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(Off topic for a second): Phantoms in SE Asia used to experience a phenomenon called "mach bite", where the honeycomb filled entire outer wing panel aft of the leading edge/spar D tube would get saturated with moisture during the monsoon season and freeze at altitude, bulging the skin outward. If the plane then flew fast enough to generate a shock wave, the entire panel aft of the spar would pop right out leaving the spar and D tube giving the proverbial "one finger salute". This didn't constitute much of an emergency, as there were no flight controls or plumbing out there, just an extra 15 knots on final, bingo ashore if carrier based, and take the wire on landing. We had one come in at Boca Chica after a midair collision that took off the entire panel, and it was a nugget pilot at the controls with a 2 'Nam tour RIO in the back seat practicing his oratory skills. Piece of cake. The plane was fixed in time to fly the last cycle of the day.People tend to think that the tropics are hot and therefore icing will not be a problem. The reality is that the very high humidity means that icing is a serious problem and extends far higher than in temperate and cold weather climates.
Now im really scratching my head. I read an article about a year ago in which Schroer himself was quoted about the combat wherein he mentioned the loss of his wingman. I suppose the author could have made it up or quoted someone who made up the quote( that sort of thing happens) but l like I said scratching my head a bit here.MAW vol. 1, page 252-253, describes the combat rather differently. Caldwell was jumped by Schroer and his P-40 lit up, but the flames died out so he stayed with the plane.
Schroer returned to base without damage and no losses to his unit.
By the time the USA were involved in the war then the standard UK Spitfire 20mm had 120 rpg not the 60rpg limitation. Granted this still gave you less firing time that the F4F-3 but this was often sufficient.I agree with parts of this as well. But if I'm repelling an attack on my carrier, I would much prefer and F4F-3 with 4 50's and 400 rounds per gun than 2 20mm with 60 rounds per gun. (I know 20mm were never put on the Wildcat)
Luck and or good shooting makes a difference as well. I have also read several stories of 20mm bursting inside the cockpit and not killing the pilot. (Certainly didn't do him any good either) which 20mm with which bullet makes a big difference, the fuses may not always work causing the shell to burst on the skin of the aircraft or over penetrate and burst after exiting.
As with everything we discuss on here there are infinite variables for infinite outcomes
So could 4 or 6 .50s. USN's early carrier losses weren't due to ineffective firepower of the Wildcats, they were more a function of less than optimum fighter direction of the CAP. It was the few "leakers" that got through the fighter screen that did the damage. Integrating radar into CIC and multiple carrier coordination was a steep learning curve, and when it finally reached a fine art it was already Hellcat time. The Japanese had coordinated multi carrier ops pretty well worked out by Dec 1941, even without radar and effective fighter direction, where as USN still operated carriers as "lone wolves", even when together in a task force, as late as Midway. If the strikes had been coordinated rather than piecemeal at Coral Sea and Midway the results would have been more effective and less costly.20mm were supplemented by 4 x 303, whilst being far from the most effective aerial weapon I agree, but capable doing fatal damage to the early Japanese aircraft.
Actually the higher velocity is without doubt. The M1 ball and M1 AP had muzzle velocities of 2500fps or just over. The M1 incendiary wasn't adopted until after the M2 ball and M2 AP were adopted. All three had a muzzle velocity of over 2800fps and closer to 2880fps. The M8 API which is what was shown in the video, has the higher velocity and came into use in 1943 for the most part.
1 round, 50 bmg into a 55 gallon barrel of water. Imagine if that is a fuel tank on an airplane. Just punching through armor doesn't tell the whole story of the superiority of the 50 bmg over any 30 caliber bullet.
.......
30 caliber bullets just poke a small hole.
What's oil or fuel doing up in the turtledeck? Isn't that where ADI fluid lives?
On the subject of fitting the Kinsei to the A6M, the Kinsei 50 series was in production in 1941 and was fitted to the H6K5 flying boat, which was ordered into production in case the H8K was seriously delayed and delivered over 1941 and early in 1942 with production stopped once the H8K was seen to be a success. They were also used by the G3M3, the last G3Ms produced.
