Loss of Singapore - Whose fault was it?

[Freebird]

The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.

That's not how I would interpret it.
The carriers were an excellent tool for control of the seas and neutralizing enemy sea power. (eg. Sinking of Bismarck, V. Vento damaged at Matapan etc)
However only when operating beyond the range of shore based air power, otherwise the enemy will overload carrier defences and sink or put out of action the carrier.(Illustrious Formidable in the Med)

Given the fact that there are already 2 carriers out of action (in summer '41) attempting to interdict the Japanese in the Gulf of Siam is too risky a prospect. (IMO)
The task would be better done by aircraft (that's why they built the airbases in the first place )

According to the official history, Australia produced 12,987 sea mines.

Excellent information, thanks very much Wildcat.

That's why you needed intel that could be shared with other interested parties so that a unified, concerted effort could be brought to bear. There were no guarantees that the Japanese fleet was going to invade Malaya and Thailand until the first troops hit the beaches. Brooke-Popham would have done far better had he stuck to the original indicators of impending attack - the arrival of short-range Japanese fighters.

With this intel, it might (stress might) have been possible to convince Washington and Bangkok that a more cooperative defence approach was needed, enabling MATADOR to be called perhaps as early as 5 Dec - it's a slim margin but it would probably be enough, with Thai troops supporting, to make life much more difficult for Yamashita.

Agreed, but there is no guarantee that this would work.
I would certainly have no problem with planning for Matador, and with a better mix of assets, (ie: tanks) the mission would be much more viable, even if the Japanese landing had already taken place.
However, I wouldn't want to depend on some foreign power (Bankok or Washington) for the success of the mission.
Better to assume that Thailand would remain neutral and make plans for that event. If they later agree to participate - great - but if they don't I would want a "Plan B" ( Plan C)

If the Matador plan isn't used (or they lose control of the port) I would propose a major strategic strike to disable the port facilities. Continued night strikes would continue to keep the port out of action.
Destroying the airbase would be helpful too.
Even if Japan is able to reopen the port for use sometime later, the added logistics demand of repairs, AA and port defence will eat away the supplies needed for the 25th Army.

View attachment songkla1.bmp

 

[buffnut453]

Agreed, but there is no guarantee that this would work.

Agreed. Nothing is guaranteed in this whiffery. However, even a couple of days would enable forces to be positioned and demolition charges set just in case things turn for the worst.

I would certainly have no problem with planning for Matador, and with a better mix of assets, (ie: tanks) the mission would be much more viable, even if the Japanese landing had already taken place.

But that was the nub of the problem. Brooke-Popham was not allowed to order MATADOR until the Japanese attacked but by that time it was too late. Lack of tanks, or even decent anti-tank weapons, was a critical shortfall on the British side during the campaign - even relatively modest provision of such weapons would have helped prevent the filleting of entire formations by the hard-charging Japanese tanks.

However, I wouldn't want to depend on some foreign power (Bankok or Washington) for the success of the mission. Better to assume that Thailand would remain neutral and make plans for that event. If they later agree to participate - great - but if they don't I would want a "Plan B" ( Plan C).

Which is essentially what happened. London didn't want to implement MATADOR unilaterally for fear of:

1. Giving Japan a pretext for invasion.
2. Turning American public opinion against Britain if it was perceived that we were invading a sovereign, and neutral, nation.

The consequences of this political conundrum are well documented - British forces were somehow expected to prepare simultaneously for an advance into Thailand for MATADOR whilst also establishing defensive positions in northern Malaya (this was, essentially, the format of Brooke-Popham's "Plan B"...there was no "Plan C"). What I'm proposing is that intelligence, properly applied, could have broken the political log-jam to enable a mutually-agreeable defensive posture for both Malaya and Thailand, and to do so without upsetting American sensitivities.

If the Matador plan isn't used (or they lose control of the port) I would propose a major strategic strike to disable the port facilities. Continued night strikes would continue to keep the port out of action. Destroying the airbase would be helpful too. Even if Japan is able to reopen the port for use sometime later, the added logistics demand of repairs, AA and port defence will eat away the supplies needed for the 25th Army.

Entirely agree but AHQFE lacked the heavy bomber forces to implement such attacks, although the job would have been much easier if, per my point above, British forces had been able to set demolition charges in Singora harbour before any withdrawal. I'd add the Haad Yai (Hat Yai in your map illustration) railhead as another target - that was vital to the movement of supplies from Singora down the Malaya peninsula.

