How do you figure the value of "just being there"?

What I mean by this isn't obvious, so let me explain. We all love to argue about the performance characteristics of this airplane vs that one. When it comes right down to it, a lot of fighter-fighter victories came because of luck. In my view, luck starts with the number of aircraft that you can put into the field of battle. You hear different figures, but usually a majority of pilots shot down say they never saw the plane that shot them. In those cases, just being in a position to surprise your adversary has a value, and that starts with just being there.

So all else being equal, you want to produce more fighters, and of the fighters produced you want to have them available for battle on a consistent basis. My question is - how do you weight these factors, is there a formula that you can use when figuring number fielded vs performance. I recall seeing some figures (but I can't find the source now) which said that against 1945 US fighters, mostly F6F, F4U and F2M, the loss ratios per Japanese fighter type vs the Americans were pretty close among the Japanese fighter types. In other words, the late war Japanese fighters like the N1Ki, the Ki-84 and the J2M were pretty similar to the old A6M Zero. It therefore was not a mistake to keep producing the zero as the IJN's front line fighter in 1945, since the newer, more expensive and more trouble-prone fighters didn't do a whole lot better.

Looking at it from another angle. It is said that the F2M ("wilder") Wildcat actually had a higher kill ratio than the F6F and F4U, but I don't think anybody would argue that the F2M was better than the F6F or F4U on a one-on-one battle. The F2M was good enough "and" just happened to be where a lot of juicy kamikazes were encountered. The FM2 rarely had to face unfriendly anti-aircraft fire or top quality pilots. So the FM2 was "good enough" and that's all the US Navy asked of it. The Navy figured the FM2 would be good enough for second line duty and it was; but how did the Navy know not to rush the F8F or the F7F?

Conslaw said:

What I mean by this isn't obvious, so let me explain. We all love to argue about the performance characteristics of this airplane vs that one. When it comes right down to it, a lot of fighter-fighter victories came because of luck. In my view, luck starts with the number of aircraft that you can put into the field of battle. You hear different figures, but usually a majority of pilots shot down say they never saw the plane that shot them. In those cases, just being in a position to surprise your adversary has a value, and that starts with just being there.

So all else being equal, you want to produce more fighters, and of the fighters produced you want to have them available for battle on a consistent basis. My question is - how do you weight these factors, is there a formula that you can use when figuring number fielded vs performance. I recall seeing some figures (but I can't find the source now) which said that against 1945 US fighters, mostly F6F, F4U and F2M, the loss ratios per Japanese fighter type vs the Americans were pretty close among the Japanese fighter types. In other words, the late war Japanese fighters like the N1Ki, the Ki-84 and the J2M were pretty similar to the old A6M Zero. It therefore was not a mistake to keep producing the zero as the IJN's front line fighter in 1945, since the newer, more expensive and more trouble-prone fighters didn't do a whole lot better.

Looking at it from another angle. It is said that the F2M ("wilder") Wildcat actually had a higher kill ratio than the F6F and F4U, but I don't think anybody would argue that the F2M was better than the F6F or F4U on a one-on-one battle. The F2M was good enough "and" just happened to be where a lot of juicy kamikazes were encountered. The FM2 rarely had to face unfriendly anti-aircraft fire or top quality pilots. So the FM2 was "good enough" and that's all the US Navy asked of it. The Navy figured the FM2 would be good enough for second line duty and it was; but how did the Navy know not to rush the F8F or the F7F?

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Numbers of aircraft are important but I feel more so is the training the pilots receive. The seasoned and well trained pilot will get the most out of any aircraft. Being in the wrong place at the wrong time is a given.

Conslaw said:

What I mean by this isn't obvious, so let me explain. We all love to argue about the performance characteristics of this airplane vs that one. When it comes right down to it, a lot of fighter-fighter victories came because of luck. In my view, luck starts with the number of aircraft that you can put into the field of battle. You hear different figures, but usually a majority of pilots shot down say they never saw the plane that shot them. In those cases, just being in a position to surprise your adversary has a value, and that starts with just being there.

So all else being equal, you want to produce more fighters, and of the fighters produced you want to have them available for battle on a consistent basis. My question is - how do you weight these factors, is there a formula that you can use when figuring number fielded vs performance. I recall seeing some figures (but I can't find the source now) which said that against 1945 US fighters, mostly F6F, F4U and F2M, the loss ratios per Japanese fighter type vs the Americans were pretty close among the Japanese fighter types. In other words, the late war Japanese fighters like the N1Ki, the Ki-84 and the J2M were pretty similar to the old A6M Zero. It therefore was not a mistake to keep producing the zero as the IJN's front line fighter in 1945, since the newer, more expensive and more trouble-prone fighters didn't do a whole lot better.

