Loss of Singapore - Whose fault was it?

[buffnut453]

I don't think I've ever argued that Malaya could be held with the forces assigned. Airpower was vital and the lack of fighter units in theatre was deplorable, as was the lack of flexibility and imagination displayed by AHQFE (eg stringent adherence to stovepiped application of air power such as "airfields must be attacked by bombers" or "fighters are there to defend against the enemy's attacks").

I disagree with your statement that a stronger RAF presence and balanced RN fleet would have prevented the ground battle from ever occurring. The Japanese invasion force would have landed somewhere, if not Singora and Kota Bharu (among other locations) then Bangkok or even into French Indochina. The land battle would have developed but, per my earlier posts, at a much slower pace.

As for the logistics, if the Japanese needed to remove supplies from Yamashita's army for other theatres then surely that points to a lack of logistical or resupply capacity. Why take such risks with your main axis of assault? One could argue that Yamashita was confident of victory but why, then, did Tsuji as one of the key architects of the campaign complain about lack of supplies at the end? Also, per Frei's book, several Japanese soldiers actually thought they'd surrendered, and not the British, when the guns went quite in mid-Feb 42. This all suggests a far more "touch-and-go" situation from the Japanese perspective. Removing supplies for other, lower priority, theatres just doesn't make sense unless there were some fundamental logistical issues.

Finally, I also your comment that British forward defence would have reduced the length of Japanese supply lines. Per my earlier posts, if Singora was denied to the Japanese, the only viable place to land forces in sufficient quantity was Bangkok which would have resulted in a 600-mile logistics chain just to get to Singora. That's extending supply lines not shortening them.

As for the rest, you're right that we're discussing "might have beens" and there is no right answer. It would be interesting to know how many units Japan felt were needed to defend the homeland, although your earlier posts provide a pretty good indication of what were allotted as reserves. I still wonder about the ability to keep a larger force supplied had Yamashita met stiffer resistance. Fundamentally, I think we are in broad agreement that more could (and should) have been done by Brooke-Popham's forces but we'll probably always differ on relative importance and details.

Cheers,
B-N

 

[buffnut453]

I don't think I've ever argued that Malaya could be held with the forces assigned. Airpower was vital and the lack of fighter units in theatre was deplorable, as was the lack of flexibility and imagination displayed by AHQFE (eg stringent adherence to stovepiped application of air power such as "airfields must be attacked by bombers" or "fighters are there to defend against the enemy's attacks").

I disagree with your statement that a stronger RAF presence and balanced RN fleet would have prevented the ground battle from ever occurring. The Japanese invasion force would have landed somewhere, if not Singora and Kota Bharu (among other locations) then Bangkok or even into French Indochina. The land battle would have developed but, per my earlier posts, at a much slower pace.

As for the logistics, if the Japanese needed to remove supplies from Yamashita's army for other theatres then surely that points to a lack of logistical or resupply capacity. Why take such risks with your main axis of assault? One could argue that Yamashita was confident of victory but why, then, did Tsuji as one of the key architects of the campaign complain about lack of supplies at the end? Also, per Frei's book, several Japanese soldiers actually thought they'd surrendered, and not the British, when the guns went quite in mid-Feb 42. This all suggests a far more "touch-and-go" situation from the Japanese perspective. Removing supplies for other, lower priority, theatres just doesn't make sense unless there were some fundamental logistical issues.

Finally, I also disagree with your comment that British forward defence would have reduced the length of Japanese supply lines. Per my earlier posts, if Singora was denied to the Japanese, the only viable place to land forces in sufficient quantity was Bangkok which would have resulted in a 600-mile logistics chain just to get to Singora. That's extending supply lines not shortening them.

As for the rest, you're right that we're discussing "might have beens" and there is no right answer. It would be interesting to know how many units Japan felt were needed to defend the homeland, although your earlier posts provide a pretty good indication of what were allotted as reserves. I still wonder about the ability to keep a larger force supplied had Yamashita met stiffer resistance. Fundamentally, I think we are in broad agreement that more could (and should) have been done by Brooke-Popham's forces but we'll probably always differ on relative importance and details.

Cheers,
B-N

 

[parsifal]

I disagree with your statement that a stronger RAF presence and balanced RN fleet would have prevented the ground battle from ever occurring. The Japanese invasion force would have landed somewhere, if not Singora and Kota Bharu (among other locations) then Bangkok or even into French Indochina. The land battle would have developed but, per my earlier posts, at a much slower pace.

The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.

