Loss of Singapore - Whose fault was it?

[parsifal]

The main problem in IIIcorps wasnt the senior leadership. Senopr commanders were adequate, but not inspired for the most part. the big problem was in the lower ranked officers and NCOs . there werent enough of them, and those that were there were totally lacking in experience

 

[Freebird]

Freebird,

You say we were reading naval cables in 1941. Really? If so, why couldn't we predict the attack on Pearl Harbor? I think you're overstating our code-breaking capabilities at that stage of the war.

We had intercepts from "Magic" and also JN-25 (IIRC) We didn't have detailed information about specific attacks.
However the big picture was crystal clear.

Either A.) The Emperor would be humiliated the Japanese would submit, and come begging for oil,
or B.) there would be war

There was a small chance for some sort of negotiated settlement, but the US position was firm - full withdrawl from China.

Certainly by September it was clear that Japan wouldn't back down, the US wouldn't compromise on a negotiated settlement, and that Japan was gearing up for war.
The Allies certainly knew that war was coming, and as Japanese objectives would have to include oil in the DEI or Borneo, that Japan would very likely attack Singapore to eliminate danger to it's flanks.

It was foolhardy to ignore the advice of senior leaders on what was needed to thwart an attack

The highest rank Percival attained during WWI was Lt Col and had no real experience of combat command above the Battalion level. Commanding several Divisions is a completely different challenge. Heath at least had recent (ie WWII) experience commanding large forces in combat. This experience, and his knowledge that Percival hadn't commanded above the Battalion level, undoubtedly contributed to the well-publicised friction between the 2 officers. There can be few who would argue with my statement that Percival was not a fighting general. That said, he was brave, intelligent and capable as his experiences as a POW, and the respect he earned during that period from his men, indicate.

fair enough, yet the battle in France 1940 was certainly more critical as far as the UK was concerned, how many divisional or corps commanders there had leadership above battalion experience?
Brooke didn't, Monty didn't, nor Pownall, Gort, or any of the other corps commanders.
Of the divisional commanders, AFAIK only Alexander and Fortune (CO - 51st Highlanders) had any experience in WWI commanding above battalion level, each as brigade commander for a few months in 1918.

They managed to command effectively nonetheless.
That being said, more experience is always better than less. 8)

My own thoughts, (as mentioned before) would be to send a second Australian division, along with Morshead as division commander and Lavarack as corps command, both having shown competance in higher command in Tobruk Levant respectively.
There were major difficulties having essentially the entire defence of Malaya handled by a single corps command.
Having an Australian corps on the west coast (along the direct route from Singora) and put Heath's corps on the East coast (Kota Bharu, Kuantan Johore) makes much more sense, allowing each force to concentrate on it's sector without distractions.

 

[Glider]

This is I admit a personal view but Singapore was never a realistic propect for defence, if only for one reason. It was a huge city with a massive civilian population and you would never be able to defend the area and keep the people fed without command of the sea and sky. If you command the sea and sky then you probably wouldn't need to worry about a defence anyway, because you would win the battle in the first place.

It doesn't matter how many division you send or what the quality is of those divisions, you still have a massive population to keep fed.

 

[parsifal]

Yes, Singapore was indefensible without control of the air and sea. Or at least dispute of these. The allies lost control of its ability to challenge at sea on the 10 December. When the ability to challenge in the air was lost is an open question. My opinion is that the air battle was lost before the first shot was even fired.

 

[buffnut453]

I'm not sure I agree. It all depends on the situation. One could argue that the Allies never had control of the sea - had they possessed such control, the Japanese invasion force would have been prevented from getting anywhere near Malaya. Also, despite losing Prince of Wales and Repulse, the Allies were still able to bring convoys into Singapore as late as 5 Feb 42...and by that stage, the RAF's fighter defences were pretty much non-existent. Equally, all the air and maritime superiority in the world would not have worked indefinitely for the Japanese and, as has been pointed out, their supply situation was pretty grim by the end of the fighting for Singapore (and that's not propaganda...it's provided in Japanese sources on the battle with some front-line Japanese units only able to muster 20 rounds per man at the end).

A more intractable challenge, IMHO, was the political problem. Essentially, Britain was committed to a strategy of not provoking Japan...or, rather, of not provoking Japan unilaterally in the mistaken belief that Japan would never fight both Britain and America at the same time. Against this political backdrop, Brooke-Popham and the other Allied leaders had to develop operational and tactical plans for the defence of Malaya and Singapore. One of the results was MATADOR, a plan to deploy into Thailand and secure key territory and facilities. There were 3 options for MATADOR: Line A just north of Songkhla; Line B near Bandon, and; Line C just north of Chumphon. Percival indicated that Line B was probably the best operationally but that he only had the forces to reach Line A. That said, even that modest move into Thailand would have provided tangible benefits for the Allies and would have made Japan's task much more difficult.

