Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks (2 Viewers)

[elbmc1969]

Greg busily ignores private correspondence between USAAC generals.


View: https://youtu.be/LFI8frj1NbM?si=5XmPJDdZov7wjZ1L

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I watched this earlier tonight. His fallacy is that he assumes the "Bomber Mafia" as a premise, never questions it, and then uses that to explain the absence of the P-38 in ETO. Even if Hap Arnold was against drop-tanks, that doesn't make it a "mafia". Disregards that the USAAC/USAAF never forbade drop tanks, only refused to finance them. Ignores that the P-38 was sent to North Africa because that was where the fighting was.

Slipshod thinking.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Ignores that the P-38 was sent to North Africa because that was where the fighting was.

This is an interesting point.

Anyone got a month by month (or even week by week) comparison of USAAF claims in North Africa and Western Europe?

I wonder at what point the rate of ETO claims takes over that of MTO claims.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

This is an interesting point.

Anyone got a month by month (or even week by week) comparison of USAAF claims in North Africa and Western Europe?

I wonder at what point the rate of ETO claims takes over that of MTO claims.

I don't, but I bet G Geoffrey Sinclair does. Dude has a spreadsheet on everything.

 

[pbehn]

"Greg" didnt even get a click from me this time around. There is only so much BS that a "bomber mafia" coat hanger conspiracy theory can keep in the air. It was the Bomber Mafia and their stance on drop tanks that caused Napoleons retreat from Moscow I learned on "Greg does the 1800s" Youtube site.

 

[MIflyer]

My late friend Ward Duncan, maintenance chief of the 9th PS, said that the first drop tanks utilized by P-38's were much smaller than later ones, 50 gal rather than 165, and located close to the wing lower surface, rather than on pylons. The result was they were not of much use, increasing drag while not providing much in the way of additional fuel. And I did not click on that item either, figuring that he would not know about the ineffective early drop tanks and would ignore the need to send P-38's to Operation Torch.

As to when the later drop tanks became available......, Looks like it was well into 1943.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

I don't, but I bet G Geoffrey Sinclair does. Dude has a spreadsheet on everything.

42

First to columns from the USAAF Statistical Digest enemy aircraft destroyed in the air by USAAF fighters, next three from the published victory credits lists, some significant differences.

Source	Statistical	Digest	Victory	Claims	List
Theatre	ETO	MTO	ETO	MTO	MTO P-38 only
Aug-42​	1​	0​	3​
Sep-42​	0​	0​	1​
Oct-42​	5​	22​	6​	27​	0​
Nov-42​	0​	16​	2​	40.5​	26.5​
Dec-42​	1​	43​	0​	63.33​	40​
Jan-43​	5​	56​	6​	86​	51​
Feb-43​	2​	57​	0​	71​	48​
Mar-43​	0​	103​	0​	137.5​	61​
Apr-43​	4​	319​	4​	332.5​	143​
May-43​	8​	132​	11​	136​	83​
Jun-43​	18​	115​	18​	161​	60​
Jul-43​	42​	125​	37​	174​	52​
Aug-43​	53​	117​	57​	120​	80​
Sep-43​	38​	102​	41​	92​	47​
Oct-43​	76​	81​	76​	66​	38​
Nov-43​	105​	21​	105.5​	28​	13​
Dec-43​	100​	42​	92​	72​	41​
Total	458​	1351​	459.5​	1606.83​	783.5​

The 9th Air Force report says its fighters claimed 27 victories in October 1942 and 18 in November.

Luftwaffe priorities in the first half of 1943 were in the east and south, the west needed to make do. In July and August 1943 the Luftwaffe received a series of significant wake up calls, in date order,

1) On July 5 the Kursk offensive begins, for the first time in the east the Luftwaffe is unable to secure air superiority where it wants it, the Red Air Force is able to intervene effectively. The air force needs to become bigger, given the Red Air Force largely ignores its opposite number the Luftwaffe can still usually operate.

2) 10 July the allied invasion of Sicily, in the air fighting before and during the invasion the Luftwaffe discovers the more aircraft it commits the higher the casualties without changing the overall situation. The air force needs to become much bigger or leave.

3) 27 July the firestorm at Hamburg. One of the biggest shocks the allied air offensive ever delivered the Nazi leadership, the blinding of the night defences followed by the apparent destruction of a city.

4) 17 August the strikes on Schweinfurt and Peenemunde.

The next day the Luftwaffe chief of staff committed suicide.