A properly trained and worked up TF, equipped with Martlets and/or Sea Hurricanes could well have interdicted sea comunications as far north as Cam Ranh Bay IMO. A strike force of about 150 long range maritime strike aircraft, such as the CA-4 or Mosquito, escorted by Mosquitoes and/Beafighters would have been unstoppable for the japanese until their carriers arrived. A force of 2-300 Boomerangs or Hurricanes would have made life very difficult for the British. if the Bris had invested something like decent amounts of money into the development of carrier avaiation prewar (a very long shot admittedly), they would have been flying earlier derivatives of the Fury and Firefly instead of Albacores and Fulmars. These a/c would have been very difficult propositions for the Japanese and would have made any land battle problematic. Land battles would have been supported by CA-4s (a divebomber with a 2000lb warload and a top speed in excess if 300 mph) and may well have given a vital edge to the Allied ground forces. If the allies were able to fortify in the peninsula things may also have gone better
what

As for the logistics, if the Japanese needed to remove supplies from Yamashita's army for other theatres then surely that points to a lack of logistical or resupply capacity. Why take such risks with your main axis of assault? One could argue that Yamashita was confident of victory but why, then, did Tsuji as one of the key architects of the campaign complain about lack of supplies at the end?

The needed to remove supplies because suficient supplies were arriving at the supply heads. There was no more need for additional supply. The difficulty was the same as that faced by Rommel, enough supply at the points of disembarkation, but insufficient supply at the fronts, because the supply lines were over extended. It was a matter of choice for the japanese....do they continue to pour most resources into malaya, where they were winning hands down, or do they bring forward their other key assaults 9principally the invasions of burma, and the East indies, but also the attacks into the SWPA). They chose the latter, because they were nervous about securing their supplies of raw materials, and couldnt believe how successful they had been to that point.

If the land battle had developed closer to their supply heads and rail links (both of which they possessed in Thailand), the strain on their supply lines would have been far less. Halve the distance, and your supplies increase roughly 8 fold, using Rommels experience as a guide. A land battle around the norther frontier, as opposed to somewhhere near Singapore is about 1/10 the distance in terms of the length of their supply lines. At those distances, the amount of transport becomes unimportant, its the actual tonnages of supplies arriving at the supply heads thats important. and 25th army was never short of supply at its supply heads

Also, per Frei's book, several Japanese soldiers actually thought they'd surrendered, and not the British, when the guns went quite in mid-Feb 42. This all suggests a far more "touch-and-go" situation from the Japanese perspective. Removing supplies for other, lower priority, theatres just doesn't make sense unless there were some fundamental logistical issues.

Once the battle reached the gates of Singapore, it was a bit dicey, but the issue was never in doubt once that point had been reached. Worst case for the Japanese would have been to hunker down and stockpile, Allies were just withering on the vine by then....the japanese could decide when and in what strength they would attack

If there were no supply issues further north, and no doubt to the oucome further south, there is nowhere for the allies to gio, no magical position for them to defeat the Japanese

Finally, I also disagree with your comment that British forward defence would have reduced the length of Japanese supply lines. Per my earlier posts, if Singora was denied to the Japanese, the only viable place to land forces in sufficient quantity was Bangkok which would have resulted in a 600-mile logistics chain just to get to Singora. That's extending supply lines not shortening them.

The problem with a matador strategy is that it alienates the thais even more than they already were. 600 miles over friendly territory, through territory where quite possibly the japanese would have had months to prepre, is no more difficult than keeping units supplied in Brisbane, using supply heads from melbourne. Supply through friendly territory is much easier than through disputed or eney controlled territory

Might have to accept a differnce her, but I do agree, most points we are in agreement

 

[buffnut453]

Tanks were initially thought not possible to operate in the jungle.

In Malaya, the tanks didn't operate in the jungle. They drove straight down the roads. The failure of mindset on the British side was that tanks should only ever be used on open terrain (ie a Flanders-like scenario) rather than, as the Japanese employed them, in the role of sledgehammer or steamroller to smash through defensive infantry positions.

They knew that the Jungle could nearly always cover a retreat and therefore flanks were not that important in the jungle.

Were he still alive, I think Lt Col Anderson VC of 2/19th Bn might comment on the practicality of retreating through the jungle.

If they realized it, they certainly didnt practice it, either during the campaign in Malaya, or in any of the other jungle campaigns up to and including Arakan. British armies were repeatedly flanked and defeated because of that one failing.

One unit was well-trained in jungle warfare - Stewart's Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Stewart realised that the fighting in Malaya wasn't "fighting in the jungle" it was fighting for domination of the road. The actual amount of jungle fighting was minimal, it was simply a useful cover for the Japanese to infiltrate behind fixed defensive positions (usually poorly-located - my earlier comment about Ivan Simson's book applies here).

Japanese Infantry formations sliced through Allied positions so easily there was never any opportunity to set up solid lines of defence in the manner you described, and where is was tried, the Japanese simply outflaked it, knowing the British would obligingly retreat every time their "lines of communication" was threatened.

Actually, I think it was the tanks that did the slicing. The infantry did an excellent job of working round the flanks but it was the tanks that smashed through entire formations.

