A4K
Brigadier General
Would agree there.
Germany's European Allies
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bluezanzibar
Recruit
- 8
- Feb 26, 2012
From HyperWar: Moscow To Stalingrad: Decision In The East
"In mid-December, across the front on the German side, new Soviet units were still being identified in such numbers that the OKH almost did not want to hear the reports. General Halder sent an advisory letter through General Staff channels in which he said, "The large number of enemy units identified has sometimes had a paralyzing effect on our leadership. . . ."
Whether the Soviet sources were wrong is a matter of conjecture, but what is indisputable is that on the 6th Dec the Red army launched a massive counteroffensive that by the 16th had eliminated the threat to Moscow and threatened to completely destroy Army group center.
"The first phase of the counteroffensive ended on 16 December with the German spearheads, which had been aimed at Moscow, eliminated and the majority of the original Soviet objectives taken. Twentieth Army had entered Solnechnogorsk on the 12th, and Tenth Army was in Stalinogorsk the next day. A mobile group set up by Thirtieth Army took Klin on the 15th, and Thirty-first Army troops marched into Kalinin on the 16th. The armies had advanced over thirty miles on the north flank and better than fifty miles on the south. No new armies had been deployed during the first phase; however, the number of troops committed had probably grown substantially during the ten-day period. General Lelyushenko, at Thirtieth Army, had been awaiting the arrival of the larger part of a half-dozen Siberian and Urals divisions when the counteroffensive began.1
General Zhukov had issued an initial second phase directive to his right flank armies on 13 December. In it, he ordered them to advance to "an average distance of 130 to 160 kilometers [78 to 96 miles] west and northwest of Moscow."2 Zhukov believed that the objective for the rest of the winter should be to drive the entire Army Group Center back 150 miles to the line east of Smolensk from which it had launched TAIFUN in early October. To do so, he estimated, would require resupply and replacements for the armies already in action and four fresh armies from the Stavka reserves. Zhukov's thought was to keep the advance essentially frontal while using mobile groups, which were being formed in all the armies (typically out of a cavalry division, a tank brigade, and a rifle brigade), to strike at targets of opportunity ahead of the main forces.3
Stalin and the Stavka, however, were beginning to think in less conservative terms. They allowed West Front to go into the second phase as Zhukov proposed but without the four armies as reinforcements. Zhukov made this change, bringing his center, which consisted of Fifth, Thirty-third, Forty-third, and Forty-ninth Armies, into the counteroffensive on 18 December. Elements of Fifth Army, including a mobile group under General Mayor L. M. Dovator, had been in action since the 11th, and Forty-ninth Army's left flank had been engaged together with Fiftieth Army in the Tula sector since the 14th. Thirty-third and Forty-third Armies took a week to move out of their starting positions.
The reinforcements went to the outer flanks of the offensive, which were not under Zhukov's control. Thirtieth Army, from West Front, and Thirty-ninth Army, from the Stavka reserves, went to Kalinin Front, and General Konev's orders as of 18 December were to employ those and his Twenty-second, Twenty-ninth, and Thirty-first Armies in a drive west and southwest behind the Army Group Center left flank to Rzhev. On the south, between 18 and 24 December, the Stavka reactivated the Bryansk Front under General Cherivichenko, giving it Third and Thirteenth Armies and Sixty-first Army from the reserve.5 Cherivichenko had orders to break through Second Army and strike northwest behind the Army Group Center right flank to Mtsensk.
The Stavka, at that point, had nothing less in mind than to encircle Army Group Center by having Kalinin Front head south past Rzhev to Vyazma while Bryansk Front came west and northwest to Vyazma and Bryansk. Ambition was high in Moscow"
It is clear that at a time when the German army had essentially no reserves, the Soviets were deploying entire armies from their reserves. It seems reasonable to assume that the Soviet figures were closer to the truth than the German estimates.
parsifal
Colonel
What about gehlens red book estimates. On taking over the foreign armies east intell post, he immediately ascertained the OKH estimates of soviets were at least 50% too low.
After the Smolensk battle, most pie in the sky pro-german sources paint a picture of moscow being completely exposed. A complete fabrication according to gehlen. he identified in 1943 that at that time the capital had reserves of nearly 200 divs behind it. Not all combat ready, even by soviet standards, but stavkha were prepared to commit them if needed
DonL
Banned
@ bluezanzibar
I have some problems with the definition "German casualties"!
German casualties as of 1 November 1941 were 677491 men (KIA, MIA, Wounded)! 226297 (KIA, MIA)!
The average return rate of wounded soldiers was between 50-60%!
This numbers are only for the east front!
Source: Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg by Rüdiger Overmans.