From Torch to about the end of 1943 the operations in the Mediterranean were completely justifiable as major political, economic, tactical and strategic successes for the allies. Italy knocked out, Germans need to replace those occupation troops, Mediterranean open, Imports from Africa to Europe stopped, Italian economy no longer working well for axis, allied forces learnt significant lessons on how to fight, large number of axis forces destroyed and captured.

Air attacks on the axis forces in Tunisia were shorter range raids, the ones in early 1943 on places like Italy had similarities to the Pacific, over water approaches, little chance of interception until near the target allowing medium altitude flights at economic cruise, helping to cover the P-38 problems at altitude and the availability of external tanks that could be used at high altitude, while places like Naples, Foggia and Sicily were closer to allied bases than Schweinfurt. The P-38 units played a major role in enabling the daylight heavy bomber raids. The USAAF had a nominal 13 fighter and 2 fighter bomber groups operational in the MTO in 1942/43, the 3 P-38 groups account for just under half the claims made, the two Spitfire groups just under 15%.

The size of the existing allied military, shipping and invasion shipping ruled out landing in France in 1943, the activities of U-boats ensuring no build up could easily happen anyway. Any 1943 build up would be noticed leading to the German Kursk forces being available for France, defeating a western allied invasion would be well worth some (believed temporary) loss of territory in the east. The world did not have the number LSTs used in Normandy until the end of June 1943, assuming every LST made was serviceable, and sent to Normandy, and it took around another 4 months to train the crews properly anyway. Plus the transport aircraft to put down paratroops or supplies, they were mainly US and in June 1943 the USAAF had around 500 in theatres versus Germany in June 1944 the figure was around 1,650. The USAAF had 1,841 combat aircraft in the UK in June 1943 and 10,637 in June 1944 (with 4,087 combat aircraft in the Mediterranean in June 1943 and 4,867 in June 1944?), with Luftwaffe bomber and fighter forces much more effective than June 1944 before talking about the axis losses in the Mediterranean that could not have happened, greater allied inexperience (1st Army under General Fredendall at Omaha beach anyone?) and so on.

The 6 P-38 groups active in the ETO November 1943 to June 1944 claimed 205.5 victories out of 2,706 claimed by all USAAF fighters

Figuring out Luftwaffe dispositions in the west needs to keep in mind Germany was used to refit units, they were present and could be used but were meant for deployment elsewhere,

E R Hooton, Eagle in Flames
20 January 1943 Luftflotte 3 had 241 on strength, Mitte/Reich 163 on strength, total 404
20 April 1943 Luftflotte 3 had 232 on strength, Mitte/Reich 188 on strength, total 420
20 June 1943 Luftflotte 3 had 353 on strength, Mitte/Reich 343 on strength, total 696
20 September 1943 Luftflotte 3 had 222 on strength, Mitte/Reich 677 on strength, total 899
20 December Luftflotte 3 had 312 on strength, Mitte/Reich 572 on strength, total 884

Luftwaffe Data Book Alfred Price as of 17 May 1943, Mitte strength 299, serviceable 198, Luftflotte 3 192 and 178, total 491 and 376

From Fighter units Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, Zerstörerverbände
Strengths start of month for JG and ZG units in west that date or when unit considered to have moved to west or formed in west.
August to December 1942, 467, 531, 500, 521, 525
January to December 1943, 526, 449, 461, 529, 581, 668, 740, 692, 946, 1192, 1130, 1100
The presence of the 8th Air Force did little to Luftwaffe fighter strength in the west until mid 1943 at the earliest, the twin engine ZG units started to return at the start of August 1943, from 8 in August to 146 in September to 313 in October, just as the USAAF changed to escorting all raids.

 

[Shortround6]

I haven't seen the video.
But.
AHT book says that Lockheed built 1264 P-38s in 1942 It also lists 1479 built in 1942 on another page. (most of the earlier 1940-41 production was not rated for combat) of which 179 out of 186 were flown to England and in Dec 1942 475 had been sent by sea.
All of the P-38s (3 fighter groups) that were in NA in Nov/Dec 1942 had been flown from England (around 1200 miles). This left one under strength group trying to rebuild.
Production of the P-38 in 1942 is listed as
Jan..................116 Some of these are P-322s not sure when production stops
Feb.................127 P-38F with maneuver flap starts.
March............100
April...............100
May................100
Jun..................105 First P-38Gs
July..................170
Aug...................80
Sept................132
Oct..................145
Nov................144
Dec.................160

P-38s were being sent to Alaska in small numbers, being kept on the west coast in early months of 1942, and being sent to the South Pacific.

The Trans-Atlantic flights were done in stages and used 165 gallon tanks. I don't know if the early planes and tanks had the ability to operated at high altitudes using the drop tanks.