That said, I agree with all your other comments about it taking far too long for the British to adopt, in a widescale fashion, the techniques promoted by Stewart.

 

[buffnut453]

The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.

Perhaps, although the prospect of sustained operations when the Japanese had submarines, long-range torpedo bombers and Zeros in theatre remains highly debatable.

A strike force of about 150 long range maritime strike aircraft, such as the CA-4 or Mosquito, escorted by Mosquitoes and/Beafighters would have been unstoppable for the japanese until their carriers arrived.

Not in late 1941. Given that Beaufighters didn't start maritime ops until mid-1942 and that Mossies weren't available in numbers until the same timeframe, I think it's stretching the "what if" scenario to the absolute limits to suggest they could have been available to defend Malaya in late 1941 (although I agree they'd be a great combination for ops over the Gulf of Thailand).

The needed to remove supplies because suficient supplies were arriving at the supply heads. There was no more need for additional supply. The difficulty was the same as that faced by Rommel, enough supply at the points of disembarkation, but insufficient supply at the fronts, because the supply lines were over extended. It was a matter of choice for the japanese....do they continue to pour most resources into malaya, where they were winning hands down, or do they bring forward their other key assaults 9principally the invasions of burma, and the East indies, but also the attacks into the SWPA). They chose the latter, because they were nervous about securing their supplies of raw materials, and couldnt believe how successful they had been to that point.

But leaving soldiers with less than 20 rounds per man at the end of the battle, and some artillery units equally down to the last few shells, is cutting things unnecessarily close - too close, in my view, for it to be entirely deliberate. Also, if Singora was not available, the Japanese would have to use resupply hubs further to the rear and, with a couple of less-likely options, Bangkok is the closest. Then consider that the roads weren't metalled which forces you onto rail...and, voila, you have a tempting air strike target that can be easily interdicted. I don't think the resupply problem is as easy as you're making out. And it's still 600 miles from Bangkok to Singora so if the Japanese had difficulties getting supplies the 560 miles from Singora to Johore, then it's probably fair to say that the same problem would exist from Bangkok to Singora.

600 miles over friendly territory, through territory where quite possibly the japanese would have had months to prepre, is no more difficult than keeping units supplied in Brisbane, using supply heads from melbourne. Supply through friendly territory is much easier than through disputed or eney controlled territory

But the route from Singora to Johore was not disputed. Not by the end of the campaign. And as noted above, resupplying from Bangkok would probably have to depend on rail rather than mud-swamped loads. Thus the concept of "friendly" territory is moot because the resupply route would be highly susceptible to air attack. As an aside, the Thai weren't, on the whole, friendly to the Japanese - they were trying to play Japan off against Britain and broadly were about as neutral as it's possible to get...with a few exceptions (Direk's book "Thailand During the Second World War" is most enlightening on this subject).

The problem with a matador strategy is that it alienates the thais even more than they already were.

And this is the nub of the political challenge - Britain didn't want to get sucked into a war against Japan unnecessarily just because the latter invaded Thailand. The only way to overcome the problem was accurate intelligence that would have prompted both London and Bangkok to reach an accommodation. There was a narrow window of opportunity for this to occur between 3 Dec and 7 Dec when the IJAAF were sending fighters to the newly-built airfields on Phu Quoc island and to other airfields nearby on the Indochina mainland. Singapore knew these airfields were being built, and also knew that other airfields were being extended (eg Siem Riep), which was a key indicator of bomber deployments. As late as October 1941, Brooke-Popham was urging FECB to expend every effort to detect the arrival of Japanese fighter aircraft in theatre and yet those priorities changed as soon as intelligence of the Japanese invasion fleet was received. From that point on, the focus became locating and tracking the fleet even though it would provide no real indication of destination or axis of attack. Flying PR missions over the airfields that were known to exist in western Indochina would have provided evidence of a major Japanese build up that was clearly directed at Singora and northern Malaya. Since it was not highly-classified, such PR-derived intel could have been shared with the Thai and US Governments, potentially enabling all to agree on mutual defence. It would still be short notice but having some troops in Singora and preparations to blow the ledge would have hurt Yamashita quite badly.

Interesting discussion...I'm enjoying this. Then again, I can (and do!) bore for NATO on this topic...as you well know!

