German-Soviet peace 1942/1943, air war

[Dimlee]

Separate peace between Germany and USSR and its impact on the air war from early 1943.

Berlin and Moscow have reached understanding and ceased the fire at the end of 1942 or early 1943. Not later the end of March 1943 (after the Battle of Kharkov).

A new pact is signed, followed by a number of other political and economical treaties.
USSR becomes the neutral state de-jure and the non-belligerent ally of Axis de-facto.
Territories and borders:
- mostly restored to June 1940 (before the Soviet annexations of Baltic states and of Romanian territory) with some exceptions, for example, Finland is given back Petsamo (since it's vital for German economy)
- Baltic states sovereignty is restored de-jure, they remain under German control de-facto
- German/Soviet border returns to its pre-war status, but western regions of Ukraine and of Belorussia and Crimea are demilitarized, which means no Red Army, just border troops.
Military:
- German forces withdraw from occupied territories within the agreed period (let's say, 3 to 6 months). All POWs return home.
- Red Army numbers are reduced to the year 1939 figures. Restrictions imposed on the Soviet military production and on the development of certain weapons (as long-range and rocket artillery, tanks as T-34 and heavier, multi-engined bombers, etc.)
Economy:
- USSR resumes supplying Germany and its allies with staple food, oil, metals, timber, and other strategic materials.
- Germany contributes to the restoration in the formerly occupied territories.
- Germany industry is given concession rights in USSR in exchange for technologies and for a share of output (somewhat similar to Japanese concessions in Sakhalin).
- Transit is resumed via Transib and through the Soviet Arctic, including military transit.

Questions:
1. What is the impact on Axis air forces and air industries?
2. How this agreement will change the course of the air war, in Europe and elsewhere?
3. What measures should Allies take to counter new threats?

 

[Kevin J]

Separate peace between Germany and USSR and its impact on the air war from early 1943.

Berlin and Moscow have reached understanding and ceased the fire at the end of 1942 or early 1943. Not later the end of March 1943 (after the Battle of Kharkov).

A new pact is signed, followed by a number of other political and economical treaties.
USSR becomes the neutral state de-jure and the non-belligerent ally of Axis de-facto.
Territories and borders:
- mostly restored to June 1940 (before the Soviet annexations of Baltic states and of Romanian territory) with some exceptions, for example, Finland is given back Petsamo (since it's vital for German economy)
- Baltic states sovereignty is restored de-jure, they remain under German control de-facto
- German/Soviet border returns to its pre-war status, but western regions of Ukraine and of Belorussia and Crimea are demilitarized, which means no Red Army, just border troops.
Military:
- German forces withdraw from occupied territories within the agreed period (let's say, 3 to 6 months). All POWs return home.
- Red Army numbers are reduced to the year 1939 figures. Restrictions imposed on the Soviet military production and on the development of certain weapons (as long-range and rocket artillery, tanks as T-34 and heavier, multi-engined bombers, etc.)
Economy:
- USSR resumes supplying Germany and its allies with staple food, oil, metals, timber, and other strategic materials.
- Germany contributes to the restoration in the formerly occupied territories.
- Germany industry is given concession rights in USSR in exchange for technologies and for a share of output (somewhat similar to Japanese concessions in Sakhalin).
- Transit is resumed via Transib and through the Soviet Arctic, including military transit.

Questions:
1. What is the impact on Axis air forces and air industries?
2. How this agreement will change the course of the air war, in Europe and elsewhere?
3. What measures should Allies take to counter new threats?