NA P-38 operations had a higher than expected loss rate and there was a mad scramble to supply replacement aircraft and pilots from the one remaining fighter group in England as replacements. Jan 1943 sees about 90 P-38s operational in NA. Gen. Arnold orders all P-38s to be sent from England, including updated P-38Es, all reserve aircraft from the 78th fighter group plus aircraft straight from the US.

Is this part of a anti drop tank bomber mafia conspiracy or just a limited supply of P-38s around the world and P-38s, being better than P-39s and Allison P-40s, are in high demand as America's best fighter available at the time.

 

[tomo pauk]

Hear me out.

I'd suggest that we don't do some mad scramble the moment Greg posts a video, even if the title contains the word like 'Bomber mafia' and similar. I know that finding mistakes in his videos is cool here, but still. I managed to find a few of these myself in the earlier videos, but I still do watch his videos, including the one debated here. Yes, Greg does not like when people disagree with him, but people rarely do so.
Is Greg at fault when he points out to some mistakes that AAC/AAF brass did? Was the AAC/AAF brass actually to blame for some mistakes? Nobody had monopoly on mistakes in conducting the ww2 - not AAF, not LW, not RAF, not the Japanese, nor the Italians, nor the Soviets.
Nobody with the rank of General or Admiral was quick to admit his mistakes. Some of them have had their pet projects, and were not amused when these projects were surpassed by either reality of the war or some other project that was better and brought the fruits faster.
Unescorted bomber idea was the norm in the 1930s doctrines, it will take a defeat if not a catastrophe to change stuff around. Things take time to materialize, advice from the Allies nevertheless.

At the end, we have the human beings in the high places. Combination of human beings being prone to make some mistakes, and the high places never being a place to admit mistakes = cost in servicemen lives (and indirectly in civilian lives). See the torpedo scandal, or the turret fighter idea, or the notion that a fighter aircraft does not need armor protection and s-s tanks, or the tanks with riveted armor, or that an aero engine that was good in 1941-42 will still be good in 1944.

 

[Shortround6]

At the end, we have the human beings in the high places. Combination of human beings being prone to make some mistakes, and the high places never being a place to admit mistakes = cost in servicemen lives (and indirectly in civilian lives). See the torpedo scandal, or the turret fighter idea, or the notion that a fighter aircraft does not need armor protection and s-s tanks, or the tanks with riveted armor, or that an aero engine that was good in 1941-42 will still be good in 1944.

People, and groups of people, did make mistakes. I in my own opinion there is a difference between make a 'mistake' and covering it up to avoid criticism and making a 'mistake' or making choices to advance a certain agenda. Sometimes the agenda was not inline with actually winning the war.
Now at what point does a 'mistake' cross the line from simple mistake to willful suppression of technology or tactics in order to further an agenda that should be secondary to winning the war?
Much like the Japanese Army and Navy fighting each other for 'glory' instead of trying to fight the allies together.
Many Allied armed forces were fighting each other for 'dominance' in their own countries as much as they were fighting the enemy, the upstart air forces were starting from further behind and were fighting for funding, prestige, (promotions?) and their own future. The existing Armies and Navies were fighting to maintain their own funding, dominance, prestige.

Given that, at what point do we look at certain actions/decisions made by certain officers/leaders and declare them the result of a 'mafia', a semi secret group trying to control the outcome of the war, campaign for their own benefit? This can be as crass as getting kick backs from war contracts to just expanding their own branch of the service to increase it's influence (budget). For the US it took until 1957 for the first Joint Chief of Staff be an Air Force Officer. Now without the Strategic Air Command and nuclear bombs would that have ever happened? And without the 8th Air Force or the 20th and 21st Air Forces/groups operating against Japan would SAC ever had come into being. British commonwealth members can substitute in Bomber Command.
The pre war Air Forces were concerned with expanding the size/budget/prestige of their own Force at the expense (somewhat fixed defense budgets) of the Army and Navy and the only way they could do that was by claiming they could "win" the war in a different way than a WW I blood bath.

US Torpedo Scandal was bad enough but that was about keeping their own cushy jobs (not getting fired or losing the contracts) not steering policy decisions affected tens of thousands (hundreds?) of men and wide spread policy/procurements that affected many parts of war fighting.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Strength is first line end of month, and was 96 end December 1941, losses are deliveries minus the difference of this and last month's strengths and include dropped to second line, P-38D and E went to restricted class on 22 October 1942. The XP-38A was accepted in December 1942, not included here.