 

[renrich]

The US and Great Britain were totally unprepared for a war against Japan. The loss of Singapore was foreordained once Japan commenced the war.

 

[Freebird]

The US and Great Britain were totally unprepared for a war against Japan. The loss of Singapore was foreordained once Japan commenced the war.

Not at all - it's like saying that the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor couldn't have been detected or damage mitigated, because the fact that they DID have radar but didn't use it (or ignored the warning) and the fact that the aircraft were all laid out neatly in rows (for ease of destruction) doesn't mean that they COULDN'T have been better prepared, using common sense and some better command decisions.

The British were far better prepared for war than the US, simply because they were already at war, and had a far bigger pool of aircraft, crews trained divisions available. The fact that they didn't make better use of the resources in the Empire was the big failing.
The US doesn't have 4 or 5 divisions available to send to the Philippines nor 30 or 40 squadrons, but the British do.

The point here is that the British COULD have been much better prepared to defend Malaya, had the advice of the senior army RAF leaders been listened to, and reasonable prudent preparations been taken

But the key issue was time. The Allies needed time to reinforce Malaya whereas the Japanese needed to take Malaya quickly before the reinforcements arrived. Singora was the vital ground, together with the road/rail links from there south. Denying that port would have forced Yamashita to undertake the long, overland invasion from French Indochina which was much more difficult and would have taken much more time.

There are other minor Thai ports in the gulf of Siam and a rail line to Singora, but it would make supply much more difficult.

Even if Commonwealth forces in Singora had folded quickly, there was a much greater chance that The Ledge could have been destroyed, essentially halting any major infiltration into Malaya from Singora. Yes, the Japanese had the capacity to undertake landings at various points along the peninsula but these were typically small affairs and without an equivalent major port, like Singora, would have been very difficult to keep resupplied
Also, removal of The Ledge would have really hurt Japan's ability to employ its tanks

Hold on a minute, are you mixing up the two routes?- the "Ledge" blocked the road from Kroh, Malaya to Patani, Siam - not the road/rail link from Singora.

the Japanese a few month later demonstrated what could be achieved in sea denial with the Ryujo in the Bay Of bengal....why is it less possible for two or three british Carriers to do the same or similar? Say the Ark Royal had not been sunk (a plausible assumption IMO) and she was married to say Indomitable and Implacable (not completed until 1944, but should have been ready
1941) that gives the RN a potent strike capability....of around 200 a/c. .

There is no way that Implacable can be ready by late '41, unless you time travel back in to have it laid down a couple years earlier.
Also, if you rushed Implacable up to say, late '42 or early 43' it would be without the mid-war redesign to give it a second hanger deck.

A more realistic scenario would be the Indomitable 2 Illustrious class sent in early '42, but not in time to prevent any landings.
In the summer/autumn of 1941 the Illustrious Formidable still under repair, Furious is in refit and Indomitable is still running trials. This only leaves HMS Victorious, HMS Ark Royal and the (smaller) HMS Eagle HMS Argus, to guard the Britis Isles, Gibraltar and the South Atlantic.

With only 2 full size fleet carriers available, there is no chance for the RN to send more than 1, and even that would be iffy.

The one big reserve available in the end of '41 is airpower, so I think that's where we have to see what can be done.

 

[Freebird]

But that was the nub of the problem. Brooke-Popham was not allowed to order MATADOR until the Japanese attacked but by that time it was too late. Lack of tanks, or even decent anti-tank weapons, was a critical shortfall on the British side during the campaign - even relatively modest provision of such weapons would have helped prevent the filleting of entire formations by the hard-charging Japanese tanks.

They did have some 2 pdr anti-tank guns, though not enough.
We can provide some tanks, not a huge number, but even a few dozen will make a world of difference.

Which is essentially what happened. London didn't want to implement MATADOR unilaterally for fear of:

1. Giving Japan a pretext for invasion.
2. Turning American public opinion against Britain if it was perceived that we were invading a sovereign, and neutral, nation.

The consequences of this political conundrum are well documented - British forces were somehow expected to prepare simultaneously for an advance into Thailand for MATADOR whilst also establishing defensive positions in northern Malaya (this was, essentially, the format of Brooke-Popham's "Plan B"...there was no "Plan C"). What I'm proposing is that intelligence, properly applied, could have broken the political log-jam to enable a mutually-agreeable defensive posture for both Malaya and Thailand, and to do so without upsetting American sensitivities.