How about adding, Polish government set up in General Government with civil jurisdiction over German occupied zone except for German speaking areas which are annexed to Germany. So just like Vichy with promise of return to Poland when war is over. USSR still occupies Baltics, Moldova, Bukovino and Karelian isthmus. Germany invades USSR in war of liberation. Throws Soviets out of Baltics, Belarus, Ukraine who's citizens join them. That would be 1941. 1942 an even larger army is available to get all the oil in the Caucasus. Germany wins. Soviets sue for peace. Germany sets up Eastern European Community for trading and self defence against Russia. 1943 throws all its forces into North African war. Beats the Anglo-Americans.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Well-thought-out scenario, D
... the Axis air industries can focus production on defensive high altitude fighters (jets) to counter the Allied strategic bombing, but also develop an effective strategic long range bomber of their own. They will be assured better quality metals for their engine programs.
The Allies will pay a much higher butcher's bill without Russian sacrifice.
An Allied treaty with Turkey would be a huge win for them and open targets from Turkish bases and force Germany/Soviets to defend the Black Sea.
The same huge volume of L-L war materials that flowed into Iran would flow into Turkey to be used against the Axis+1.
By 1942 the news of the holocaust was circulating ... neither USA nor UK+Commonwealth would suddenly seek peace with Hitler ... not after what had been revealed.

 

[Dimlee]

Well-thought-out scenario, D
... the Axis air industries can focus production on defensive high altitude fighters (jets) to counter the Allied strategic bombing, but also develop an effective strategic long range bomber of their own. They will be assured better quality metals for their engine programs.
The Allies will pay a much higher butcher's bill without Russian sacrifice.
An Allied treaty with Turkey would be a huge win for them and open targets from Turkish bases and force Germany/Soviets to defend the Black Sea.
The same huge volume of L-L war materials that flowed into Iran would flow into Turkey to be used against the Axis+1.
By 1942 the news of the holocaust was circulating ... neither USA nor UK+Commonwealth would suddenly seek peace with Hitler ... not after what had been revealed.

Thanks, Michael.
Yes, more metals for engines and factories and airfields are better protected now from bombing raids due to redeployment of Luftwaffe from the East, thousands of qualified workers remain in the air industry, so no need to involve low skilled immigrants and prisoners... Good for future programs.
But could there be another scenario? German leadership has demonstrated some kind of complacency and shortsightedness in earlier years. In the case discussed, as soon as the Eastern Front disappears, Luftwaffe can move AAA pieces and fighters and experienced personnel to the home defense. Tanks and field artillery output can be reduced or slowed down for a while, freeing materials and capacity for the AAA and aircraft production. For Doenitz as well, of course.
At the same time, Allied fighters are not flying over Reich yet and strategic bombing offensive is just starting. Do RLM and Luftwaffe really need to prioritize new unproven technologies or they might prefer to focus on piston-engine aircraft and to put jet/rocket engines on a backburner?

Turkey - good thought, indeed. It becomes now a Norway of 1943, so to speak. Both sides will suspect that the opponent will bring Ankara on its own side. If Axis moves first, the Black Sea becomes their inner lake where shipping of Baku oil and grain from the Kuban is done with impunity. If Allies are fast enough, they can control the airspace over the Aegean and the Black Sea. And Ploesti is just 500 km away from Istanbul...

 

[michaelmaltby]

.... well reasoned ... but the complacency you speak of can surely take hold when, by 1942, the night bombers are conducting what some Germans called
"Churchill's Jew Raids" ... piston or turbine powered ... both are needed .... with Eastern Front losses curtailed there is a large manpower pool for badly needed TRAINED pilots. U boats should be used against the convey routes without restraint ... there will be high losses but the effects on Britain are real and it will hurt the Americans as well, as they rush to fortify Fortress England.

The Allies faced a formidable fighting organization when they landed in Europe on D-Day ... 2 weeks later the Soviets launched Bagration which destroyed Army Group Center.

Without the Eastern Front bleeding Germany .... how do the Allies destroy Hitler? Certainly, no June 6, 1944 invasion.

Would an Atom bomb on Berlin produce enough shock and awe to gain an unconditional surrender?

 

[Андрей]

You have nothing to do? )))

 

[Dimlee]

Agree that the complacency would be short-lived in 1943. Hamburg raid or similar raids would become an eye-opener as in real life.
So, new tech development is given a boost in Germany in more favorable conditions than in real history.
It's interesting to think about the next move on the side of Allies if Luftwaffe starts to deploy jet aircraft at least 6 months earlier (or even sooner?). There is no USAAF/RAF air dominance over continental Europe and no UK/US jets close to operational status.

