How about a little flip-flop

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

I have difficulty believing hostile enemy aircraft entered UK airspace and were ignored by the RAF, I've certainly not seen any written evidence of this.

I'll try to find something, but RAF controllers were under orders to ignore the fighters where possible and go for the bombers. Of course this frequently wasn't possible.

Do you have any figures to support your claim that the Luftwaffe enjoyed a higher kill ratio over London than over their previous stategy? The RAF had finally got their Big Wing act together and were starting to hit bomber streams very effectively.

ER Hooton, Eagle in Flames, details losses on a weekly basis. The weeks don't fit the phases exactly, but the trend is clear:

Main phase, 5th August - 1st Sept
Luftwaffe Bombers
Sorties 3850
Losses 303
Loss rate 7.9%

Luftwaffe Fighters
sorties 12,450
losses 359
loss rate 2.9%

Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 3.2
raf fighter losses 367
total luftwaffe/raf rate 1.8:1

Attack on London, 2nd Sept - 29th Sept
Luftwaffe Bombers
Sorties 4125
Losses 192
Loss rate 4.7%

Luftwaffe Fighters
sorties 8450
losses 280
loss rate 3.3%

Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 2
raf fighter losses 363
total luftwaffe/raf rate 1.3:1

So the loss rate went from 1.8 Luftwaffe aircraft lost per RAF fighter in August to 1.3 in September. I think that's more down to the change in tactics. I suspect the Luftwaffe found it easier to defend a few large bomber formations than lots of little ones.

Gruenhagen's sources included complete disclosure and support from NAA as well as extensive interviews with Ed Schmeud and Ed Hockley.

Show me better references and we can talk?

I think we are talking at cross purposes here. I am not disputing the figures.

NAA cost to produce the Mustang was $26,741. Profit and government furnished equipment raised the price to $58,698 in 1942.

"In October 1941, 12,000 hours were required to assemble each Mustang.

That reinforces the point I am trying to make. NAA took 12,000 hours to make a Mustang, which included fitting, but not making, some key parts (probably including the engine).

12,000 hours is the time NAA required to make the plane. That does not include the time required to make the "government furnished equipment". That was provided separately. It's included in the cost, but not the man hours.

Mass Production techniques reduced the price to $50,985 by 1945
At the time of assembly of the last Mustang in August 1845 production techniques had reduced this figure to 2,077.

Can't you see the disparity there? 12,000 hours cost $59,000 in 1942. 2,000 hours cost $51,000 in 1945.

The answer is probably that NAA's man hours reduced because they subcontracted more work.

Just as an example, suppose the wings took 2000 man hours to make in 1942. In 1943 NAA subcontract the manufacture of the wings to another company. Complete wings are delivered to NAA. NAA's hours would go down by $2000, but the cost would not go down much because the sub contractor has to be paid.

I'm not saying the P-51 wings were made by a subcontractor, but such things weren't uncommon. This about the NAA plant building B-25s in Kansas City:

The Fairfax plant was designed as an assembly center for some one thousand subcontractors supplying parts. For instance, the gas tanks came from a Detroit producer, Fisher Body of Detroit built cowlings and bomb racks, and Fisher Body of Memphis produced the wings, stabilizers, and bomb bay doors. Because of the lack of available skilled workers, the plant followed a job simplification procedure whereby each worker performed one simple task that could be taught relatively easily to unskilled farm boys and girls. The 165,000 parts were held together by 150,000 rivets. All the parts were identical, and the final assemblies were identical Mitchell bombers. In 1944, the fantastic production of the North American Aviation plant won the coveted Army-Navy e Award.

Now if you examined NAA's man hours on the Mitchell, they would appear pretty low. If you add in Fisher Body and all the other sub contractors, the total would be much higher.

Just to sum up, I am not disputing the price of the P-51. I am not disputing how many man hours NAA required to build one. I am pointing out that unless you know how many man hours were required IN TOTAL, by not just NAA but Packard, the company that made the guns, the company that made the radio, etc, you don't know the TOTAL man hours required to make the plane.