Honestly, I can't see that Thailand would go for it, as they see Japan as the stronger power in the Far East. They picked the most logical policy, which was to plaw neutral while making secret promised to the Japanese. In the event that the Allies gained the upper hand, they would disavow any knowledge of a secret pact and play the invaded victim. (Which is exactly how it played out )

With a stronger force in Jitra/Kroh, (an extra brigade or 2) the defenders would be far better able to prepare a brigade sized force to launch Matador AND to also prepare defensive positions if that failed.
Also, in the event that Matador wasn't possible before the Japanese land, with even a half-regiment of tanks and a motorized brigade, and launched the moment that Kota Bharu is attacked, they could still race forward to seize the airport and rail junction before the Japanese troops can secure the landing and move forwards.
While perhaps not capturing the port, it could still be made unusable by artillery.


Now, if the Thai government would agree I'm all for launching it pre-invasion, I just don't thonk it's likely that they will side against Japan. They may well deduce that the arrival of the fighters was for an attack against Malaya - not Thailand

Entirely agree but AHQFE lacked the heavy bomber forces to implement such attacks, although the job would have been much easier if, per my point above, British forces had been able to set demolition charges in Singora harbour before any withdrawal. I'd add the Haad Yai (Hat Yai in your map illustration) railhead as another target - that was vital to the movement of supplies from Singora down the Malaya peninsula.

This is essentially my question: (challenge)
If you were in charge in the Far East, what kind of preparations plans could be made? (starting in the end of July, 1941)

Suppose I were representing the British War cabinet, I could give you 30 or 40 Valentine tanks, and say about 250 bombers, along with 250 fighters.
We could also send an Australian division from the Middle East, instead of the 11th Indian division HQ, and the two poorly trained brigades that arrived in Aug/Sept 1941 (22nd 28th Indian brigades)

Other assets such as some minelayers, extra engineers, motor transport, anti-tank, AA artillery can be made available too.
(But no major fleet )

What sort of plans could be made?

 

[parsifal]

That's not how I would interpret it.
The carriers were an excellent tool for control of the seas and neutralizing enemy sea power. (eg. Sinking of Bismarck, V. Vento damaged at Matapan etc)
However only when operating beyond the range of shore based air power, otherwise the enemy will overload carrier defences and sink or put out of action the carrier.(Illustrious Formidable in the Med)

Given the fact that there are already 2 carriers out of action (in summer '41) attempting to interdict the Japanese in the Gulf of Siam is too risky a prospect. (IMO)
The task would be better done by aircraft (that's why they built the airbases in the first place

Illustrious was overwhelmed by a force of land based airpower, trained for the anti-shipping operations, and tasked specifically to sink the carrier. There were some 40 aircraft involved directly in the actual attacks, but well over 500 involved in the overall operation (including shadowers, italians, aircraft undertaking the feints, aircraft deployed for the purpose but in the wrong positions).....there were 248 attached to FKX, including over 50 lr fighters. The germans had an additional 40 or so floatplane search aircraft, whilst the italians, fom memory had approximately 100 seaplanes searching for the carrier. If memory serves me correctly the italians had approximately 120 torpedo bombers involved in the operation.

Ad to this the fact that the illustrious was operating within 60 miles of the Sicilian coast at the time she was hit, completely unaware of the impending attack, with the majority of her escort completely out of position, and with just 12 Fulmars flying CAP, then her loss becomes far more understandable.

similar situations arose at the time of formidables disbaling. i know of at 330 german aircraft involved in the operation.

Short answer to these situations is that the carriers were left exposed by inadequate escort, escort out of position and not closed up, inadequate fighter protection, and massive numbers ranged against them. At other times carriers operated with virtual impunity in enemy dominated skies. there are numerous examples of that...literlally thousands of operations in WWII and post WWII where carriers operated in heavily defended airspace and came out without a scratch. To successfully hit a carrier was a major operation, requiring a massive advantage in numbers, and a well trained force with very good intell.

Not all these condition existed for 25th flotilla in the south china sea. RN carriers could operate well clear of the coast, there were just 60 torpedo bombers and a few search planes, and just 25 fighters as escort . Brit carriers could operate with virtual impunity in those conditions. In December 1941, the Brits retained potent night strike capability (as demonstrated in their attacks against bismarck and the italian fleet). Time needed to be spent working up an Integrated TG to support the carriers...about 2 months would have been needed to integrate the fleet.