 

[michaelmaltby]

agreed
With Russia compliant, German occupied fortess Europe is formidable. How do you crack it. I wasn't joking when I suggested the A bomb on Berlin - radiation aside, ,the Hiroshima bomb wouldn't do more physical damage or kill more people than the Battle of Berlin in May 1945 did. IMO. For good measure, as second bomb could be employed against Moscow -- to dissuade any aggression from the Soviets. Drop dates late August, 1945.

Until then:
- no D day invasion
- continued mass bombing raids in German cities
- harassment of German supply lines by air and naval guns
- massive leaflet campaign warming Germans that the Fist of God was over their head

These efforts in Europe may make the matter of Japan's 'unconditional' surrender more attainable ... but the Japanese people had not been broken by the air offensive ... numb perhaps, certainly to experience PTSD, but broken .... not.

 

[NevadaK]

Greetings Dimlee,

I suggest that you rethink your timeline a little to a scenario where peace is established in late 1941 before Pearl Harbor. Once you are into 1942 the Soviet Union is committed to victory at all costs and by the time we get to December 1942 and the triumph at Stalingrad the tide has really turned and there would be no real reason for the USSR to seek peace. Here is the collection of reasons why I propose this, in no order:

1. Nazi Bad Behavior - At the start of Barbarossa a significant percentage of USSR citizens (especially in the Ukraine) welcomed the invading German's as liberators. Obviously, this perception did not last long, but it took several months for the remainder of the Soviet people to be aware of what was happening in occupied lands. If peace had happened early, there is a chance that it would have been supported by the population. After the victory at Moscow, support for such a move would have ceased.
2. Mother Russia - This was a brilliant public relations/propaganda campaign to motivate the people of the Soviet Union to defend the motherland. This really gets into full swing in 1942 and a unifying concept for the nation. Abandoning Mother Russia without a vengeful victory would have been political suicide.
3. Lend Lease - Lend Lease supplies to Russia were in full swing by mid-1942 with the opening of the Persian corridor and shipments through the Pacific Route. These supplies were reshaping the Soviet Forces and as the army was being improved the late summer and planning for what would become Operation Uranus (the Soviet CounterOffensive at Stalingrad) began in early Autumn. It seems unlikely that Soviet forces would accept a peace plan at a time when they are laying the foundation for victory.
4. Pearl Harbor - Once the Japanese had committed to war with the United States and United Kingdom, the USSR was free to not only relocate troops from the east for the defense of the west, but could freely ship war materials from the US to Vladivostok as war had not broken out with Japan. 50% of Lend Lease materials were freely shipped using this route. The USSR had to use their own ships as a neutral power and they wouldn't be attacked. To my thinking, this is a huge misstep by the axis powers as these materials were essential to future Soviet success.
5. Soviet Partisan Success - Soviet partisan forces were motived and effective from an early point in the war. Much of this has to do with the size of the territory occupied by the Nazi and difficulty having adequate forces to govern (if that's the right term for oppression) these lands.

Just my thoughts. Move your timeframe up to winter 1941/1942 and it seems more believable.

As an anecdotal story - I had an acquaintance in the early 1990's who had been a panzer commander in the drive to Stalingrad. He used to tell tales about how glorious (his words) the offensive was and the long line of tanks across the steppes. He said they started to get nervous when the Soviet troops began to give way more easily and they suspected that a trap was being set. Luckily for him, his unit was directed away from Stalingrad and he ultimately was wounded, sent home to recover and then fight in the west.

 

[GrauGeist]

Turkey may have been persuaded to join the Axis even if not actively participating.

With the Soviets no longer at war, Turkey may be more receptive than was historically. Perhaps step up diplomatic missions from Berlin and Sofia offering more than just a handful of fighters - this would create a secure flank to Europe and free access to the Black Sea and the Levant.

 

[Kevin J]

Turkey may have been persuaded to join the Axis even if not actively participating.