Additionally, Brooke-Popham was refused permission to launch MATADOR unilaterally unless Japan directly attacked Malaya - the obvious problem here was that MATADOR was largely impossible to implement after Japan had attacked Malaya. We also have the frenzied message from Crosby, Britain's attache in Bangkok, not to violate Thai neutrality. Put together, Brooke-Popham was essentially put in the position of deciding when Britain would be at war with Japan but was politically prevented from taking the necessary steps to secure, via MATADOR, the best operational position with which to defend Malaya (ie by securing Singora).

Defence of Singapore in isolation was never workable - too small an area with too many civilians. Defending Singapore by establishing a forward defence in Thailand was operationally feasible but politically impossible. The only way to break this status quo was by gathering intelligence of Japanese intentions that clearly pointed to an aggressive, direct threat against Singora and northern Malaya. Such intelligence was available to be gathered but Brooke-Popham, Percival and Pulford didn't take the opportunity when it was offered. Instead, they tried chasing the will-o'-the-wisp target that was the Japanese invasion fleet...and they failed.

 

[parsifal]

Of course speculating about whether "Matador" would have made a difference to the outcome is a matter of opinion, and certainly there is some solid research undertaken recently that supports that notion. but I dont buy it. Most importantly, it assumes the same force structures and the same battle plans by the japanese, and there is no evidence, or at best flimsy evidence that supports that notion. It also fails to take into account the uncommitted reserves and capabilities at the disposal of the Japanese. It assumes that the japanese would obediently follow their historical plans and behave as they did historically. There is little or no evidence to support that. The Japanese made their decision to invade at Singora and Pattani because they were confident that the British would not pre-emptively invade into the Kra Isthmus. If they had assessed the british as being likely to pre-emptively invade Thailand they would have simply committed their ready reserves and focussed their offensive initially on a landward occupation of Thailand and perhaps a subsequent amphibious invasion to support the landward assault. The British did not do well against the japanese resisting amphibious assaults even from prepared positions, witness the efforts at Kuantan, so why would they do any better from unprepared positions... and whilst also worrying about their flanks. Even in frontal assaults the Japanese showed time and again in 1941 they were superior to the Allied forces. Add in the reserves available and the disaster that occurred at Singapore would simply have occurred earlier at Singora.

Japanese intelligence only detected 30,000 to 50,000 British and Commonwealth troops in Malaya, when in fact there were about 88,600 men; this under-estimation could have easily caused serious harm in the Japanese invasion, but General Tomoyuki Yamashita would later admit that "our battle in Malaya was successful because we took the enemy lightly". Thats a nice way of saying they knew the british and colonial troops were not up to the task. Yamashita was given the overall responsibility of the invasion. On paper, he commanded a force 100,000-strong, organized into three divisions; in reality, the Japanese strength was less than that, (with less than 50000 men committed to the invasions). At his immediate disposal but not committed was a complete regiment of the the 5th Division left behind in Shanghai, China until after 26 Dec 1941, while the 18th Division left two regiments in Canton, China. There were two full regiments of armour not used as well. Japanese higher HQs were admittedly short of heavy artillery. Meanwhile, the Imperial Guard Division, elite academically, had no combat experience. There were a further two divisions reserved for the invasion, but not used, one in Japan, and one in North China. The Japanese calculated they could pull out up to 12 of their motor transport units from China in a pinch...enough to support up to 12 division in Thailand. Beyond that the japanese had 12 Division in Japan on garrison duty, and up to 10 division in Manchuria that would be transferred to the Pacific front in the coming year. Logistics would have prevented all these formations from being committed all at once, but they were available, and could have been fed in in echelon if the the british resisted more effectively than they did. The British in Malaya were going nowhere but down, unless they could stop the flow of these forces into the theater.

The Japanese outnumbered the british in every category, they outfought them in every battle. They could rely on control of the oceans and the air, given the prewar varications of the british. their generals were superior, their fighting soldiers better. They had the priceless advantage of having better understanding of jungle tactics and fighting. Their troops were for the most part battle hardened veterans and their equipment was more suited to the jungle and rough terrain. Slick manouvres like Matador might have helped but IMO could not reverse or change the outcome to any significant degree

 

[buffnut453]

But the key issue was time. The Allies needed time to reinforce Malaya whereas the Japanese needed to take Malaya quickly before the reinforcements arrived. Singora was the vital ground, together with the road/rail links from there south. Denying that port would have forced Yamashita to undertake the long, overland invasion from French Indochina which was much more difficult and would have taken much more time. The main roads in Malaya were nice, modern, metalled affairs...those in Thailand were dirt tracks which, in the monsoon season, turned into quagmires. The overland route would have been slow and would have sapped Japanese resources.