Anyway the "casualties" and loss of material were higher then estimated, but the casualities, losses of material and the Red Army (in general) weren't to my personal opinion the decisive factors till december 1941 for the Wehrmacht at Barbarossa.
The decisive factors were the permanent changes of the strategic goals (first Middle, then North, then South, back to Middle), Hitlers inability to make decisions to a focal point, the change to the south to get Kiew (worst failure in terms of Clausewitz and the strategic goal), and Hitlers want of confidence in the strategic and tactical leadership of his Generals.
One of the worst failure was the not capture of Leningrad and North Russia till the end of August to get a stable supply platform through the Baltic Sea and the russian harbours.
Till December 1941 the Red Army was in some state of paralyse and has only the potential to do some local limited action, but to my opinion was not able to do a coordinated huge general action as the Winteroffensive! THe Wehrmacht wasn't able to use it's full capacity (till december 1941) at this time to reach their strategic goals! (Moskau and Leningrad)
Through the reasons I have named above plus the underestimation of logistcal problems and the mud period!
After December 1941 and Landlease the war in the east was lost!
To my kmowledge this isn't quiet correct. This picture was painted after Wjasma and Brjansk, but not after Smolensk!
I have some problems with the definition "German casualties"!
German casualties as of 1 November 1941 were 677491 men (KIA, MIA, Wounded)! 226297 (KIA, MIA)!
The average return rate of wounded soldiers was between 50-60%!
This numbers are only for the east front!
Source: Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg by Rüdiger Overmans.
Anyway the "casualties" and loss of material were higher then estimated, but the casualities, losses of material and the Red Army (in general) weren't to my personal opinion the decisive factors till december 1941 for the Wehrmacht at Barbarossa.
The decisive factors were the permanent changes of the strategic goals (first Middle, then North, then South, back to Middle), Hitlers inability to make decisions to a focal point, the change to the south to get Kiew (worst failure in terms of Clausewitz and the strategic goal), and Hitlers want of confidence in the strategic and tactical leadership of his Generals.
One of the worst failure was the not capture of Leningrad and North Russia till the end of August to get a stable supply platform through the Baltic Sea and the russian harbours.
Till December 1941 the Red Army was in some state of paralyse and has only the potential to do some local limited action, but to my opinion was not able to do a coordinated huge general action as the Winteroffensive! THe Wehrmacht wasn't able to use it's full capacity (till december 1941) at this time to reach their strategic goals! (Moskau and Leningrad)
Through the reasons I have named above plus the underestimation of logistcal problems and the mud period!
After December 1941 and Landlease the war in the east was lost!
To my kmowledge this isn't quiet correct. This picture was painted after Wjasma and Brjansk, but not after Smolensk!
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parsifal
Colonel
I concur with the assessment, and its a very good source DonL. however total German casualties as at the beginning of the Russian counterattack in December were about 700000 as stated, though many of these were temporary. I would just draw your attention to Halders diary, wherein, IIRC he says that casualties were running at about 40000 per week, but returns (men convalescesced and returned to the front) was only about 10000 per week. The heer in the east was being slowly bled white and its powers of recovery were simply not up to the task. Similar stories were applicable to the MT and AFV situation, though the recovery rate was somewhat faster than it was for the manpower rates. Tank strengths for 2nd Panzer were down to 10% by December, but had staged a partial recovery by the following spring. I cannot recall the percentage of runners compared to the authorised TO&E. I think it was about 50% by May, but will stand corrected.
However, there were very good reasons for the Germans restricting their offensive actions to just one army group in 1942....lack of manpower, lack of functional AFVs and lack of MT. Only by stripping out 50% of the available tanks strengths of the armour attached to AGC and AGN were the germans able to bring the tank strengths up to strength in tyhe south for 1942.
For the Infantry, virtually every Infantry Bn had to lose at least one company of fit men to bring the AGS Infantry formations up to strength. There were many Infantry Divs in the centre and north reduced to 2 regiments, each with just 2 bns less one company per bn. thats a fraction of the authorised TOE. Moreover all the specialists, the assault pioneers, 2/3 of the heavy artillery that remained (a lot had been abandoned in the withdrawal before moscow, and had not yet been replaced) also had to be stripped out to bring AGS up to strength.
For the truck pool, the situation became abosolutely diabolical. The authorised TOE for each Inf div at June 1941 was about 800 truck per div. Each Army had (from memory) about 40000 truck operating as rear area logistics trains (this figure did vary). The dives lost 75% of their truck pools, whilst the army HQs lost a similar percentage. There was no possibility of any offensive action whilst that situation existed in the centre and the north.
