Fairey Battle
- Thread starter Zipper730
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Shortround6
Major General
It is what happens when you take a medium level strategic bomber and use it in penny packets as a low altitude interdiction bomber (trying to blow up bridges and moving columns of troops) with little or no escort against an enemy who has, often times, air supremacy and a much better AA suite than your own troops.
I would note that the Blenheim and Lysander didn't fare much different.
I would note that the Blenheim and Lysander didn't fare much different.
My take on the situation is that the Air Ministry at the time was very much in favour of the light bomber concept, and were out to replace the Hart/Hind. Fairey wasn't at all enthusiastic about the specification and wanted to go with a twin-engine aircraft but the Air Ministry wasn't having it. It seems Fairey was eventually proven right (Blenheim).
I think simply inflating the numbers of bombers was important politically at this time too - as a 'bomber gap' was a pretty big deal in the 30s.
Reading RAF correspondence just before and shortly after war began - they were very aware how obsolescent the Battle was ...
buffnut453
Captain
The RAF wasn't simply "in favour of the light bomber concept". There were very real concerns that "heavy" bombers might be banned under the various disarmament concepts being discussed in the 1930s. That said, it's a fair question to ask why the Battle continued in service when no such ban eventuated...but, presumably, by then it was too late and aircraft were already operational (plus it would take time to get newer types into service and the RAF was desperate to grow rapidly from 1936 onwards).
Shortround6
Major General
I would note that the Fairey P.4/34 was probably more of heir to the Hart/Hind than the Battle was. The Battle carried twice the bombload and carried it further. It also had a navigator/bomb aimer and a bombsight/bomb aimer position.
The RAF needed something (anything?) to equip the rapidly forming squadrons and the Battle was picked as one of the types, it was ready, it was cheap, it was better than the existing biplanes. It trained an industry in modern construction techniques.
It turned out to be sturdy, easy to fly with few, if any vices. Great trainer and if the war had broken out in 1937/38 it might be remembered differently.
The RAF needed something (anything?) to equip the rapidly forming squadrons and the Battle was picked as one of the types, it was ready, it was cheap, it was better than the existing biplanes. It trained an industry in modern construction techniques.
It turned out to be sturdy, easy to fly with few, if any vices. Great trainer and if the war had broken out in 1937/38 it might be remembered differently.
It was also something to put a Merlin engine in to see how it worked.
FalkeEins
Senior Airman
Indeed... often thought of as 'slow', it was only around 20 mph slower than the Fulmar (ship-borne fighter). It was 50 kph faster than a Whitley.
Tempted to say what bomber flying unescorted at low level won't or doesn't pay a heavy price!
- Thread starter
- #11
The RAF did do a lot of low altitude missions early on to increase bombing accuracy. This ironically defeated the whole idea of bombing up high, which requires the enemy to climb up to altitude and accelerate to get you (in this case, they were above you almost off the bat).
So concentration was partially a problem, the airplane was at low altitude and fairly vulnerable. I remember them doing some maneuvers that looked pretty impressive, what kind of agility was it capable of?
Regardless, if they were taking losses: Didn't the British have Hawker Hurricanes in Europe prior to Dunkirk?
That's right -- I'm amazed we were able to avoid this.
Shortround6
Major General
Bombing low also puts you range of the German light AA.
There were twin MG 34 AA mounts, 20mm single AA mounts and 37mm AA guns defending the bridges/river crossings and other points. More dangerous to low flyers than 88mm guns.
The Battle had pretty good agility for a bomber, but it was a big single engine plane (and that engine only had 880hp near sea level) so any maneuvers took a while to get back up to speed from. The Airframe was capable of doing dive bombing but the crews were not trained (or not well trained) in doing so, no dive bomb sight was fitted. It was possible to put a 500lb bomb under each wing but this of course adds drag.
I am not certain but it may have been equipped with a two pitch propeller. Welcome to correction.
