks.

Actually Wood and Dempster's sources are also matching the figures by Hooton, 'who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records', and the only reason of difference is that W+D counts 'fighter' sorties which are that, sorties flown by fighters (SE and TE) in an air superiority role, and counting Jabo's amongst bomber sorties (properly, IMHO) while Hooton counts the Luftwaffe air superiority and fighter-bomber sorties as 'fighter' sorties.

Are you seriously claiming the Luftwaffe flew 2,355 fighter sorties and 1,695 fighter bomber sorties in the first week of September? That 42% of all Luftwaffe fighter sorties were fighter bombers? I'd really, really like to see a source for that.
 
None of this transition to the 110 seems to have occured in the time period we are discussing, though.

There were certainly 109 equipped night fighter units during the Battle, usually operating a mix of 110s and 109s. These were transformed from existing daylight fighter units, 109 units as well. So those 109s 'missing' from the daylight fighter lists were not 'lost', but sent to other duties.

No, there were no night fighter units formed with 109s in the period we are discussing. 1 NG1 (iirc) formed with 109s on 22nd June 1940, before the 29th June strength figures.

Whether they gave up any 109s during the period I don't know, it depends how fast they transitioned. Personally I doubt the numbers would have been substantial, if any, but it's certainly not true that missing 109s during the BoB can be accounted for by aircraft transferred to the night fighter units.

What is your source for this claim?
 
The british novelist, and amateur historian (albeit an amateur historian that has won critical praise by professional historians) Len Deighton has written an excellent non-fiction study of the Battle of Britain. I highly reccomend it.
 
No, there were no night fighter units formed with 109s in the period we are discussing. 1 NG1 (iirc) formed with 109s on 22nd June 1940, before the 29th June strength figures.

No, there were night fighter units formed with 109s in the period we are discussing. IV/JG 2 was redesignated to II/NG1 with 109s on 22nd June 1940, but it was still counted in the 29th June strength figures, with 30 Bf 109s and 33 pilots. They are not counted 28 September Tagjagd figures, because by that time they were de facto transferred to another fighter arm, night fighters.

Are you saying that those 30 Bf 109s and 33 pilots were 'lost' in the period? Or they just were transferred elsewhere.

In July the RAF got stronger as the Luftwaffe got weaker.

Bull. Already exposed bull, I might add.

In August, the RAF briefly got a bit weaker, the Luftwaffe got a lot weaker.

In July the RAF got stronger as the Luftwaffe got weaker. In August, the RAF briefly got a bit weaker, the Luftwaffe got a lot weaker.

RAF serviceable aircraft 13th August - 579 Spitfires and Hurricanes
7th September - 621 Spitfires and Hurricanes

In contrast the Luftwaffe. Serviceable SE fighters 13th August - 853
7th September - 658

RAF figures for early in the morning at 9:00, before the major fight on the 7th September, before loosing 27 fighters missing and many more shot up and unservicable, LW figures counted in the evening, where every aircraft with but a single hole waiting for patched up being 'unservicable', right? :rolleyes:

As for the LW's servicable fighters, on 7th September I can count 889 on strenght with 728 servicable (17 of them in ErGr.210 which had 110s as well), but thats still missing data for some units, like Stab and III/JG 77 and I/LG 2. Its fairly reasonable to assume that these units held another 50-60 servicable 109s, so the servicable total was more like around 780, not 728 (as a reminder, on August 10 the SE units deployed against Britain had 805). The list may still miss some other units present in the area, of course. These are also only the units engaged against Britain and stationed in the direct vicinity, not counting units in Germany, while I am sure your count of 13 August do include units everywhere.

The count for 28 September is 920 of which 712 was servicable, this time including I./LG2, Stab and III/JG 77 but not II./LG2 or ErGr.210 (and possibly missing others created in the meantime..?). Overall, very little change, even possibly a small increase.

Fighter Command aircrew 10th August - 1,396
7th September - 1,381

Bf 109 pilots fit for duty 1st August - 869
1st September - 735

RAF fighter pilots 'present' (inc. those unfit for duty being sick, insufficiently trained etc.), LW fighter pilots 'fit for duty'... :rolleyes:

So, between Adlertag and the switch to London, RAF serviceable Spitfire and Hurricane strength increased by 42, Luftwaffe 109 strength decreased by 195.

In terms of pilots, FC aircrew (not just pilots) decreased by 15, Luftwaffe 109 pilots by 134.

No, just another one of your statistical stunts, comparing apples and oranges, without a source.

Who was getting hammered?

Fighter Command. In August 1940 they lost 355 fighters as total loss, and 112 severly damaged to enemy action.

