How America Leaped Into WW2 After Pearl Harbor...(or did we?)

[OldGeezer]

I was reading the minutes of Air Staff meetings today, and the one from December 17th 1941, just 10 days after Pearl Harbor, really struck me. I've always been given the impression that the reaction to that attack was sudden and firm, yet in that meeting General Spaatz himself brought up this: "Item 10. Question of Christmas leave for [a] few days." I mean, this was even a thing that USAAC people were asking about, or expecting? Spaatz's answer surprised me even more: "All right if we can get hold of them" presumably in case they were needed back, in case, oh, I don't know, something important happened? There are all sorts of other little surprises in those Staff Meeting notes, like instead of jumping in as the Arsenal Of Democracy, America in fact was short on just about everything. "British at Cairo can give us 6 tons of ammunition, half to go on B-24 and arrangements to be made for carrying the other half." Or "Colonel Sorensen to check on practicality of using 15 inch shells for bombs. Also to convert British shells to bombs."

There are some interesting tidbits about specific aircraft as well. Again, General Spaatz:, 12/19/41 "Importance of Dive Bombers was stressed. Must develop and conduct research on possibility of converting light bombers of the 54 and 84 group programs into dive bombers. Also investigation of the practicability of using light bombers as night pursuit... Also taking into consideration attaching a light weight bomb on the P-40's and other pursuit for converting them into dive bombers." They'd have to be very shallow dives in order for the falling bombs to be sure of clearing the propellers. Speaking of P-40s, the same meeting said this: "There are no objections to sending P-39's to X to replace an equal number of P-40's as the P-40's are said to be inferior to certain new types of Jap[anese] pursuit ships." Interesting that they obviously considered P-39 to be a more competitive fighter than P-40. And "X" crops up throughout these meetings as some sensitive place, but since these notes were originally classified Secret, and apparently it was still necessary to be circumspect at that level, it's intriguing.

One last example, from the 12/29/41 meeting: "General Weaver reported that the guns made by Frigidaire will not shoot. He has informed General Arnold of this condition." Wonder what that was all about?

 

[SaparotRob]

Great post! Allow me to encourage you to contribute more on these mind boggling minutes.

 

[BobB]

I was reading the minutes of Air Staff meetings today, and the one from December 17th 1941, just 10 days after Pearl Harbor, really struck me. I've always been given the impression that the reaction to that attack was sudden and firm, yet in that meeting General Spaatz himself brought up this: "Item 10. Question of Christmas leave for [a] few days." I mean, this was even a thing that USAAC people were asking about, or expecting? Spaatz's answer surprised me even more: "All right if we can get hold of them" presumably in case they were needed back, in case, oh, I don't know, something important happened? There are all sorts of other little surprises in those Staff Meeting notes, like instead of jumping in as the Arsenal Of Democracy, America in fact was short on just about everything. "British at Cairo can give us 6 tons of ammunition, half to go on B-24 and arrangements to be made for carrying the other half." Or "Colonel Sorensen to check on practicality of using 15 inch shells for bombs. Also to convert British shells to bombs."

There are some interesting tidbits about specific aircraft as well. Again, General Spaatz:, 12/19/41 "Importance of Dive Bombers was stressed. Must develop and conduct research on possibility of converting light bombers of the 54 and 84 group programs into dive bombers. Also investigation of the practicability of using light bombers as night pursuit... Also taking into consideration attaching a light weight bomb on the P-40's and other pursuit for converting them into dive bombers." They'd have to be very shallow dives in order for the falling bombs to be sure of clearing the propellers. Speaking of P-40s, the same meeting said this: "There are no objections to sending P-39's to X to replace an equal number of P-40's as the P-40's are said to be inferior to certain new types of Jap[anese] pursuit ships." Interesting that they obviously considered P-39 to be a more competitive fighter than P-40. And "X" crops up throughout these meetings as some sensitive place, but since these notes were originally classified Secret, and apparently it was still necessary to be circumspect at that level, it's intriguing.

One last example, from the 12/29/41 meeting: "General Weaver reported that the guns made by Frigidaire will not shoot. He has informed General Arnold of this condition." Wonder what that was all about?

Frigidaire was contracted to build AN/M2 machine guns in June 1941. They made 500 design changes to reduce cost to 25% of original cost. So a few minor problems like not being able to shoot might pop up.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Bear in mind that at the time American arms manufacturers were backlogged not only with American orders but British orders as well. Production got sucked up into contracts as fast as it rolled off the lines, so having to borrow bombs from the Brits doesn't seem unlikely.

