syscom3
Pacific Historian
I received this in an e-mail today. I know some of you might have some opinions on this subject.
© Anthony G Williams
Originally published in 'Warship World' magazine,
Spring 1990
In the past few years a great deal of information has
been published about battleships and their design;
probably more than for any other type of warship. In
the process the post-WW1 vessels of the Royal Navy
have been criticised in comparison with contemporary
foreign ships, a criticism all the more pointed
because of the unquestioned superiority of the RN's
battleships in the Great War. It is perhaps time to
take a brief look at these arguments and their
validity.
The two classes we are referring to are of course the
l6in. gunned Rodney and Nelson and the five l4in.
gunned vessels of the King George V class. The
argument goes that the l6in. ships, with their 23 knot
speed, were too slow to be effective in WW2 when
battleships were required to operate with fast
aircraft carriers. Furthermore, X turret, tucked away
behind and below B turret, was of limited use as it
could only fire on or close to the beam. It is
therefore suggested that these ships would have been
far more useful if X turret had been deleted and the
weight and space saved used to provide more powerful
machinery for higher speeds.
The KGVs, on the other hand, were (just about)
adequately fast at around 28 knots but are criticised
both for lack of gun power (as every other nation
building battleships at the time went for at least
l5in. calibre) and for the reliability of the main
armament. The almost complete breakdown of the Prince
of Wales' fire in the action against the Bismarck is
notorious; perhaps less well known were the similar if
less severe problems suffered by the King George V in
the second action against the Bismarck, and the Duke
of York when she sank the Scharnhorst; that is, in
every action against enemy capital ships.
The Nelson and Rodney
The exercise of hindsight is of course all too easy.
Military history is probably more vulnerable to wisdom
after the event than most affairs of men, presumably
because of the huge uncertainties involved in the
planning and execution of warfare. It can therefore
readily be conceded that the Nelsons would indeed have
been more useful vessels with only six l6in. guns but
the ability to reach 28 knots. However, the criticism
of the designers can only be valid if they might
reasonably have been expected to foresee that.
(Incidentally, I use the term designers rather than
naval architects because many others apart from
architects were involved in determining the parameters
of ship design; it became a very political matter.)
The fact is that the war which the big ships were
called upon to fight in 1939-45 was radically
different to that envisaged when they were designed in
the 1920s. Contemporary paintings imagining their
appearance in warfare show them steaming in line of
battle together with other battleships, firing on the
broadside at an enemy fleet as in the Battle of
Jutland. It has frequently been observed that armed
forces spend each period of peace equipping and
training themselves to win the last war they fought
in. While this may be true in this case, it is hard to
see that the designers could have been expected to
foresee at that time the way that battleships would
actually be employed against enemy capital ships;
singly or in pairs, together with aircraft carriers,
in fast task forces forever pursuing an elusive enemy.
Ironically, the Nelsons turned out to be very well
suited to their most productive employment; that of
shore bombardment.
Perhaps the most curious aspect of these ships was the
relatively light shells specified for the main
armament. These weighed 2048 lb, hardly any more than
the 1920 lb (later 1938 lb) of the l5in. gun. There
would have been little difference in penetration or
destructive power so it hardly seemed worth the bother
and expense of developing a new gun. The only reason
which comes to mind is one of national prestige; the
USA and Japan were building 16in. ships so we had to
have them too. This may seem silly but it is worth
remembering that these capital ships were very much an
_expression of national pride; in modern terminology,
their deterrent effect was more significant than their
actual use.
The King George V Class
Having largely exonerated the Nelsons' designers let
us turn our attention to the KGVs. In the mid 1930s
the long "battleship holiday" was at an end and the
British, Germans, French, Italians, Americans,
Japanese and even the Russians were all planning new
building programmes. The British were very concerned
about the enormous cost involved and were very keen to
keep the size of these new ships down to the minimum
by international agreement. The result was the Second
London Naval Conference, which agreed in 1936 to
limits of 35,000 tons on displacement and l4in. on gun
calibre. Unfortunately there were various escape
clauses (and Japan and Germany weren't involved
anyway) so in the end it was only the British,
desperately keen to make a start and to set a good
example, who adhered to the l4in. limit.