The Luftwaffe lost 177 SE and 114 TE fighters, a total of 291 written offto enemy action, but only 56 damaged.
The total losses of RAF fighters in August in combat was 467 RAF fighters vs 347 LW fighters. The RAF lost 304 pilots killed, injured or missing, the LW lost 289.

Another set of figures available for between 8 August - 30 September shows 555 Bf 109s, 264 Bf 110s shot down/written off/damaged vs 854 Hurricanes, 520 Spitfires, 65 Defiants/Blenheims to all causes. Or 819 LW fighters vs 1439 RAF fighters.

By 6th September, only 86 Hurricanes and as little as 41 Spitfires were ready for issue, compared to 160 Hurris and 132 Spits on the 9th August. The losses were so severe that pilots were transitioned from fighter schools before they would finish even the already much shortened six week course.

Both pilots and reserve aircraft were running out - fact.

It wasn't just the Luftwaffe fighters that were getting hammered.

KG strength 13th August, 1,482 on hand, 1,008 serviceable
7th September 1,291 on hand, 798 serviceable.

That's a decline in bomber strength of 191 total, 210 serviceable, in three and a half weeks.

Source please.

KG strenghts as of

29.6.1940 - 1380
28.9.1940 - 1420
2.11.1940 - 1423
30.11.1940 - 1393

Whether they gave up any 109s during the period I don't know, it depends how fast they transitioned. Personally I doubt the numbers would have been substantial, if any, but it's certainly not true that missing 109s during the BoB can be accounted for by aircraft transferred to the night fighter units.

To make it short, quite clearly some Tagjagd units which have been present and counted on the 29 June 1940 were not counted in the later figures, because they were transferred to the Nachtjagd and counted in the Nachtjagd strenght reports.
 
Kurfurst;

Interesting, I have seen references to this elsewhere. Can you please provide me a scan/shot of that page where he mentions this (OK in a PM too!), I would like to read his own words.

Alas I can only give you a 2nd hand reference to it from material that I own (Bungay's The Most Dangerous Enemy, 2000) as, like most of the other references quoted by Bungay which I followed up myself, I had to borrow it. Though I am still hopeful of finding one for myself and if that happens anytime soon I will be happy to oblige.

I don't see where the Luftwaffe 'hammered' the RAF from July, as that would have meant a German victory would it not?

Overall the Luftwaffe only lost 20% more aircraft than the RAF, but they never got near to achieving victory which is why the attempt was abandoned.

Bungay's book is an interesting read, as is 'Invasion 1940' by Derek Robinson as after decades of reading various histories of the Battle of Britain these tweo books added other dimensions and pointed me towards other sources that I had missed before. But, to anyone wanting to learn more about the battle and get a properly balanced view, I wouldn't recommend basing your entire opinion of the Battle on the findings of these two very different books, do look elsewhere as well (like Deighton as mentioned above for instance and others).
 
Britain...NOT ENGLAND!!!!!!!!!!

The first shoot down of a German aircraft over the UK was not over England.
 
Whoops...be careful of merging 'England' and 'Britain' with the Basket around...

...are members of the forum aware that 'Basket' is an old, now-fogotten word for a type of sword (cutlass, I believe)?
 
This is what one source (Deighton) has to say about the fighter strengths (Total and Combat Ready) on 1 July 1940
 

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Whoops...be careful of merging 'England' and 'Britain' with the Basket around...

...are members of the forum aware that 'Basket' is an old, now-fogotten word for a type of sword (cutlass, I believe)?

The question...Dear Bandit...is one of correctness.

How can one talk about the merits of the splendid Spitfire when you cannot even get the country right?

Attention to detail...
 
Obviously the numbers of single engine ,single seat fighters were comparable, depending on the source ,date ect. What is surprisng to me is the suggestion that the Luftwaffe was at some disadvantage. The RAF was responsible for the air defense of all of Britain, the Luftwaffe being on the offensive had the advantage of concentration of numbers. This is always the case, the defender reacts to the intrusions of the attacker.

Slaterat
 
ah yes, but this is where the limited range of the 109, and the fighter command GCI system comes into play. Radar was essential to the functioning of that system, enabling British fighters to remain on the deck until needed, and be placed at the right altitude, and against the most dangerous threats.

It was the first time that the advantage rested with the defence, and not the the attack in air combat
 
Obviously the numbers of single engine ,single seat fighters were comparable, depending on the source ,date ect.

There are two things confusing the issue.

First there is Kurfurst's comparison of all RAF fighter types (inc Blenheims etc) with German single seat fighters only.