We will have to disagree on thet score. The loss of manpower, and materiel in front of Moscow were direct reasons why the Germans were unable to recommence a general front wide offensive the following Spring. Neither were the Russians for that matter, but then Russian casualties to the end of 1941 were 10 times those of the germans
Agreed, but hitler was not a complete fool. The reasons for this constant shifting of priooerities was that from an early point OKH began to realize they did not have the strength to meet all the objectives. The Rusians were not collapsing as had been promised....they were resisting with increasing effectiveness, and this rattled the german high command.
In the case of the aftermath of Smolensk, the germans switched south out of necessity. they had brought enough supply and repair capability to push the railheads to minsk. Then there was a forced delay of nearly six weeks whilst additional rail repair logisitics were brought up. According to the German State Railways ghistory, the germans had great difficulty getting the bridges, coaling and water station operational. The marshalling yards were so comprehensively wrecked that it would take many weeks to get the supply situation sorted out. AGC estimated its needs to be a minimum of 18 fully laden trains per day just to maintain the situation. at that point they were receiving just 2 trains per day on average. Worse, the frontline Infantry formations were down to 40% authorised strength. I think it was Bock that reported he needed about six weeks to recover his strength of the infantry, and that was conditional to his supply situation being improved. And it is from that report that Hitler was forced to divert 2 Pz south. Guderians Panzer Army was at that time relatively better off than the other Infantry formations of AGC. Moreover, the supply situation of the entire AGC was being threatened and harrassed by remnants of the SU 5th Army, which was itself being somewhat resupplied by riverborne carried by the Pinsk flotilla, and hauling supplies all the way up from Kiev. To get the AGC front moving again, the Germans simply had to do something about this situation, hence the Kiev encirclement. Its not nearly as straight forward as people think.
The battle for Leningrad would have been much more favourable if the germans had made a lunge for it in august. i completely agree with that. However whether they could secure it AND return the port to a functional state is a highly questionable and debateable issue. Like Moscow, there were vast numbers of untrained or formations in and behind Leningrad even in August. Moreover the decision to push the AGN armour south to support the assault into Smolensk was a necessary one...again alluding to the insufficient resources at the disposal of the heer. Taking Leningrad, like Moscow and Stalingrad would have been a costly and time consuming exercise
I agree in general, but in detail, its just untrue. The Soviets had mounted very effective defences at Smolensk that had rattled OKH by its effectiveness. AGS had basically stalled in front of Kiev and could not get moving until the arrival of 2 Pz. In the south, the Soviet defences of Odessa were very effective against the Rumanians and the German 11A. There were plenty of examples of effective Soviet defences, attacks though were far less effective.
I can only refer you to gehlens assessment. He lists over 45 Divs as defending Moscow immediately folowing Smolensk. Neither the germans or the soviets were in any condition to move offensively, but the reserves, suitable for defence were there to defend Moscow. Thats a big reason why Stalin did not move from the capital. he and STAVkHA were fairly confident that in August/Septemeber, the germans were unable to make a move on the city.
starling
Airman 1st Class
Hey guys,were these"Allies"off hitlers,under German operational Command throughout the eastern front war.?Starling.
parsifal
Colonel
No, not always. Examples that i can think of are:
In north Africa, the front commander was an Italian, Marshal Bastico, and all decisions regarding the prosecution of the campaign were meant to flow through Commando Supremo. Most of the time thats how it worked, however Romel was often in actual control of military operations because DAK played such a critical role. DAK usually included the Ariete Armoured Div incidentally. When it suited him, Rommel would short circuit the chain of command and appeal directly to Hitler. he seldom went through OKW, because they would tell him to behave and direct his request through the chain of command.
The Axis capture of Odessa was done under Rumanian command, because they supplied the majority of troops.
The counterattack on the Chir following Stalingrad disaster was under the command of Radu Korne (I think it was him....it may have been another Rumanain. Korne was certainly there), possibly the most brilliant non-german armoured specialist in the Axis. His handling of Ru 2nd Armoured and 8th Mech Cav was brilliant, and earned him a knights cross. Whilst he was pitting his Pzkpfw 35s against Russian T-34s and winning (for a time) his German allies were sitting on their hands complaining that mice had eaten through the electrical wiring of their tanks....
The control of Finn troops particualalry on the JKarelian front was always under the direct control of the finns. And they did a very good job of it.
Most formations Army size and below were under national control. There was very little direct integration of national forces. Where such integration was attempted, it usually did not go well. Germans were so cavalier with the lives of their allies that nobody trusted them. They also tended to be pompous and patronising toward their allies to the extreme.
In north Africa, the front commander was an Italian, Marshal Bastico, and all decisions regarding the prosecution of the campaign were meant to flow through Commando Supremo. Most of the time thats how it worked, however Romel was often in actual control of military operations because DAK played such a critical role. DAK usually included the Ariete Armoured Div incidentally. When it suited him, Rommel would short circuit the chain of command and appeal directly to Hitler. he seldom went through OKW, because they would tell him to behave and direct his request through the chain of command.