And if you compare NAA's hours to Supermarine's, you have to be sure Supermarine were doing exactly the same amount of sub contracting, otherwise you do not have an accurate basis for comparison.
 
DaveBender - There were versions of the P-38 that allowed "pods" to be attached under the wings and fuselage (one was designed to transport a person inside of it, although I don't think they enjoyed the ride). You could install the radar in the fuselage or in a pod, install rockets or cannons in another, extra fuel in another and so on. You could have a squadron of these locate the bomber group with radar, fire a spread of rockets at the close group formation, then go in with cannons.
 
I'll try to find something, but RAF controllers were under orders to ignore the fighters where possible and go for the bombers. Of course this frequently wasn't possible.
There is no doubt that RAF controllers were under orders to ignore fighter only sweeps. This became more difficult when some of the 109 and 110 aircraft started to carry bombs but the basic principle of ignoring fighters is correct



ER Hooton, Eagle in Flames, details losses on a weekly basis. The weeks don't fit the phases exactly, but the trend is clear:

Main phase, 5th August - 1st Sept
Luftwaffe Bombers
Sorties 3850
Losses 303
Loss rate 7.9%

Luftwaffe Fighters
sorties 12,450
losses 359
loss rate 2.9%

Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 3.2
raf fighter losses 367
total luftwaffe/raf rate 1.8:1

Attack on London, 2nd Sept - 29th Sept
Luftwaffe Bombers
Sorties 4125
Losses 192
Loss rate 4.7%

Luftwaffe Fighters
sorties 8450
losses 280
loss rate 3.3%

Fighter sorties per bomber sortie 2
raf fighter losses 363
total luftwaffe/raf rate 1.3:1

So the loss rate went from 1.8 Luftwaffe aircraft lost per RAF fighter in August to 1.3 in September. I think that's more down to the change in tactics. I suspect the Luftwaffe found it easier to defend a few large bomber formations than lots of little ones.

I certainly don't dispute the figures but I believe that a good number of the German bomber sorties in September were night raids against which of course, Fighter Command was basically useless.
This probably goes some way to explaining the fall in loss rates. What I have never been able to find is a breakdown of the split between daylight and night raids/losses. If anyone could give me a pointer it would be appreciated.
 
Very interesting discussion here gents 8) The best aircraft to take away from the USAAF would undoubtedly be the P-51, as the 8th AF would either have to face the losses caused by unescorted raids deep into Germany, or avoid making those raids altogether. I think the latter would have been more likely, as Schwienfurt casualty rates would have been unsustainable in the long term.

On another note, I'm not sure where the idea originates that the Whirlwind would have seen trouble-free development in the absence of the Spitfire. Regardless of whether the Spitfire existed or not,m the Whirlwind would still have suffered the developmental problems that it was plagued by historically, and would not have entered service any sooner or any more successfully. Nor would more resources have been available - I think it is safe to assume that any numerical deficit in Spitfires would have been made up in Hurricanes, meaning production rates for the Merlin would be essentially identical to those seen historically, at least until the Typhoon entered widespread service. Even then, the Hurri would have to soldier on (maybe in 'Mk V' form) until a superior high-altitude fighter was developed. There is also a possibility that in the absence of the Spit, some of the designs proposed by Boulton-Paul (P.94) and Miles (M.20) may have gone into series production to supplement Hurricane numbers. Either way, there would have been little or no extra resource available for the development of the Whirlwind...
 
Those figures are for day bomber sorties only. Hooton splits the sorties and losses up in to day/night for the bombers.

Luftwaffe night bombers
5 Aug - 1 September
sorties 2150
losses 12

2 - 29 Sep
sorties 3650
losses 21
 
On another note, I'm not sure where the idea originates that the Whirlwind would have seen trouble-free development in the absence of the Spitfire. Regardless of whether the Spitfire existed or not,m the Whirlwind would still have suffered the developmental problems that it was plagued by historically, and would not have entered service any sooner or any more successfully
BT
there were more strings to the Whirlwind's woes than developmental, in this alternate time-line it's not hard to imagine the Air Ministry attaching more urgency (funds), the RAF losing their 'single-engine syndrome' and Westlands, faced with a big contract, losing some of their apathy.