The best chance of retaining Malaya remains a naval solution, given the forces available to the japanese and thei other committments. problem of course is that the japs would probably deploy their carriers to intervene roughly D+30

 

[buffnut453]

There are other minor Thai ports in the gulf of Siam and a rail line to Singora, but it would make supply much more difficult.

Which is precisely my point. Singora was the main logistical hub for the Japanese advance. There was no other port that even came near to its capacity on the east coast of Thailand.

Hold on a minute, are you mixing up the two routes?- the "Ledge" blocked the road from Kroh, Malaya to Patani, Siam - not the road/rail link from Singora.

I don't think so. The Ledge was key to preventing Japanese forces from attaining the main road which ran down the western side of Malaya from the Thai border all the way to Johore. There was a rail line on the eastern side of the peninsula but no major road and so the going down the eastern side was much harder.

 

[Freebird]

I don't think so. The Ledge was key to preventing Japanese forces from attaining the main road which ran down the western side of Malaya from the Thai border all the way to Johore. There was a rail line on the eastern side of the peninsula but no major road and so the going down the eastern side was much harder.

There are actually 3 routes into Northern Malaya, there is the main road/rail route from Singora through Jitra and then down the West Coast. The second route is where road rail split off at Singora and go down the east coast and over the border into Kota Bharu, and from there the rail line (only) continues south to Johore through the Jungle. (The coast road goes about 50 miles south and then stops before irt reaches Kuantan.)

There is a third route, from Patani a road goes south through "the Ledge" and across the mountains at Kroh. From Kroh the road splits, one fork goes west to join the main road near Penang, the second fork goes south through Grik towards Ipoh.


(See map)

The Matador plan was in fact separate from the plan to have "Krohcol" move north to seize "the Ledge."
Percival made this critical mistake, he forgot that even though Matador could not be done (as the Japanese had already landed) he still should give the go-ahead for Krohcol to move forward. Part of the reason for taking the ledge was to prevent a rapid Japanese move from Patani towards Panang or Ipoh, which would cut off the main part of the 11th division which was defending at Jitra

The main defensive positions on the primary route from Singora were the Kedah river line, and lower down the Muda river at Gurun.
The Matador plan would still be useful if it could deny or significantly damage Singora to deny the supply port, however it's poorly sited for a defensive line, so I would expect the Matador force to draw back into Malaya as the Japanese advance

 

[Freebird]

They forced the Japanese into making direct frontal assaults onto heavily defended positions, much as the Americans did on guadacanal. First successes using this "funelling" method are traditionally attributed to Milne Bay.

...Which was exactly the point at Kampar, to have them frontal assault a defensive position, especially as it proved extremely difficult to outflank.

A similar plan was for the Muda river line, which could have worked, except for the fact that defensive works were not made beforehand, and the initial position at Jitra collapsed so quickly that there wasn't time to fall back in good order.

If they realized it, they certainly didnt practice it, either during the campaign in Malaya, or in any of the other jungle campaigns up to and including Arakan. British armies were repeatedly flanked and defeated because of that one failing.

Well again, they did put it in practice at Kampar, which the Japanese were unable to flank (on land), until they made an amphibious landing behind the Allied positions.
The failing in this case was to not prevent the Japanese from capturing intact shipping at Penang, and not having control over the Western seas, by deploying stronger naval air forces, and denying Japan airfields.

The problem wasn't so much that they didn't know how to fight the Japanese, but that the quality preparations of the forces at hand were totally inadequate

FB, I know you know what those plantations in Johore are like. They are as bad as natural jungle as far as access is concerned. They might as well be jungle because whelled vehicles cannot get access to them. The British had no end of trouble with the Japanese around KL

I don't mean at KL, but in Southern Johore from Mersing to the western coast, where the road net is better.
Obviously this assumes that defensive emplacements will be built, and that some plantations will have to be cleared to provide fields of fire.

Yamashita thought the fighting around Johore was relatively easy. He said repeatedly in post action reports that there was litle effective resistance in the battles around Johore

Indeed it was, because Percival made the choice of not contesting Johore at all, and made the fatal mistake to withdraw directly onto Singapore island itself.
No defensive works were emplaced in Johore. Percival was also badly handicapped by having ~ 2 divisions as reinforcements that were next to useless, the 44th 45th Indian brigades that were unfit for combat, and the newly arrived British 18th division was not acclimatized after months-long voyage.

