July 26, 1941. Build the Far East Air Force.

[JoeB]

Shores counts 72 Type 97 (Ki-27) fighters on Formosa and seems to believe these were the planes that occupied the airfield near Vigan, in Northern Luzon early in the battle. Do you have a source to resolve the discrepency? Not that I think that particular component significantly changes the scale. Just wondering...

When you say "initial" do you mean the first day? One of the enduring myths of the battle seems to be that most of the P-40s were knocked out the first day which according to Edmunds and Shores didn't happen. The losses amounted to about 20-25% (which is still high and not to diminish the nature of the tragedy) mainly the P-40Bs of the 20th and probably spares. But clearly a fair number of P-40s survived the first attacks on the 8th.

By initial I mean the JNAF attacks in central Luzon through Dec 10. There were no encounters between FEAF fighters and JAAF fighters until Dec 12 (Buzz Wagner's lone attack probably against 50th Flying Regiment at Aparri in N Luzon where he claimed several on the ground, none in the air in his initial reports though later he was also credited with aerial victories; the Japanese records for those operations didn't survive, the 50th's CO was quoted in the Japanese official history* as recalling that a single Type 97 was burned on the ground in that attack; the a/c had flown in on the 11th). And the first contact of any kind between FEAF and JAAF was Dec 10 (Type 97's, from Batan Isl between Formosa and Luzon, intercepted B-17, one Type 97 forcelanded; lone P-40 attacked formation of Type 99 Twin Lights, one Type 99 downed and the P-40).

So, the PI air campaign divides itself fairly neatly between a short initial period to Dec 10 when a 90 plane Zero force mainly facilitated the neutralization of a FEAF containing a similar number of P-40's (somewhat more in inventory, though somewhat fewer in active squadron strength) and the JAAF and particularly its fighter force was largely irrelevant; then a much longer period where a relatively small remnant of the FEAF fighter force mainly faced JAAF fighters based on Luzon but was mainly serving as recon and light strike a/c and avoiding fighter combat; the remnant of the B-17 force quit the PI for DEI and Australia not long into the campaign as well.

Of course JNAF bombers achieved a lot of the actual destruction Dec 8-10, but could have fared very differently without escorts, or at least it's much more plausible to 'what if' a situation where the FEAF could have 'upped its game' to effectively counter such a/c if unescorted. Even in China in 1937 JNAF Type 96 Land Attack often suffered heavy losses in the initial long range operations beyond the reach of their fighters, to the likes of Chinese Boeing 281's (ie P-26's) and Curtiss Hawk biplanes; and the Type 1 Land Attack's performance wasn't hugely greater, especially considering the P-40's superiority to 1937 Chinese fighters.

The Zero force with its ability to operate over central Luzon directly from Formosa was the key to the swift neutralization of the FEAF, and it's hard IMO to come up with a plausible 'what if' to change that story completely, though better airfield defence, especially passive measures, could have at least stretched out the process. Yet, that Zero force was not significantly, if at all, numerically superior to the modern fighter component of FEAF.

*Sensi Sosho vol 34; in some cases 'Bloody Shambles' co-author Izawa adds info about other periods from other Japanese sources, photo's from other sources too, but for PI campaign virtually every item of Japanese info in Shambles seems to be directly from Senshi Sosho, and SS has a few additional things omitted in Shambles. Also Shambles has a fair number of mistakes and omissions from US side of PI campaign as can be seen from Bartsch's more in-depth books. Still a great book overall of course, Shambles.

Joe

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Great stuff Joe,

I kinda thought you might mean the initial phase of the campaign as opposed to just the raids on the 8th. Of course, I have to add Bartsch's Doomed to my growing list of books to buy. I doubt our local library has a copy, and also to finally procure Shores' volume II. Here's a link to Edmunds in the event you haven't previously seen it.

THey fought with what they had: the story of the Army Air Forces in the ... - Walter Dumaux Edmonds - Google Books

OC

 

[davebender]

That only matters for heavy bomber units.