Even if Commonwealth forces in Singora had folded quickly, there was a much greater chance that The Ledge could have been destroyed, essentially halting any major infiltration into Malaya from Singora. Yes, the Japanese had the capacity to undertake landings at various points along the peninsula but these were typically small affairs and without an equivalent major port, like Singora, would have been very difficult to keep resupplied (look at some of the equivalent attempts in the Philippines where landings were not resupplied and withered on the vine). I agree Kuantan was a dismal failure but the beach defences further north actually inflicted considerable losses on the Japanese. Also, removal of The Ledge would have really hurt Japan's ability to employ its tanks - and they were the real battle-winners, "filleting" Commonwealth positions that had no adequate anti-tank defence (not even PIATs).

I entirely agree that the Commonwealth forces in Malaya were out-fought, their leaders were out-generalled...but I still believe something akin to Matador, if it could have been effected before the Japanese attacked, would have significantly blunted the Japanese offensive. I'm not willing to speculate much further than that because we can "what if" until the cows come home. That said, I think it would have been a much harder task for the Japanese had MATADOR been politically viable in, say, late November 1941 as it would have exposed the fragility of the Japanese logistics chain.

As I've said before, the Malayan Campaign was superbly orchestrated by Yamashita. He knew he couldn't afford to waste time so when he struck, he struck hard and kept moving. Once his forces started rolling down Malaya, there was no way to stop them with the forces at hand. The only way to do it would have been to halt the movement at its source...but that didn't happen and the rest is history.

 

[parsifal]

But the key issue was time. The Allies needed time to reinforce Malaya whereas the Japanese needed to take Malaya quickly before the reinforcements arrived. Singora was the vital ground, together with the road/rail links from there south

Unless the british were able to regain control of the air and the seas around Singas, more troops poured into the TO was merely going to put greater strain on the allied logistics. and in 1941 British logistics in the far east were in far worse shape than the japanese. In the far east, the brits were at least a year off soloving their logistics issues.

Denying that port would have forced Yamashita to undertake the long, overland invasion from French Indochina which was much more difficult and would have taken much more time. The main roads in Malaya were nice, modern, metalled affairs...those in Thailand were dirt tracks which, in the monsoon season, turned into quagmires. The overland route would have been slow and would have sapped Japanese resources

.


Why do you assert that an invasion from french indochina was a "much more difficult undertaking that would take much more time" No evidence exists to support that. the japanese oversame much greater difficulties in burma and New guinea with ease. they were in bangkok, in force, by december 9th, and on the burma frontier at regimental strength three days later. yamashita estimated he could be at singora via th overalnd route D+5 if that need arose. it never did. with only 3 or 4 days to prepre, the brits would have been in serious trouble with untrained troops in a close combat like singora

That said, I think it would have been a much harder task for the Japanese had MATADOR been politically viable in, say, late November 1941 as it would have exposed the fragility of the Japanese logistics chain

.


Japans supply system was its achilles heel, but only after it had overextended itself. there was no possibility of that whilst the combat remained in close proximity to japanese bases. matador might have slowed them, but not enough....

 

[buffnut453]

Why do you assert that an invasion from french indochina was a "much more difficult undertaking that would take much more time" No evidence exists to support that. the japanese oversame much greater difficulties in burma and New guinea with ease. they were in bangkok, in force, by december 9th, and on the burma frontier at regimental strength three days later. yamashita estimated he could be at singora via th overalnd route D+5 if that need arose. it never did. with only 3 or 4 days to prepre, the brits would have been in serious trouble with untrained troops in a close combat like singora

Bangkok to the Burma border is about 100 miles (given that the first phase of the Japanese attack was against the southernmost "tail" of Burma). The n-shaped route from French Indochina to Singora was roughly 10 times that distance. If the Japanese took the intermediate step of landing in force at Bangkok, that's still a distance of 600 miles to Singora - 6 times the distance from Bangkok to the Burmese border. So if it took 3-4 days for the Japanese to reach the Burma border in regimental strength, there's simply no way they could accomplish an overland move to Singora by D+5. What would the impact on the Japanese tanks have been of driving almost 1000 miles (or 600 miles via the Bangkok route) along muddy roads? Tanks aren't designed for long periods of sustained driving even on good roads. Under monsoon conditions, the unserviceability rate over such a distance and on muddy roads would have increased massively.

Furthermore, even the Bangkok option adds at least 600 miles to the logistics train and the main entry port is smaller, and less capable, than Singora (note Singora also had the main Haad Yai railhead nearby, a facility created to support trade with Malaya and used extensively by the Japanese to move forces and supplies - Bangkok had no such facility). I reckon even the Bangkok option would have garnered the Commonwealth upwards of a month to position forces, prepare defences and bring in reinforcements. It would have removed the command confusion whereby Allied units in northern Malaya had to prepare to advance and defend at the same time - they would have time to move into southern Thailand (probably unopposed) and prepare.