On some missions escorts were planned for but due to poor communications and lack of practice actual rendezvous were rare and all to often the flight leaders did the old POR (Press ON Regardless) which got a lot of medals but not much in the way of actual results (damage to Germans). To be fair in some cases giving the Germans an extra day or two to improve defenses on bridges (or move the division they were trying stop miles away) meant that delaying the attack hours or till the next day would mean the opportunity was gone.
It takes practice and coordination to properly execute ground attack/interdiction missions and unfortunately the Battle and Hurricane squadrons lacked the practice/training needed no matter how willing they were. Same for the Blenheim and Lysander squadrons.
There were twin MG 34 AA mounts, 20mm single AA mounts and 37mm AA guns defending the bridges/river crossings and other points. More dangerous to low flyers than 88mm guns.
The Battle had pretty good agility for a bomber, but it was a big single engine plane (and that engine only had 880hp near sea level) so any maneuvers took a while to get back up to speed from. The Airframe was capable of doing dive bombing but the crews were not trained (or not well trained) in doing so, no dive bomb sight was fitted. It was possible to put a 500lb bomb under each wing but this of course adds drag.
I am not certain but it may have been equipped with a two pitch propeller. Welcome to correction.
On some missions escorts were planned for but due to poor communications and lack of practice actual rendezvous were rare and all to often the flight leaders did the old POR (Press ON Regardless) which got a lot of medals but not much in the way of actual results (damage to Germans). To be fair in some cases giving the Germans an extra day or two to improve defenses on bridges (or move the division they were trying stop miles away) meant that delaying the attack hours or till the next day would mean the opportunity was gone.
It takes practice and coordination to properly execute ground attack/interdiction missions and unfortunately the Battle and Hurricane squadrons lacked the practice/training needed no matter how willing they were. Same for the Blenheim and Lysander squadrons.
parsifal
Colonel
All of these issues were relavant to the overall failure of the design, but it was the age and origins of the design that were the dominant resons for its failure. The original specification dated back to April 1933 under design specification 27/32. Its chief designer wasn't even British, it was a Belgian known as Lobelle, and he based a lot of his design inspiration on the Fairey Fox III and IV designs then in service with the Belgian Airforce. the design was always on the understanding that it would be a ground attack aircraft, along the lines of a Hawker Hart or Hind. It single engine configuration to take advantage of the brand new Merlin engine.
Divebombing had been al but rejected by both the FAF and the RAF in favour of these "hedgehoppers".
What really killed the Battle in 1940 was its obsolescence
By the eve of the war, the Battle had already been identified a obsolete, however a lack of a suitable replacement meant that its re-equipment continued apace.
In June 1937, 63 sqn became the first RAF squadron to be equipped with the Fairey Battle. On 20 May 1937, the delivery of the first Battle to No. 63 occurred; following further deliveries, the squadron was initially assigned to perform development trials. The type holds the distinction of being the first operational aircraft powered by a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine to enter service, beating the debut of the hurricane by a matter of months.
By May 1939, there were a total of 17 RAF squadrons that had been equipped with the Battle. While many of these were frontline combat squadrons, some, under the 2 Gp were assigned to a non-mobilising training role; with more of the frontline units scheduled to join them before the advent of war intervened. After the outbreak of war, most of these training squadrons were reassigned to operate under No 6 OTU or alternatively served as reserve squadrons.
The Battle was obsolete by the start of the Second World War, but remained a front-line RAF bomber owing to a lack of a suitable replacement. On 2 September 1939, , 10 Battle sqns were deployed to pre-selected airfields in france to form a portion of the vanguard of the AASF. Once the Battles arrived, the aircraft were dispersed and efforts were made to camouflage or otherwise obscure their presence; the envisioned purpose of their deployment had been that, in the event of German commencement of bombing attacks, the Battles based in France could launch retaliatory raids upon Germany, specifically in the Ruhr Valley region, and would benefit from their closer range than otherwise possible from the British mainland.