Light bombardment squadrons are supposed to sink IJA troop transports. Which means they should operate from airfields located near the best landing beaches. Average mission distance should only be about 100 miles.

 

[Shortround6]

Which would be fine and dandy if you had airfields conveniently located within 100 miles of most potential landing beaches. Especially airfields with 3000+ ft runways which you need to get an A-20 into the air. Add about another 1000ft to clear a 50 ft tree.

And that is at normal gross weight. that same 4000ft to the trees is good for a B-17 at 50,000lbs.

Even with a extra couple of months you are not going to get multiple (as in a 1/2 dozen or more) bomber airfields built. You not only need the grass runway but you need fueling facilities, maintenance facilities, bomb storage? and you need to be able to supply these airfields.

Your idea used to be using A-20s to replace all but a handful of the B-17s. You are biasing the defense of the Philippines on one mission, performed by one aircraft. And that aircraft not only cannot reach Formosa, it can't even reach parts of the Philippines from bases in the Philippines and make it back to it's base.

Edit> If the Japanese could reach Clark Field then any airfield north of Clark was subject to attack.

 

[varsity078740]

The more I study this subject, the more I realize that much of what was published years ago regarding FEAF was wrong. Sometimes there was exaggeration, other times minimalization. Newly found photos crop up all the time giving us a more accurate description of what was going on prior to the attack. In 2002 I had the opportunity to spend around two weeks with a number of Bataan vets while on a trip to the PI for the 60th anniversary of the fall of Bataan. Among them were former enlisted men from the 17th Pursuit, 28th Bomb Squadron, and 7th Material Squadron and the 34th Pursuit Squadron. The men from the 28th and 7th were at Clark on Dec 8th and gave me some insight into the actual condidtions there. Among other things, it turns out that there were a number of decoys there including P-40, P-35, B-18 and B-17, all built by Filipino contractors. There were a number of revetments built which actually minimized damage to the B-17s from bombing,
the majority being destroyed by strafers. There's an excellent site that has some great shots of Clark prewar including pics of the decoys. The site is run by the son of a POW who was at Clark and was in the same squadron as one of the vets I met on my trip. Check it out. www.alyoung.com/MyFathers_Captivity/Images/

 

[davebender]

Sinking enemy troop transports before they can unload is the only defensive measure guaranteed to defeat an amphibious invasion. So yes, I'm biased towards that mission.

 

[Shortround6]

But you cannot guarantee the sinking of those transports due weather or darkness. You cannot strike the invasion sites (a least many of them) from bases beyond the reach of Japanese air power. You cannot reach some of the further Philippine Islands. you cannot interdict shipping (or even try to) in most of the South China sea or even, from any historical bases, in parts of the Sulu sea. You would be depending on just a handful of B-17s for long range reconnaissance or Navy flying boats. You cannot use the A-20s as emergency transports. You need 2-4 times the number of A-20s to deliver the same tonnage of bombs even to targets within their their limited range.
While the defense of the Philippines was a gamble, going for the A-20s is an all or nothing roll of the dice. IF they sink enough of the transports you win. If they don't you have a much less capable air group with which to fight the rest of the battle.

 

[tomo pauk]

The DB-7A was credited with pretty low attrition rate during the Battle of France. The planes being with R-1830s aboard, unlike the newer versions that had R-2600s. So, even when contested with a formidable LW of 1940 (plus its thousands of light Flak), plane fared well.
The most likely opponent at Philippines, Zero, was slower than Bf-109E-3 from BoF. Actually, A-20 was as fast as Zero down low, topping 340 mph at it's best altitude. Of course, the Japanese Flak to encounter might be only from ships, just a trace when compared wit what LW had in France 18-20 months ago.

By the tame Japanese have disembarked, their positions are known, and obviously closer to the airbases the US bombers might be based when compared with ships that might sail at open seas. Advantage to the defender.

One might say that 50 Beaufighters would be of better use to the CW forces in Malaya than those two battleships.