Note - To do so they will need to have brought in better troops, and enough air assets to at least challenge Japanes air superiority.

I am unware of any evidence to support that. Japanese Infantry formations sliced through Allied positions so easily there was never any opportunity to set up solid lines of defence in the manner you described, and where is was tried, the Japanese simply outflanked it, knowing the British would obligingly retreat every time their "lines of communication" was threatened.

I'm not suggesting that is was a plausible option given the raw, poorly trained equipped troops that they had, and the lack of any air assets in late January-early February.
The Japanese did NOT slice through British positions when they faced trained, veteran troops, but did so when they rolled tank formations against barely trained teenagers in the Indian battalions.
The Japanese cannot "simply outflank" positions that can't be outflanked due to natural geography.

The Johore position that was planned advocated by Dobbie and Simson would be anchored on either coast, and with defensive works established beforehand.
The British battalions were able to check the Japanese advance several times, but establishing defensive lines is hopeless if you can't depend on your supporting battalions to hold your flank.

 

[parsifal]

nice map incidentally. Whats the simulation. is the one you were asking me about a couple of months ago. if so, any good?

 

[Freebird]

nice map incidentally. Whats the simulation. is the one you were asking me about a couple of months ago. if so, any good?

Yes, it's "Singapore" from Strategy Tactics magazine.
Singapore | Board Game | BoardGameGeek

Sadly the combat system is crap. The system uses "combat differental" so 5 attack vs 1 defence = +4, while 59 points Japanese attacking 50 defence strength would be (a much better) +9 attack... In any other system the first would be 5 to 1 attack while the second would be 1 to 1.

Nice map though.
I'm thinking to fix the CRT and try it out.

I also got the WITP Admiral's edition, but havn't had time to try it out yet

 

[renrich]

The US and Britain were totally unprepared for the concept of naval warfare that Japan had developed and executed with Kido Butai and their ground forces did not cope well with the tactics of the Japanese Army in the PI and at Malaya and Java. The British were kicked out of Burma. Their lack of understanding about the new naval tactics shows with the Repulse, Prince of Wales debacle and Ceylon. The British may have had more army assets than the US but they were unable to break loose the splendid Australian and NZ troops to send them home and the US had to take over the defense of Australia.

 

[Freebird]

Their lack of understanding about the new naval tactics shows with the Repulse, Prince of Wales debacle and Ceylon.

Mostly agreed on your post Renrich.

The Admiralty was actually had a decent grasp of the concept, but was unfortunately over-ruled by Churchill on sending a proper fleet with carrier escort, and instead he pushed his idea of sending Force Z unsupported, with the belief that Japan would be intimidated by this.

I wouldn't categorize Ceylon so much as a "debacle", the Admiralty did the correct thing by withdrawing the fleet before an obviously superior force of Japanese carriers, it was unfortunate that the RN lost 3 valuable ships, the Cornwall (hastily pulled out of drydock) Dorsetshire (could have escaped, but sent back to accompany Cornwall) and Hermes (also withdrawn, but found by Japanese scouts without her air group, which had remained in Ceylon)

The correct thing to do would have been to withdraw Force Z until it could regroup with proper carrier support.
But with Churchill convinced that battleships alone could face the Japanese fleet, the outcome was not likely to be a happy one.

their ground forces did not cope well with the tactics of the Japanese Army in the PI and at Malaya and Java. The British were kicked out of Burma.

The British may have had more army assets than the US but they were unable to break loose the splendid Australian and NZ troops to send them home and the US had to take over the defense of Australia.

You might get a disagreement from Parsifal over the "US taking over the defence of Australia"

My impression is that Churchill wanted to "have his cake and eat it too", by keeping the better ANZAC divisions in the MidEast, and basically sending a bucket of scraps to the Far East. Instead of heeding the advice of the professionals to send what was needed to begin with, they suffered defeats in both theaters as the Aussie divisions were hastily withdrawn anyways in early 1942.
This is much the same as what happened in early 1941, when he was warned against splitting the 8th Army up, (to fight in both Greece in the Desert) which resulted in defeats in both theaters

The US and Britain were totally unprepared for the concept of naval warfare that Japan had developed and executed with Kido Butai

Indeed, the concept of carrier warfare - the power of a 4 or 6 carrier punch would totally overwhelm either the US or British fleets had they faced them, and it wasn't until Midway where the US had 3 carrier (+ ground based assts) that they could equal the KB's 4 carriers

On the other hand, the concept of naval warfare developed by the British in the Med would carry over very well into the Pacific, especially given the lack of carriers available in 1941-1942. It involved hitting the enemy with your strengths, rather than let him exploit your weaknesses.