Secondly there are some sources, eg Len Deighton, that are comparing German fighters based only on the Channel coast with British fighters anywhere in the UK, including Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Neither gives an accurate picture.

The problem with counting Blenheims and Defiants, but excluding Bf 110s, is obvious, especially as the 110 was much closer to a conventional fighter than the Blenheim or Defiant.

The geographical problem isn't quite as obvious, and can be interpreted one of two ways.

First, you can argue that only those fighters in the battle area should be counted. If you do that it shows a much larger German superiority in numbers, as the Luftwaffe based almost all their fighters along the Channel coast, whereas the RAF kept about 40% of its in the North.

Secondly, you could argue that any fighter units available should be counted, even if not committed to the battle, because they are available for reinforcement. This overstates RAF strength, because being on the defensive the RAF had to keep sufficient fighter forces to defend targets all over the UK.

In terms of numbers of available fighters, just before the battle started, on 29th June 1940, the balance was:

Bf 109 - 1,107 (856 serviceable)
Spits and Hurris - 678 (490 serviceable) (both numbers approx)

We have more precise figures for serviceable fighters on 13th August, the date set by the Luftwaffe for the beginning of their all out assault:

Bf 109 - 853
Spits and Hurris - 579

Both sets of numbers are total fighters deployed in Europe.

Breaking the numbers down in to those deployed in/outside the battle area is more difficult. I believe 90% or so of the 109s were deployed along the Channel coast, about 60% of the Spitfires and Hurricanes.

This is what one source (Deighton) has to say about the fighter strengths (Total and Combat Ready) on 1 July 1940

You can clearly see the problem with Deighton's comparison. First he gives Bf 109 numbers as 809 available, 656 serviceable, then says "a further 84 109s based in Scandinavia with Luftflotte 5 lacked the range to take part in the battle". However, his RAF fighter numbers include Spitfires based as far north as Wick (tip of Scotland, 500 miles north of London), Drem (near Edinburgh, 325 miles north of London) and Dyce (near Aberdeen, 400 miles north of London).

In fact in Deighton's table all of 11 Group are in the battle area, 41 aircraft from 12 Group and none of 13 Group. Thus the totals in the battle area are:

656 Bf 109s
168 Bf 110s
Total 824

339 Spitfires and Hurricanes
50 Blenheims and Defiants
Total 389

That's a true like for like comparison, all fighter types (well, excluding Luftwaffe night fighters, anyway) and only those in the battle area.

Comparing all units available, even those based outside the operational area, we get:

724 Bf 109s
200 Bf 110s
Total 924

545 Spits and Hurris
94 Blenheims and Defiants
Total 639

The true position is somewhere in between those two sets of figures. The Germans enjoyed an advantage in committing nearly all their aircraft to the battle, but the RAF squadrons deployed elsewhere were of some use as reinforcements and for R&R.

Kurfurst, I'll reply to you later or tomorrow.
 
In terms of numbers of available fighters, just before the battle started, on 29th June 1940, the balance was:

Bf 109 - 1,107 (856 serviceable)
Spits and Hurris - 678 (490 serviceable) (both numbers approx)

...

Both sets of numbers are total fighters deployed in Europe.

Breaking the numbers down in to those deployed in/outside the battle area is more difficult. I believe 90% or so of the 109s were deployed along the Channel coast, about 60% of the Spitfires and Hurricanes.


LW on 29 june had nod deployed the force versus the british islands, (only 12 gruppen (of 28) so ~400 109s were in battle area
 
Secondly there are some sources, eg Len Deighton, that are comparing German fighters based only on the Channel coast with British fighters anywhere in the UK, including Scotland and Northern Ireland.

The problem here is that in terms of the battle, the forces of the un-engaged LW units, the forces in LF-1, 4 and 5 could not easily deploy to the battle. The airfields were too limited, and the support echelons could not be moved at a moments notice.

The RAF on the other hand had the infrastructure on hand in the South, as well as the airfield capacity to allow redeployment at short notice. This was done on a routine basis in the battle.....units would be rotated in and out of the battle zone on a more or less daily basis, as a squadron got shot up, it would be pulled out of the south and sent north for some rest and replacement....sqdns that had been rested and rebuilt would be fed back into the battle. This was not something that the germans could do with near that flexibility, because of the limits on airbase capacity, distance, and availble SGSU (Sqn Gnd Support Unit).

So in my opinion the comparison parameters you are trying to draw into the equation are even less accurate than those being used by Deighton.

The geographical problem isn't quite as obvious, and can be interpreted one of two ways.

First, you can argue that only those fighters in the battle area should be counted. If you do that it shows a much larger German superiority in numbers, as the Luftwaffe based almost all their fighters along the Channel coast, whereas the RAF kept about 40% of its in the North.