 

[JoeB]

The men from the 28th and 7th were at Clark on Dec 8th and gave me some insight into the actual condidtions there. Among other things, it turns out that there were a number of decoys there including P-40, P-35, B-18 and B-17, all built by Filipino contractors. There were a number of revetments built which actually minimized damage to the B-17s from bombing,
the majority being destroyed by strafers.

Varsity,
that's very interesting, but the link didn't work when I tried it.

Joe

 

[varsity078740]

I'm facinated by all this talk about A-20s taking out ships in a late 1941 context. Pilots weren't trained in anti ship tactics
and skip bombing methods later used in the Bismark sea hadn't been invented yet.

Duane

 

[oldcrowcv63]

In 2002 I had the opportunity to spend around two weeks with a number of Bataan vets while on a trip to the PI for the 60th anniversary of the fall of Bataan. Among them were former enlisted men from the 17th Pursuit, 28th Bomb Squadron, and 7th Material Squadron and the 34th Pursuit Squadron. The men from the 28th and 7th were at Clark on Dec 8th and gave me some insight into the actual condidtions there. Among other things, it turns out that there were a number of decoys there including P-40, P-35, B-18 and B-17, all built by Filipino contractors. There were a number of revetments built which actually minimized damage to the B-17s from bombing,
the majority being destroyed by strafers. There's an excellent site that has some great shots of Clark prewar including pics of the decoys. The site is run by the son of a POW who was at Clark and was in the same squadron as one of the vets I met on my trip. Check it out. www.alyoung.com/MyFathers_Captivity/Images/

Wish I had known more about the FEAF campaign when I was in the PI in '74, 82, and 83... I made a trip out to Corregidor island by Banka boat and saw the death march memorials lining the highway on the east shore of the Bataan Pensula but could have seen so much more. None of the books I've been reading lately were written and of course the internet didnt exist then. The damage due to the IJA shelling on corrregidor was impressive: concrete blocks the size of houses overturned on top of big guns if my memory serves. Everything I saw at Clark was new.

Duane, your link doesn't seem to work.

I'm facinated by all this talk about A-20s taking out ships in a late 1941 context. Pilots weren't trained in anti ship tactics
and skip bombing methods later used in the Bismark sea hadn't been invented yet.
Duane

The one squadron that might have done some good was the 27th Bomb Group (light) of 54 A-24's whose aircrew ended up in the PI without their mounts. The dozen planes or so that got to Java don't appear to have fared well or contributed much, being flown by relatively untrained replacement pilots (assuming Edmunds is correct). He claims Navy VB experienced pilots reached out with an offer to train the pilots but the USAAF refused their assistance and apparently the Navy Brass also nixed the idea too.

That might be the most promising part of Dave's suggestion, assuming an alternate history that reunites the original pilots with their aircraft. However, just getting the planes and pilots together wouldn't be enough. The A-24s, like their companion 18 P-40s on the Pensacola convoy arrived in Oz sans some critical components that made their numbers irrelevant. An apparently herculean effort to work around these shortcomings was undertaken. I assume the original crews of the A-24s were better trained than the ones that ended up flying the dozen or so that appeared to have gotten into combat in Java. 54 arriving in the PI appears a goodly number but their survival would have depended on a chain of what-ifs that had to play out perfectly in the modified time line. In the end, I still think there was little that could be done, beyond delaying the inevitable. As pointed out elsewhere in the forum. The people involved had to shake off a peacetime mindset. A logistical base had to be built almost from scratch and assets both human, facilties and hardware had to be created to fight the long war. It seemed that what ever could go wrong did go wrong. The combination of logistical difficults, mind set, and unfavorable initial conditions created to deep a hole.

 

[Shortround6]

The DB-7 with the R-1830 engines had, according to one source, 205 US gallons of fuel. One model of the DB-7 had the R-2600s and still had 205 gallons. the DB-7B is supposed to have had the R-2600s and 394 gallons. These planes were intended to be high performance, short ranged planes that took part in the land battle much like a Stuka. Thinking that they are medium bombers with a funny name is a mistake

Initial B-25s with R-2600 engines carried 912 gallons but when fitted with self sealing tanks and armor fuel capacity dropped to 694 gallons. Lockheed Hudson's carried around 630-640 US gallons in the wings for their R-1830s.

