I have difficulty believing hostile enemy aircraft entered UK airspace and were ignored by the RAF, I've certainly not seen any written evidence of this.
I'll try to find something, but RAF controllers were under orders to ignore the fighters where possible and go for the bombers. Of course this frequently wasn't possible.
Do you have any figures to support your claim that the Luftwaffe enjoyed a higher kill ratio over London than over their previous stategy? The RAF had finally got their Big Wing act together and were starting to hit bomber streams very effectively.
ER Hooton, Eagle in Flames, details losses on a weekly basis. The weeks don't fit the phases exactly, but the trend is clear:
Main phase, 5th August - 1st Sept
Luftwaffe Bombers
Sorties 3850
Losses 303
Loss rate 7.9%
Luftwaffe Fighters
sorties 12,450
losses 359
loss rate 2.9%
Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 3.2
raf fighter losses 367
total luftwaffe/raf rate 1.8:1
Attack on London, 2nd Sept - 29th Sept
Luftwaffe Bombers
Sorties 4125
Losses 192
Loss rate 4.7%
Luftwaffe Fighters
sorties 8450
losses 280
loss rate 3.3%
Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 2
raf fighter losses 363
total luftwaffe/raf rate 1.3:1
So the loss rate went from 1.8 Luftwaffe aircraft lost per RAF fighter in August to 1.3 in September. I think that's more down to the change in tactics. I suspect the Luftwaffe found it easier to defend a few large bomber formations than lots of little ones.
Gruenhagen's sources included complete disclosure and support from NAA as well as extensive interviews with Ed Schmeud and Ed Hockley.
Show me better references and we can talk?
I think we are talking at cross purposes here. I am not disputing the figures.
NAA cost to produce the Mustang was $26,741. Profit and government furnished equipment raised the price to $58,698 in 1942.
"In October 1941, 12,000 hours were required to assemble each Mustang.
That reinforces the point I am trying to make. NAA took 12,000 hours to make a Mustang, which included fitting, but not making, some key parts (probably including the engine).
12,000 hours is the time NAA required to make the plane. That does not include the time required to make the "government furnished equipment". That was provided separately. It's included in the cost, but not the man hours.
Mass Production techniques reduced the price to $50,985 by 1945
At the time of assembly of the last Mustang in August 1845 production techniques had reduced this figure to 2,077.
Can't you see the disparity there? 12,000 hours cost $59,000 in 1942. 2,000 hours cost $51,000 in 1945.
The answer is probably that NAA's man hours reduced because they subcontracted more work.
Just as an example, suppose the wings took 2000 man hours to make in 1942. In 1943 NAA subcontract the manufacture of the wings to another company. Complete wings are delivered to NAA. NAA's hours would go down by $2000, but the cost would not go down much because the sub contractor has to be paid.
I'm not saying the P-51 wings were made by a subcontractor, but such things weren't uncommon. This about the NAA plant building B-25s in Kansas City:
The Fairfax plant was designed as an assembly center for some one thousand subcontractors supplying parts. For instance, the gas tanks came from a Detroit producer, Fisher Body of Detroit built cowlings and bomb racks, and Fisher Body of Memphis produced the wings, stabilizers, and bomb bay doors. Because of the lack of available skilled workers, the plant followed a job simplification procedure whereby each worker performed one simple task that could be taught relatively easily to unskilled farm boys and girls. The 165,000 parts were held together by 150,000 rivets. All the parts were identical, and the final assemblies were identical Mitchell bombers. In 1944, the fantastic production of the North American Aviation plant won the coveted Army-Navy e Award.
Now if you examined NAA's man hours on the Mitchell, they would appear pretty low. If you add in Fisher Body and all the other sub contractors, the total would be much higher.
Just to sum up, I am not disputing the price of the P-51. I am not disputing how many man hours NAA required to build one. I am pointing out that unless you know how many man hours were required IN TOTAL, by not just NAA but Packard, the company that made the guns, the company that made the radio, etc, you don't know the TOTAL man hours required to make the plane.
And if you compare NAA's hours to Supermarine's, you have to be sure Supermarine were doing exactly the same amount of sub contracting, otherwise you do not have an accurate basis for comparison.