Initial wartime missions were to perform recon of the Siegfried line during daylight, resulting in occasional skirmishes and losses. On 20 September 1939, a German Bf 109 was shot down by Battle gunner Sgt. F. Letchard during a patrol near Aachen; this occasion is recognised as being the RAF's first aerial victory of the war. Nonetheless, the Battle was hopelessly outclassed by LW fighters, being almost 100 mph (160 km/h) slower than the contemporary Bf 109 at 14,000 ft (4,300 m). That same day, three Battles were engaged by German fighters, resulting in two Battles being lost.
During the winter of 1939-1940, the AASF underwent restructuring; some of the Battle-equipped squadrons were returned to the UK while their place was taken by Blenheims squadrons instead. The activities of the AASF were principally restricted to training exercises during this time.
Upon the commencement of the BoF in May 1940, Battles were called upon to perform unescorted, low-level tactical attacks against the advancing German army; this use of the type placed the aircraft at risk of attack from Luftwaffe fighters and within easy range of light anti-aircraft guns. Results were predictable and horrific. In the first of two sorties carried out by Battles on 10 May 1940, three out of eight aircraft were lost, while a further 10 out of 24 were shot down in the second sortie, giving a total of 13 lost in that day's attacks, with the remainder suffering damage. Despite bombing from as low as 250 ft (76 m), their attacks were recorded as having had little impact on the German columns. During the following day, nine Belgian AF Battles attacked bridges over the Albert Canal, losing six aircraft, and in another RAF sortie that day against a German column, only one Battle out of eight survived.
On 12 May, a formation of five Battles of 12 sqn attacked two road bridges over the Albert Canal; four of these aircraft were destroyed while the final aircraft crash-landing upon its return to its base. Two VCs were awarded posthumously for the action.
On 14 May 1940, in a desperate attempt to stop German forces crossing the Meuse, the AASF launched an "all-out" attack by all available bombers against the German bridgehead and pontoon bridges at sedan Having graciously given the Germans three days to prepare their defences, the light bombers were attacked by swarms of opposing fighters and were decimated.. Out of a strike force of 63 Battles and eight Blenheims, 40 (including 35 Battles) were lost. After these abortive raids, the Battle was switched to mainly night attacks, resulting in much lower losses.
On 15 June 1940, the last remaining aircraft of the Advanced Air Striking Force returned to Britain. In six weeks almost 200 Battles had been lost, with 99 lost between 10 and 16 May.
Divebombing had been al but rejected by both the FAF and the RAF in favour of these "hedgehoppers".
What really killed the Battle in 1940 was its obsolescence
By the eve of the war, the Battle had already been identified a obsolete, however a lack of a suitable replacement meant that its re-equipment continued apace.
In June 1937, 63 sqn became the first RAF squadron to be equipped with the Fairey Battle. On 20 May 1937, the delivery of the first Battle to No. 63 occurred; following further deliveries, the squadron was initially assigned to perform development trials. The type holds the distinction of being the first operational aircraft powered by a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine to enter service, beating the debut of the hurricane by a matter of months.
By May 1939, there were a total of 17 RAF squadrons that had been equipped with the Battle. While many of these were frontline combat squadrons, some, under the 2 Gp were assigned to a non-mobilising training role; with more of the frontline units scheduled to join them before the advent of war intervened. After the outbreak of war, most of these training squadrons were reassigned to operate under No 6 OTU or alternatively served as reserve squadrons.
The Battle was obsolete by the start of the Second World War, but remained a front-line RAF bomber owing to a lack of a suitable replacement. On 2 September 1939, , 10 Battle sqns were deployed to pre-selected airfields in france to form a portion of the vanguard of the AASF. Once the Battles arrived, the aircraft were dispersed and efforts were made to camouflage or otherwise obscure their presence; the envisioned purpose of their deployment had been that, in the event of German commencement of bombing attacks, the Battles based in France could launch retaliatory raids upon Germany, specifically in the Ruhr Valley region, and would benefit from their closer range than otherwise possible from the British mainland.