It is worth at this point reviewing briefly some of
the main considerations of the designers. It was
necessary first of all to balance the three main
priorities; armament, protection and speed; all very
demanding of weight and space. Within these choices
lay others. How should the protection be arranged? How
important was vertical armour against short range fire
in comparison with horizontal protection against long
range gunnery and aircraft bombs? Should the armament
consist of a few large guns of great power or a larger
number of lighter weapons with a greater chance of
hitting the target?
These considerations often influenced each other. This
particularly applied to the arrangement of the
armament; to concentrate the guns in a few large
turrets saved not just on the armour need to protect
the turrets and barbettes but also reduced the length
of the armoured citadel around the armament and
machinery and therefore reduced the weight of armour
needed still further. On the other hand, the loss in
action of one large turret would have a serious effect
on the fighting ability of the ship. Even with the
machinery there were choices to be made; to select
high pressure equipment with its much improved
efficiency and reduced size and weight, or to stick
with older but more reliable methods?
It is interesting to examine the effects of the
choices made by the various nations involved. The
French went for high speed and high levels of
protection, achieved by a very economical armament
layout of eight 15in. guns in two quad turrets mounted
forward. This layout, featured in the Jean Bart and
Richelieu, gave a formidable forward fire well suited
to the ships' intended role as Scharnhorst/Gneisenau
hunters.
At the other extreme, only the Germans retained the
traditional eight guns in four turrets in the l5in.
Bismarck and Tirpitz. This layout was wasteful of
weight although offering advantages in minimising the
effect of the loss of a turret. Given the vessels'
high speed this should in theory have meant they were
very poorly armoured, which they would have been had
they not exceeded the 35,000 ton standard by some 20%.
In fact, they were not as well armoured as the KGVs.
The Americans and the Italians both took the middle
ground of nine guns in three turrets as being the best
overall compromise, but differed thereafter in
priorities. The Italians chose speed at the expense of
protection in their Romas, the Americans the reverse
in the Washington and South Dakota classes; until the
Iowa class when they had both (at the cost of another
10,000 tons). The Japanese Yamatos featured enormous
(l8in.) gunpower and massive (although flawed)
protection, but they were in a different size class
altogether.
This brings us back to the KGVs. The original design
featured twelve l4in. guns in three quadruple turrets
but increasing worries over keeping to the weight
limits led to the reduction of B turret to a twin.
These ships were therefore unique in their layout as
well as their calibre. Speed was at the low end of the
range but protection at least as good as anything of
comparable size. The loss of the Prince of Wales
demonstrated the vulnerability of the "underpinnings"
to underwater damage, but then so did that of the
Bismarck and it is unlikely that any other ship would
have fared better if hit in the same place.
In practice, the l4in. calibre proved adequate to meet
the demands made upon it, but it cannot be denied that
the armament was surprisingly troublesome.
Surprisingly for two reasons; the British had a long
tradition of producing reliable armament, culminating
in the classic twin 15in., and secondly there had been
great teething problems with the complex l6in. leading
to a much simplified design being adopted for the
l4in.
Apart from this serious fault, the ships were
satisfactory enough in practice. The armament layout
was not ideal and the selection of nine guns in triple
turrets would have preserved the weight of forward
fire while saving some tonnage for extra machinery and
speed. More radically, the adoption of the Richelieu's
layout would have permitted a significantly greater
speed, which would have been useful. One can
understand why the designers did not wish to take the
risk of concentrating the armament in only two
turrets, although no KGV ever had a turret knocked out
by enemy action (self-inflicted failure was another
matter). Given the political and time constraints
within which they were working, the KGVs' designers
did about as well as they could, apart from the
serious unreliability of the quadruple turret.