The methods used by the British in the first half of 1941 in the Med:

Night bombing attacks against Italian ports.
Night torpedo attacks against Axis warships freighters.
Aerial laying mines in enemy shipping routes
Sub attacks against enemy shipping.

The Italians had really no way to counter the night attacks as they lacked night fighters radar at the time, it was only with heavy attacks against Malta that stopped the threat of RAF night marauders.

This is what the British should have planned to use against the Japanese, rather than trying to match them in carrier aircraft. The Japanese were also lacking in radar NF, so had little chance to counter this kind of attack, unless they could neutralize all the airbases in Malaya, Sumatra Java.

Excerpt from "RAF in the Mediterranean 1940 - 1945"

 

[Freebird]

Not all these condition existed for 25th flotilla in the south china sea. RN carriers could operate well clear of the coast, there were just 60 torpedo bombers and a few search planes, and just 25 fighters as escort . Brit carriers could operate with virtual impunity in those conditions. In December 1941, the Brits retained potent night strike capability (as demonstrated in their attacks against bismarck and the italian fleet). Time needed to be spent working up an Integrated TG to support the carriers...about 2 months would have been needed to integrate the fleet.

The best chance of retaining Malaya remains a naval solution, given the forces available to the japanese and thei other committments. problem of course is that the japs would probably deploy their carriers to intervene roughly D+30

There are two major problems here Parsifal:

First: is the same problem that Matador ran into - the British can't take any offensive action against Japan until Japan has attacked Thailand and/or the Allies, or else they risk losing US support if it's seen that Britain is the aggressor in the conflict.
The Foreign Office had warned that Japan might send a flottila of ciilian ships into the Gulf of Siam to try to provoke a conflict, so they really had no choice but to wait. So Force Z (with added air cover) is left either hanging around off of Kota Bharu and subject to attack, or else dispatched after Japan has already landed. (which is what happened)

Second: The British do not have prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor, so they would have to assume that all 6 Japanese fleet carriers are available either in the Philippine Sea, South China Sea and/or Gulf of Siam on D +0, not D + 30.

Also, there was no way to know how many bombers the Japanese have available, it could be 60 or 360.
Sending a fleet into the Gulf of Siam is not something that I woud risk, if there are better options available.

The best policy is to have the fleet operate with freindly ground air cover, and beyond the range of Japanese ground based fighters.
I would be more inclined to use the naval assets to block Japanese from gaining entry into the Celebes Sea and Makassar Strait, provided that there is enough air power to counter Japanese movement in the Gulf of Siam.


One question though: While the RN didn't use "deck park" in the Atlantic, the first British fleet carrier operating in the Pacific in late 1942 used deck park to bring capacity up to about 60 aircraft.
Was there any RN analysis of the concept in 1941, and could they have introduced US or Japanese style "deck park" at that time?

 

[JoeB]

Sending British carriers v the Japanese in 41-early 42 would have been just multiplying the same historical error of underestimating the Japanese compared to the Italo-Germans. This was a problem in US and British approach to the Japanese, and it's telling that the same mentality is still prevalent in some people so long after.

Besides the successes of RN carriers well beyond the range of enemy landbased fighters (the role the RN had mainly conteplated for them pre-war), they also had some success marginally within the range of such a/c in the Med. But marginally. Early on, RN carriers operated in areas where *good interservice coordination by the Italians* would have made it too dangerous, but that cooperation didn't exist. A bit later, the dedicated German anti-ship strike units demonstrated the vulnerability of carriers (eg. Illustrious) that close to land based air which the carriers had no power to suppress, but those German units still didn't have strong or well coordinated single engine fighter support. Later still, Italo-German strike units supported on paper by large single engine fighter contigents sometimes failed against British convoys covered by carriers (most importantly in Pedestal in August 1942). But in reality the short range of the single engine fighters and again only partial coordination meant that the escorts hardly in fact interfered with the small FAA fighter contingents. And, on average Italo-German antishipping a/c were simply far less effective per unit than IJN ones of late '41-early '42. The best German and Italian units were on a par, but there was lots of 'filler' of Italian, and German as well, bomber units which had quite low hit %'s v ships even after getting past fighters, as compared to JNAF units, even as shown v the RN (so it's not a question of USN ships being easier to hit or less able to defend themselves with AA).