Initial wartime missions were to perform recon of the Siegfried line during daylight, resulting in occasional skirmishes and losses. On 20 September 1939, a German Bf 109 was shot down by Battle gunner Sgt. F. Letchard during a patrol near Aachen; this occasion is recognised as being the RAF's first aerial victory of the war. Nonetheless, the Battle was hopelessly outclassed by LW fighters, being almost 100 mph (160 km/h) slower than the contemporary Bf 109 at 14,000 ft (4,300 m). That same day, three Battles were engaged by German fighters, resulting in two Battles being lost.
During the winter of 1939-1940, the AASF underwent restructuring; some of the Battle-equipped squadrons were returned to the UK while their place was taken by Blenheims squadrons instead. The activities of the AASF were principally restricted to training exercises during this time.
Upon the commencement of the BoF in May 1940, Battles were called upon to perform unescorted, low-level tactical attacks against the advancing German army; this use of the type placed the aircraft at risk of attack from Luftwaffe fighters and within easy range of light anti-aircraft guns. Results were predictable and horrific. In the first of two sorties carried out by Battles on 10 May 1940, three out of eight aircraft were lost, while a further 10 out of 24 were shot down in the second sortie, giving a total of 13 lost in that day's attacks, with the remainder suffering damage. Despite bombing from as low as 250 ft (76 m), their attacks were recorded as having had little impact on the German columns. During the following day, nine Belgian AF Battles attacked bridges over the Albert Canal, losing six aircraft, and in another RAF sortie that day against a German column, only one Battle out of eight survived.
On 12 May, a formation of five Battles of 12 sqn attacked two road bridges over the Albert Canal; four of these aircraft were destroyed while the final aircraft crash-landing upon its return to its base. Two VCs were awarded posthumously for the action.
On 14 May 1940, in a desperate attempt to stop German forces crossing the Meuse, the AASF launched an "all-out" attack by all available bombers against the German bridgehead and pontoon bridges at sedan Having graciously given the Germans three days to prepare their defences, the light bombers were attacked by swarms of opposing fighters and were decimated.. Out of a strike force of 63 Battles and eight Blenheims, 40 (including 35 Battles) were lost. After these abortive raids, the Battle was switched to mainly night attacks, resulting in much lower losses.
On 15 June 1940, the last remaining aircraft of the Advanced Air Striking Force returned to Britain. In six weeks almost 200 Battles had been lost, with 99 lost between 10 and 16 May.
- Thread starter
- #14
Yup
So the issue was energy retention and pilot skill. I'm curious if they proposed putting any larger engine available in it
I remember seeing some maneuvers that involved them peeling off and flipping it over onto it's back and hurtling downwards. I wasn't sure how steep they went as it showed them initiating the dive.
Was this a problem the USAAF or USN had?
FalkeEins
Senior Airman
..the wing on the Battle was far too large for low altitude work (low loading) - the type had a wingspan approaching that of the Blenheim (twin engines of course). However Parsifal's comments repeat the standard line of the Battle's obsolescence. If the Battle was obsolescent in 1940 then half the inventory of the German air force was equally as 'obsolescent', having flown also by 1936.
I think it is Baughen in his book who says something along the lines of
" ..with better armour and heavier armament the Battle could have performed well and enjoyed a Sthurmovik-like reputation.."
I think it is Baughen in his book who says something along the lines of
" ..with better armour and heavier armament the Battle could have performed well and enjoyed a Sthurmovik-like reputation.."
The Sthurmovik went from a heavily armoured single seater to a twin seater. Putting heavy armour and armament on the Battle plus heavier armament would take it down to powered glider type performance.
Shortround6
Major General
Part of the problem with the Battle was it's size and original intended mission. Which was not low altitude , hedge hopping bombing.
Tring to convert it to a ground attack plane is a lot of work and Lobelle himself designed a smaller version, the P.4/34 for a later requirement for a tactical bomber which he then morphed into the Fulmar.
Tring to convert it to a ground attack plane is a lot of work and Lobelle himself designed a smaller version, the P.4/34 for a later requirement for a tactical bomber which he then morphed into the Fulmar.
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Yeah, if that were the case the use of the Merlin I/II/III was an odd choice, with a critical altitude of over 16,000 feet. Something like the Fulmar's low-altitude Merlin VIII would have been a much better fit.