 

[buffnut453]

Why would personnel in the air staff not get leave? It was abundantly clear that this would not be a short war. Front-line personnel were granted leave, so why not those in rear echelons?

Bear in mind that it took quite a while for the US steamroller to start moving. The first B-17s didn't get to the UK until July 1942. Given the pace of communication and the air staff's role, letting folk take leave "for a few days" in December 1941 makes perfect sense.

 

[EwenS]

Why would personnel in the air staff not get leave? It was abundantly clear that this would not be a short war. Front-line personnel were granted leave, so why not those in rear echelons?

Bear in mind that it took quite a while for the US steamroller to start moving. The first B-17s didn't get to the UK until July 1942. Given the pace of communication and the air staff's role, letting folk take leave "for a few days" in December 1941 makes perfect sense.

The first B-17s for the RAF arrived in 1941. 20 B-17C as Fortress I which flew their first sorties in the high altitude bombing role on 8 July 1941. The type proved to be less than successful both in operations from Britain and in the Middle East. 7 survivors went to Coastal Command from Jan 1942 to assist crew training for later models in 220 and later 206 squadrons. Some operational sorties were flown with these by 220 squadron between 26th April and mid/late July 1942

United Air Lines received a Letter of Intent from USAAF Air Material Command on 24 Jan 1942 for its Cheyenne Modification Centre to modify 30 B-17E aircraft as Fortress IIA for the RAF. Subsequently the number was increased to 53 then 61 or 62 before the USAAF repossessed some (IIRC some of those turned up in the South Pacific). The first of an eventual 45 Fortress IIA was delivered to the RAF at Dorval, Canada on 19 March 1942, arriving at Prestwick, Scotland on 1st April for Coastal Command modifications.

220 squadron began to re-equip with the Fortress IIA in July 1942, flying its first operational sortie on the 24th.

206 squadron collected its first Fortress IIA on 20th July 1942, beginning conversion on 1 Aug and flying its first operational sortie on 19th Sept 1942.

 

[buffnut453]

The first B-17s for the RAF arrived in 1941. 20 B-17C as Fortress I which flew their first sorties in the high altitude bombing role on 8 July 1941. The type proved to be less than successful both in operations from Britain and in the Middle East. 7 survivors went to Coastal Command from Jan 1942 to assist crew training for later models in 220 and later 206 squadrons. Some operational sorties were flown with these by 220 squadron between 26th April and mid/late July 1942

United Air Lines received a Letter of Intent from USAAF Air Material Command on 24 Jan 1942 for its Cheyenne Modification Centre to modify 30 B-17E aircraft as Fortress IIA for the RAF. Subsequently the number was increased to 53 then 61 or 62 before the USAAF repossessed some (IIRC some of those turned up in the South Pacific). The first of an eventual 45 Fortress IIA was delivered to the RAF at Dorval, Canada on 19 March 1942, arriving at Prestwick, Scotland on 1st April for Coastal Command modifications.

220 squadron began to re-equip with the Fortress IIA in July 1942, flying its first operational sortie on the 24th.

206 squadron collected its first Fortress IIA on 20th July 1942, beginning conversion on 1 Aug and flying its first operational sortie on 19th Sept 1942.

I wasn't considering RAF use of the B-17 because the OP was about US entry into WW2 and the USAAF air staff taking leave in Dec 1941. My point was that the USAAF didn't get B-17s into the UK until July 1942 and so, while there absolutely was a war going on, it took a while for the US to spool up and deploy forces.

 

[EwenS]

I was reading the minutes of Air Staff meetings today, and the one from December 17th 1941, just 10 days after Pearl Harbor, really struck me. I've always been given the impression that the reaction to that attack was sudden and firm, yet in that meeting General Spaatz himself brought up this: "Item 10. Question of Christmas leave for [a] few days." I mean, this was even a thing that USAAC people were asking about, or expecting? Spaatz's answer surprised me even more: "All right if we can get hold of them" presumably in case they were needed back, in case, oh, I don't know, something important happened? There are all sorts of other little surprises in those Staff Meeting notes, like instead of jumping in as the Arsenal Of Democracy, America in fact was short on just about everything. "British at Cairo can give us 6 tons of ammunition, half to go on B-24 and arrangements to be made for carrying the other half." Or "Colonel Sorensen to check on practicality of using 15 inch shells for bombs. Also to convert British shells to bombs."