The Axis capture of Odessa was done under Rumanian command, because they supplied the majority of troops.
The counterattack on the Chir following Stalingrad disaster was under the command of Radu Korne (I think it was him....it may have been another Rumanain. Korne was certainly there), possibly the most brilliant non-german armoured specialist in the Axis. His handling of Ru 2nd Armoured and 8th Mech Cav was brilliant, and earned him a knights cross. Whilst he was pitting his Pzkpfw 35s against Russian T-34s and winning (for a time) his German allies were sitting on their hands complaining that mice had eaten through the electrical wiring of their tanks....
The control of Finn troops particualalry on the JKarelian front was always under the direct control of the finns. And they did a very good job of it.
Most formations Army size and below were under national control. There was very little direct integration of national forces. Where such integration was attempted, it usually did not go well. Germans were so cavalier with the lives of their allies that nobody trusted them. They also tended to be pompous and patronising toward their allies to the extreme.
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parsifal
Colonel
Part I
"Brig. general Radu Korne
2 November 1917: Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class
22 June 1941 – 4 November 1942: 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment
12 February 1942: Mihai Viteazul Order 2nd class
26 September – 6 October 1942: 3rd Mountain Division
5 November 1942 – 4 April 1944: 8th Cavalry Division
18 December 1942: Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross
7 January 1943: promoted to the rank of brigadier general
6 January – 10 March 1944: Guard Division
4 April – 20 September 1944: 1st Armored Division
Radu Korne, "the pride of the cavalry", was born on 23 December 1895 in Bucharest, as part of a noble Romanian family. The name was pronounced "Cornea", but he was very fond of the spelling from the old chronicles: Korné.
He was admitted into the Cavalry Officer School in 1913 and graduated in 1915, receiving the rank of 2nd lieutenant. He was assigned to the 4th Rosiori Regiment Regina Maria, with which he took part in WWI. In 1917 he was promoted to 1st lieutenant. He distinguished himself during the second battle of Oituz, during the assault on 13 August 1917 on the Cosna Hill, commanding a machine-gun section in the area of Hill 307. He was practically buried by the explosion of a 150 mm shell. He remained in the first line, being wounded eight f\days later. Lieutenant Radu Korne was awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class, being among the few Romanian WWII generals that won this distinction in the first line during the previous war.
In 1919 he was promoted to the rank of captain and in 1921 was admitted into the War Academy, which he graduated in 1923. He continued his studies in the Cavalry School in Saumur, France, in 1926. After his return to Romania, in 1927, he became major and was assigned as a cavalry tactics professor in the Cavalry Officer School. In 1934 he was a lieutenant colonel and in 1939 a colonel.
The war's outbreak found him at the command of the 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment from the 5th Cavalry Brigade, which was stationed in Northern Moldavia. Unlike the majority of the Romanian troops, which first saw action from on 3 July, the 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment started the war on 22 June, when the 3rd Squadron overran the pillboxes on Bobeica Hill. Colonel Korne was quickly remarked by general Neuling, the CO of the German 239th Division, who asked general Ion Antonescu on 30 June to delay his retirement, as he was a very capable officer.
On 4 July the 5th Cavalry Brigade crossed the Prut River and advanced with a detachment commanded by colonel Korne towards Lipnic, reaching the Dniester River on 7 July. The river was forced on 17 July, in the Liasevti sector. The Romanian cavalrymen had to brake through the Stalin Fortified Line, situated on the left bank. The 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment had some difficulties initially, succeeding in creating a beachhead in the afternoon and taking 12 pillboxes. From 20 July onwards started the advance to the Bug River, his regiment reaching Obodovka that day. On 29 July the Col. Radu Korne Detachment was created from the 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment, 3 motorized cavalry squadrons and a mountain artillery section. It had the mission to quickly advance to Mikhailovka and Savran. At the beginning of August it reached the Bug and by the end of the month it was on the Dnieper River.
On the Dnieper, the Cavlry Corps, of which colonel Korne's regiment was part of, repulsed several Soviet attempts to cross the river and on 19 September continued the advance north of the Azov Sea. There, from 25 September, it faced the powerful Soviet offensive carried out by the 9th and 18th Armies. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was attacked by a much superior force in the Akymovka area. The 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment stood its ground, even though the rest of the brigade was pushed back. The offensive ran out of steam after several days and the German-Romanian counterattack led to the encirclement and destruction of the two armies. For his deeds during the battle, colonel Radu Korne was awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 2nd class.