Acceptances to end 1941, 1 XP-38, 13 YP-29, 29 P-38, 36 P-38D, 115 P-38E, 13 P-322, total 207
Deliveries to end 1941, 1 XP-38, 13 YP-29, 29 P-38, 36 P-38D, 11 P-38E, 3 P-322, total 93, yes, less than end December 1941 strength

Month

Strength

Strength

Strength

Strength

Strength

Strength

Accept

Accept

Accept

Accept

Accept

Accept

Deliv.

Deliv.

Deliv.

Deliv.

Deliv.

Loss

Month

CONUS

ETO

MTO

FEAF

Alaska

Total

P-38E

P-322

P-38F

P-38G

P-38J

Total

P-322

P-38E

P-38F

P-38G-1

Total

Loss

Jan-42​

132​

132​

22​

10​

32​

18​

35​

53​

17​

Feb-42​

181​

181​

73​

40​

113​

2​

53​

55​

6​

Mar-42​

309​

309​

80​

80​

100​

22​

122​

-6​

Apr-42​

386​

386​

100​

100​

8​

104​

112​

35​

May-42​

468​

468​

100​

100​

100​

100​

18​

Jun-42​

439​

24​

463​

57​

28​

85​

100​

100​

129​

Jul-42​

580​

80​

21​

681​

120​

50​

170​

120​

3​

50​

173​

32​

Aug-42​

536​

131​

30​

21​

718​

45​

15​

60​

22​

83​

105​

149​

Sep-42​

622​

133​

65​

40​

860​

59​

70​

3​

132​

52​

52​

104​

18​

Oct-42​

636​

184​

72​

45​

937​

46​

99​

145​

65​

73​

138​

124​

Nov-42​

540​

138​

115​

68​

37​

898​

124​

124​

11​

107​

118​

214​

Dec-42​

576​

168​

134​

94​

31​

1,003​

123​

123​

165​

165​

129​

Total

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

95​

130​

527​

509​

3​

1,264​

140​

199​

526​

480​

1,345​

865​

Remembering you need things like 100% reserves if you want to mount a sustained campaign, modifications often needed to be done, there was a training system to equip and it took weeks to months to move an aircraft from the US to the front line, even by ferry operations.

I'd suggest that we don't do some mad scramble the moment Greg posts a video, even if the title contains the word like 'Bomber mafia' and similar.

Then how long should people wait before commenting? Avoiding a pile on/insults is more important that timing.

Yes, Greg does not like when people disagree with him, but people rarely do so.

If, repeat if, Greg is suppressing information that does not fit, then the discussion has to occur somewhere else, there is always a conflict of interest if you control what comments can be made about your work.

Is Greg at fault when he points out to some mistakes that AAC/AAF brass did?

No, any fault comes if say the data does not support the claim of error or the claimed reason why the error occurred.

As part of the debate with Greg discussion I posted data that showed the unescorted 8th Air Force missions were not working quite early and the trends were against the USAAF, the idea 300 strong raids would be the saviour was also wrong, 400+ strength was going to be needed at least, before any 300 strong raids occurred and the Germans were strengthening the defences, but given the small number of raids done it was quite possible to come up with a specific reason why a given raid was an exception, the most obvious one the late take off of the second wave of the August Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid. There were a number of factors involved, the pressures of expansion, the war situation, the peace time decision not to carry external fuel tanks, the initial wartime decision to do so for medium altitude ferry runs, not high altitude combat missions, Republic going with proprietary external tank fittings, the availability of the B-17 in numbers before the P-38 and P-47, the engineering time to solve the problems, the production cost of introducing changes, the numbers of high performance fighters available to the USAAF and decisions on who should have them, beliefs on how vulnerable the German economy was to "key" damage and how destructive bombs would usually be. And others. All the people involved were trying to predict the future, which is the quickest way to look foolish most of the time, being told to make do with what they had and making choices, in the 8th Air Force case, between bombing the key targets or staying within escort range.

I do not know what the Greg definition of Bomber Mafia is, you only need a few people in the room before someone disagrees on at least the details and a few more before someone flatly opposes the idea. Mafia to me implies deliberate knowing error, not genuine belief that turns out to be mostly or totally wrong.

 

[Just Schmidt]

I in my own opinion there is a difference between make a 'mistake' and covering it up to avoid criticism and making a 'mistake' or making choices to advance a certain agenda. Sometimes the agenda was not inline with actually winning the war.

Dear me, I actually manage to agree with both Shortround and Tomo here.

And it's even more convoluted. Sometimes a bad decision leads to a positive result, for all the wrong reasons. And we too, long after, cannot accurately measure all the factors, though we can try to get an infinitismal bit closer.