Well, put it this way, it's easier for me to imagine the above than it is to imagine Spitfires sweeping in over East Anglia shooting up Hurricanes sat at dispersal :)
 
I think we are talking at cross purposes here. I am not disputing the figures.

12,000 hours is the time NAA required to make the plane. That does not include the time required to make the "government furnished equipment". That was provided separately. It's included in the cost, but not the man hours.

Correct


Can't you see the disparity there? 12,000 hours cost $59,000 in 1942. 2,000 hours cost $51,000 in 1945.

No. I don't have the contracts in hand but I am intimately familiar with airframe costing and pricing - both $59,000 and $51,000 includes profit. It is absolutely possible that NAA was permitted to take a larger profit margin but more likely that the reduction in hours accounted for the reduction in price

The answer is probably that NAA's man hours reduced because they subcontracted more work.

But they didn't subcontract anything on the airframe. They built a new plant in Dallas for the P-51C and the P-51K's but unlike the B-17 and many other airframes, NAA was prime and sole contractor.

Just as an example, suppose the wings took 2000 man hours to make in 1942. In 1943 NAA subcontract the manufacture of the wings to another company. Complete wings are delivered to NAA. NAA's hours would go down by $2000, but the cost would not go down much because the sub contractor has to be paid.

Here is another example - suppose the labor rate was as you speculated - namely an average of ~ $1/hr and the labor burden was reduced by approximately 9000 hours. Do the math?


Just to sum up, I am not disputing the price of the P-51. I am not disputing how many man hours NAA required to build one. I am pointing out that unless you know how many man hours were required IN TOTAL, by not just NAA but Packard, the company that made the guns, the company that made the radio, etc, you don't know the TOTAL man hours required to make the plane.

All GFE cost/price was locked in. All GFE is included in the rollout prices. Gruenhagen's Price figures agree with USAAF acquisition Cost sources presented multiple times on this forum

The source I provided you expresses the numbers as Totals with respect to a.) $26,742 NAA cost in 1942 which included 12,000 hors to build and assemble each Mustang, b.) the $58,698 Price in 1942 with all GFE and NAA product installed and ready to fly, c.) the Price of $50,985 in 1945 and 2,077 hours to build and assemble and install all GFE equipment .

You are free to find a contradictory source to improve your argument and continue a specific dispute based on new facts rather than speculation about Spifire or B-25 sourcing compared to Mustang.


And if you compare NAA's hours to Supermarine's, you have to be sure Supermarine were doing exactly the same amount of sub contracting, otherwise you do not have an accurate basis for comparison.

Once again Hop - I am intimately familiar with past and recent DoD contractor costing and pricing practices for a wide range of DoD primes and subcontractors. I am intimately familiar with DoD 7000.1 and other assorted bibles thrust on the airframe business in the 60's.

I am not comparing the P-51 manufacturing practices or data against any other ship. I will stand by my sources and observations until you enlighten me with new facts.

Important items:
1. No subcontract
2. All GFE equipment was supplied to NAA, inventoried and drawn from inventory as reuired in the assembly stage.
3. The USAAF component of cost were
  • a. NAA complete airframe - fully burdened cost presumably $26, 742 in 1942. No subcontact sub assemblies, no subcontracts.
  • b. GFE - engines, guns, instruments, tires, radios, etc - government cost from supplier (Packard, etc)
  • c. NAA Profit (unknown)
  • d. no pass through subcontact cost for fuselage, tail, wing, etc sub assemblies which USAAF agreed to pay for in lieu of fabrication by NAA
 
The problems with the Whirlwinds engines were not serious but it was placed at a low priority and so never got fixed properly. I have read that even so, the Peregrine of the Whirlwind was less troublesome in service than the Napier Sabre was in its replacement. Given the absence of the Spitfire from this fictional arsenal I can quite easily imagine fixing the Whirlwind getting a higher priority.

also drgndog, I don't think he is disputing the dollar figures at all, but just looking for a way to determing the actual man hours expended in the entire manufacturing process, which those otherwise enlightnening figure do not include. You yanks, all you see is money :)
 
Very interesting discussion here gents 8) The best aircraft to take away from the USAAF would undoubtedly be the P-51, as the 8th AF would either have to face the losses caused by unescorted raids deep into Germany, or avoid making those raids altogether. I think the latter would have been more likely, as Schwienfurt casualty rates would have been unsustainable in the long term.

