Kursk MkII - The Air Battle (1 Viewer)

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I've a question that research on my part cannot resolve. Where would one find accurate information regarding the ground vehicle motor pools of either Luftwaffe or VVS units involved in the frontline effort during the 1943 efforts we are considering here? It is my believe, just a gut reaction, that operational efforts on both sides were hampered by the need to support the Infantry as a first priority in transportation. Any thoughts/new research venues regarding this aspect of the Kursk?

The failure of Hitler's Germany to field a strategic bomber force keeps coming back to me as a primary cause of the Third Reich's demise. Regarding the mention of James Corum's text of the history of the Luftwaffe, Yes, Regulation 16 did define the development of the National Socialist Air Arm as a balanced force of the tactical and strategic. The balance of forces changed as time passed due to several factors. Since this is not the place to discuss the topic, yet it is important to any aspect of the course of the war in Europe, you might want to revive the following thread:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/walter-wever-luftwaffe-strategic-bombers-22568.html

I don't have anything to add to the topic effort to establish an accurate tally of aircraft losses other than to suggest someone track down what primary strength returns and operational reports might still exist. Paper and flesh are two of the historical venues that are most fragile, once lost we are dependent on derivitive sources of information.
Regards
 
Rivet


I cant make much comment on your post, so if you could let me indulge just a little longer....it just occurred to me, that with something like 250 fighters, plus a flak force, the Germans managed to shoot down about 900 Soviet aircraft, the remainder of Soviet losses should statisitcally fall to non-combat related causes. Of that 900, about 33% are going to fall to the flak arm. That leaves about 600 shot down by the Jagdfliegers. That means on averageeach one of them shot down 2-3 Soviet aircraft in the two months of the battle.

There are other ways of looking at this......they say that on average 10% of the fighter pilots shoot down 90% of the enemy aircraft. If that adage holds true, then just 25 LW pilots, the best of the best, shot down 540 aircraft in two months....thats an average of 21 Soviet aircraft each....man is that good shooting or what......
 
Hello Percifal
so is the Bergström's figure 1546 for 5 Jul - 23 Aug 43 and does it incl the losses suffered by ADD and PVO units that participated to the Kursk Battles? And before begining to speculate too much, is the figure only for the combat related losses or for losses to all reasons?

On strategic bomber force of LW, now if it would have had a meaningful strategic bomber force, from production of which types of a/c would the necessary resources have taken? And from which types of flying would have been curtailed so that the necessary fuel would havee been amassed? I wonder if a partial curtailment of medium bomber production would have been enough.

Hello Rivet
at least LW suffered from lack of the trucks, see Friedrich Kless' article in Newton's Kursk The German View, unfortunately no figures, probably there is not any anymore, some 90-97% of LW papers were destroyed during the war, maybe something not generally known will be found fron Russian archieves.

Juha
 
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I'll do that in an upcoming post. Firstly the LW strength according to Bergstrom. For a number of units, he does not give strengths, so I have had to estimate on the basis of unit size. Ive indicated this with a ? followed by a number, indicating an estimate only. Some entries are of combined types here I have simply divided the total as equally as possible amongst the various types attached to that entry. So this is still an estimate.

The numbers are as follows:
269xJu88, 383xHe111, (?) (6) He111,(?)(34) Do217, 16xHs123, (?)(12) FW58, 180xJu52, (?)(6) Ju52, (?)(6) Do17, (?)(18)Fi156, 79xHs129, (?)(8) He46, (?)(25)Ar66, (?)(12 Go145, (?)(12) DFS 230, (?)(5) Ju86, (?)(4) Ar240, 403xJu87, (?) (6) Ju87, 18xHs126, (?)(9) Hs126, 47xFW189, (?)(10) FW189,

190 x FW190, 89 x FW190 (FB), 228 x Bf109, 84 x Bf110

Roughly that gives a total of 591 Fighters (rather more than I had estimated), and 1568 other types for the LW, to which must be added 30 fighters and 60 others of the Hungarian Air Force.