 

[Vincenzo]

Parsifal sorry for my fault (you had already posted the source), the source is intelligence info take in wartime or after war collecting/using japanese docs?
i try to compare us intelligence division list with that on niehorster page
1 Gds, 2 Gds, Gds, on orbat.com there is a Gds division in SEA/25th Army, a mix Brigade in East Japan and the depot of Guard division ever in east japan
infantry division 1st to 41nd there are all on orbat.com like that from 43rd to 52nd, there is also a 53rd, there are also 54th-57th, none of division from 58th to 77th, no the 42nd (there are the 1st-20th IMB, plus an other 3 infantry brigade not called mixed)
of the 100s series there are only 104th and 110th and a 116th
there are not armoured division there are 3 armoured brigade this are not near to division are all tanks units with 2/4 tank regiment (regiment like british, battalion strenght)
there is also a para division (very small unit with 2 regiment alone and this are battalion strenght unit)

 

[Vincenzo]

deleted double post

 

[A4K]

LOSS OF SINGAPORE - WHO'S FAULT WAS IT?


It was Jan (Lucky 13). I saw him!

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal sorry for my fault (you had already posted the source), the source is intelligence info take in wartime or after war collecting/using japanese docs?

not a problem Vincenzo. in reference to your question, the foreword of my copy says "These two volumes are an edited version of the last edition of the Order of Battle Of the Japanese Armed Forces issued issued by the military intelligence Division of the US Department Of Of the Army. The amended 5th edition was used with pencilled changes through to september 1945. These changes included amnedments made by US occupation authorities during the postwar debriefings and interogations undertaken 1946-7. The original text of 1407 pages has been substantially edited to eliminate redundant entries (ie entries corrected during the war or in the post war debrief).This edition also eliminates certain other information such as unit codes, postal systems and home station designations, that may be of great interest to an Intell analyst, but of limited interest to historians. The editor acknowledges that the high level of accuracy and detailed information on units must be credited to the unknown military writers that prepred the material for direct use in the war. Most of the original text has not been removed or changed. Editing concentrated on removing unneccesary or innaccurate bul without compromising content".

i try to compare us intelligence division list with that on niehorster page

I will try to do the same to try and get as accurate a picture for you as possible

1 Gds, 2 Gds, Gds, on orbat.com there is a Gds division in SEA/25th Army, a mix Brigade in East Japan and the depot of Guard division ever in east japan

1st Gds HQ was not formed until 6/43, however the most of the assets existed prewar, as 1 Gds Independant Mixed Brigade (see 2gds Inf Div below) , with authorised complement in December 1941 of 12350 men and 36 artillery pieces in place. it did not bear the name division, but with a strength of that size as an IMB it was stronger than many divisions. a bit like SSLAH descibed as a Brigade in June 1941....it had an authorised strength of just under 9000 men.

2nd gds was the original "Gds unit" . it was forme in 1867. by 1937 it had 1st and 2nd gds Infantry Brigades attached, organized into 1, 2, 3,4, 5 6 Inf Rgts, Gds Recon Rgt, 2 and 3 Gds Art Rgts, 2 Gds Assault Rgt, 2 Gds Construction Rgt, a signals and a transport regt. The Gds Cavalry Rgt was added in 1920. in 1937 it had a complement in excess of 35000 men, making it a corps strength unit in all but name. this sort of thing was typical of the japanese for their elity formation. Totally unworkable as a formation I might add.

In June 1941 the division was completely reorganized and rationalized. 1st Gds Inf Bde 91 nd 2 Inf Rgts attached) were dropped along with some lesser support echelons which became the 1 Gds Idependant Inf Bde (IIB). 2nd Gds Bde (3 and 4 Inf Rgts attached), half the Cavalry and some artillery were also detached..... these formations were used to build the 1 Gds Independant Mixed Brigade (IMB). 1 Gds IMB became the 1st Gds Inf Div in June 1943 (see the entry for 1st gds Inf Div above)

This is where I get a little confused. At this point 2nd Gds Inf Div appears to have 5 and 6 Infantry regts still attached, plus some of the support units. According to the Intell report, 2nd Gds Bde (3 4 Inf Rgt) plus some additional assets (which I have yet to identify the source) were also detached and formed the nucleas of the Imperial Guards Division ....the unit that fought in Malaya, but then it says that when the 1st gds Div was activated in 1943, this formation (the gds Div) was also redesignated the 2Gds Div. I cannot reconcile what happened to the remains of the original 2Gds Div and the "new" 2nd Gds Div.

Confused? i am....But wait theres more.....the report further states" The Guards Div was activated in Tokyo in 1867, and is believed to have remained there until 1940 when 2gds Bde (3 and 4 Gds Inf Rgts) were sent to Shanghai and then to Sth China. in June 1941 this Brigade transferred to Hainan where the 5th Gds Rgt came under its command" ( Iassume this was the 5th regt from the remains of the original 2nd Gds Div, which now leaves 2nd Gds Div with one Inf Rgt attached from its original TOE)...."In July the Gds Div were sent to Sth Indo China. On the outbreak of the war they entered Thailand. Folwing the peace traty with thailand, the division moved soth into Malaya, following the 5th Division, and crossing the frontier 3 days after departure from Bangkok. Its first action is believed to have been north of Ipoh where its lack of combat experience showed....it suffered heavy casualties. Subsequently it was used in amphibious assaults down the west coast, landing at (unreadable) where it was again involved in heavy fighting ...."