I think that counting the fighters in the battle area is the way to go, but i also think that whilst you cannot include those numbers of the LW not in the battle (for the reasons stated above) you should include 13 gp because in a very real senser they were part of the battle. I would not, however, start counting those units in overseas commands and the like, as they clearly could not contribute to the battle


Secondly, you could argue that any fighter units available should be counted, even if not committed to the battle, because they are available for reinforcement. This overstates RAF strength, because being on the defensive the RAF had to keep sufficient fighter forces to defend targets all over the UK.

True, but the Brits did use the north as a rest area, so even though they could not use all of their assets at the same time, they could use them. It actually fitted Dowdings strategy perfectly, commit just enough with each battle to stay in the fight, not be reduced to negigent propertions.

The germans actually wanted the big showdown, and never really got it. Dowding constantly looked to the next days battle before committing RAF assets to battle. It was a subtle , yet brilliant stratgegy that few even today seem to understand

In terms of numbers of available fighters, just before the battle started, on 29th June 1940, the balance was:

Bf 109 - 1,107 (856 serviceable)
Spits and Hurris - 678 (490 serviceable) (both numbers approx)


err, would have to disagree here. The 109 figure you are quoting is exactly the same number as is published in the LW quarterly situation reports. The first qtr is March, the second June, the third September.....these quarterly reports are an averge, of the daily availability returns....so in effect they are a massive averaging excercise.

However, German LW strengths are consistently overstated because the LW includes crates that have been so badly shot up that they are basically only used for parts. To get accrate figures on flyable or potentially flyable crates, one has to deduct all those machines with more than 60% damage, and this was only done at the conclusion of each quarter. hence in the June qtr, the LW returns list 1107 SE fighters as available, but the September qtr, this figure had dropped to 932. This drop in September was not mostly due to the losses inflicted in the BOB, it was mostly due to the write offs that occurred in France and the Low countries finally being taken off the books. The write offs from the BOB dont show themselves until the December qtr, when the qtr shows an average daily strength of 832.

In actual fact the LW had a "potentially" flyable availability (not serviceable, i am just not including the wrecks parked on the side of the tarmac) of just under 900 machines. Of this total about 700 were available for the battle and of this just over 600 were ready, or serviceable

We have more precise figures for serviceable fighters on 13th August, the date set by the Luftwaffe for the beginning of their all out assault:

Bf 109 - 853
Spits and Hurris - 579

Both sets of numbers are total fighters deployed in Europe.



Same mistake is being made here....I bet your figures include the toatal write offs, of which by that time there were many. The RAF, incidentally did not use the same accounting system as the germans, so the figures you give for them may well be right

Breaking the numbers down in to those deployed in/outside the battle area is more difficult. I believe 90% or so of the 109s were deployed along the Channel coast, about 60% of the Spitfires and Hurricanes.

No 100% of the Spitfires and Hurris need to be included, for the reasons outlined earlier


You can clearly see the problem with Deighton's comparison. First he gives Bf 109 numbers as 809 available, 656 serviceable, then says "a further 84 109s based in Scandinavia with Luftflotte 5 lacked the range to take part in the battle". However, his RAF fighter numbers include Spitfires based as far north as Wick (tip of Scotland, 500 miles north of London), Drem (near Edinburgh, 325 miles north of London) and Dyce (near Aberdeen, 400 miles north of London).

In fact in Deighton's table all of 11 Group are in the battle area, 41 aircraft from 12 Group and none of 13 Group. Thus the totals in the battle area are:

656 Bf 109s
168 Bf 110s
Total 824

339 Spitfires and Hurricanes
50 Blenheims and Defiants
Total 389

That's a true like for like comparison, all fighter types (well, excluding Luftwaffe night fighters, anyway) and only those in the battle area.


Unfortunately it is not a true like for like comparison, because the LW numbers are inflated by the inclusion of wrecks, and also because only a fraction of the available fighters could get into the battle, the british battle strategy never called for an all in effort, and in fact used the north as a rest and recuperation area. Deightons comparison is actually bette than the one you are suggesting, to be honest.
 
A lot of interesting information in that posting. I admit that I thought the quarterly figures were a snapshot in time not an average figure.
Re the RAF I totally agree that all of Fighter command should be included but what was to stop the german forces replacing losses from their reserve or forces away from the front line? The lack of space may well put a cap on the number of aircraft that could participate in the battle at any one time, but units could be replaced with fresh ones.
In this case there is little difference between including Northern based units in the RAF numbers or those based in Germany.
 

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