With the Soviets no longer at war, Turkey may be more receptive than was historically. Perhaps step up diplomatic missions from Berlin and Sofia offering more than just a handful of fighters - this would create a secure flank to Europe and free access to the Black Sea and the Levant.

I don't think the Turks were or are that stupid. Bulgaria only joined because they had little choice, it was either that or being overrun by the Germans on their way to Greece. They certainly didn't send troops to the Eastern Front.

 

[GrauGeist]

I don't think the Turks were or are that stupid. Bulgaria only joined because they had little choice, it was either that or being overrun by the Germans on their way to Greece. They certainly didn't send troops to the Eastern Front.

No one said they sent troops to the front, but they had closer ties to Istanbul than Berlin.
And Turkey was being more receptive to Germany than the Allies during the war, so in this "what if", the Soviet Union being sidelined may have seen Turkey be more involved with Axis proposals.

And stop tossing negative marks on my GD posts.

 

[Kevin J]

No one said they sent troops to the front, but they had closer ties to Istanbul than Berlin.
And Turkey was being more receptive to Germany than the Allies during the war, so in this "what if", the Soviet Union being sidelined may have seen Turkey be more involved with Axis proposals.

And stop tossing negative marks on my GD posts.

The Soviets helped them in their war of independence. Turkey was a safe have for Jews if they could get there. I always thought the Turks just humoured the Nazis, a bit like Franco did.

 

[Dimlee]

Greetings Dimlee,

I suggest that you rethink your timeline a little to a scenario where peace is established in late 1941 before Pearl Harbor. Once you are into 1942 the Soviet Union is committed to victory at all costs and by the time we get to December 1942 and the triumph at Stalingrad the tide has really turned and there would be no real reason for the USSR to seek peace. Here is the collection of reasons why I propose this, in no order:

1. Nazi Bad Behavior - At the start of Barbarossa a significant percentage of USSR citizens (especially in the Ukraine) welcomed the invading German's as liberators. Obviously, this perception did not last long, but it took several months for the remainder of the Soviet people to be aware of what was happening in occupied lands. If peace had happened early, there is a chance that it would have been supported by the population. After the victory at Moscow, support for such a move would have ceased.
2. Mother Russia - This was a brilliant public relations/propaganda campaign to motivate the people of the Soviet Union to defend the motherland. This really gets into full swing in 1942 and a unifying concept for the nation. Abandoning Mother Russia without a vengeful victory would have been political suicide.
3. Lend Lease - Lend Lease supplies to Russia were in full swing by mid-1942 with the opening of the Persian corridor and shipments through the Pacific Route. These supplies were reshaping the Soviet Forces and as the army was being improved the late summer and planning for what would become Operation Uranus (the Soviet CounterOffensive at Stalingrad) began in early Autumn. It seems unlikely that Soviet forces would accept a peace plan at a time when they are laying the foundation for victory.
4. Pearl Harbor - Once the Japanese had committed to war with the United States and United Kingdom, the USSR was free to not only relocate troops from the east for the defense of the west, but could freely ship war materials from the US to Vladivostok as war had not broken out with Japan. 50% of Lend Lease materials were freely shipped using this route. The USSR had to use their own ships as a neutral power and they wouldn't be attacked. To my thinking, this is a huge misstep by the axis powers as these materials were essential to future Soviet success.
5. Soviet Partisan Success - Soviet partisan forces were motived and effective from an early point in the war. Much of this has to do with the size of the territory occupied by the Nazi and difficulty having adequate forces to govern (if that's the right term for oppression) these lands.

Just my thoughts. Move your timeframe up to winter 1941/1942 and it seems more believable.

As an anecdotal story - I had an acquaintance in the early 1990's who had been a panzer commander in the drive to Stalingrad. He used to tell tales about how glorious (his words) the offensive was and the long line of tanks across the steppes. He said they started to get nervous when the Soviet troops began to give way more easily and they suspected that a trap was being set. Luckily for him, his unit was directed away from Stalingrad and he ultimately was wounded, sent home to recover and then fight in the west.