infantry division 1st to 41nd there are all on orbat.com like that from 43rd to 52nd, there is also a 53rd, there are also 54th-57th, none of division from 58th to 77th, no the 42nd (there are the 1st-20th IMB, plus an other 3 infantry brigade not called mixed)

I will recheck when the assets and the HQs were formed for these formations and get back to you

of the 100s series there are only 104th and 110th and a 116th
there are not armoured division there are 3 armoured brigade this are not near to division are all tanks units with 2/4 tank regiment (regiment like british, battalion strenght)
there is also a para division (very small unit with 2 regiment alone and this are battalion strenght unit)

Will check these as well when I get time.

 

[Vincenzo]

for orbat.com
the gds division had 3rd, 4th and 5th guards regiment +arty (36 pieces) +recon and support
the gds mixed brigade had 1st and 2nd guards regiment, a Cavalry guards rgt, not indicated artillery, maybe a miss, common mixed brigade had a arty btl (12 pieces)

 

[Freebird]

I don't think I've ever argued that Malaya could be held with the forces assigned. Airpower was vital and the lack of fighter units in theatre was deplorable, as was the lack of flexibility and imagination displayed by AHQFE (eg stringent adherence to stovepiped application of air power such as "airfields must be attacked by bombers" or "fighters are there to defend against the enemy's attacks").

I think we may all be agreed on that point (at least ), with the forces on hand it woould be difficult to see how Percival (or any commander) could have won the battle.
I think where I disagree with Parsifal ( Glider?) in that the navy would have to prevent a landing. The naval assets needed to do this are just not available.
Parsifal's statement (correct me if I'm wrong) is that once the Japanese land, Malaya is doomed as Japan can reinforce with several (dozens?) of additional divisions.

What I'm saying is that in the absence of huge naval forces, but given proper troops, tank support, defensive preparations, decent air support and good leadership the Allied forces should be quite able to halt the Japanese advance.

I disagree with your statement that a stronger RAF presence and balanced RN fleet would have prevented the ground battle from ever occurring. The Japanese invasion force would have landed somewhere, if not Singora and Kota Bharu (among other locations) then Bangkok or even into French Indochina. The land battle would have developed but, per my earlier posts, at a much slower pace.
B-N

I agree, the problem here (IMO) is how to properly defend Malay given the assets that were available or could reasonable been made available at the time.

Not in late 1941. Given that Beaufighters didn't start maritime ops until mid-1942 and that Mossies weren't available in numbers until the same timeframe, I think it's stretching the "what if" scenario to the absolute limits to suggest they could have been available to defend Malaya in late 1941 (although I agree they'd be a great combination for ops over the Gulf of Thailand).

I would also agree, a great combination. (Perhaps some Corsairs Fireflies too? )

However, let's try this: Take (late) July 1941 as a starting point.
Using forces that we can make available, what are some of our options?
Abandoning Malaya is not a good option.


Now, I agree with Buffnut that interdicting Singora, is a good idea, however the option to enter in advance of a Japanese invasion just won't work (IMO). Britain had a guarantee from FDR that the US would take action against Japan providing that Japan made the first move. It is absolutely critical that the US enter the war when hostilities begin.

I'm also not in agreement with Parsifal that sending a TF into the Gulf of Siam is feasable, given the risk.

So, here are a couple of other options:
Suppose that we are able to send a force of 20 - 25 squadrons of medium bombers to the Far East (Mostly Wellingtons, + some Hampden, Whitley, Bolingbroke Beaufort)
What about a major attack on Singora the next night after Japan lands - to destroy port facilities.

Also, how many mines could we get hold of in the Pacific? What about mining all of the Eastern Malayan ports (Kota Bharu, Kuantan, Mersing) before hostilities begin, and then air-dropping mines at Singora?
Mining was a very effective tool vs German merchant traffic in the ETO, and Japan has nowhere near the sweeping ability or technology that Britian or Germany does.

Did Australia produce mines? How many/month could they make?

 

[Glider]

I think we may all be agreed on that point (at least ), with the forces on hand it woould be difficult to see how Percival (or any commander) could have won the battle.
I think where I disagree with Parsifal ( Glider?) in that the navy would have to prevent a landing. The naval assets needed to do this are just not available.
Parsifal's statement (correct me if I'm wrong) is that once the Japanese land, Malaya is doomed as Japan can reinforce with several (dozens?) of additional divisions.

You are correct in that I do believe that the Allied Naval forces were not strong enough to stop a landing and that would be critical.

What I'm saying is that in the absence of huge naval forces, but given proper troops, tank support, defensive preparations, decent air support and good leadership the Allied forces should be quite able to halt the Japanese advance.