The P-38 was less effective as an escort but was introduced earlier (and had longer gestation problems). Having said this, the P-38 could have been introduced to 8th FC at the same rate as the Mustang, had equivalent range, etc.

All the P-38s scheduled to convert the P-47 groups would have been available in same or greater numbers as the Mustang before Doolittle elected to 'trade' his P-47s and P-38s to 9th AF in return for Mustangs.

IMO, the P-38 would have suffered more losses to LW and been less effective than the Mustang but it showed its effectiveness when the P-38J-25 was flying for 479th FG as well as 364, 55th and 20th before they converted over to Mustangs


[/ QUOTE]

The 8th BC bomber would have suffered far fewer losses with only P-38 for Target Escort in 1944 than unescorted 8th AF in summer/fall 1943.
 
I am not comparing the P-51 manufacturing practices or data against any other ship.

Then we are in agreement and have been from the start. My whole point is that you cannot compare the simple man hours figures without knowing exactly what is included, and what is excluded.

also drgndog, I don't think he is disputing the dollar figures at all, but just looking for a way to determing the actual man hours expended in the entire manufacturing process, which those otherwise enlightnening figure do not include.

Exactly. I really can't see what drgondog's problem is with what I wrote, which is basically exactly the same thing he is arguing in his last post.
 
Then we are in agreement and have been from the start. My whole point is that you cannot compare the simple man hours figures without knowing exactly what is included, and what is excluded.



Exactly. I really can't see what drgondog's problem is with what I wrote, which is basically exactly the same thing he is arguing in his last post.

I will walk you through my disconnect

Hop>Can't you see the disparity there? 12,000 hours cost $59,000 in 1942. 2,000 hours cost $51,000 in 1945.

Hop - what I said was - the Total cost, labor, GFE, materials, etc cost 59K in 1942 and 51K in 1945.

I did not say that 12000 hours cost $59,000 in 1942 or that 2000 hours cost $51,000 in 1945

So, I did not see any unexplainable 'disparity' or incongruity between the fly away prices of 1942 and 1945 other than good old fashioned manufacturing learning curve to dramatically reduce the Labor hours in three years.

It seemed very reasonable to me that automation, better manufacturing practices and better training and experience for the assembly line personnel could take the cost down.

This is also what I said -

"No. I don't have the contracts in hand but I am intimately familiar with airframe costing and pricing - both $59,000 and $51,000 includes profit. It is absolutely possible that NAA was permitted to take a larger profit margin but more likely that the reduction in hours accounted for the reduction in price


Hop also said >"The answer is probably that NAA's man hours reduced because they subcontracted more work. Just as an example, suppose the wings took 2000 man hours to make in 1942. In 1943 NAA subcontract the manufacture of the wings to another company. Complete wings are delivered to NAA. NAA's hours would go down by $2000, but the cost would not go down much because the sub contractor has to be paid."

And then I said -

"But they didn't subcontract anything on the airframe. They built a new plant in Dallas for the P-51C and the P-51K's but unlike the B-17 and many other airframes, NAA was prime and sole contractor.

Here is another example - suppose the labor rate was as you speculated - namely an average of ~ $1/hr and the labor burden was reduced by approximately 9000 hours. Do the math?"


Waynos then said to the above >also drgndog, I don't think he is disputing the dollar figures at all, but just looking for a way to determing the actual man hours expended in the entire manufacturing process, which those otherwise enlightnening figure do not include. You yanks, all you see is money

I got what he was saying Waynos. What I apparently failed to communicate, multiple times, is that the Labor hours for 1942 and 1945 are documented labor hours to fabricate, build and assemble the entire airframe, add the GFE equipment, perform quality checks and turn the finished Mustang over to the USAAF. All in pure NAA Labor.