However, the 11th German Army remained, following this operation, without its only motorized unit: the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Waffen SS Division, which was reassigned. Because General von Manstein, the army's CO, needed troops that would make a quick advance after the brake through into the Crimean Peninsula, the Colonel Korne Mechanized Detachment was organized with the 6th and 10th Motorized Rosiori Regiments, an AT battalion, the 54th Motorized Heavy Artillery Battalion and a motorcycle company. The detachment was engaged in the follow-up operation after the front in the Perekop Isthmus was breached on 28 October 1941. Colonel Korne distinguished himself again, this kind of actions probably suiting him very well. His detachment infiltrated to southwest of Simferopol on 31 October, where, isolated, it cut the retreat roads towards Yevpatoria and carried out heavy fights with the Soviet troops heading to Sevastopol.
It was then subordinated to the German 54th Corps and took part in the first siege of Sevastopol. It advanced 5 km along the coastline between 17 and 23 December, reaching the Kachea Valley, which it cleared up until 25 December, advancing another 5 km towards the city.
The Soviets made several landings at Kerch on 26 December. The detachment was immediately sent on the other side of the peninsula, being reinforced with the 3rd Motorized Calarasi Regiment and subordinated to the German 42nd Corps. The Soviet landing at Feodosiya on 30 December forced the detachment, already on its way to Kerch, to turn back and create a new front in the threatened sector. Thus in January 1942 it repulsed, together with the rest of the 42nd Corps' forces, all the attempts of the Soviet troops in the Kerch Peninsula to come to the aid of those at Feodosiya, which were under attack by the German 30th Corps. In February it was moved in the Genichesk area, receiving the mission to guard the coastline.
After the elimination of the Feodosiya beachhead, the Soviet command reinforced constantly the troops in the Kerch Peninsula, thus in May 1942 the 44th, 47th and 51st Armies were found there. For their destruction, general von Manstein, 11th Army's CO, conceived the Operation Trappenjagd. On 5 May 1942, the Korne Detachment received the order to move to Feodosiya, where it was supposed to subordinate to the Groddek Brigade. This was a German ad-hoc unit, which reunited the motorized units of the 11th Army. Beside the Romanian cavalry detachment, which constituted its main force, the brigade had the 22nd Recon Group, the 6th Company of the Brandenburg Regiment and the 560th Mixed AT Company.
The attack started on 8 May. On 9 May, the Groddek Brigade infiltrated through the breach made by the German 30th Corps and advanced on the coast up to Kipcheak, where it arrived in the evening, bypassing the Soviet troops. Colonel Korne, with the bulk of his detachment, secured the brigade's rear and flanks. On 11 May it had to continue the advance towards Saraymin. It arrived there with difficulty, because the Soviet troops in retreat towards Kerch were trying to make their way through the brigade's positions. In the evening, in front of Saraymin, the assault failed and colonel Korne was lightly wounded at the left arm. But the Romanian and German troops, although practically surrounded, controlled the Saraymin-Kerch road. During 12 and in the morning of 13 May, the Soviets desperately attacked to open the retreat route, but were repulsed every time. In the afternoon, with a part of the forces, colonel Groddek and colonel Korne mover to Ortaeli in the attempt to cross the Tabechikoe Lake and to advance to Kamish Burun, which was situated just south of Kerch. On 14 May, colonel Groddek was seriously wounded and left the command of the brigade to colonel Korne. He took Ortaeli and then entered Kamish Burun in the same time with the forward elements of the German 132nd Infantry Division.
The action of the Groddek Brigade, implying obviously also that of the Korne Detachment, which represented the majority of its forces, was decisive, as general Erich von Manstein recognized in his memoirs, because it prevented the creation of a new Soviet front behind the one already breached. The Red Army lost 162,282 men, as well as large quantities of equipment.
After the battle, on 16 May, the detachment was assigned with the defense of the coastline south of Kerch. It returned to the Cavalry Corps, which in August was involved in the offensive in the Caucasus. Colonel Korne was again named at the command of a detachment organized from the motorized elements of the 5th and 9th Cavalry Divisions. It preceded the quick advance of the other Romanian units and on 31 August 1942 it reached Anapa, taking two 152 mm batteries on Nasuruvo Heights, with which it bombarded the city and the port, facilitating its capture. It then continued the advance towards Novorosyisk, which fell to German and Romanian troops at the beginning of September.
Because of the dangerous situation created at the 3rd Mountain Division following the failure of its offensive, on 26 September, colonel Korne was temporarily named at its command, managing in a short time span to reorganize it.
