Favorites and their achilles heels!

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Hello MustangRaider
Late Mk IXs and XVIs etc could have two rear fuselage tanks one on the top of another, 33+33Impgal in teartop canopy versions and 33+41Impgal in traditional highback versions.

Juha
 
Worth noting is that the 85 gallon tank was at first a field modification under direction of 8th AF, beginning in March 1944. Hard to describe as an "Achilles Heel' - at least for the Mustang. It wasn't a production standard until middle of -7 series.

It may have been the Achille's Hell for the Luftwaffe by enabling the extended 300 miles cruise range or another 15 minutes of combat.

The solution wasn't difficult, and available on every mission just by burning it early down to 25 Gallons or less early in the mission. The general over ride to that SOP was the ultra long range mission when drag was a factor - then burn the external tanks before switching to the fuselage tank... like the Shuttle missions.
 
I think that the early ops of 8th AF fighters in the UK were severely hampered by the fact the USAAC had an order against droppable fuel tanks.

The P-47 had good range once wing pylons were used and fuel systems were plumbed for the use of these tanks but it took crucial time. The belly drops on it weren't very capable.
The P-38 and the P-47 were capable of operating with bombers all the way to the target and back with Lockheed 150 gallon drops, but weren't capable of doing it until the P-51 showed up. Why it took so long with the Lockheed I don't know, it always had the drops, under the guise of "long range ferry tanks".

Also, the P-51 B/C didn't start with the rear fuselage tank, and it came in two sizes. The large 85 gallon was installed later in the B/C series and all D's had it.
The airplane had directional stability problems, nothing to do with the razorback to bubble change, and the dorsal fin was for structural deficiency when yawing and rolling at high speeds. With aft CG it was made even worse.
The trim tab on the rudder was an anti-servo tab when in service so the rudder was harder to push than when used as a straight tab as it was converted to after the war, directional stability in ops when full fuel and in instrument flight being the driver here, especially with low time pilots in command.

The Mustang was and is a great airplane but it had a lot of work done to it during it's development. All of the WWII airplanes went through a phenomenal development to good fighting machines in an incredibly short period of time.

Chris...
 
I think that the early ops of 8th AF fighters in the UK were severely hampered by the fact the USAAC had an order against droppable fuel tanks.

Chris - when the tanks became available, the order was to 'bring them home' because they were in scarce supply. Most Group CO's told their pilots to ignore the order if they needed to drop to engage or evade German fighters.

The P-47 had good range once wing pylons were used and fuel systems were plumbed for the use of these tanks but it took crucial time. The belly drops on it weren't very capable.

The P-38 and the P-47 were capable of operating with bombers all the way to the target and back with Lockheed 150 gallon drops, but weren't capable of doing it until the P-51 showed up. Why it took so long with the Lockheed I don't know, it always had the drops, under the guise of "long range ferry tanks".

The 47D-22 or -25 were the first with a wet wing IIRC and they didn't arrive in theatre until May, 1944 and even these weren't going to Berlin or Leipzig until late summer 1944. Their deepest penetrations were when a group like 56FG was flying a free lance Sweep where they weren't constrained by escort (weave) and then they got to the Celle, Friedrichshafen radius in May. In contrast the 51B/C was going to Posnan and Brux on the 75 gallon externals.

Operationally the middle dash number P-38J's were barely making Steinhuder Lake nw Berlin on a free lance Sweep (like March 4/6/8 Berlin leaving the really deep target escort entirely to the 51's when Berlin, Merseburg, Munich, Brux, Stettin was on the table.
Also, the P-51 B/C didn't start with the rear fuselage tank, and it came in two sizes. The large 85 gallon was installed later in the B/C series and all D's had it. The P-38s were really doing target escort through June 44 as far as Kiel, Brunswick, Friedrichshafen



The airplane had directional stability problems, nothing to do with the razorback to bubble change, and the dorsal fin was for structural deficiency when yawing and rolling at high speeds. With aft CG it was made even worse.

True - and fixed only when the H with 13" extra fusew length, 50 gallon aft tank and tail rolled off the lines

The trim tab on the rudder was an anti-servo tab when in service so the rudder was harder to push than when used as a straight tab as it was converted to after the war, directional stability in ops when full fuel and in instrument flight being the driver here, especially with low time pilots in command.

The Mustang was and is a great airplane but it had a lot of work done to it during it's development. All of the WWII airplanes went through a phenomenal development to good fighting machines in an incredibly short period of time.

Chris...

"Also, the P-51 B/C didn't start with the rear fuselage tank, and it came in two sizes. The large 85 gallon was installed later in the B/C series and all D's had it."