NevadaK, thanks a lot for your detailed comment.
I can agree with almost everything you say (except #5 - the partisans but the explanation would worth a separate topic not related to the aviation).
Your proposal of peace in late 1941 makes sense and there are historical arguments in its favor. First records of the peace feelings from the USSR sent through Bulgaria were recorded as early as September 1941. Propaganda efforts and other measures and Moscow counter-offensive - all that has helped to restore the morale and confidence in the USSR and to change the minds of those who decided that Communists are done. German crimes have damaged the efforts of Russian anti-communist forces and of "pro-Russian" Germans as Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt as just one example. Lend-lease has beefed up the Red Army and the economy and fed the people (probably preventing mass hunger in some regions), etc. Your arguments are true and valid.

But please note that in this thread I tried to study the possible course of the air war in just one plausible scenario, not to study all scenarios and their impact on WWII overall. Such a task would require a separate discussion in another section of the forum.

I have chosen the period of end 1942/early 1943 for the following reasons:
1. History. The very last period where I could find any hint about German-Soviet talks is winter 1942/1943. Through intermediaries, in Sweden.
2. While the Red Army was stronger, so was the Wehrmacht. Today we remember the Stalingrad but tend to forget about the Soviet failures in Rzhev meat grinder and around Kharkov. I do not think that the tide already turned rather it was near the lowest point. The end of the beginning, in Churchill's words.
3. The war was still deep in the Soviet territory. The economy has managed to increase the output yet at a high cost on the population. Material and human losses in the preceding year 1942 were higher than in 1941. At the same time, Third Reich territory was intact and its war economy was far from reaching its peak output and not yet damaged by air raids.
3. We can assume that both Berlin and Moscow desire to negotiate from the position of strength. That period was interesting as there were victories and defeats on both sides, sometimes at the same time. So each side could find a convincing argument - not only for the negotiations but also for own propaganda. And it was probably the last period like that.
4. The Soviets feared that Allies would go for the separate peace. Indirect connections between Abwehr and MI6 were probably already known thanks to Kim Philby and/or other Soviet agents. That fear began to reduce in 1943, step by step, after the unconditional surrender principle was declared at Casablanca and the Allies-Soviet relationship improved a lot through the year. Less distrust, more confidence in Moscow.

So, all in all, I consider the period discussed as the latest possible for German-Soviet reconciliation and therefore very interesting. But I appreciate your input.

 

[NevadaK]

NevadaK, thanks a lot for your detailed comment.
I can agree with almost everything you say (except #5 - the partisans but the explanation would worth a separate topic not related to the aviation).
Your proposal of peace in late 1941 makes sense and there are historical arguments in its favor. First records of the peace feelings from the USSR sent through Bulgaria were recorded as early as September 1941. Propaganda efforts and other measures and Moscow counter-offensive - all that has helped to restore the morale and confidence in the USSR and to change the minds of those who decided that Communists are done. German crimes have damaged the efforts of Russian anti-communist forces and of "pro-Russian" Germans as Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt as just one example. Lend-lease has beefed up the Red Army and the economy and fed the people (probably preventing mass hunger in some regions), etc. Your arguments are true and valid.

But please note that in this thread I tried to study the possible course of the air war in just one plausible scenario, not to study all scenarios and their impact on WWII overall. Such a task would require a separate discussion in another section of the forum.

I have chosen the period of end 1942/early 1943 for the following reasons:
1. History. The very last period where I could find any hint about German-Soviet talks is winter 1942/1943. Through intermediaries, in Sweden.
2. While the Red Army was stronger, so was the Wehrmacht. Today we remember the Stalingrad but tend to forget about the Soviet failures in Rzhev meat grinder and around Kharkov. I do not think that the tide already turned rather it was near the lowest point. The end of the beginning, in Churchill's words.
3. The war was still deep in the Soviet territory. The economy has managed to increase the output yet at a high cost on the population. Material and human losses in the preceding year 1942 were higher than in 1941. At the same time, Third Reich territory was intact and its war economy was far from reaching its peak output and not yet damaged by air raids.
3. We can assume that both Berlin and Moscow desire to negotiate from the position of strength. That period was interesting as there were victories and defeats on both sides, sometimes at the same time. So each side could find a convincing argument - not only for the negotiations but also for own propaganda. And it was probably the last period like that.
4. The Soviets feared that Allies would go for the separate peace. Indirect connections between Abwehr and MI6 were probably already known thanks to Kim Philby and/or other Soviet agents. That fear began to reduce in 1943, step by step, after the unconditional surrender principle was declared at Casablanca and the Allies-Soviet relationship improved a lot through the year. Less distrust, more confidence in Moscow.