© Anthony G Williams
Originally published in 'Warship World' magazine,
Spring 1990
In the past few years a great deal of information has
been published about battleships and their design;
probably more than for any other type of warship. In
the process the post-WW1 vessels of the Royal Navy
have been criticised in comparison with contemporary
foreign ships, a criticism all the more pointed
because of the unquestioned superiority of the RN's
battleships in the Great War. It is perhaps time to
take a brief look at these arguments and their
validity.
The two classes we are referring to are of course the
l6in. gunned Rodney and Nelson and the five l4in.
gunned vessels of the King George V class. The
argument goes that the l6in. ships, with their 23 knot
speed, were too slow to be effective in WW2 when
battleships were required to operate with fast
aircraft carriers. Furthermore, X turret, tucked away
behind and below B turret, was of limited use as it
could only fire on or close to the beam. It is
therefore suggested that these ships would have been
far more useful if X turret had been deleted and the
weight and space saved used to provide more powerful
machinery for higher speeds.
The KGVs, on the other hand, were (just about)
adequately fast at around 28 knots but are criticised
both for lack of gun power (as every other nation
building battleships at the time went for at least
l5in. calibre) and for the reliability of the main
armament. The almost complete breakdown of the Prince
of Wales' fire in the action against the Bismarck is
notorious; perhaps less well known were the similar if
less severe problems suffered by the King George V in
the second action against the Bismarck, and the Duke
of York when she sank the Scharnhorst; that is, in
every action against enemy capital ships.
The Nelson and Rodney
The exercise of hindsight is of course all too easy.
Military history is probably more vulnerable to wisdom
after the event than most affairs of men, presumably
because of the huge uncertainties involved in the
planning and execution of warfare. It can therefore
readily be conceded that the Nelsons would indeed have
been more useful vessels with only six l6in. guns but
the ability to reach 28 knots. However, the criticism
of the designers can only be valid if they might
reasonably have been expected to foresee that.
(Incidentally, I use the term designers rather than
naval architects because many others apart from
architects were involved in determining the parameters
of ship design; it became a very political matter.)
The fact is that the war which the big ships were
called upon to fight in 1939-45 was radically
different to that envisaged when they were designed in
the 1920s. Contemporary paintings imagining their
appearance in warfare show them steaming in line of
battle together with other battleships, firing on the
broadside at an enemy fleet as in the Battle of
Jutland. It has frequently been observed that armed
forces spend each period of peace equipping and
training themselves to win the last war they fought
in. While this may be true in this case, it is hard to
see that the designers could have been expected to
foresee at that time the way that battleships would
actually be employed against enemy capital ships;
singly or in pairs, together with aircraft carriers,
in fast task forces forever pursuing an elusive enemy.
Ironically, the Nelsons turned out to be very well
suited to their most productive employment; that of
shore bombardment.
Perhaps the most curious aspect of these ships was the
relatively light shells specified for the main
armament. These weighed 2048 lb, hardly any more than
the 1920 lb (later 1938 lb) of the l5in. gun. There
would have been little difference in penetration or
destructive power so it hardly seemed worth the bother
and expense of developing a new gun. The only reason
which comes to mind is one of national prestige; the
USA and Japan were building 16in. ships so we had to
have them too. This may seem silly but it is worth
remembering that these capital ships were very much an
_expression of national pride; in modern terminology,
their deterrent effect was more significant than their
actual use.
The King George V Class
Having largely exonerated the Nelsons' designers let
us turn our attention to the KGVs. In the mid 1930s
the long "battleship holiday" was at an end and the
British, Germans, French, Italians, Americans,
Japanese and even the Russians were all planning new
building programmes. The British were very concerned
about the enormous cost involved and were very keen to
keep the size of these new ships down to the minimum
by international agreement. The result was the Second
London Naval Conference, which agreed in 1936 to
limits of 35,000 tons on displacement and l4in. on gun
calibre. Unfortunately there were various escape
clauses (and Japan and Germany weren't involved
anyway) so in the end it was only the British,
desperately keen to make a start and to set a good
example, who adhered to the l4in. limit.