Chris - I am only aware of the 85 gallon mod to the P-51B-1 and -5's (and early -7s) done in mid March 1944. I have heard of filling the tank to only 65 gallons but even that was stopped when too many 'under fill's occurred. From middle block of P-51B-7 through P-51D-30 NA (and matching NT) all the factory tanks were 85 gallon. Only the H had a factory 50 gallon tank.
 
Another issue with the early F4F3 was that the fuel gauge was notoriously inaccurate and the early protected fuel tank's linings caused fuel lines to get stopped up. UGH!
 
The one fault that was probably the cause of more young mans deaths , the lack of de icing equipment on the Brit heavy bombers was almost criminal
 
Hello Edgar
thanks for the info!
but
... The reduction in armament needed the gyro gunsight to give the pilot a better chance to actually hit something, which needed a new throttle box, and had to be fitted before the tank went in; the extra fuel (as you say) made the airframe extremely touchy to fly, which was another reason for 11 Group's distaste, since it badly affected their ability to work as escorts.
All of these changes took so long that not a single low-back fuselage Spitfire saw service before 1945, which was another reason for not converting the high-backs, which were needed for straight fighter/escort work.

I understand the first part but IMHO 2 .5 HMGs nearer the fuselage was an improvement over 4 .303mgs far out, especially after 41 when self-sealing fuel tanks and pilot armour were the norm. Gyro sight was a clear plus irrespectively whether one had C or E wing. And as in P-51, rear fuselage tank(s) made the plane difficult to handle first but it also allowed the plane fly farther or stay longer, which was important in escort work, but because RAF had also Mustang IIIs and IVs, there well migh have not been great need for longer range Spits. But a fighter which could escort bombers only part of way to their targets was not worth of much as an escort. As an interceptor of course extra weight reduced RoC.

Juha
 
I am going to have a lie down in shock as I have had to admit that my much loved Spitfire was not 101% perfect...
:D Can I offer you a stiff drink, John?

Regarding the Bomber Command aircraft; arming them with .303s instead of .5s sooner in the war; both Boulton Paul and Rose developed a .5 armed turret during the war but these were not fitted (the BP turret was post-war). Even 'Bomber' Harris was highly critical of this aspect of 'his' bombers.

I read an interesting thing in a book recently about gunners were discouraged from firing at enemy night fighters for fear of giving their position away! I'm astounded by this, since I also read an account by a German Bf 110 pilot who claimed that many of the bombers did not fire back, even after he had attacked them; he stated that had the bombers fired off a stream every time he approached, he would not have continued his attacks on many occasions.

The Halifax is worth mentioning for how bad it was in its initial versions (including the Mk.V) until the Mk.III came along with its bigger rudders, streamlined nose, Hercules engines and other changes, which brought its performance closer to the Lancaster, but still not on a par with it, despite Handley Page's assertions. It had rudder over balance, which resulted in the loss of life of service and test personnel, weak undercarriage, it was heavy, draggy and underpowered and could not meet its stipulated performance. Harris proposed that Stirling and Halifax production be canned and those two manufacturers build Lancs.

Some of my favourites: The Me 163 - what can I say but the only thing in its favour was that it was horrendously fast!

The Boulton Paul Defiant - slow, but deadly to a bomber stream; unfortunately not used in its designed capacity, so suffered at the hands of single seat fighters. Excellent night fighter, though.

The Mitsubishi Zero; I spoke to a guy who flies one of the airworthy ones and he said one of its biggest weaknesses is that it wasn't very fast, so could easily be overhauled in a dive. Weak construction, but this contributed to its greatest advantage, however.

The Fairey Swordfish; obsolete and antiquated, but all the more charming as a result. Its aircrews seemed to agree!

:)
 
I've been digging out more information on the .5" versus .303" controversy; Leigh-Mallory tried his hardest to get the change, but the Air Ministry flatly refused, since the .5" (no matter what people think) had no advantage over the .303" from directly behind the Fw190 (Fighter Command's chief worry.) To make the .5" effective, the pilot needed to use a 5degree deflection shot, at the very least, and, as with the bomber turret, four faster-firing guns had more chance of killing the pilot than two. The same thing applied though; once the gyro gunsight was available for fighters, the .5" made more sense. Eventually, in 1943-onwards, the Spitfire XIV was available, with more internal fuel, plus the ability to carry droptanks, and, once the Allies were in Europe, distances weren't critical any more; it's also worth remembering that, with most bombing done at night, Bomber Command didn't need escorts before 1944, when more daylight raids began to happen.

The destructive power of the .50 cal, over the .303, versus the airframe has to be far greater. I agree that a .303 will kill a man just as dead as the .50. I understand the volume of fire argument, but how many fighters shot down were due to dead or incapacitaed pilots versus the aircraft being damaged beyond continued flight?
 