Also bear in mind the impact on the air campaign. The IJAAF employed its Ki-27 units to defend the invasion fleets (and were rapidly deployed to airfields in southern Thailand) while the two Ki-43 Sentai were engaged in offensive fighter sweeps against the airfields in northern Malaya. The fighter assets were, to an extent, mutually supporting because they were operating in the same general area. That would not be the case if the Ki-27s had to support a fleet going into Bangkok or, worse, provide air cover for a long ground move from French Indochina. Based on Japanese post-war reporting, the provision of replacement aircraft was unable to keep pace with the losses sustained during the Malayan Campaign. Is it reasonable to think they could have sustained the same pace of operations for another 30 days without significant impacts on operational effectiveness?

 

[Freebird]

Yes, Singapore was indefensible without control of the air and sea. Or at least dispute of these. The allies lost control of its ability to challenge at sea on the 10 December. When the ability to challenge in the air was lost is an open question. My opinion is that the air battle was lost before the first shot was even fired.

The control of the sea was not really a major factor. Unless the Brtish had a huge fleet on hand, they were not going to be able to deny the East coast to the Japanese, they would have been far better to use air assets.
The Japanese on the other hand, couldn't get major assets to the West coast, nor get close to Singapore until the RAF/RAAF were neutralized.
And as for the air campaign, as Buffnut points out, the Japanese couldn't prevent the British from supplying Singapore until the beginning of February.

Of course speculating about whether "Matador" would have made a difference to the outcome is a matter of opinion, and certainly there is some solid research undertaken recently that supports that notion. but I dont buy it. Most importantly, it assumes the same force structures and the same battle plans by the japanese, and there is no evidence, or at best flimsy evidence that supports that notion. It also fails to take into account the uncommitted reserves and capabilities at the disposal of the Japanese.

Better to to have them commit these reserves to Malaya where the British have a chance to build up a defence, than to have them free to progress outward to Burma, DEI, New Caledonia, Fiji etc.

The Japanese calculated they could pull out up to 12 of their motor transport units from China in a pinch...enough to support up to 12 division in Thailand. Beyond that the japanese had 12 Division in Japan on garrison duty, and up to 10 division in Manchuria that would be transferred to the Pacific front in the coming year. Logistics would have prevented all these formations from being committed all at once, but they were available, and could have been fed in in echelon if the the british resisted more effectively than they did. The British in Malaya were going nowhere but down, unless they could stop the flow of these forces into the theater.

Which 12 divisions are in Japan?

These garrison units in Japan/China would have nowhere near the capability of the 5th division.
The ability of the Japanese to bring down other divisions into Malaya and supply them was limited, especially if the Allies made efforts to interdict Japanese logistics

The Japanese outnumbered the british in every category, they outfought them in every battle. They could rely on control of the oceans and the air, given the prewar varications of the british.

They didn't outfight the Allies at Kampar. The Kampar position was the best opportunity to halt the Japanese advance, had the Allies prevented Japanese movement down the west coast it couldn't have been outflanked.

Unfortunately the two advantages that the British did have, artillery night operations were not taken advantage of.

 

[parsifal]

These garrison units in Japan/China would have nowhere near the capability of the 5th division.
The ability of the Japanese to bring down other divisions into Malaya and supply them was limited, especially if the Allies made efforts to interdict Japanese logistics

Manyt of the units in Japan were not garrison troops. Many were in fact elite units held back just in case. My source for the following is Japanese Armed Forces order of Battle Vol I and II Military Intelligence Division US Army - my version is a commercial copy edited by Victor Madej.

Many contemporary source give far lower numbers of troops for the Japanese, not realizing they are quoting available forces in 1937. By 1941, the japanese Army had more than 70 divs available, not 52 as is often reported.

The following is a brief summary of some of the forces retained in the home islands but ready for action. 1st Gds XX (sometimes referred to a the 1st and 2nd guards Mixed Brigades in 1941), 2nd Gds Division (built around the 1st gds Inf Bde and 1 and 2 Gds Inf Regts....the guards Division that fought in Malaya were different troops drawn from a number of units. Both guards units were lacking in modern combat experience, but later in the war distinguished themselves),

1st div was involved in North China 1937-40 where it fought outstandingly. It is reported by US intelligence as having been withdrawn back to Port Arthur and was designated part of the CEFs strategic reserves for Operation Z/

2nd div was another elite formation not used in the southern drive until after January 1942. It had been involved in the offensives in China, advancing across hundreeds of miles of trackless swamp and desert in north and central China, before beng transferred back to Manchuiria. it fought and was defeated at Nomonhan, and in December 1940 was recalled and rebuilt in Japan. It formed part of Operations Zs strategic reserve, finally being committed to the invasion of Java. It ended the war in Rabaul.