And I believe that stopping the landing was critical, because the allies didn't have the tanks, art support, defensive positions, air support and most importantly training in Jungle warfare. The allies were more or less tied to the roads.

Clearly if you have the land forces then stopping the landing was less critical (but still a good idea).

I would also agree, a great combination. (Perhaps some Corsairs Fireflies too? )

Who needs these. There were a lot of Spitfires more or less wasting their time over the North Sea in 1941, few squadrons could have made a huge difference. People point out that they didnt do well over Darwin which is a fair point but at the start of the Burma campaign we are talking about Ki27 and early Ki43 with 2 x LMG.

However, let's try this: Take (late) July 1941 as a starting point.
Using forces that we can make available, what are some of our options?
Abandoning Malaya is not a good option.


Now, I agree with Buffnut that interdicting Singora, is a good idea, however the option to enter in advance of a Japanese invasion just won't work (IMO). Britain had a guarantee from FDR that the US would take action against Japan providing that Japan made the first move. It is absolutely critical that the US enter the war when hostilities begin.

I'm also not in agreement with Parsifal that sending a TF into the Gulf of Siam is feasable, given the risk.

So, here are a couple of other options:
Suppose that we are able to send a force of 20 - 25 squadrons of medium bombers to the Far East (Mostly Wellingtons, + some Hampden, Whitley, Bolingbroke Beaufort)
What about a major attack on Singora the next night after Japan lands - to destroy port facilities.

Wellingtons would be a tough nut to crack with the Ki27 and early Ki43, certainly less vulnerable than the Japanese bombers to the Spit IIb and Spit VB. If you could get hold of the Whirlwinds for GA the Japanese could be in trouble. They are a lot faster than the Jap fighters and being two engined the pilots wouldn't be as likely to try and dogfight the Ki43.

Also, how many mines could we get hold of in the Pacific? What about mining all of the Eastern Malayan ports (Kota Bharu, Kuantan, Mersing) before hostilities begin, and then air-dropping mines at Singora?
Mining was a very effective tool vs German merchant traffic in the ETO, and Japan has nowhere near the sweeping ability or technology that Britian or Germany does.

Mining is a good idea as they probably had some left over from WW1 and if not, they are pretty simple things to build assuming that you stick to good old fashioned contact mines.

Did Australia produce mines? How many/month could they make? [/QUOTE]

 

[parsifal]

There were already extensive minefields down the east coast of Malaya, and also blocking the malacca straits. This was a primary reason why the japanese did not invade closer to Singapore in the first place.

 

[Freebird]

You are correct in that I do believe that the Allied Naval forces were not strong enough to stop a landing and that would be critical.


And I believe that stopping the landing was critical, because the allies didn't have the tanks, art support, defensive positions, air support and most importantly training in Jungle warfare. The allies were more or less tied to the roads.

Clearly if you have the land forces then stopping the landing was less critical (but still a good idea).

Tanks and airpower is something that the Allies had the power to provide, as could be better troops defensive works.

Who needs these. There were a lot of Spitfires more or less wasting their time over the North Sea in 1941, few squadrons could have made a huge difference. People point out that they didnt do well over Darwin which is a fair point but at the start of the Burma campaign we are talking about Ki27 and early Ki43 with 2 x LMG.

The Spitfires would be handicapped by the short range however, a better idea perhaps would be to use P-40s.

Wellingtons would be a tough nut to crack with the Ki27 and early Ki43, certainly less vulnerable than the Japanese bombers to the Spit IIb and Spit VB. If you could get hold of the Whirlwinds for GA the Japanese could be in trouble. They are a lot faster than the Jap fighters and being two engined the pilots wouldn't be as likely to try and dogfight the Ki43.

Wellingtons would be an almost impossible nut to crack, if flying at night - against Japanese forces lacking both radar and night fighters.

There were already extensive minefields down the east coast of Malaya, and also blocking the malacca straits. This was a primary reason why the japanese did not invade closer to Singapore in the first place.

Do you have some details of these minefields?
And could Australia produce mines?

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal

The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.

Buffnut

Perhaps, although the prospect of sustained operations when the Japanese had submarines, long-range torpedo bombers and Zeros in theatre remains highly debatable.