According to Bergstrom, therefore, the Axis initially committed about 2249 aircraft to the battle

Whats missing are the numbers of reserves available, and the numbers of reinforcements received. These are the figures available at the beginning of the battle
 
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Hello Parsifal
have you looked The Luftwaffe, 1933-45 ? An excellent site!!
one can find strenght returns from there also replacements per month, notice that the losses were not total losses but those which were removed from strenght at Gruppe level.

And thanks for the CB's numbers!

Hello Altea
thanks for the analyze for Khazanov's numbers!

Juha
 
Now, for the VVS, Bergstrom gives figures for 2, 16 and 17 VA. No figures are given for PVO or ADD units, nor is there any indicationm of strength for the Reserve Air Army the 5th or the Air Army on the northern flank of the Orel salient (1VA). There are no figures given for reserves or reinforcements, so again, the Soviet OB is not complete. However it does at least give an indication of air units known to be present at the beginning of the battle.

Because the LW are listed as aircraft available, I have opted to go for "total aircraft available" for the Soviets rather than aircraft serviceable. I did this because the figurees given for the Germans are also "aircraft available", suggesting a total availability, rather than a serviceability number.

Total Availability is 2782, of which 1206 are Fighters.

From Hardesty approximately 300 airframes from ADD and PVO must be added to this total. So my best estimate based on Bergstrom and Hardesty is about 3100 iniitally available to the Soviets.

Bergstrom does not give numbers of individual types, , but types include Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Yak7B, La-5, Aircobra, Boston III, Pe-2, Il-2, Boston (not the III), and U-2. Either the Soviets do not have liason and recon types, or they ar3e not included in the OB. No transports are included in their OB, perhaps these were controlled by the ADD organization, or they simply did not have any
 
The failure of Hitler's Germany to field a strategic bomber force keeps coming back to me as a primary cause of the Third Reich's demise.

I think Altea has already shown (in the 1st try at this, the closed thread) that what we are really talking about here is the German need for an ultra long range strategic bomber (with reliable ultra long range flying navigation aids) beyond anything possible at that time.

The sort of global strike aircraft which took another decade or 2 to become an everyday reality.

Altea said:
Anyway bombing Russia, in 41-42 no?
With what kind of navigation devices and maps would you use, e-net with satellite images and GPS something like that?

You want to attack the big factory n° 153 in Novosibirsk?

So if you please,
distance from Berlin to London: 926 km.
Berlin to Novosibirsk: 4387 km

About 4 800 km to hit Lavotchkin factory in Ulan Ude
About 7 500 km to strike on strategic wooden stocks at Komsomolsk on Amur

Good luck

No matter how you chop it up I keep coming back to the central issue being that Germany cannot take on the rest of the world (even before the 1944 D-day landing she was up against a USSR supplied at least by the western allies) in a drawn out war, certainly not a USSR that has already started organising the shift of heavy industry in the manner they did..

When the smash grab fails in 1941 (which outside of the wealth of possible outcomes character, personality politics offer was IMHO always bound to happen) it's over.
They just do not have the weapons systems necessary to stem the tide not to stop the vast restocking and reequipping the USSR was capable of.
When the tide turned it was Germany suffering huge repeated defeats, encirclements and vast amounts of equipment being destroyed she simply could not do what the USSR had done.

Tactical success is still possible, even to the extent of causing the Russians to pause for thought (see Manstein @ Kharkov) but it hardly matters in the overall scheme of things, merely delaying the inevitable causing further losses Germany cannot afford the Russian can.
 
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I think Altea has already shown (in the 1st try at this, the closed thread) that what we are really talking about here is the German need for an ultra long range strategic bomber (with reliable ultra long range flying navigation aids) beyond anything possible at that time.

The sort of global strike aircraft which took another decade or 2 to become an everyday reality.

Hitler was too in love with the Blitzkrieg. so by default a long range strategic bomber wasn't even in the cards. until it was too late. "Strategic" Bombing in Kursk/Kuban consisted of troop support for the most part.
 
Hello
for ADD 300 might be a bit too low, on 6 Jul ADD flew 269 sorties into Orel area + 85 into Kharkov area, on 7 Jul 210 + 163 according to Khazanov. On PVO, in an article published in a book published to honour 30years anniversity of the Kursk Battle in 1974 (English version) the writer tells that in June 43 over 200 PVO fighters protected the rail connections to Kursk.