"Brig. general Radu Korne
2 November 1917: Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class
22 June 1941 – 4 November 1942: 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment
12 February 1942: Mihai Viteazul Order 2nd class
26 September – 6 October 1942: 3rd Mountain Division
5 November 1942 – 4 April 1944: 8th Cavalry Division
18 December 1942: Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross
7 January 1943: promoted to the rank of brigadier general
6 January – 10 March 1944: Guard Division
4 April – 20 September 1944: 1st Armored Division
Radu Korne, "the pride of the cavalry", was born on 23 December 1895 in Bucharest, as part of a noble Romanian family. The name was pronounced "Cornea", but he was very fond of the spelling from the old chronicles: Korné.
He was admitted into the Cavalry Officer School in 1913 and graduated in 1915, receiving the rank of 2nd lieutenant. He was assigned to the 4th Rosiori Regiment Regina Maria, with which he took part in WWI. In 1917 he was promoted to 1st lieutenant. He distinguished himself during the second battle of Oituz, during the assault on 13 August 1917 on the Cosna Hill, commanding a machine-gun section in the area of Hill 307. He was practically buried by the explosion of a 150 mm shell. He remained in the first line, being wounded eight f\days later. Lieutenant Radu Korne was awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class, being among the few Romanian WWII generals that won this distinction in the first line during the previous war.
In 1919 he was promoted to the rank of captain and in 1921 was admitted into the War Academy, which he graduated in 1923. He continued his studies in the Cavalry School in Saumur, France, in 1926. After his return to Romania, in 1927, he became major and was assigned as a cavalry tactics professor in the Cavalry Officer School. In 1934 he was a lieutenant colonel and in 1939 a colonel.
The war's outbreak found him at the command of the 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment from the 5th Cavalry Brigade, which was stationed in Northern Moldavia. Unlike the majority of the Romanian troops, which first saw action from on 3 July, the 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment started the war on 22 June, when the 3rd Squadron overran the pillboxes on Bobeica Hill. Colonel Korne was quickly remarked by general Neuling, the CO of the German 239th Division, who asked general Ion Antonescu on 30 June to delay his retirement, as he was a very capable officer.
On 4 July the 5th Cavalry Brigade crossed the Prut River and advanced with a detachment commanded by colonel Korne towards Lipnic, reaching the Dniester River on 7 July. The river was forced on 17 July, in the Liasevti sector. The Romanian cavalrymen had to brake through the Stalin Fortified Line, situated on the left bank. The 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment had some difficulties initially, succeeding in creating a beachhead in the afternoon and taking 12 pillboxes. From 20 July onwards started the advance to the Bug River, his regiment reaching Obodovka that day. On 29 July the Col. Radu Korne Detachment was created from the 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment, 3 motorized cavalry squadrons and a mountain artillery section. It had the mission to quickly advance to Mikhailovka and Savran. At the beginning of August it reached the Bug and by the end of the month it was on the Dnieper River.
On the Dnieper, the Cavlry Corps, of which colonel Korne's regiment was part of, repulsed several Soviet attempts to cross the river and on 19 September continued the advance north of the Azov Sea. There, from 25 September, it faced the powerful Soviet offensive carried out by the 9th and 18th Armies. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was attacked by a much superior force in the Akymovka area. The 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment stood its ground, even though the rest of the brigade was pushed back. The offensive ran out of steam after several days and the German-Romanian counterattack led to the encirclement and destruction of the two armies. For his deeds during the battle, colonel Radu Korne was awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 2nd class.
However, the 11th German Army remained, following this operation, without its only motorized unit: the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Waffen SS Division, which was reassigned. Because General von Manstein, the army's CO, needed troops that would make a quick advance after the brake through into the Crimean Peninsula, the Colonel Korne Mechanized Detachment was organized with the 6th and 10th Motorized Rosiori Regiments, an AT battalion, the 54th Motorized Heavy Artillery Battalion and a motorcycle company. The detachment was engaged in the follow-up operation after the front in the Perekop Isthmus was breached on 28 October 1941. Colonel Korne distinguished himself again, this kind of actions probably suiting him very well. His detachment infiltrated to southwest of Simferopol on 31 October, where, isolated, it cut the retreat roads towards Yevpatoria and carried out heavy fights with the Soviet troops heading to Sevastopol.
It was then subordinated to the German 54th Corps and took part in the first siege of Sevastopol. It advanced 5 km along the coastline between 17 and 23 December, reaching the Kachea Valley, which it cleared up until 25 December, advancing another 5 km towards the city.
The Soviets made several landings at Kerch on 26 December. The detachment was immediately sent on the other side of the peninsula, being reinforced with the 3rd Motorized Calarasi Regiment and subordinated to the German 42nd Corps. The Soviet landing at Feodosiya on 30 December forced the detachment, already on its way to Kerch, to turn back and create a new front in the threatened sector. Thus in January 1942 it repulsed, together with the rest of the 42nd Corps' forces, all the attempts of the Soviet troops in the Kerch Peninsula to come to the aid of those at Feodosiya, which were under attack by the German 30th Corps. In February it was moved in the Genichesk area, receiving the mission to guard the coastline.