The quality of the anti-surface forces that the Japanese could bring to bear was better than their European counterparts, admittedly, but the quantity was less. the case in point is FKX in the central basin, the forces used to pound the RN near Crete in mid 1941, and the attacks against the pedestal convoys. In all these cases, superior numbers of highly trained and motivated LW and KM men, and less well trained and less well motivated RM and RA men were attacking the RN Carriers. There were successes, and there were failures in all cases, but the carriers proved they could operate and in these disputed waters. In the case of the malta convoys the Brits proved repeatedly that with carriers they could get merchjant shippng through, whereas without carriers it was well nigh suicidal. In the case of this hypothetical we are asking the question, could a well balanced well trained British raiding force imprede or even stop maritime traffic into and out of the Japanese disembarkation points. I would say they could. the Japanese a few month later demonstrated what could be achieved in sea denial with the Ryujo in the Bay Of bengal....why is it less possible for two or three british Carriers to do the same or similar? Say the Ark Royal had not been sunk (a plausible assumption IMO) and she was married to say Indomitable and Implacable (not completed until 1944, but should have been ready
1941) that gives the RN a potent strike capability....of around 200 a/c. Its all a bit surreal, i admit, and not able to happen, but we are talking about potential here, not reality.

parsifal
A strike force of about 150 long range maritime strike aircraft, such as the CA-4 or Mosquito, escorted by Mosquitoes and/Beafighters would have been unstoppable for the japanese until their carriers arrived.


Buffnut
Not in late 1941. Given that Beaufighters didn't start maritime ops until mid-1942 and that Mossies weren't available in numbers until the same timeframe, I think it's stretching the "what if" scenario to the absolute limits to suggest they could have been available to defend Malaya in late 1941 (although I agree they'd be a great combination for ops over the Gulf of Thailand)

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Point taken about the Mossies, however if the brits had not been so one eyed about their engine techs 1938-41 there is every possibility that both Beafighters and CA-4s would have been available in quantity from Australian factories. The RAAF always intended to use Beafighters for maritime escort, flak suppression and later direct strike. CA-4s were intended to be improved Beaforsts, and Beforts were intended to be in service from 1940. none of that happened because of the embargo placed by the British on the export of their engine and aero techs. Either Boomerangs, or more remotely Hurricanes (projected for construction in Australia) could have been built as well. None of this came to anything, but i keep harping backl to the possibility that it could have happened. there was no real technological isue stopping it, other than Australian industry needed the rights and the jigs and the money to build British (or US) engines locally. For various reasons (that we have argued about elsewhere) this never happened. It could have, it should have, but it didnt, and thats part of the tragedy really.

 

[parsifal]

Do you have some details of these minefields?
And could Australia produce mines?

I have a map at home showing the location of these fields, which were very extensive, but i dont know the density of the fields

Ive read Australian munitions factories produced around 60000 mine during the war, but could be wrong. The attached article is a bit of a propaganda piece, but buried in part 3 is mention of sea mine production....



http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&r...3d25CQ&usg=AFQjCNGGvlR5ZrjenBCnp4a2asNB_3a8rA

 

[buffnut453]

Point taken about the Mossies, however if the brits had not been so one eyed about their engine techs 1938-41 there is every possibility that both Beafighters and CA-4s would have been available in quantity from Australian factories.

Beaufighters might have been available but would they have been the maritime strike variant? Per my earlier post, the MkVI didn't enter service until mid-1942. Prior to that time, the Beau's role was heavy fighter.

 

[buffnut453]

Now, I agree with Buffnut that interdicting Singora, is a good idea, however the option to enter in advance of a Japanese invasion just won't work (IMO). Britain had a guarantee from FDR that the US would take action against Japan providing that Japan made the first move. It is absolutely critical that the US enter the war when hostilities begin.

That's why you needed intel that could be shared with other interested parties so that a unified, concerted effort could be brought to bear. There were no guarantees that the Japanese fleet was going to invade Malaya and Thailand until the first troops hit the beaches. Brooke-Popham would have done far better had he stuck to the original indicators of impending attack - the arrival of short-range Japanese fighters. Singapore had PR assets (just!) that could have achieved the required mission but, instead, the Beaufort was sent off to PR a port in Indochina while the Buffalo was not used at all. Presence of the Japanese fighters on and near Phu Quoc Island would have provided vital intel about Japanese intentions - the numbers of fighters involved and the locations of their bases were clear indicators that the overland invasion route was not being considered. With this intel, it might (stress might) have been possible to convince Washington and Bangkok that a more cooperative defence approach was needed, enabling MATADOR to be called perhaps as early as 5 Dec - it's a slim margin but it would probably be enough, with Thai troops supporting, to make life much more difficult for Yamashita.

 

[parsifal]

Beaufighters might have been available but would they have been the maritime strike variant? Per my earlier post, the MkVI didn't enter service until mid-1942. Prior to that time, the Beau's role was heavy fighter.

Unquestionably if they were operated by the RAAF. 30 sqn was the first unit to operate British supplied Beadfighters. These were an earlier mark to the MkVIs you refer to (though I am embarrassed to say i dont know which mark they actually were).