4th Division was in central China until September 1941. It was then moved to Shanghai where it too became part of the elite reserves to support operation Z. if any part of the operation had struck unexpected trouble, these units were there for the speific purpose of reinforcing those stalled areas. To a degree that happened, but not all forces were found necessary. Because of the difficulties being experienced in the Philipnnes islands, 4th Division was eventually moved to Battaan where it played a pivatal role in the destruction of the allied forces there. In July 1942 it returned to China, for several months before returning to Japan. In 1943 it was returned to Sumatra, and then to Thailand in 1945, following the collapse of the Japanese army in Burma. There is not the slightest evidence that the Japanese had any trouble moving this formation around the Far eastern TO in 1941-2. Difficulties arose later.

7th Division had fought in north China in 1937-8 before being moved to Manchuria. it fought in Nomonhan where it sufferefd heavy casualties. It returned to it home dpot in Japan in early 1941, and was also listed as available in the strategic reserves in December 1941. It provided manpower for the formation of the Ichiki detachment. It remained on garrison however in north japan and the Kuriles for most of the war

8 Di8vision was not part of the strategic reserve, however it was unengaged in Manchuria in 1941, meaning it was available for deployment. these are not my words....they are the assessments made by US intell at the time. They would have been available if needed

9th div was similarly freed from garrison and frontline duties in 1941. Unlike 8th dive, it was eventually moved to the Pacific, in February 1943.

12 Div was an Army reserve for the Mutanchiang fortified sector in november 1941. in that month it was given orders to prepare for transhipment south, as it was designated one of the emergency reserves for the southern operation. It was never needed. It was eventually moved to Formaosa in January 1945.

14 div was transferred from Manchuria to the home islands in the Summer of 1941. It was reorganised (triangularized) in June, and attached to the strategic reserve in September. It wa another reserve formation that was never needed. It was not transfered to the pacific until March 1943 when it was moved to the Marshalls. it was destroyed there in 1944.


These units I have cited are just a few. There were plenty of others removed from China and Manchuria, and attached to various reserves. Japan had oodles of such forces. And they were far from garrison troops. they were actually more elite than the forces placed under Terauchi's command. And Japan never had the slightest problem moving these troops in the ABDA area until well after 1943

They didn't outfight the Allies at Kampar. The Kampar position was the best opportunity to halt the Japanese advance, had the Allies prevented Japanese movement down the west coast it couldn't have been outflanked.

Isolated battles does not constitute a victorious formula. the gurkhas outfought the Japanese at Moulmein and other places. they were still defeated. And not by numbers. they were defeated by manouvre....spcalled hooking tactics for which the Britiah had no answer until 1944.

Unfortunately the two advantages that the British did have, artillery night operations were not taken advantage of.

I would dispute that they had any significant advantages in night operations, and their advantage in artillery wa curtailed by shortages in supply

 

[tomo pauk]

I must say that this thread is one of the most informative ones, many thanks for the contributors.

 

[Freebird]

Additionally, Brooke-Popham was refused permission to launch MATADOR unilaterally unless Japan directly attacked Malaya - the obvious problem here was that MATADOR was largely impossible to implement after Japan had attacked Malaya.

True, but unfortunately, (probably after having been up for 36 hours) both Percival Brooke-Popham failed to realize that the Khota Bharu landing (at ~ 2am) immediately lifted the restrictions on Matador, and failed to authorize the move forwards. They could at least have gotten the troops forward to "The Ledge" but the order failed to arrive for another 8 or 10 hours more.

Manyt of the units in Japan were not garrison troops. Many were in fact elite units held back just in case. My source for the following is Japanese Armed Forces order of Battle Vol I and II Military Intelligence Division US Army - my version is a commercial copy edited by Victor Madej.

Many contemporary source give far lower numbers of troops for the Japanese, not realizing they are quoting available forces in 1937. By 1941, the japanese Army had more than 70 divs available, not 52 as is often reported.



These units I have cited are just a few. There were plenty of others removed from China and Manchuria, and attached to various reserves. Japan had oodles of such forces. And they were far from garrison troops. they were actually more elite than the forces placed under Terauchi's command. And Japan never had the slightest problem moving these troops in the ABDA area until well after 1943

Thanks for the details!

Isolated battles does not constitute a victorious formula. the gurkhas outfought the Japanese at Moulmein and other places. they were still defeated. And not by numbers. they were defeated by manouvre....spcalled hooking tactics for which the Britiah had no answer until 1944.

Then how did the Australians defeat Japan in New Guinea in 1942. if Japanese Infantry couldn't be stopped and if they had many (dozens) of divisions available?

Britiain did in fact have an answer for the Japanese hooking manouver - stay away from hookers.
Seriously though, they did hava an answer that was realized pretty quickly in Malaya - don't anchor your line onto jungle, because the Japanese will indeed infiltrate around it.
By forming a line that isn't surrounded by jungle, the Japanese cannot infiltrate around it.

This was exactly the position at Kampar, with mountains to one side and swamp along the coastal side, the position couldn't be outflanked or infiltrated, and the Japanese took much heavier casualties trying to assault it.