The Price to USAAF in 1942 was approximately $8K less in 1945 than 1942.


Where Hop and I did not agree at all was that the NAA figure of 2077 hours in 1945 was based on not accounting for subcontract hours, but in fact subcontracting large portions of the airframe - like the wing - and treating that as a 'finished assembly cost' and reducing the equivalent labor hours from the Total fabrication build up.

As I said before the plausible difference to me in reduced Price to USAAF, is primarily a function of stripping 9900 hours out of the NAA Labor burden per Mustang from 1942 to 1945. It is also possible that NAA took a little more profit on the final fly away Price - but I don't know that.
Back to where Hop and I diverged from common ground

Hop said >I'm not saying the P-51 wings were made by a subcontractor, but such things weren't uncommon. This about the NAA plant building B-25s in Kansas City:

Now if you examined NAA's man hours on the Mitchell, they would appear pretty low. If you add in Fisher Body and all the other sub contractors, the total would be much higher.

Just to sum up, I am not disputing the price of the P-51. I am not disputing how many man hours NAA required to build one. I am pointing out that unless you know how many man hours were required IN TOTAL, by not just NAA but Packard, the company that made the guns, the company that made the radio, etc, you don't know the TOTAL man hours required to make the plane.


You are certainly right about that- and your point is?

Let me sum it up - Just because I cited the Total NAA labor hours, that is what I meant. I explained as well as I could that I was Not including any other costs than for the total airframe, including labor to install all GFE equipment - All In, Total - there are no other labor hours that apply in this discussion. Everything else is GFE and Profit.

But let's be fair.

Do you have an example where any major multi vendor supplied airframe cost build up takes for example a Packard Merlin (or Rolls Royce) engine and rather than simply apply a unit cost of the engine, your example actually dives into the cost build up of that engine through price, to shipping, then to assembly and QA labor and packaging for shipment, to the labor build up to grind valves, forge or cast engine blocks, to the labor to rdeliver all the component parts from different suppliers, all the way to process ore into ingots, extract ore from earth, pay geologists to search for the quarry site, etc?

Then move on to the Gyro and apply the same rigor.

If that what you really meant when you said is the following I must confess I am clueless

>I am pointing out that unless you know how many man hours were required IN TOTAL, by not just NAA but Packard, the company that made the guns, the company that made the radio, etc, you don't know the TOTAL man hours required to make the plane."

If that is what you meant, could you please produce just a single example of a CLI/WBS cost build up that supports your requirement?

I do confess I may have been an airhead to proclaim that the total NAA labor hours to complete a Mustang did not include all the time that Browning or Frigidaire spent producing 50 caliber M3's or Firestone used to produce tires or Bendix used to make radios or Packard used to make the Merlin.. etc.. so I do Not in fact know the total hours required for every process to find, extract, forge, machine, assemble and deliver every GFE component.

But for the life of me why is that important to you in this debate?
 
I got what he was saying Waynos. What I apparently failed to communicate, multiple times, is that the Labor hours for 1942 and 1945 are documented labor hours to fabricate, build and assemble the entire airframe, add the GFE equipment, perform quality checks and turn the finished Mustang over to the USAAF. All in pure NAA Labor.

I never disputed that. All I disputed was that 2,000 hours was sufficient to make a complete aircraft, from scratch, including manufacturing the engine, guns, radios etc.

I was merely pointing out that simply saying the P-51 took 2,000 man hours in 1945 wasn't a basis for comparison without knowing what was included, and excluded, in that total. And that to then compare that to another aircraft, like a Spitfire, would mean you also have to know what was included and excluded in the Spitfire's man hours.

Where Hop and I did not agree at all was that the NAA figure of 2077 hours in 1945 was based on not accounting for subcontract hours, but in fact subcontracting large portions of the airframe - like the wing - and treating that as a 'finished assembly cost' and reducing the equivalent labor hours from the Total fabrication build up.