The following is a brief description of their easrly employment. If Beafighters had been made available earlier, by release of the engines techs, there is no reason to suggest that the Australians would not have still used them for maritime strike/escort/flak suppression purposes. its the specific reason we wanted them in the first place....they were meant to work closely with the CA4s and beaforts

"RAAF Beaufighters: 30 Squadron – Early operations

30 Squadron was the first Raaf unit to be to be equipped with the newly built beaufighters. The unit was formed at Richmond, New South wales, on 9 march 1942. The first beaufighter to be received from the unit was delivered on the 2 june, training commenced under the famous Australia aviator Wg Cdr Brian Walker also known and more commonly referred to as 'Blackjack', he also took command of the squadron on the 4th of June.

On the 17th of August the Squadron moved to Bohle River, near Townsville, Queensland, in preparation for the move to Port Moresby, which was where the unit was to be based. At this stage of the war the Japanese where still advancing and had captured most of northern New Guinea, the Japanese had captured Kokoda and was moving up the Owen Stanley Ranges. Milne bay if captured by the Japanese, this would provide an excellent position to provide a base of operations for a flanking attack on the defenders of Port Moresby.

First Sortie:

Coast watchers reported Japanese barges moving along the coast towards Milne bay, kittyhawks from 75 76 squadrons moved to the Milne bay airfield to provide air defence for the local area. The onslaught commenced on 26 August, the Japanese attempted to establish a foot-hold but were fiercely resisted by the Australian air and ground forces. On September 6th, three Beaufighters arrived at Fall river (Milne bay) to assist the Kittyhawks already stationed there. The following day Hudson, Beauforts and the beaufighters were assigned to attack an enemy cruiser and destroyer that had been sighted off Cape Karitahua on Normanby Islanda and with the kittyhawks were to operate as top cover. On takeoff one beaufighter ran off the strip and destroyed itself and a Hudsun, the other two aircraft though made strafing runs on the ships to divert anti-aircraft fire from the beauforts. At the end of the attack neither ship appeared to be seriously damaged. This was the first operational sortie carried out by the squadron.

Move to Ward's Strip

30 squadron moved to Port Moresby under the control of the fifth air force USAAF on September 12th. The Squadron's new task was to attack enemy supply lines, gun positions, barges and transports, a role well suited for the beaufighter. The squadron was then involved in operations to attack shipping and various ground targets, including important targets for the now advancing Australian forces on the Kokoda trail. On the 17th, twelve aircraft were sent to attack barges and troop transports at Sanananda Point and Buna beach, three barges were left blazing and others exploding from the attack. Conditions at Ward's strip had remained primitive until the Japanese advance could be stopped and a major base established for the eventual allied offensive.

Battle of the Bismarck Sea
On the 1st of March, a patrolling USAAF Liberator sighted 14 ships 64 kilometers north-west of Ubili being escorted by at least four destroyers and a top cover of zero's. The weather closed in until the convoy was located and attacked by B-17's which attacked one ship. The convoy was still out of range of the beaufighters so an attempt was made to move two flights to Dobodura. On the mourning of the 3rd the convoy was confirmed to be heading directly towards Lae, a total of 90 aircraft rendezvoused at 9.25am over Cape Ward Hunt for what was to become known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Walker expected to lead the squadron in the attack but the medical officer grounded him as unfit for duty. However Blackjack had other ideas and was not going to be left out of such an important engagement, Walker was later sighted cruising along at 12,000 feet amongst the USAAF lightnings, where he would be able to watch the battle unfold.

The first attack was made by 13 B-17's from about 7,000 feet, a large formation of Zero's attacked them shooting down one B-17 and 3 of the lightning escorts. The B-17's sank at least one ship and probably another, immediately after this the 13 beaufighters of 30 squadron attacked. The squadron made mast-height strafing runs over the ships to silence the anti-aircraft guns to pave the way for the following Mitchell's of the 90th Bombardment Squadron. The beaufighters played an important role in the battle, by making broadside attacks on the destroyers it fooled them into believing that they were torpedo bombers. This caused the destroyers to turn away from the merchant ships which left them to be an easier target. For the next few days beaufighters attacked the remaining barges and rafts in the Huon Gulf to prevent any survivors reaching shore. The final tally of ships sunk was eight transports and four destroyers, with 2,890 personel being killed. The losses to the allied side being thirteen aircrew killed, 10 in combat and 3 in accidents."

Iwould have no problem to claim that Beafighters in RAAF service, had they been available, would have been pressed into a maritime role, with or without prior RAF usage in that role. Beafighters were intended to be used in that role by the RAAF deom at least 1940, and were trained and used for the role from the very beginning. By 1941 we were starting to break free of the arbitrary restrictions being imposed by the british on the use of their equipment.....the Aussies were quite prepred to use any gubn in the AT role for example and not restrict AA guns to AA uses 9just as an example).....

 

[Wildcat]

According to the official history, Australia produced 12,987 sea mines. Mike, The early RAAF Beaufighter operations were with MkIc's.