So, all in all, I consider the period discussed as the latest possible for German-Soviet reconciliation and therefore very interesting. But I appreciate your input.

Greetings Dimlee,

I appreciate the time and effort you have put into this proposal and certainly agree that the conflict on the Eastern Front was not decidedly tilted in the USSR's favor until mid-summer 1943. I also appreciate any discussion on this site which makes me put effort into better understanding a given topic. Pursuant to your post, here are my thoughts:

1. Peace Talks - You are spot on that there were efforts to broker a peace between Germans and the Soviets into 1943. From what I can find, from 1942 onward these were principally brokered by the Japanese who wanted to establish peace on the eastern front to free up Nazi Germany to contribute to the war against the US. The principal sticking point appears to be the Ukraine and the Baltic states. Hitler was not willing to give these back to the USSR and the USSR was not willing to accept peace without them. Hitler considered the Ukraine as essential territory for the survival of Germany, particularly its agricultural capacity. (I suspect that he remembered the starvation of Germany during the First World War). From what I was able to read, the German General Staff also contributed to the reluctance to accept peace without keeping the conquered lands as they felt that their victory was inevitable. The Japanese representative writes in his notes the concern that the while the German general staff was receiving his efforts warmly, they were undermining his efforts behind his back. Another opinion that I have come across is that at some point the Soviets were using the peace discussions as misdirection to make the Germans believe that they were in worse straights than they actually were. The sticking point then seems to be the Ukraine. I'm more inclined to believe that for Germany to accept peace, it would need to retain the conquered lands and for Soviet leadership to believe that it was in threat of an imminent collapse.
2. Here is a comparison of eastern front army strengths from wikipedia. You can see that the Russian Army outgrows the Germany Army fairly substantially in 1942. It took longer to build up the Red Army's material strength than manpower and reading through the assessment of Operation Mars (the Rzhev offensive) it appears that the Soviet Troops engaged there were not as well equipped as the troops around Stalingrad. By summer 1943, material issues were less of a concern with the Soviet Army, but did affect the conflict during the time frame you have outlined. I could see an argument where material shortages might enhance Soviet willingness to pursue peace if Lend Lease had been affected by either the loss of the Persian Corridor or Japanese interference in the Pacific Route.

3. Yes, the war was deep in Soviet Territory, however, without German willingness to return it through a peace (which seems unlikely) then the USSR would have to be committed to liberating it. There is also debate about the latter part of the German advance to Stalingard as to whether the German's were advancing due to their superiority or whether the Russians were encouraging them to advance beyond the limits of their resources. Different histories tell different stories. Personally, I think its a bit of both. Soviet planning for the counteroffensive began in early Autumn and was designed around a double entrapment. This implies forethought on the Soviet part to allow the German's to create the salient. The same kind of overextension created the circumstances that led to the German counter offensive at Kharkov that you reference. My feeling, however, is that by mid-1943 the Soviet superiority in men and materials becomes overwhelming. While we disagree on this, the length of German supply lines becomes a significant weakness and vulnerable to partisan efforts.
4. Agreed that the Soviet's were insecure about the US/UK.

I'm guessing we probably won't agree on the window of opportunity for peace in the eastern front, but I can see the merits of an argument that says peace might have happened as late as mid 1942. I think the biggest stumbling block would be the status of the Ukraine as it seems to be the item that neither side was willing to give up.

Great post and provocative response!