The key to the Kampar position was to prevent the Japanese from capturing boats at Penang and to have enough air or sea power on the west coast to deny Japan the ability to land behind the Kampar position, which is the only way they could defeat it.


In a similar manner, instead of falling back to Singapore Island which was far from defensible, they needed to have set up defensive works in southern Johore, where there isn't jungle but mostly plantations.
Had they set up a defensive line in Johore the position would be hard for Japan to break.*

*Note - To do so they will need to have brought in better troops, and enough air assets to at least challenge Japanes air superiority.

I would dispute that they had any significant advantages in night operations, and their advantage in artillery wa curtailed by shortages in supply

Sorry, I meant night air operations, not ground.
The Allies did indeed not have an advantage on the ground at night, but the RAF, RAAF FAA had considerable success operating at night.

 

[parsifal]

Then how did the Australians defeat Japan in New Guinea in 1942. if Japanese Infantry couldn't be stopped and if they had many (dozens) of divisions available?

They forced the Japanese into making direct frontal assaults onto heavily defended positions, much as the Americans did on guadacanal. First successes using this "funelling" method are traditionally attributed to Milne Bay.

Japanese infantry could be stopped, but it required considerable nerve. importantly skill and methods of warfare seen as fundamental principals of battle in Europe had to be essentially unlearned in the pacific. You see the same mindset in this place. Somehow, bigger is better....always worry about your flanks and your logistic tail. Tanks were thought not able to operate in close terrain. all these assumptions had to be abandoned before success could be achieved in the jungle. Some cottoned on quicker than others.

In fact, in the jungle the allies struggled with getting artillery into position because the artillery they were using waqs too heavy to be effectively used in that terrain. Tanks were initially thought not possible to operate in the jungle. Tactics in the jungle were centred around the squad rather than the platoon, and in general there was a decentralization of command structures. British soldiers even as late as 1943 were stil attempting to enter battles with full packs strapped to ther backs, wearing boofy hobnailed boots and gear bulky and moisture retaining. By contrast the Japanese centred their firepower behind smaller, but far more mobile artillery, they used rubber, threee toed jungle boots and lightweight, quick drying uniforms. Japanese soldiers were conditioned to go without rations for days and carried packs generally 20-40kg lighter than their british counterparts. The Japanese were very adept at using artillery and tanks in jungle terrain. The Japanese learned or practised from the beginning, not to worry about their flanks or their supply lines at all. they knew that the Jungle could nearly always cover a retreat and therefore flanks were not that important in the jungle.

Gradually the Allies learned these skills as well. Australia set up its jungle warfare school in Canungra (Qld) at which both the US and Australian armies learned the necessary skills acquired by the veterans of Buna. its because the Australians paid attention to Japanese tactics, and learned from them, and then adapted them to suit our needs (incoproarating air supply and lightweight artillery mostly.....Japanese tactics were also poor ini some respects and accepted high casualty rates which were unnacceptable to the Australian army. We always emphasised greater use of firepower than the japanese , which meant our guys were still more dependant on re-supply than the japanese).

Britiain did in fact have an answer for the Japanese hooking manouver - stay away from hookers.
Seriously though, they did hava an answer that was realized pretty quickly in Malaya - don't anchor your line onto jungle, because the Japanese will indeed infiltrate around it. By forming a line that isn't surrounded by jungle, the Japanese cannot infiltrate around it.

If they realized it, they certainly didnt practice it, either during the campaign in Malaya, or in any of the other jungle campaigns up to and including Arakan. British armies were repeatedly flanked and defeated because of that one failing. At Araklan, two divisions were essentially defeated by a single Japanese regiment, all because the british could not understand that in the jungle you never worry about being outflanked.

Having a few individuals realize what was needed is not devising effective counters and training to defeat a resourceful and tough enemy. The lessons need to be absorbed on an army wide basis, equipment devised and issued to deal with the problem, and training and tactics implmented in manuals and training. This most definately was not learned or adopted by the british and Indian armies until well into 1943. Wingate led the charge in the transformation of the British thinking

In a similar manner, instead of falling back to Singapore Island which was far from defensible, they needed to have set up defensive works in southern Johore, where there isn't jungle but mostly plantations.

FB, I know you know what those plantations in Johore are like. They are as bad as natural jungle as far as access is concerned. They might as well be jungle because whelled vehicles cannot get access to them. The British had no end of trouble with the Japanese around KL

Had they set up a defensive line in Johore the position would be hard for Japan to break.

*


Yamashita thought the fighting around Johore was relatively easy. He said repeatedly in post action reports that there was litle effective resistance in the battles around Johore

*Note - To do so they will need to have brought in better troops, and enough air assets to at least challenge Japanes air superiority.

I am unware of any evidence to support that. Japanese Infantry formations sliced through Allied positions so easily there was never any opportunity to set up solid lines of defence in the manner you described, and where is was tried, the Japanese simply outflaked it, knowing the British would obligingly retreat every time their "lines of communication" was threatened.