There are some interesting tidbits about specific aircraft as well. Again, General Spaatz:, 12/19/41 "Importance of Dive Bombers was stressed. Must develop and conduct research on possibility of converting light bombers of the 54 and 84 group programs into dive bombers. Also investigation of the practicability of using light bombers as night pursuit... Also taking into consideration attaching a light weight bomb on the P-40's and other pursuit for converting them into dive bombers." They'd have to be very shallow dives in order for the falling bombs to be sure of clearing the propellers. Speaking of P-40s, the same meeting said this: "There are no objections to sending P-39's to X to replace an equal number of P-40's as the P-40's are said to be inferior to certain new types of Jap[anese] pursuit ships." Interesting that they obviously considered P-39 to be a more competitive fighter than P-40. And "X" crops up throughout these meetings as some sensitive place, but since these notes were originally classified Secret, and apparently it was still necessary to be circumspect at that level, it's intriguing.

One last example, from the 12/29/41 meeting: "General Weaver reported that the guns made by Frigidaire will not shoot. He has informed General Arnold of this condition." Wonder what that was all about?

I'm a bit puzzled about why the USAAF would be wanting Britain to convert British shells to bombs as they were already doing the same with US Coast artillery shells. IIRC (can't find the production records just now) that had started in 1941.

600lb AP M62
800lb AP M61
900lb AP M60
1,000lb AP M52/M52A1 (converted from a 12in mortar shell)

Of course the Japanese had successfully used 800kg converted 14in naval shells from B5N2 Kate level bombers at PH.

By mid-Dec the USAAF had acquired 75 LB-30 Liberators from RAF contracts with some of those ending up on Java in early 1942.

 

[OldGeezer]

Great post! Allow me to encourage you to contribute more on these mind boggling minutes.

Here's one, from November 27, 1941: "A-2 get copies of Janes (Navies of the World) to the 20th Squadron at once." That squadron was in the Philippines and it wouldn't be long before it would be in active combat when the war broke out, but it's revealing that the best source of info on ship ID wasn't anything being produced by Army or Navy Intelligence, it was the same Jane's that any interested civilian could buy. In the few months before Pearl Harbor these meetings seemed heavily focused on the Philippines, talking about sending 2 steel mats for landing strips (5,000 ft long each) by ship for example, so clearly they were aware that war was on the horizon. Yet there was also mention of squabbles with the Navy over basing sites as well as roles and missions, among other trivial things. In fact the very next item in that 27 November meeting was "A-3 advise Strahm that the squadron that goes to Iceland will be watched and criticized by the Navy with the idea of getting across the point that this should be a Navy function."

And on the subject of "things I didn't realize" a subsequent item says: "The Ferry Command has requested authority to ferry to England. General Spaatz' opinion is the answer should be 'no' but desires that A-3 study the proposition." We'd been providing aircraft to the UK for some time before this, so how was this still an issue?

Same meeting, "The Russians have asked for 600 DC-3's. Is trying to figure a good way of telling them 'no.' "

And to wrap up, "Major Eagan, just returned from England, reports having accompanied a British bombing mission in which 200 planes participated but only six got over the target and, in his estimation, none of the six did very accurate bombing or hit the target intended. His opinion is that it is inadvisable to combine both functions of bombing and navigation in one individual, and he considers the ineffectiveness of British bombing to be partly the result of their doing this. A-3 and General Spaatz agreed with the idea that the performing of both functions should not be done by one individual, but both agreed that both the bomber and the navigator should be trained in both functions so that in case of casualty to either, the other can carry on both functions." 200 dispatched, only 6 over the target, and all missed the target. Wow! Wonder where the other 194 ended up???

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

I was reading the minutes of Air Staff meetings today, and the one from December 17th 1941,

Where are the copies located?

I think you will find X = USSR.

USAAF Chronology: WEDNESDAY, 1 JULY 1942, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) (8th Air Force): The first B-17, assigned to the 97th Bombardment Group (Heavy) of the BOLERO air movement via the N Atlantic route lands at Prestwick, Scotland. According Dave Osborne 41-9085 Del Boise 359BS/303BG [BN- ] 7/4/42; 97BG Polebrook 1/7/42, first B-17E with 'big tail' to arrive at Prestwick, Scot. UK, 12/5/42; tran 11 CCRC Bovingdon /9/42; 303BG Molesworth 21/9/42; Sal 26/7/45. JARRIN' JENNY

The A-20/P-70 type, including the turbo supercharging attempt for light bomber to night fighter.