It is worth at this point reviewing briefly some of
the main considerations of the designers. It was
necessary first of all to balance the three main
priorities; armament, protection and speed; all very
demanding of weight and space. Within these choices
lay others. How should the protection be arranged? How
important was vertical armour against short range fire
in comparison with horizontal protection against long
range gunnery and aircraft bombs? Should the armament
consist of a few large guns of great power or a larger
number of lighter weapons with a greater chance of
hitting the target?
These considerations often influenced each other. This
particularly applied to the arrangement of the
armament; to concentrate the guns in a few large
turrets saved not just on the armour need to protect
the turrets and barbettes but also reduced the length
of the armoured citadel around the armament and
machinery and therefore reduced the weight of armour
needed still further. On the other hand, the loss in
action of one large turret would have a serious effect
on the fighting ability of the ship. Even with the
machinery there were choices to be made; to select
high pressure equipment with its much improved
efficiency and reduced size and weight, or to stick
with older but more reliable methods?
It is interesting to examine the effects of the
choices made by the various nations involved. The
French went for high speed and high levels of
protection, achieved by a very economical armament
layout of eight 15in. guns in two quad turrets mounted
forward. This layout, featured in the Jean Bart and
Richelieu, gave a formidable forward fire well suited
to the ships' intended role as Scharnhorst/Gneisenau
hunters.
At the other extreme, only the Germans retained the
traditional eight guns in four turrets in the l5in.
Bismarck and Tirpitz. This layout was wasteful of
weight although offering advantages in minimising the
effect of the loss of a turret. Given the vessels'
high speed this should in theory have meant they were
very poorly armoured, which they would have been had
they not exceeded the 35,000 ton standard by some 20%.
In fact, they were not as well armoured as the KGVs.
The Americans and the Italians both took the middle
ground of nine guns in three turrets as being the best
overall compromise, but differed thereafter in
priorities. The Italians chose speed at the expense of
protection in their Romas, the Americans the reverse
in the Washington and South Dakota classes; until the
Iowa class when they had both (at the cost of another
10,000 tons). The Japanese Yamatos featured enormous
(l8in.) gunpower and massive (although flawed)
protection, but they were in a different size class
altogether.
This brings us back to the KGVs. The original design
featured twelve l4in. guns in three quadruple turrets
but increasing worries over keeping to the weight
limits led to the reduction of B turret to a twin.
These ships were therefore unique in their layout as
well as their calibre. Speed was at the low end of the
range but protection at least as good as anything of
comparable size. The loss of the Prince of Wales
demonstrated the vulnerability of the "underpinnings"
to underwater damage, but then so did that of the
Bismarck and it is unlikely that any other ship would
have fared better if hit in the same place.
In practice, the l4in. calibre proved adequate to meet
the demands made upon it, but it cannot be denied that
the armament was surprisingly troublesome.
Surprisingly for two reasons; the British had a long
tradition of producing reliable armament, culminating
in the classic twin 15in., and secondly there had been
great teething problems with the complex l6in. leading
to a much simplified design being adopted for the
l4in.
Apart from this serious fault, the ships were
satisfactory enough in practice. The armament layout
was not ideal and the selection of nine guns in triple
turrets would have preserved the weight of forward
fire while saving some tonnage for extra machinery and
speed. More radically, the adoption of the Richelieu's
layout would have permitted a significantly greater
speed, which would have been useful. One can
understand why the designers did not wish to take the
risk of concentrating the armament in only two
turrets, although no KGV ever had a turret knocked out
by enemy action (self-inflicted failure was another
matter). Given the political and time constraints
within which they were working, the KGVs' designers
did about as well as they could, apart from the
serious unreliability of the quadruple turret.