 

[parsifal]

One thing I should say about the force levels committed to the pacific. Whilst the japanese army was quite prepred to pour the necessary resources into the battles for the southern area, they were not prepred to pour large numbers of groun troops in the Pacific TO, until after Guadacanal. They viewwed operations in the Pacific to be an IJN responsibility. this explains the reluctance of the IJA to send large numbers of troops to the PTO. they wanted to go back to China to finish the job there. Evidence that the japanese had the troops and could move them around as needed, with supply can be found by the fact that byb 1943, the Japanerse had 25 div equivalents in the PTO compared to less than 10 in 1942. They had the troops, they had the logistics, they just didnt have the will to make that committment in early 1942...

 

[fastmongrel]

Just spotted that there is going to be a documentary on BBC2 May 21st at 9pm "The Fall of Singapore:The Great Betrayal"

Apparently it claims there was a high level Japanese Spy in the British Military who gave information on Singapore and Pearl Harbour.

Dont know if anyone outside the UK can watch it but might be of interest to you guys. That is as long as its not in the usual run of documentaries on BBC, a celebrity presenter, lots of bouncy camerawork and no information or what little there is wrong or used out of context. The BBC used to do fantastic documentaries now it does celebrity dancing shows.

 

[buffnut453]

Hi Parsifal,

Thanks for the info. Undoubtedly the Japanese had more forces available in the region - they considered it "home turf". However, a couple of observations/questions:

1. There's a world of difference between having forces available and being able to mobilize them for combat. How would the Japanese overcome the logistic problem given that, by the end of the fighting in Singapore, they were running out of ammo? And that's not a myth generated by westerners to excuse the fall of Singapore - it's documented from Japanese sources including Tsuji's book about the Japanese side of the campaign and Frei's "Guns of February" which provides several first-hand accounts from Japanese soldiers involved in the Malayan Campaign (unless simply the translation and publishing of these accounts is part of the myth generation?).

2. If the Japanese were so invincible and were able to reinforce Yamashita almost at will, then where does that leave your argument that the British screwed up? By your logic, the Commonwealth forces "could have done better" but ultimately were doomed to failure...so why bother? The net result, per the arguments (and I mean that in a legalistic way rather than an aggressive flame-war manner) you've set forth would simply have been more Aussies either dead or in Japanese POW camps (which for so many was effectively the same thing). Or have I missed something as we've bounced around the topic?

Great discussion - I always learn stuff when I spar with you.

Cheers,
B-N

 

[Vincenzo]

niehorster pages also report around 50 division for japanese army and commonly him informations are not so bad, missing 20 divisions is very large error. What's your source? there is some online?

 

[parsifal]

niehorster pages also report around 50 division for japanese army and commonly him informations are not so bad, missing 20 divisions is very large error. What's your source? there is some online?

ive already provided the reference in preceding posts.

According to the US Intelligence Volumes the Japanese were fielding the following divisions (or division equivalents) in December 1941

1 Gds, 2 Gds, Gds, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 (aug'41), 32 (assets only, no HQ), 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48 (dec'40), 51 (Aug '40), 52 (Aug '40), 55 (Aug'40), 54 (Aug '40), 56(Aug '40), 57 (Aug '40), 58 (Feb '41), 59 (Feb '41), 60 (assets only, Div HQ formed 4/42), 61(assets only, Div HQ formed 8/42), 63 ( partial assets only, Div HQ formed 4/43), 64 ( formed from existing assets from square divs , HQ formed 6/43), 68 (formed around 14 IMB, plus excess artillery and various existing assets Div fomred 1/42), 69 (same as 68 but around 16 IMB, Div formed 2/42), 70 (same as previous, around 20 IMB, Div formed 3/42), 71 (formed 4/42 2 x free Inf Regts and the hunchon artillery garrison unit, all existing 12/41), 72 9out of sequence, formed 7/41 from training assets attached to the 2nd depot at Sendai) 77 Div was the same but based in Hokkaido,

(Garrison Divs (mostly formed 1937-8, most demobilised as divs 1941-3, though the assets were never disbanded, just the HQs. The assets were generally redesignated IMBs and various other nondivisional assets. many of the divisional numbers were reactivated in the last year of the war, using different personnel and core formations...many of these ressurrected units were torn to pieces in the Soviet offensive of 1945, and one at Okinawa. others were destroye in the Solomons and NG. Not all of this series of divs were disbanded...110 for example).

100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110,

(the 111 through to 133 Divs were all formed in 1944-5 from existing prewar assets mostly IMBs and surplus independant regts. they were brigaded divs, meaning they were short of artillery and transport, and only had 50-70% of the manpower of the elite divs)

Armour

In 1941 the Japanese had two divisional sized armoured formations 1 2 armoured. 3 Armoured was formewd in 1942 from existing armoured brigades and assets

There were 18 depot divs in 1941, which also had to provide garrison troops for local defence. as one exception to that that I know of 57th Depot cmd and the Formsan Depot cmds each contributed personnel fo0r the 65 IMB, which was meant to be a garrison unit, but finished up fighting in the front line. though that unit was undistinguished, it still was effective against the early alied field formations.