Juha
 
Losses according to Bergstrom


Firstly the LW

Bergstrom has a list on Page 120, that gives three separate entries.....losses according to Flivo2 (not sure what that organization is, but I assume some kind of operational command, and gives a breakdown for the two operational commands involved....FliegerKorps VII and Luftflotte 6. Unfortunately these two formations do not represent the total command of the Luftwaffe committment. Approximately 790 further aircraft, placed at the disposal of these two formations, but not assigned, to them directly, also took part in the battle. Neither are the losses for the Hungarian airforces listed (some 90 a/c committed to the battle). So, instead of seeing losses for all 2250 a/c initially committed to the battle, we are only seeing the losses for 1364 a/c committed to the battle. I guess, to get a rough idea of true losses we could multiply by 2250, anhd divide by 1364, but this is not very accurate.

I am dissapointed in Bergstroms error here, but I will continue nevertheless.

For the two commands that he does look at, he gives three separate entries: Soviet claims, losses according to 2 Flivo, and losses according to the LW QM. QM loss figures are uniformly larger than those given by 2 Flivo. I am going to ignore Soviet claims, simnce they are obviously exaggerated.

However the losses given by flivo2 and the QM may be for separate airframes, in which case I have to add the two totals to get an overall total. Or the QM losses may incorporate 2 flivos losses in which case I should only include those losses given by the QM.

The QMs figures are noted as only those lost to enemy action in the air, or returned and scrapped immediately They dont include aircraft returned and scrapped (but with less thanh 90% damage), or aircraft lost in non-combat related accidents, or aircracraft lost to enemy action on the ground. In other words, Bergstroms loss figures are very restricted in other words.

My assumption is that the the QMs figures include the figures given by 2 Flivo

Losses in the air, or above 90% damage on return are 97 for that 4 day period (5-8 July). However as I saif there are numberous holes in the figures he gives. He is not looking at at the losses sustained by a significant fraction of the force....over 880 of the 2250 a/c in fact. He is not looking at accidents on the ground, losses due to enemy action on the ground (such as bombing, non combat related losses and the like) or aircraft scrapped or lost with les than 90% damage. If we use Zetterlings 1942 loss figures as a proportions guide, we would have to assume that the losses mentioned by Bergstrom only account for about 43% of the total losses for the 1364. We would need to multiply his losses by 2.29 to arrive at a more realistic figure, and then multiply again by 1.65 to take into account that he has not looked at all the formations committed. That increases our 97 apparent loss figures to an actual loss of 367 LW aircraft for that 4 day period.


Lies, damn lies and statistics............
 
Total Availability is 2782, of which 1206 are Fighters.
Considering the 1, 2, 5,16, 17th VA more than 5 500 front-line airplanes were available in Kursk aera.

From Hardesty approximately 300 airframes from ADD and PVO must be added to this total. So my best estimate based on Bergstrom and Hardesty is about 3100 iniitally available to the Soviets.
ADD had 740 planes in june 1943. 26 from the 34 ADD regiments participated to the Kursk battle.
PVO was represented at least by 3 air divisions, prior to the battle.

Bergstrom does not give numbers of individual types, , but types include Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Yak7B, La-5, Aircobra, Boston III, Pe-2, Il-2, Boston (not the III), and U-2. Either the Soviets do not have liason and recon types, or they ar3e not included in the OB.
Not inclueded by Bergstrom, i already gave mention of independent regiments
16 ODRAP (organic reconaissance regiment) Maj DS Shertsyuk A20B/Pe-2
98 GvODRAP Lnt-col VP Artemyev Pe-2
in my post n°53.
There were also independent reconaissance Escadrilia in A armies and Air corps.
Some organic rec. regiments belonged to STAVKA, not air armies.


No transports are included in their OB, perhaps these were controlled by the ADD organization, or they simply did not have any
ADD? Only Li-2 and C-47 used as night bombers.
Many others belonged to GVF (civilian fleet 2 000- 3 000) or VDV (paratroopers -hundreds).
It seems that there were also VTA (military transport aviation) regiments, simply in VVS without any special Air Command for that...

Regards
 
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Hello Parsifal
the Flivo
Fliegerverbindungsoffizier.

This position was created as part of the re-organisation that took place in Apr/May 1942.