After the elimination of the Feodosiya beachhead, the Soviet command reinforced constantly the troops in the Kerch Peninsula, thus in May 1942 the 44th, 47th and 51st Armies were found there. For their destruction, general von Manstein, 11th Army's CO, conceived the Operation Trappenjagd. On 5 May 1942, the Korne Detachment received the order to move to Feodosiya, where it was supposed to subordinate to the Groddek Brigade. This was a German ad-hoc unit, which reunited the motorized units of the 11th Army. Beside the Romanian cavalry detachment, which constituted its main force, the brigade had the 22nd Recon Group, the 6th Company of the Brandenburg Regiment and the 560th Mixed AT Company.
The attack started on 8 May. On 9 May, the Groddek Brigade infiltrated through the breach made by the German 30th Corps and advanced on the coast up to Kipcheak, where it arrived in the evening, bypassing the Soviet troops. Colonel Korne, with the bulk of his detachment, secured the brigade's rear and flanks. On 11 May it had to continue the advance towards Saraymin. It arrived there with difficulty, because the Soviet troops in retreat towards Kerch were trying to make their way through the brigade's positions. In the evening, in front of Saraymin, the assault failed and colonel Korne was lightly wounded at the left arm. But the Romanian and German troops, although practically surrounded, controlled the Saraymin-Kerch road. During 12 and in the morning of 13 May, the Soviets desperately attacked to open the retreat route, but were repulsed every time. In the afternoon, with a part of the forces, colonel Groddek and colonel Korne mover to Ortaeli in the attempt to cross the Tabechikoe Lake and to advance to Kamish Burun, which was situated just south of Kerch. On 14 May, colonel Groddek was seriously wounded and left the command of the brigade to colonel Korne. He took Ortaeli and then entered Kamish Burun in the same time with the forward elements of the German 132nd Infantry Division.
The action of the Groddek Brigade, implying obviously also that of the Korne Detachment, which represented the majority of its forces, was decisive, as general Erich von Manstein recognized in his memoirs, because it prevented the creation of a new Soviet front behind the one already breached. The Red Army lost 162,282 men, as well as large quantities of equipment.
After the battle, on 16 May, the detachment was assigned with the defense of the coastline south of Kerch. It returned to the Cavalry Corps, which in August was involved in the offensive in the Caucasus. Colonel Korne was again named at the command of a detachment organized from the motorized elements of the 5th and 9th Cavalry Divisions. It preceded the quick advance of the other Romanian units and on 31 August 1942 it reached Anapa, taking two 152 mm batteries on Nasuruvo Heights, with which it bombarded the city and the port, facilitating its capture. It then continued the advance towards Novorosyisk, which fell to German and Romanian troops at the beginning of September.
Because of the dangerous situation created at the 3rd Mountain Division following the failure of its offensive, on 26 September, colonel Korne was temporarily named at its command, managing in a short time span to reorganize it.
parsifal
Colonel
Part II
On 7 October, the 5th Cavalry Division started its trip towards Stalingrad, but colonel Radu Korne received a new assignment: the 8th Cavalry Division, which was subordinated to the 4th Army, situated south of the city. After the start of the Soviet offensive, on 20 November, it received the mission to create the link between the 6th and 7th Corps in Aksay sector. He decided to create a strong point at Kraniy Geroy with the mounted elements and to concentrate the motorized elements (the 3rd Motorized Calarasi Regiment) at Korobkin, from where he could quickly intervene in the threatened area. But Krasniy Geroy had to be abandoned on 23 November, colonel Korne retreating his men to Korobkin and then to Kotelnikovo, destroying on the way a Soviet motorized column in cooperation with the German Panwitz Detachment. He created a new defense line in the Dorganof and Sarnutovsky area, which he held until 4 December, when the division pulled back towards Pimen Cherny. It took part in the Wintergewitter Operation, being subordinated to the General Popescu Group. It managed to retake Dorganof on 14 December, after very heavy fights. But the attempt to reach the encircled 6th Army failed and, on 26 December, the general retreat started, the Romanian cavalrymen being permanently harassed by Soviet tanks. On 7 January it crossed the Don Riverand continued its trip to Romania, where it arrived on 4 April 1943. For the way he commanded the 8th Cavalry Division in the hard moments in November-December 1942, as well as for the actions in the spring and summer of the same year, Radu Korne was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and was promoted to the rank of brigadier general.
A year away from fighting followed. During 1943, the 8th Cavalry Division was transformed into a motorized division, the general supervising its reorganization. For two months between January and March 1944, he also held the command of the Guard Division.