 

[tomo pauk]

Now that we are talking about the other US bombers, I wonder how well would've fared? Maryland, or Hudson, in 'defend the PI' assignment? Maryland (with different name) fared pretty good in French hands back in 1940.

 

[varsity078740]

Varsity,
that's very interesting, but the link didn't work when I tried it.

Joe

Try this:

Photos - My Father's Captivity

 

[oldcrowcv63]

works. Thanks.

 

[Shortround6]

The Hudson might be the only real alternative. The last of a 150 plane order for Maryland IIs was completed in April of 1941 and the first Baltimore doesn't roll out until late 41. Whatever is sent has to be on board ship in Aug/Sept in order to be delivered, assembled, test flown and then trained with in time to do any good at all. Just about any other "medium" bomber is available in too few numbers to really do anything. 38 B-23 built, few dozen early B-25s may be available as are few dozen early B-26s but the high stalling speed would probably rule the B-26 out from grass runways.

 

[davebender]

Without proper training it wouldn't matter if FEAF were equipped with F-15Es. They would still fail to intercept IJN airstrikes and bombs would still fail to hit anything besides the ocean. Then half the fighters would be destroyed on the ground after Gen. Brereton orders pilots to lunch en mass.

So let's assume competent leaders who know how to train aircrew are part of the package.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

From what I've read, assuming all supply problems solved and A-24 aircraft early arrival, A situation is produced wherin the probably 18 or so grounded P-40Bs destroyed at Clark could have provided an AVG-similar high altitude intercept capabilty especially if all aircraft are flown from camouflaged secret bases. The A-24s should provide a potent offensive punch at virtually any point on Luzon flying from either Clark or Nichols. I believe the 1,000 pound bomb radius was about 225 miles and 500# pound range used for CV searches was closer to 300 miles. I can't recall whether these ranges are in nm or sm. WRT to secret airfield construction, the Dutch were apparently able to build, fairly quickly, well hidden airfields from rice paddy and jungle environment. The A-24's could have enjoyed the lower altitude capabili escorts of the P-40Bs bringing the zeros into a somewhat more favorable engagement situation where many would be focused on countering the A-24s. Of course this is still assuming ideal circumstances where you are only able to catch the transports in dayilight, in good weather, nearer to shore and before they've unloaded . To be be more robustly effective you need a good antishipping bomber with longer legs (add about another 100-150 miles for one day grace) or airfields appropriately fashioned nearer all the potential beachheads which in reality were VERY widely separated.

Each beachhead distributed airfield would need to be able to handle about 18 fighters and about as many A-24s, with no less than a dozen of each continually being operational. That means installing a far better communication system than existed at the time. A lot of wire stringing or very reliable wireless voice comm. Add a few miles for denavalized weight lightening.


Apology for the continous editing if anyone is attempting to keep up...

again!! Found the SBD range reference.... I am assuming, based on published numbers (Lundstrom Fletcher book) 175 and 225 nm that max combat radius was 200 and 260 sm with the 1942 CV battles providing the basis for the estimate.

 

[davebender]

These would be little more then forward area arming and refueling points.

Long range search aircraft such as the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 typically provided one to two days warning of approaching IJA troop transports. That gives you time to ferry A-24s and their P-40 escorts to the correct forward area airfield. Until then A-24s remain hidden away in a secure location. You don't piddle them away trying to sink Japanese warships.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Long range search aircraft such as the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 typically provided one to two days warning of approaching IJA troop transports. That gives you time to ferry A-24s and their P-40 escorts to the correct forward area airfield. Until then A-24s remain hidden away in a secure location. You don't piddle them away trying to sink Japanese warships.

Good points, of course you want to hit them as early as possible when weather allows.

I should add, that researching the A-24 range issue in USN published data confirms for me the desirability of using actual operational mission examples for such quantities.