That's not what I said at all. In fact I said:

I'm not saying the P-51 wings were made by a subcontractor

I was just pointing out that without knowing exactly what was subcontracted you cannot compare 2 different aircraft.

As I said before the plausible difference to me in reduced Price to USAAF, is primarily a function of stripping 9900 hours out of the NAA Labor burden per Mustang from 1942 to 1945.

This is entirely a side issue to me, but the objection I have to this is that I would expect other parts, like guns, engines, radios, instruments etc to become cheaper as well.

If NAA charged $26,000 for 12,000 man hours in 1942, and by 1945 took only 2000 man hours, then I would expect them to reduce their bill by more than $9,000. And even that assumes all the government supplied parts remain at the same price.

Just to sum up, I am not disputing the price of the P-51. I am not disputing how many man hours NAA required to build one. I am pointing out that unless you know how many man hours were required IN TOTAL, by not just NAA but Packard, the company that made the guns, the company that made the radio, etc, you don't know the TOTAL man hours required to make the plane.

You are certainly right about that- and your point is?

That is the point. That's what I said in the first place and you responded with

just the opposite

Let me sum it up - Just because I cited the Total NAA labor hours, that is what I meant.

I think this is perhaps where the confusion is coming from. Your initial post said:

The P-51D labor burden was 2000 hours. Out of curiosity what were the comparable numbers for the Spit and Me 109 in late 1944?

You didn't say NAA, you just gave a figure of 2,000 hours. I responded with:

No idea. But what's included in the hours? The P-51 cost just over $50,000 in 1944. That's an awful lot if 2000 was the total man hours. From memory the average wage in the US was about $1 an hour at the time.

Of course, if the 2,000 hours is only for the airframe, and excludes the engine, guns, radios, tyres etc, then it makes sense.

I still fail to see why you responded to my post with "just the opposite", when you now say the 2,000 hours figure included only NAA's hours, and excluded the time required to produce the engine, guns, radios etc.

I explained as well as I could that I was Not including any other costs than for the total airframe, including labor to install all GFE equipment

You didn't until quite a few posts in to the discussion, which is where the confusion set in. For example your next post was:

Just the opposite -

the $53K/Mustang included all in PRICE to USAAF for airframe and GFE.

Remember the original labor burden for the P-51A was 12,000 hours and mass production techniques plus a fully trained work force took the cost down - but not the Price. The Price includes Direct Labor, Indirect Labor, R&D amortization, Material Costs, Depreciation and profit. A lot more profit on the tail end when labor hours were reduced 10,000 hours per ship. I suspect the Indirect Costs (Engineering/Management/Procurement, etc) were also dramatically reduced on the P-51D in late 1944 as the R&D and large indirect costs were being applied to the P-51H and P-82 at that time.

Again you are not making clear that 12,000 hours excludes "GFE", and I wouldn't even have known what "GFE" stood for anyway.

My next post made that pretty clear:

I don't believe even 12,000 is total man hours for a fully fitted aircraft. The price is simply too high. I suspect it includes a lot of bought in equipment, ie that the price is the final total but the man hours are only those expended by the aircraft manufacturer, and don't include the hours required to make the engine, guns, instruments etc.

But let's be fair.

Do you have an example where any major multi vendor supplied airframe cost build up takes for example a Packard Merlin (or Rolls Royce) engine and rather than simply apply a unit cost of the engine, your example actually dives into the cost build up of that engine through price, to shipping, then to assembly and QA labor and packaging for shipment, to the labor build up to grind valves, forge or cast engine blocks, to the labor to rdeliver all the component parts from different suppliers, all the way to process ore into ingots, extract ore from earth, pay geologists to search for the quarry site, etc?

No. And I think factoring man hours to quarry ore is taking it a bit too far. The British government categorised quarrying, metal industries separately from aircraft and parts production. All workers in the aircraft industry, whether making airframes or engines or guns came under the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

I can see that a government comparison during war time, where labour was subject to government control and direction, could well include total man hours for all the components of the aircraft, whereas a manufacturer's figures might only include their own man hours.