I'll need to answer two, for the price of one, here; the retention of .303" guns, in bombers, was for exactly the same reason as they were retained in fighters. More guns, with a faster rate of fire, gave more chance of hitting the enemy pilot, who very rarely had any armour in front of him, and a .303" through his head is just as lethal as a .5". The Rose turret, with the .5" guns, only came into use when the rear gunners also got the use of the gyro gunsight, and thus had a better chance of hitting what they were aiming at...

Hello Edgar, the point is that in both 109 and 190 pilot had armoured glass, which usually stopped .303 bullets but was less effective against .5 bullet, in front of him. Engine did the rest of shielding from front (+plus oil collar armour in 190A). Now against 109 with liquid-cooled engine .303 might well be enough but against air cooled radial IMHO .5 probably was more effective than 2 .303s. Tail turrets were a bit different thing, firing distances were usually fairly short at night and up to late 44 vast majority of LW night fighters were 110s and 88Cs with liquid-cooled engines, so a burst from 4 .303s could easily knock out an engine.

I've been digging out more information on the .5" versus .303" controversy; Leigh-Mallory tried his hardest to get the change, but the Air Ministry flatly refused, since the .5" (no matter what people think) had no advantage over the .303" from directly behind the Fw190 (Fighter Command's chief worry.) To make the .5" effective, the pilot needed to use a 5degree deflection shot, at the very least, and, as with the bomber turret, four faster-firing guns had more chance of killing the pilot than two. The same thing applied though; once the gyro gunsight was available for fighters, the .5" made more sense...

Finns though otherwise and began to install at least one .5 HMG cowling gun to their Hawk-75As early on, just to have something to pierce back armours and saw that one HMG was better than 2 .300/.303.


Eventually, in 1943-onwards, the Spitfire XIV was available, with more internal fuel, plus the ability to carry droptanks, and, once the Allies were in Europe, distances weren't critical any more; it's also worth remembering that, with most bombing done at night, Bomber Command didn't need escorts before 1944, when more daylight raids began to happen.

Now even if XIV had more fuel than standard IX it also had more thirstly Griffon, and already Mk V had had ability to carry drop tanks. But clearly RAF didn't though that Spit critically needed more range in ETO otherwise they would have kept some longer range VIIIs there and not sent them all to MTO and to Far East.

Juha
 
Hello Edgar
IMHO no hindsight, USAAC and USN opted for .5 already between the WWs, most USAAC fighters had one .5 and one .300 cowling guns in 30s, Finns decided in 41 that it was preferable to install one .5 instead of 2 .300/.303. And for ex German ace Fönneköld? was killed by a .5 AP staight through the back armour of his 109G. Even if RAF seemed to prefer 4 .303s over 2 .5s, and I'm not sure of that, it might well have been a case to make virtue out of necessarity because US needed almost all of .5s it produced up to 44, but US, SU, Italy all thought that .5 was clearly better than .300/.303. Even JAAF and JNAF dumped .303 and went to .5 (and cannon) fairly early in the Pacific War.

Juha
 
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Edgar - I see nothing but speculation in 2. and 3. A Browing .50 has nearly 4 time the KE of a .303 at the Muzzle and ranges for defense in RAF night ops were short relative to USAAF day operations. So it would be interesting (to me) to see a firing test against an FW 190 at 100 yards with both weapons.

Absent testing validation (presumably there is something somewhere in your report) the comparison of .50 cal and .30 cal (or .311) at 100 yards should be immensley in favor of the M2/M3 hitting an FW 190 or 109 or 110 head on. The Sturm FW had more frontal and side armor to protect the pilot (true) but if a .50 API couldn't do the job a .303 was hopeless.

Next - head on hits on an FW 190 to the oil cooling vanes is an Achilles Heel. It will go down soon if not immediately due to an oil fire.

Next - a .50 will definitely destroy an engine, penetrate into ammo storage and IMO have a far greater chance of critically damaging a wing spar with one hit than a .303 with multiple hits.

Last but not least - what are the percentages of FW 190 intercepts on BC aircraft versus Me 110, Ju 88, etc that did not have the same protection up front of the modified Fw 190s attacking 8th AF formations?

I realize I am offering opinions that may be trashed by a well thought out series of comparative tests but ballistically speaking there is simply no useful benefit to two .303's versus one .50 caliber HMG. Even the ability to carry a lot more .303 rounds is kind of silly considering how few opportunities to engage in prolonged fights at night.

If that was a serious consideration I would have immediately moved to single 20mm to replace four .303's
 
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