Using data from q‹ó‹@ƒGƒ"ƒWƒ"ˆê——E"ú–{ŒR (Goodwin and Starkings agrees but leave some numbers as question marks), for take off we have 1300 ps at 2600 rpm for the Kinsei 51 and 1130 ps at 2750 rpm for the Sakae 21. At 6200 metres, the Kinsei 51 gave 1100 ps at 2500 rpm while at 6000 metres the Sakae 21 gave 980 ps at 2700 rpm (both translated as military power). The Kinsei weighed 640 kg compared to 590 kg for the Sakae.
Thus a 1941 A6M8 would have lost the two 7.7 mm machine guns, increased in weight and probably in fuel consumption but benefited from an extra 120 ps at altitude. The Kinsei 60 series was first used in December 1942 for the Ki-46 III prototype. The variant powering the real A6M8 gave 1250 ps at 5800 metres and 2600 rpm (probably with an extra bearing to allow higher rpm but with an increase in weight to 675 kg). The A6M8's quoted max speed of 356 mph suggests that we would see about 341 mph with a Kinsei 50 series engine ignoring the slight difference in weight. However, the A6M8 was able to dive significantly faster than a 1941 Zero due to thicker skinning and carried a heavier armament.
I agree with you on this with one small exception or addition: fighter direction was one problem, the 2nd problem was US fighter performance. The fact that the Wildcat has such a horrible climb rate often meant that they simply couldn't get high enough in time to intercept dive bombers and sometimes couldn't catch a Kate torpedo bomber if the Kate passed over them in a slight dive. I think it was John Thach that said "we need something that gets upstairs faster"So could 4 or 6 .50s. USN's early carrier losses weren't due to ineffective firepower of the Wildcats, they were more a function of less than optimum fighter direction of the CAP. It was the few "leakers" that got through the fighter screen that did the damage. Integrating radar into CIC and multiple carrier coordination was a steep learning curve, and when it finally reached a fine art it was already Hellcat time. The Japanese had coordinated multi carrier ops pretty well worked out by Dec 1941, even without radar and effective fighter direction, where as USN still operated carriers as "lone wolves", even when together in a task force, as late as Midway. If the strikes had been coordinated rather than piecemeal at Coral Sea and Midway the results would have been more effective and less costly.
Cheers,
Wes
(Off topic for a second): Phantoms in SE Asia used to experience a phenomenon called "mach bite", where the honeycomb filled entire outer wing panel aft of the leading edge/spar D tube would get saturated with moisture during the monsoon season and freeze at altitude, bulging the skin outward. If the plane then flew fast enough to generate a shock wave, the entire panel aft of the spar would pop right out leaving the spar and D tube giving the proverbial "one finger salute". This didn't constitute much of an emergency, as there were no flight controls or plumbing out there, just an extra 15 knots on final, bingo ashore if carrier based, and take the wire on landing. We had one come in at Boca Chica after a midair collision that took off the entire panel, and it was a nugget pilot at the controls with a 2 'Nam tour RIO in the back seat practicing his oratory skills. Piece of cake. The plane was fixed in time to fly the last cycle of the day.
Cheers,
Wes
I agree with you on this with one small exception or addition: fighter direction was one problem, the 2nd problem was US fighter performance. The fact that the Wildcat has such a horrible climb rate often meant that they simply couldn't get high enough in time to intercept dive bombers and sometimes couldn't catch a Kate torpedo bomber if the Kate passed over them in a slight dive. ...
You beat me to it.
I figure this might have been one of the reasons Spitfire V wasn't killing all that many A6M2 while Wildcats were.
That's like saying Wildcats didn't kill many Me109's or FW190's. They fought in different theaters.
So Australia is a different theater than SW Pacific?That's like saying Wildcats didn't kill many Me109's or FW190's. They fought in different theaters.
I think Wildcats did kill a few Bf 109s. They also shot down a fair number of P-36s and D.520s.
So Australia is a different theater than SW Pacific?
Yes, but the initial comment was specifically in reference to the Spit V's poor performance in Australia against the same aircraft types the Wildcats were facing.Spitfires shot down a few Japanese planes too, but the Spitfire spend the war fighting the Luftwaffe, the Wildcat the Japanese, you can't shoot down what you don't fight.