I can also envisage some aircraft manufacturers contracting out the manufacture of internal fuel tanks, and another building them in house. Same for things like ailerons, control columns, landing gear components etc.

I do confess I may have been an airhead to proclaim that the total NAA labor hours to complete a Mustang did not include all the time that Browning or Frigidaire spent producing 50 caliber M3's or Firestone used to produce tires or Bendix used to make radios or Packard used to make the Merlin.. etc.. so I do Not in fact know the total hours required for every process to find, extract, forge, machine, assemble and deliver every GFE component.

Perhaps if you'd said "NAA hours", and NOT said "just the opposite" when I DID say NAA hours, confusion might have been avoided.

But for the life of me why is that important to you in this debate?

It's not. It never was. I merely made the point that without knowing what is included in an aircraft's man hours, you cannot make comparisons between them. You immediately disagreed with that, yet seem to be saying the same thing.
 
1. Spitfire I - 400 miles; Bf109E - 350-450 miles (roughly true of all 109 versions)

Spitfire MK I range is officially (from data sheets) 575 miles, for "still air cruising", including an allowance for warming up and climb to 20,000 feet. Combat range would be about one third to 40% of this: 190-230 miles.

Later Merlin engined marks, with more power, saw the range drop. Mk IX has about 435 miles range in internal fuel. By then they had drop tanks to compensate for the thirsty-er engines. Mk IX with 45 gal drop tank has about 685 miles range, or a combat radius of about 225-275 miles.

More specialised marks, like the Mk VII/VIII had better range due to larger nose tanks and added wing tanks. Internal range was about 660 miles, or 935 miles with a 45 gal drop tank, or 1,180 miles with a 90 gal drop tank. This give a minimum combat radius of about 220-275 miles, and a maximum combat radius of 395-470 miles, although the 90 gal tank was rarely used on combat missions, most were conducted with the 30 or 35 gal tanks, or the less common 50 gal tank, which was developed in 1944.


Personally, I think a Mk VIII Spitfire fitted with 4 Hispano or a Tempest V would of been an exceptional aircraft for bomber interception, but I question whether any of them would of been any better in the role than the two existing single-seater day fighter types the Luftwaffe fielded.

I can't see Germany building large, heavy, long-ranged US type fighters either.Their aircraft don't need the range or endurance, and all that weight is an encumberance if you're trying to get to altitude quickly to get position on bombers and their escorts. The cost alone would sink them.
 
Spitfire MK I range is officially (from data sheets) 575 miles, for "still air cruising", including an allowance for warming up and climb to 20,000 feet. Combat range would be about one third to 40% of this: 190-230 miles.

Personally, I think a Mk VIII Spitfire fitted with 4 Hispano or a Tempest V would of been an exceptional aircraft for bomber interception,

but I question whether any of them would of been any better in the role than the two existing single-seater day fighter types the Luftwaffe fielded
OK
400 miles typical, 610 miles maximum :)

Good choices but at the altitudes you could expect the 8 AF at, I'd be happier in the Spitfire

No, I'd be happier again in the Fw190D
 
OK


Good choices but at the altitudes you could expect the 8 AF at, I'd be happier in the Spitfire

No, I'd be happier again in the Fw190D

At 20k, B-24 altitude, the Fw-190D was slightly inferior to the P-51B and D, about equal in climb but slower, much slower than the P-51B. At 25k, B-17 altitude, the Fw-190D was pretty well outclassed by both the P-51B and D in climb and airspeed. The Bf-109K was a much more formidable aircraft at these altitudes.
 
Hop - it is real simple now that you explain that a British airframe manufacturer must report to the British government that every labor hour must be accounted for and reported on from nuts and bolt assembly in an engine to gear and case assembly on instruments, to installation and assembly of gears in a prop.

I would believe that Rolls Royce would be accountable to the Brit government for the roll up for the Merlin if there were price controls, but once the engine was purchased, say by AVRO, they should not be required to account for those labor hours embedded in the engines that are purchased (by Government or AVRO).

