Plus the fact from what I recall those Intelligence reports were as often discounted than they were heeded. Thach might've been a smart cookie because he's the one in the seat, but it's really not the same thing as the DoD/USNHQ issuing general pilot familiarisation with Zero fighting techniques. It's much more like getting orders to go up, but before you jump in the cockpit some of you get together and say, right boys, bugger the brass, what we're going to do is this...
So in terms of having things nicely printed in classified debriefings I'm sure the comparative testing of a captured model helped standardise the Thach Weave among other tactics among pilots.
Chenault's personal tactics (Oscars and Nates are still highly manoeuvrable and dangerous), was to either boom and zoom or dive and extend, using superior dive speed of the Warhawk, the brilliance in this is the Warhawk has a lot more power under 5000ft (more with ram air) than any of the Japanese fighters (evens out at 8-12,000 but, so get them low if you can't boom and zoom).
Still another popular tactic devised, or should I say discovered at Guadal was shooting down flight leaders threw the entire enemy squadron into such disarray that they no longer functioned as a coherent unit, but broke into highly stressed individuals. I'm guessing the US pilots picked this up during the large suicidal charges against Henderson, stopped in their tracks by little more than pack howitzers, MGs, hand to hand and guts. One thing noted was that once the command group which often led the charge was killed, all the other junior officers simply continued to lead their men to the slaughter showing no tactical initiative whatsoever, and it really turned into a slaughter.
At length documentaries have examined the Japanese military culture (including Japanese vet interviews) correlating the contention that indeed, military training for the Japanese was so brutal and dehumanising, yet the command structure at the mid level so unbelievably insubordinate, and the battleplans at the very top so ridiculously complicated, that you wind up with very few people among thousands which are capable of displaying any tactical initiative whatsoever, and those few are incapable of following through on the overcomplicated battleplans under fire anyway, they consistently disobeyed orders, the Colonel who led the charge that cost something like 8000 against Henderson was ordered not to frontally attack, but he thought the order cowardly. At Midway the assault force was ordered to cover the carriers and it retreated, at Leyte with Taffy Group (the destroyers and destroyer-escorts that took on the Japanese battleline and forced a retreat), again disobeying direct orders which at the very least would've made far more bloody and brutal conclusions. The Japanese mid level commanders fought the whole Pacific war like you could just concede the field of battle and return to fight it out again in a month after a rest and refit and a cup of tea, like the colonial powers in WW1. Just like them it's as if armed with modern weapons, without any idea of how to conduct modern warfare.
And this military culture was most extreme within the IJN AF (the élite of the élite, so also with the highest training attrition, lowest recruitment, and greatest doctrinal dehumanisation).
The tactic of taking down the flight leaders to break up Japanese squadrons and then using teamwork like the Thach Weave or any other kind of real teamwork immediately gives advantage because you're doing something the Japanese could no longer do, given their training conditions, which is function as a coherent flight unit and use teamwork at all times. They didn't do that once you shot the leader down. This was used at Wake and the series Dogfights claims that it became doctrinal US fighter tactics by the late war, something widely noted.
Now...I don't think the flight evaluation of any Zeros really helped all that much in terms of discovering things like they've no armouring, pilots already knew if you hit near the wing roots they flamed every time and often with a rather large explosion and breakup midair. Anyway by 44 any new Zeros delivered had the same armouring the JAAF had been using for two years.
But it did result directly in the improvement of tracer type rounds for USN fighters specifically designed to flame Japanese aircraft fuel tanks. By that stage they'd figured out pretty much any Japanese aircraft flames very easily if hit right. Now they flamed even if you hit them wrong.
But I would certainly suggest that such official flight testing standardised effective tactics against aircraft like the Zero doctrinally, which it wasn't before. It was just pilot initiative. US military training might be dehumanising for infantry coherency, but fighter jocks are a very different case. Not so for the Japanese. This was one of the biggest single factors that worked against the Zero in practise.