From April 1944 he was named at the command of the most powerful Romanian unit: the 1st Armored Division Romania Mare. On 15 July 1944 it was sent to the front in Moldavia and put in the reserve of Army Group Wöhler (4th Romanian Army and 6th German Army). After the start of the Soviet offensive on 20 August 1944, the 1st Armored Division entered in combat south of Bahlui River, counterattacking the Soviet tanks that had broken the Romanian-German front. During the 20/21 August night, the 1st Tank Regiment and the motorized vanatori regiments were separated. The division lost 34 tanks and self-propelled guns, destroying 60 Soviet tanks. The attempts to restore the front on the Bahlui River and then on the Traian Fortified Line failed, the division's elements covering, as much as it was possible, the retreat. On 23 August it created a defensive position north of Roman, between the Siret and Moldova Rivers, where the armistice with the allies found him.
After the offensive against the German and Hungarian troops in Transylvania began, general Korne requested a command on the front, but he was turned down and put at disposal of the Ministry of War on 20 September and on 21 October 1944 he was arrested at the request of the Soviet Commission for the Armistice. He was locked down in the Capital's Military Command, until February 1945 when he was released, only to be put under house arrest. Between 1945-46 he was investigated by the "People's Court", but was found innocent. He was arrested again on 24 March 1948 for "conspiring against the State's security" and imprisoned at Jilava. On 18 April 1849, his health deteriorated and was taken to the Vacaresti Central Hospital No. 1, where he passed away on 28 April 1949, at 1300 hours".
On 7 October, the 5th Cavalry Division started its trip towards Stalingrad, but colonel Radu Korne received a new assignment: the 8th Cavalry Division, which was subordinated to the 4th Army, situated south of the city. After the start of the Soviet offensive, on 20 November, it received the mission to create the link between the 6th and 7th Corps in Aksay sector. He decided to create a strong point at Kraniy Geroy with the mounted elements and to concentrate the motorized elements (the 3rd Motorized Calarasi Regiment) at Korobkin, from where he could quickly intervene in the threatened area. But Krasniy Geroy had to be abandoned on 23 November, colonel Korne retreating his men to Korobkin and then to Kotelnikovo, destroying on the way a Soviet motorized column in cooperation with the German Panwitz Detachment. He created a new defense line in the Dorganof and Sarnutovsky area, which he held until 4 December, when the division pulled back towards Pimen Cherny. It took part in the Wintergewitter Operation, being subordinated to the General Popescu Group. It managed to retake Dorganof on 14 December, after very heavy fights. But the attempt to reach the encircled 6th Army failed and, on 26 December, the general retreat started, the Romanian cavalrymen being permanently harassed by Soviet tanks. On 7 January it crossed the Don Riverand continued its trip to Romania, where it arrived on 4 April 1943. For the way he commanded the 8th Cavalry Division in the hard moments in November-December 1942, as well as for the actions in the spring and summer of the same year, Radu Korne was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and was promoted to the rank of brigadier general.
A year away from fighting followed. During 1943, the 8th Cavalry Division was transformed into a motorized division, the general supervising its reorganization. For two months between January and March 1944, he also held the command of the Guard Division.
From April 1944 he was named at the command of the most powerful Romanian unit: the 1st Armored Division Romania Mare. On 15 July 1944 it was sent to the front in Moldavia and put in the reserve of Army Group Wöhler (4th Romanian Army and 6th German Army). After the start of the Soviet offensive on 20 August 1944, the 1st Armored Division entered in combat south of Bahlui River, counterattacking the Soviet tanks that had broken the Romanian-German front. During the 20/21 August night, the 1st Tank Regiment and the motorized vanatori regiments were separated. The division lost 34 tanks and self-propelled guns, destroying 60 Soviet tanks. The attempts to restore the front on the Bahlui River and then on the Traian Fortified Line failed, the division's elements covering, as much as it was possible, the retreat. On 23 August it created a defensive position north of Roman, between the Siret and Moldova Rivers, where the armistice with the allies found him.
After the offensive against the German and Hungarian troops in Transylvania began, general Korne requested a command on the front, but he was turned down and put at disposal of the Ministry of War on 20 September and on 21 October 1944 he was arrested at the request of the Soviet Commission for the Armistice. He was locked down in the Capital's Military Command, until February 1945 when he was released, only to be put under house arrest. Between 1945-46 he was investigated by the "People's Court", but was found innocent. He was arrested again on 24 March 1948 for "conspiring against the State's security" and imprisoned at Jilava. On 18 April 1849, his health deteriorated and was taken to the Vacaresti Central Hospital No. 1, where he passed away on 28 April 1949, at 1300 hours".