Kk

 

[GrauGeist]

The Soviets helped them in their war of independence. Turkey was a safe have for Jews if they could get there. I always thought the Turks just humoured the Nazis, a bit like Franco did.

The Bulgarians had historical ties to Germany and were on board with the Axis in the hopes of regaining land lost in the war with Serbia and WWI - Bulgaria lost alot of territory between the two events.

The Bulgarians maintained a neutrality pact with Turkey and while they did not want to take up arms against the Soviet Union, they also did not trust the Communists. The Bulgarians were indeed aided by Imperial Russia in their struggle for independance (the battle of Shipka was Bulgaria's greatest moment, by the way) however the relationship was somewhat cool by the 1930's (again, due to the communist regime).

They were not forced or coerced into joining the Axis, the Parliment was pro-German and Tsar Boris did not hesitate to approve their resolution to join.
There is language to the effect that Germany "threatened" Bulgaria and this was not the case, Germany told the Bulgarian government that they were going through their country to access Greece and Yugoslavia and preferred to have Bulgaria's approval, which was forthcoming.

So in Dimlee's scenario, it is not far-fetched with the case of Turkey, I feel they would lean more toward the Axis than Britain, who claimed considerable territory from the Ottoman Empire after WWI and a brokered Alliance with the Axis (even as a "neutral state") after the Soviets backed out of the war would be to their benefit, as they may have requests for terrotories lost to Britain much like Bulgaria hoped to regain land lost in the Balkan War and WWI as I mentioned earlier.

 

[Kevin J]

The Bulgarians had historical ties to Germany and were on board with the Axis in the hopes of regaining land lost in the war with Serbia and WWI - Bulgaria lost alot of territory between the two events.

The Bulgarians maintained a neutrality pact with Turkey and while they did not want to take up arms against the Soviet Union, they also did not trust the Communists. The Bulgarians were indeed aided by Imperial Russia in their struggle for independance (the battle of Shipka was Bulgaria's greatest moment, by the way) however the relationship was somewhat cool by the 1930's (again, due to the communist regime).

They were not forced or coerced into joining the Axis, the Parliment was pro-German and Tsar Boris did not hesitate to approve their resolution to join.
There is language to the effect that Germany "threatened" Bulgaria and this was not the case, Germany told the Bulgarian government that they were going through their country to access Greece and Yugoslavia and preferred to have Bulgaria's approval, which was forthcoming.

So in Dimlee's scenario, it is not far-fetched with the case of Turkey, I feel they would lean more toward the Axis than Britain, who claimed considerable territory from the Ottoman Empire after WWI and a brokered Alliance with the Axis (even as a "neutral state") after the Soviets backed out of the war would be to their benefit, as they may have requests for terrotories lost to Britain much like Bulgaria hoped to regain land lost in the Balkan War and WWI as I mentioned earlier.

Soviet Union–Turkey relations - Wikipedia

 

[GrauGeist]

And in that wiki artical, you'll find that Turkey and the Soviet Union had strained relations in the late 30's AND gave Germany preference in access to the Black Sea via the Bosphorous Straights...

 

[Dimlee]

Greetings Dimlee,

I appreciate the time and effort you have put into this proposal and certainly agree that the conflict on the Eastern Front was not decidedly tilted in the USSR's favor until mid-summer 1943. I also appreciate any discussion on this site which makes me put effort into better understanding a given topic. Pursuant to your post, here are my thoughts:

1. Peace Talks - You are spot on that there were efforts to broker a peace between Germans and the Soviets into 1943. From what I can find, from 1942 onward these were principally brokered by the Japanese who wanted to establish peace on the eastern front to free up Nazi Germany to contribute to the war against the US. The principal sticking point appears to be the Ukraine and the Baltic states. Hitler was not willing to give these back to the USSR and the USSR was not willing to accept peace without them. Hitler considered the Ukraine as essential territory for the survival of Germany, particularly its agricultural capacity. (I suspect that he remembered the starvation of Germany during the First World War). From what I was able to read, the German General Staff also contributed to the reluctance to accept peace without keeping the conquered lands as they felt that their victory was inevitable. The Japanese representative writes in his notes the concern that the while the German general staff was receiving his efforts warmly, they were undermining his efforts behind his back. Another opinion that I have come across is that at some point the Soviets were using the peace discussions as misdirection to make the Germans believe that they were in worse straights than they actually were. The sticking point then seems to be the Ukraine. I'm more inclined to believe that for Germany to accept peace, it would need to retain the conquered lands and for Soviet leadership to believe that it was in threat of an imminent collapse.
2. Here is a comparison of eastern front army strengths from wikipedia. You can see that the Russian Army outgrows the Germany Army fairly substantially in 1942. It took longer to build up the Red Army's material strength than manpower and reading through the assessment of Operation Mars (the Rzhev offensive) it appears that the Soviet Troops engaged there were not as well equipped as the troops around Stalingrad. By summer 1943, material issues were less of a concern with the Soviet Army, but did affect the conflict during the time frame you have outlined. I could see an argument where material shortages might enhance Soviet willingness to pursue peace if Lend Lease had been affected by either the loss of the Persian Corridor or Japanese interference in the Pacific Route.

View attachment 589557
3. Yes, the war was deep in Soviet Territory, however, without German willingness to return it through a peace (which seems unlikely) then the USSR would have to be committed to liberating it. There is also debate about the latter part of the German advance to Stalingard as to whether the German's were advancing due to their superiority or whether the Russians were encouraging them to advance beyond the limits of their resources. Different histories tell different stories. Personally, I think its a bit of both. Soviet planning for the counteroffensive began in early Autumn and was designed around a double entrapment. This implies forethought on the Soviet part to allow the German's to create the salient. The same kind of overextension created the circumstances that led to the German counter offensive at Kharkov that you reference. My feeling, however, is that by mid-1943 the Soviet superiority in men and materials becomes overwhelming. While we disagree on this, the length of German supply lines becomes a significant weakness and vulnerable to partisan efforts.
4. Agreed that the Soviet's were insecure about the US/UK.

I'm guessing we probably won't agree on the window of opportunity for peace in the eastern front, but I can see the merits of an argument that says peace might have happened as late as mid 1942. I think the biggest stumbling block would be the status of the Ukraine as it seems to be the item that neither side was willing to give up.

Great post and provocative response!

Kk

Thank you. We are not in disagreement overall. Probably, we just see the same things from a somewhat different perspective.

Just briefly, as we already went off-(aviation)topic:
1. I also think that Ukraine was the major stumbling block. If not the whole territory of UkrSSR, then the Southern part including Odessa and Left Bank. As for the Baltic States, probably not the territory as such, but access to the ice-free ports. It seems to me that besides Japan there were at least two channels more and the most important places were Istanbul, Stockholm, Sofia, and, occasionally, Lissabon. Information is scarce, controversial, and politically "sensitive" until now... But the subject is intriguing and I hope we'll live to see more solid research in this area.

2. That Wiki table is somewhat misleading for 1941. Historians continue to debate the total number of Red Army in Western (officially called in USSR "near frontier" prigranichnye) districts. The Army was moving towards the frontier and 22nd June numbers are usually made by extrapolation where the initial data is taken from the last official document by Chiefs of Staff (by Vatutin) dated June 13th. NKVD troops are probably not accounted for in that table. Numbers alone don't tell us the whole picture and are not indicators of combat effectiveness, of course.

3. No disagreement about the Soviet superiority in numbers and about the vulnerability of supply lines.

Thought-provoking talk is the best "provocation", isn't it.

 

[Dimlee]

Turkey - I give credit to michaelmaltby for reminding about the importance of the country.
In the scenario discussed, neither Axis nor Allies can allow Turkey to remain neutral for too long. Allies would be much more persistent than in real history in 1943 in the period from Adana conference to 2nd Cairo conference.
If we speak about the air war, the immediate benefits of allied Turkey for the Allies are new airfields. Probably the same for Axis who could attempt their own bomber offensive in the Middle East?