US Bomb production according to the USSBS
M62, 2,691 November 1942 to March 1943
M61, 1,532 October 1942 to February 1943
M60, 1,505 October and November 1942
M52, 7,283 March 1942 to June 1943, by month 696, 1,366, 1,980, 0, 0, 898, 0, 46, 0, 1,431, 0, 834, 10, 0, 10, 12
The 1,000 pound Mk 33 started production in October 1942, stopped in August 1943, resumed in June 1944 until July 1945.

 

[OldGeezer]

Where are the copies located?

I think you will find X = USSR.

They're on a reel of microfilm that I got several years ago when doing research for our XP-67 book. I just didn't bother at that time to read all the other stuff on the reel, so now I'm having fun doing that.

The Russians are specifically mentioned in the meeting notes as on 12 November 1941: "Telegram 1884 from Fayonville to General Spalding, signed Steinhardt, pertaining to delivery of aircraft to the Soviet [Union] was discussed. This telegram contained the suggestions of the Soviet and British authorities as to assembly and delivery points and indicated that for political reasons the most favored arrangement was to establish an American assembly point at Basra and deliver the airplanes to the Soviets at Basra or Tehran." This was not long after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. And to digress, I had only just found out about that invasion while researching the subject of the Curtiss pilots and mechanics who were sent covertly to Iran to assemble and test the P-36s or P-40s (contemporary sources aren't clear) that were being sent there, when my wife handed me a small box of old letters and cards that her late father had put together for his stamp collection. The very first one that I pulled out of the box was from a company in Teheran and was stamped "Anglo Soviet Persian Censorship." I was floored at the coincidence!

 

[OldGeezer]

I can't resist sharing this one, still along the lines of how unprepared and ill-equipped we were in certain areas. 2 days after Pearl Harbor, the staff meeting focused on how many airplanes of various types could be scraped together in a hurry. But this: "Equipment: Instructed Col. Mariner that all airplanes must have radios. Must buy them, steal them, beg them, but they must have radios regardless of where or how they are procured and this must be done by December 31st." Or this: "Armament: Colonel Sorensen charged with obtaining of guns. It is realized that some airplanes will be furnished with American guns, some with British guns and some with Russian guns. We must put up with this and obtain uniform guns as soon as possible but guns must be on every airplane by December 31st." Russian guns???

"General Echols instructed to work on all shortages of equipment that will prevent fulfilment of program. Instructed to use substitutes, temporary expedients, or anything else until proper equipment is procured. Each man charged with a project this morning will have oral or a brief report to General Arnold every 48 hours. There is no limitation on funds. Of course, money will not be thrown away but will be used judiciously." That last bit is quite a change from the tone of the meetings before war was declared.

 

[smutny]

We'd been providing aircraft to the UK for some time before this, so how was this still an issue?

We'd get the planes to Canada, Ferry Command got them over the pond.

 

[OldGeezer]

We'd get the planes to Canada, Ferry Command got them over the pond.

That reminds me, I've been meaning to reread Ernest K Gann's "Fate is the Hunter" where he describes his experiences ferrying aircraft among other things. Interestingly, the movie by the same name has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the book, but both are classics of their own types.

 

[OldGeezer]

Here's one for my fellow P-40 fans, from the September 19, 1941 meeting: "One group of P-40E's reported they could not fire because all gadgets in the airplane were connected to the same electrical system and if the guns were used, fuses blew out. Therefore, they disconnected the guns. Materiel has been advised and directed to correct." I thought I'd heard all the stories about teething problems with the E models but this one must have slipped by me. Then there's this for the P-39 gang: "In the demonstration scheduled for the 22nd, the P-39 cannot be used because there are no 37 mm guns and if there were, there is no ammunition. A-4 to look into situation and get some for this demonstration." A separate item: "Something is wrong with the P-39 supercharger. This ship is outclassed, both at high and low altitude, by other ships with less performance. Colonel Myers stated that this had been corrected and corrective measures will be placed in the production line immediately." These comments are apparently in connection with maneuvers that had recently been held, involving both the Army and Navy forces.

 

[fannum]

My Uncle, Robert G. Mills was USNA '42, and they had just finished semester finals when Pearl Harbor was attacked.
They were allowed to go on Christmas leave, but upon return to Annapolis, were handed graduation diplomas and fleet orders.
He was aboard the DD Ralph Talbot for the Guadalcanal Battles in the Slot, and as an engineering officer, he retired as Admiral in charge of the Pearl Harbor facilities.