Looking at it from another angle. It is said that the F2M ("wilder") Wildcat actually had a higher kill ratio than the F6F and F4U, but I don't think anybody would argue that the F2M was better than the F6F or F4U on a one-on-one battle. The F2M was good enough "and" just happened to be where a lot of juicy kamikazes were encountered. The FM2 rarely had to face unfriendly anti-aircraft fire or top quality pilots. So the FM2 was "good enough" and that's all the US Navy asked of it. The Navy figured the FM2 would be good enough for second line duty and it was; but how did the Navy know not to rush the F8F or the F7F?

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A good example is the British in the Bob. A major advantage of the Spitfire was not that it shot down more German planes, but that pilots in Spitfires had a better survival rate (lasted longer even if only a week?) than pilots in Hurricanes. If (when) bounced they had more performance to help evade/escape. Once they were no longer being shot at they had more ability to get back in the fight (more speed if displaced horizontally from the fight) and better climb if displaced vertically.
Spitfires could also evade/escape by doing a climbing turn which the Hurricane could not. This could end with the Spitfire at an advantage height wise once disengagement was complete. Not meant as a Spitfire vs Hurricane argument, just pointing out advantage of better plane.
For the Japanese, with their woefully inadequate training program, better performing aircraft could provide the same function, allow new/green pilots to survive a least a few more missions before being shot down. And perhaps take a few allied aircraft down before they were lost.
More Zeros with green (and not even adequately trained pilots let alone combat experience) might have just swung the numbers even further in the allies favor.

For the Americans, not rushing the F8F and F7F wasn't quite a question of figuring the FM-2 could do the job but that since they also had plenty of F6Fs and Corsairs (and they did fly both off of escort carriers) the need wasn't really pressing and they might as well make sure the first production aircraft were up to snuff rather than try some half-assed hack job like sticking a B-26 bomber engine in the first hundred or so F8Fs just to get "something" in the air.
Production of the C series engine didn't hit triple digits until May of 1944 and most of those went into the P-47M and N.
The C series engine required less cooling airflow through the cowl so substituting the older engine wasn't just a matter of putting up with a bit less power.

The F6F was on the full-size carriers facing the main Naval Air Forces of what Japan had left. The FM-2 was on "Jeep Carriers" facing the dregs of what the main U.S. Navy Task Forces bypassed and left for mop-up. So, the FM-2 was facing opposition that was hardly ever Japan's first line of defense, and they probably hadn't been resupplied anytime in the recent past, either, in large part. Yes, it faced some fighters, but mostly not the best guys Japan had nor the best airplanes.

Also, the FM-2 was of the Wildcat family and should properly be ranked with Wildcats when figuring ratios. Name ANY other U.S. fighter of either service that was broken out by sub-type for victory ratios. You can't, and there is a reason for that ... a P-38 is a P-38, a P-51 is a P-51, and an F6F is an F6F. The only reason the FM-2 was broken out was publicity value. Otherwise, it did very well because it was only facing mop-up bypassed points of resistance that were not going to put up a first-class fight.

It says nothing about the FM-2 pilots or even the FM-2. All it says is the assigned mission wasn't getting stiff resistance from the bypassed units of the Japanese expansion. The FM-2 pilots did what was asked of them, as did the FM-2. The enemy defenders did what they could with what they had left.

Meanwhile, the F6F kicked butt against the best of the remaining Japanese Naval and Army Air Forces, and wasn't called the "Ace Maker" for nothing. It had a huge wing area and turned VERY WELL, had very good acceleration, adequate armament, and was easy to fly, even in the pattern around the carrier. The F6F handily outperformed the F4U in combat statistics, and that could also be largely due to the timing of the assigned mission and areas of operation. Though they came out within a month of each other, the F4U was assigned to Marine land-based units until the British Navy embarrassed us by approving the Corsair for Naval deployment before we did. The F6F was in Naval service as soon as they could get it there.

When it got into Naval combat, the F4U did well, but it got there late, after the Hellcat had already clawed through a lot of the remaining opposition.

A LOT of combat success depends upon who gets assigned to do what and when. If you never get to fly against the enemy's best Ace, you never shoot him down ... but you also never even get the chance to try it. The glory goes to the service, people, and equipment assigned to do a difficult task, and who actually get it done.

So, I'd say being there gives the opportunity to succeed or fail. Not being there means you never get the chance. In my view, being there accounts for almost all of the actual combat success or failure. Successful operations get credit for success and unsuccessful operations often get dissected so blame can be apportioned, but it largely falls on leadership, even if the unit faces a hugely larger opposing force.

We expect success, expect our commanders to be sharp, and expect enemy commanders to be less-smart than we are. Sometimes it isn't the case, and sometimes there is plain old bad luck involved. Some wins come by plain old good luck ... like when our scout planes find them first as opposed to the other way. Hopefully, the luck part evens out, usually by effort expended in being prepared for unexpected but possible events. If they CAN do it, then they MIGHT. Plan for it.

But ... if you aren't there because you are assigned somewhere else, you don't have a chance at all.