Luftwaffe Staff officer (usually and Oberst) attached to an Armee Gruppe, Armee or Panzerarmee - responsible for the following:-

1. Liaison between the Armee gruppe and the Fliegerkorps or Luftflotte operating within the area of the Armees control.

2. Briefing the Armee headquarters on the local air situation, the operational intentions of the Fliegerkorps or Luftflotte and its order of battle.

3. Passing to the Fliegerkorps or Luftflotte the Armee Gruppes wishes with regard to luftwaffe operations and any air transport requirements.

4. Briefing the Fliegerkorps or Luftflotte with regard to the ground situation within the Armee Gruppes carea of control, its operational intentions and the order of battle of the Armee formations.

5. Employment of the aircraft of the Kurrierstaffel attached to the headquarters of the Armee Gruppe.

6. Co-operation and co-ordinatioon with the Armees Quartermaster branch.

staight from Wiki

Juha
 
Hello again Parsifal
It came into my mind that you are not aware the excellent Kursk site of Pawel Burchard see Air Battle over Kursk 1943, Starting Page
Pawel freely admits that the VVS part is a bit out of date but it is still a gem, it has also info on PVO units in the area. And of course on ADD.

HTH
Juha

ADDITION, are you sure that CB used 90% or over definitation for LW losses because that seems odd, 60-80% were unrepairable, useable parts were cannabalized to repair other a/c and 81-99% Written offs, crashed on own territory and 100% Written off, crashed on enemy territory or into water.
 
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Juha, Pawel must have re-opened his site then as it was closed for a time ................

Parsifal Bergstorm only had what he could find. 90-95 % of the LW claims and losses are lost forever even Freiburg does not have all Tony Wood has admitted to me some years ago on this very fact. the KTB's are no more, burned up in spring of 45 or lost and buried on the Ost front this is fact and yet we have to pay the piper and make it a guessing game out of it. you can readily see we are just using projections of figures from multiple sources and the frustration abounds in error from German/Soviet sources. no matter still it is all debatable.
 
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Hi Erich

I am frustrated by the lack of finality and precision in the figures. Doing my best to come up with a balanced estimate of losses for both sides, but I alays knew it would be difficult. Happy to stand back and listen to what others have to say regarding strengths and losses.

great work so far guys. I will have a look at that additional site Juha, might help to claify the issue.


On classification of losses, Bergstrom at the back of the book has a note on damage classification. Says that it is based on officieal LW system. The note is on Page 131. Will go back and check his classifications tonite when I have more time. If I was wrong I will post a revision of my estimated loss figures. However Bergstroms losses in his table on Page 120 are only for aircraft lost in the air, not aircraft scrapped on the ground. He makes that distinction in the notes on the Table. Erich has explained why.....
 
I think unless those that are so fortunate enough to have in their possession all the loss/kills data figures and there are ones that could have in Germany, Russia then it will be hard to only guesstimate those, but we must do our best.

everyone is keeping a level head and the debate is good, please continue.
 
At this stage, I would say that the superior reserves at the disposal of the VVS were critical in tipping the balance. I do not think at this stage that LW losses can be passed off as minor or insignificant. They took heavy casualties, but inflicted higher caualties on the VVS. The trouble for the LW was that the VVS had the depth to absorb its losses, and come back for more....the LW had no depth and could not sustain the losses it was absorbing.

I know that what I am saying is obvious and safe, but we have to start somewhere. I know that the basis for saying it is not all that solid, but its based on the best information and projections we as a group can put together. If people have information that improves that understanding, including people that have information to support a contrary view, you should bring that forward now. If not, the discussion will move forward I expect.
 
Parsifal- Regarding your Post #96- See if the Russians, who retook the areas where the German aviation was posted, might have better documentation than the BDU? I'd posted the Lend-Lease Site regarding the P-40, perhaps you might want to go there. One fellow in Buffalo, New York is quite conversant. Regards
 
Parsifal- Regarding your Post #96- See if the Russians, who retook the areas where the German aviation was posted, might have better documentation than the BDU? I'd posted the Lend-Lease Site regarding the P-40, perhaps you might want to go there. One fellow in Buffalo, New York is quite conversant. Regards
 

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