Were the airframe manufacturers liable in any way for mistakes in the labor roll ups made by equipment manufacturers?

What a concept.

It is inconceivable but I believe you and that explains the disconnect.

No US company would EVER have to report or account for the labor hours imbedded in GFE equipment (Packard Merlin, Hamilton Standard, etc) supplied by the US Government (Government Furnished Equipment) or purchased separately from a component manufacturer by NAA. It would be charged to the Contract as 'purchased components' or set aside as a line item for GFE (with no charge to US Government other than labor to install).

An audit system to account for all that detail through multi level/multi vendor bills of materials and labor would cost more labor hours than it took to build an airframe and assemble all the government supplied equipment.

Until large business computers and internal cost accounting processes and controls were applied as a requirement to conduct business with Department of Defense (late 60's/early 70's) that type of accounting for planning, costing and contract % completion was simply impossible... and still not being done very well.
 
I can't see Germany building large, heavy, long-ranged US type fighters either.Their aircraft don't need the range or endurance, and all that weight is an encumberance if you're trying to get to altitude quickly to get position on bombers and their escorts. The cost alone would sink them.

That was thier belief, but it has already been proved wrong by history. If they had fighters with range and endurance, the BoB may have had a much different outcome. Maybe.

This really plays into how ahead of its time the P-38 was. Nothing had the combination of speed and range like it did. I think most of it's teething problems were all related to its advanced technology. In the hands of the Germans, it would have been doing what it was in fact designed to do, take-off, climb hard, and attack bombers. Because of its endurance it could have made many passes if the attack commenced over target. Or because of its endurance, it could have met the bomber stream over the channel and made the allied fighter cover have even less escort range. ( much like an aggressive baseball pitcher that meets the batter half way to home plate for the fight )
And a big heavy fighter it was, but wasn't the Me110? I could see the "German" P- 38 have 2 cannons and 2 guns in the nose, and twin Daimler Benz engines.
 
At 20k, B-24 altitude, the Fw-190D was slightly inferior to the P-51B and D, about equal in climb but slower, much slower than the P-51B. At 25k, B-17 altitude, the Fw-190D was pretty well outclassed by both the P-51B and D in climb and airspeed. The Bf-109K was a much more formidable aircraft at these altitudes.
Slightly inferior in what respect?
The speed differential wasn't nearly enough to be called decisive and doesn't take into account the rest of the Dora's box of tricks. ETO P-51 pilots are pretty unanimous in their estimate of the Fw190D - they regarded it as a dangerous opponent.

That said, you took my comment slightly out of context. I can't remember who but he stated (in the posts above) that with the Spitfire Mk VIII and the Tempest V you'd have two good fighters but wondered if they were enough to replace the two Luftwaffe mainstays; my response was directly to that post - no, I don't believe they would be and actually I'd rather have the Dora over the Spitfire in such circumstances.

I share your regard for the Bf109K, the K-4 was the only one to see serious production and the MK103 and 108-armed versions were let down substantially by jamming issues.
 
three little observations

"Pg 138
"In October 1941, 12,000 hours were required to assemble each Mustang. At the time of assembly of the last Mustang in August 1845 production techniques had reduced this figure to 2,077"

assembly is not build

what's is source for operating altitude for B-24 and B-17?

what's source of 109E range?
 
Can I ask what make you think that the Germans would have sorted the P-38 issues more effectively than the USA? The US threw a lot of resources into resolving the issues and I cannot see how the Germans or anyone else would have done the job any quicker.

Lets not forget that the Germans had extensive R&D capabilities during the war. After all, they invented rocket propulsion and jet propulsion, while inventing stehlhegrantes (stick grenades/potato mashers) and SMGs. The German Werhmact and Luftwaffe were both technologcly advanced ( like the modern US military). They would have been able to design, build, and field a more potent version of the P-38 (or any other Allied plane for that matter!)

I personally think that the P-47 with 108's would pose a serious threat to Allied daylight bombing. The P-38 would have mopped up the remains that the P-47 missed
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back