The IMBs are confusing, and I dont claim to be at all accurate here.....this is a quick reply to give a quick idea of the IJA OOB in 1941. People have spent years trying to unravel this and still cant get it right. but this gives at least some idea....

I count 19 Indepenandent Mixed Brigades and Independant Infantry Brigades that remained independant through the war. Their authorised TOE varied, but typically was about 4-8000 men. Artillery was generally light on, but good enough for the jungle.

Im halfway through VolI (of 2 vols) and have decided to stop at that point

Disregarding everything below the brigades and the depot divs, but counting the garrison units and converting the Brigades to 0.5 Div, we arrive at a figure of 81 divs. To that figure you must also add the equivalent of 5 Divs in the IJN....the SNLF forces and their naval paratroops.

A good estimation of real strength for the japanese in December 1941 was around 90 Divs, of which about 70 might be considered combat worthy

 

[parsifal]

Thanks for the info. Undoubtedly the Japanese had more forces available in the region - they considered it "home turf". However, a couple of observations/questions:

Thanks, and your most welcome. not trying to flame this thread up or having a go at you guys, but looking at the allied position in 1941 with rose coloure glasses, whilst disregarding latent japanese capability is just kidding ourselves. Thats why ive come down the pitch with this information.....Malaya, and Singapore were doomed before even the first shot was ever fired....fancy plans and a few extra or better troops might string things out, but would not change the final outcome

1. There's a world of difference between having forces available and being able to mobilize them for combat.

As per my previous post, about 90 divs fielded in 1941, or equivalent, with about 70 that can be considered fully combat ready.

How would the Japanese overcome the logistic problem given that, by the end of the fighting in Singapore, they were running out of ammo? And that's not a myth generated by westerners to excuse the fall of Singapore - it's documented from Japanese sources including Tsuji's book about the Japanese side of the campaign and Frei's "Guns of February" which provides several first-hand accounts from Japanese soldiers involved in the Malayan Campaign (unless simply the translation and publishing of these accounts is part of the myth generation?).

There were logisitc problems at the very end, but only because the Japanese pushed forward other elements of their overall campaign and had already begun to divert supply to other commands.

The difficulty was not supply availability, or even shipping in 1941. The japanese had adequate of both. But they did find their wheeled transport a tad light on for sustained heavy operations with trucks having to traverse several hundred miles from their supply heads in Singora, tho the front in johore. Any army would find that hard going in terms of logistics. if the defences had been pushed forward into Thailand the Japanese would not have had near the same problem with overextended supply lines.

Not to say that there werenot limits. Supply was the japanese achilles heel. But my best guess is that they could have kept supplied for a sustained period around 12-15 divs if the main fighting remained in the North

2. If the Japanese were so invincible and were able to reinforce Yamashita almost at will, then where does that leave your argument that the British screwed up?

Because if the forward airfields had been defended properly., and the air force properly exapanded, and a balanced naval task force deployed to Singapore, as had been promised, the ground battle would never have developed in the first place. the war in the pacific, above everything was a battle for control of airfieldws and sealanes. Retain control of those, and you win the battle

By your logic, the Commonwealth forces "could have done better" but ultimately were doomed to failure...so why bother?

Because a stand had to be made somewhere. if Malaya was abandoned, or not seen as adequately defended, all sorts of bad things would arise....everything from a loss of faith by the ANZACs (and a wholesale withdrawal from Europe) through to a possible collapse in China and a faltering will and resolve on the part of the americans. once the battle was joined with the historical forces, it was game over, the whole thing was a gigantic bluff that went horribly wrong

The net result, per the arguments (and I mean that in a legalistic way rather than an aggressive flame-war manner) you've set forth would simply have been more Aussies either dead or in Japanese POW camps (which for so many was effectively the same thing). Or have I missed something as we've bounced around the topic?

We are discusing in a friendly way ( I hope) the possibilities in Malaya in December 1941. obviously there is a lot of speculation going on here, and there is no right answer.

I dont think Malaya was a waste of time. I believe it to be a necessary sacrifice for all the reasons mentioned above and more. Japanese military strength was a wasting asset....generally everything they lost, they replaced with difficulty and delay. Losses incurred in Malaya for them has an effect later on, but that doesnt mean we can join the dots and argue the place could be held, with the historical forces, or near the historical forces. Its two different positions really.

I would have thought that you of all people, with such a keen interest in far eastern air power would appreciate why it was so crucial, and why in 1941 it was so hopeless to argue that without adequate airpower the allies had any hope of winning.....

Great discussion - I always learn stuff when I spar with you.

Ditto