The failure of the heavy bomber to bomb unescorted and win the war with a few well planned raids, did get dividends. (And yes, I believe the B-17 was a failure in its intended role, while it proved to be very effective still). Die Luftwaffe was forced to weigh down their fighters, as the heavy armament on the bombers prevented them from taking their time while they got really close, in the event making them easier opponents for the escorts when they finally showed up. Germany did not only have to fight the US army air force high at day and the RAF at medium height at night, they had to fight the VVS down low, matching comparatively nimble fighters in contrast to the gunships of the western allies. In that context the armour on the IL-2 may also have pulled in somewhat the same direction. I digress, as it were the heavies of the eight proved efficient in drawing the Luftwaffe up and away.

And still, what do we actually know? It is often said that the crippling of die Luftwaffe was a prerequisite for Overlord. was it? How crippled and how could they be sure, even with Ultra? The insane optimistic invasion of western Europe plans in 1942 (not long after the channel dash) did not call for air superiority, and the landings in Sicily and Italy happened against rather stiff opposition, or at least fair numbers. The numerical superiority could still have supplied good air support over Normandy and challenged German fighters, bombers and attack aircraft. Air superiority could in my opinion have been won rather quick in that way, even though losses on the ground (and sea) probably would have increased.

I'm not saying Overlord was sure to happen anyway, but I would not in the least have been surprised if the humans making the decisions chose to go ahead anyway.

Was the whole strategic bomber idea the most optimal way of spending the resources that went into it, or could they have been used more efficiently. (Ie, was it some kind of mistake?) Was half the number of bombers a better idea, or maybe 50% more? I will probably never be 100% certain, and i bet we will not reach an agreement across the forum either.

I value the differing viewpoints, even when I suspect the word mafia is loaded with more than it can carry. Or that it is a little harsh to call the B-17 crap.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yeah, my objection is to the word "mafia". It implies a conspiracy to push agenda with no regard for the men at the time dying. USAAC was certainly mistaken in not funding DTs, but they did not bar them.

 

[pbehn]

Greg routinely removes facts that prove him wrong, he insults and disparages people who clearly know more than him. He has an aversion to to the written word, preferring his endless vortex of contradictory nonsense that requires many views AKA clicks to get to the bottom of. His madcap bomber mafia theory is based on a homicidal group that were OK with use of fighters, OK with fitting funny shaped fuel tanks in fighters fuselages, front or rear, OK with fitting funny shaped fuel tanks in wings. OK with fighters being disarmed and used for photo recon. OK with Mosquitos being used for long range weather recon in fact anything that improved the efficiency of a bombing raid is OK with "Greg" EXCEPT fitting of external metal streamlined droppable tanks. Gregs methods for increasing his revenue and clicks were an education to me. If the charlatan wasnt making money at it he would obviously be severely mentally ill, but in war time what he does would have had him charged with treason, like that other BERK Caliban Rising, who did change one of his disgusting titles, probably for his own safety. Having seen Greg at work I no longer watch any Youtube crap because that's what it is. Happily in a few years time it will go and Greg will be in the "I remember seeing on the net" type of history that you know as soon as you see "bomber mafia" in any discussion anywhere.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Having seen Greg at work I no longer watch any Youtube crap because that's what it is. Happily in a few years time it will go and Greg will be in thee "I remember seeing on the net" type of history that you know as soon as you see "bomber mafia" in any discussion anywhere.

There are good Youtube channels that, while not perfect, have errors that are usually corrected rather than bald mistruths uttered by someone who should know better.

 

[GrauGeist]

Greg is about as accurate as those "history" sites on Facebook...

 

[wuzak]

There are good Youtube channels that, while not perfect, have errors that are usually corrected rather than bald mistruths uttered by someone who should know better.

And are receptive to constructive criticism and corrections from the comments.

 

[pbehn]

There are good Youtube channels that, while not perfect, have errors that are usually corrected rather than bald mistruths uttered by someone who should know better.

I cant be assed trawling and since it is almost always "Greg" that gets his BS promoted here, obviously the BS route to wealth and fame works best.

 

[GrauGeist]

I wouldn't actually sat that he's being promoted here (as well as a few other forums) when his bullshit is scrutinized and peeled apart with hard facts backed by solid sources.

I know that he's a hero at such places as warthunder and Reddit, but that isn't saying much.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I cant be assed trawling and since it is almost always "Greg" that gets his BS promoted here, obviously the BS route to wealth and fame works best.

I prefer to not throw out the baby with the bathwater. YMMV.