Aggressively committing the available RN carriers to the FE in earl '42, absent coordination with the USN carrier force (which is an interesting what if) would highly likely have meant simply losing them. The limited number of ships and small fighter contingents, partly of obsolete types like the Fulmar (as far as fighter combat, at least) were simply not enough to effectively defend them against the JNAF level of anti-ship capability and long range single engine fighter escort capability.

Anyway, Japanese interference with British sea lines of communiction into Singapore only became really serious after the land battle in Malaya was already essentially lost. The British forces on the ground suffered no more, if even as much, from lack of resupply as the IJA force during the critical phase of the land campaign. OTOH RN naval success great enough to cut the IJA's supplies would have meant operation in the Gulf of Thailand much too close to too-strong contigents of highly capable Japanese land based anti-ship a/c, w/ the main Japanese carrier force also free to intervene as the campaign progressed (it wasn't doing anything else critical after returning from Hawaii). And in that period of the war Allied codebreaking was not right on top of IJN major units' locations most of the time, either.

Joe

 

[renrich]

The IJN not only decided that a massive strike by multiple carriers was a good tactic but they trained so that the strikes were all coordinated so that the four or six carriers operated like one. The USN had not learned that by Midway and they were fortunate that they got away with the lousy coordination of strikes at that battle. Hornet was hopeless from deck spot through launch and from there on out. Enterprise spotted wrong but at least sent them in roughly the correct direction. Yorktown at least did it's job but none of the carriers acted as if there were any other American carriers in the vicinity. They made the same mistakes at Coral Sea. I don't believe the RN was any better at that concept or doctrine.

I don't mean to say that the US was totally responsible for the defense of Australia or NZ but I believe they sent troops there to form a garrison because the Aussie and Kiwi guys were too heavily involved in N Africa. The USN at Coral Sea frustrated the Japanese attempt to take Port Moresby which would given them the opportunity to interdict supply lines to Australia and their previous raid on Lae and Salamauwea (sp?) helped in that regard.

Doing battle with the Italian Navy in the Med was a whole different kettle of fish than trying on the IJN in the Pacific in 1941-42.

 

[buffnut453]

I don't mean to say that the US was totally responsible for the defense of Australia or NZ but I believe they sent troops there to form a garrison because the Aussie and Kiwi guys were too heavily involved in N Africa.

The fact that Australia was the logical starting/staging point for any forces moving north to engage the Japanese in New Guinea has nothing to do with it. And of course the 30,000 Australian troops committed to the Kokoda Campaign and the predominance of Australian forces in the battle for Milne Bay are clear evidence that Australia couldn't defend itself?

 

[parsifal]

There are two major problems here Parsifal:

First: is the same problem that Matador ran into - the British can't take any offensive action against Japan until Japan has attacked Thailand and/or the Allies, or else they risk losing US support if it's seen that Britain is the aggressor in the conflict.
The Foreign Office had warned that Japan might send a flottila of ciilian ships into the Gulf of Siam to try to provoke a conflict, so they really had no choice but to wait. So Force Z (with added air cover) is left either hanging around off of Kota Bharu and subject to attack, or else dispatched after Japan has already landed. (which is what happened)

Second: The British do not have prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor, so they would have to assume that all 6 Japanese fleet carriers are available either in the Philippine Sea, South China Sea and/or Gulf of Siam on D +0, not D + 30.

Also, there was no way to know how many bombers the Japanese have available, it could be 60 or 360.
Sending a fleet into the Gulf of Siam is not something that I woud risk, if there are better options available.

The best policy is to have the fleet operate with freindly ground air cover, and beyond the range of Japanese ground based fighters.
I would be more inclined to use the naval assets to block Japanese from gaining entry into the Celebes Sea and Makassar Strait, provided that there is enough air power to counter Japanese movement in the Gulf of Siam.


One question though: While the RN didn't use "deck park" in the Atlantic, the first British fleet carrier operating in the Pacific in late 1942 used deck park to bring capacity up to about 60 aircraft.
Was there any RN analysis of the concept in 1941, and could they have introduced US or Japanese style "deck park" at that time?

Wasnt envisaging ny movement before December 8th. Historically Force z made steam 1930 hrs December 8th and were sunk December 10. The japanese began their landings December 8 at 2200 hrs and were still unloading 3 days later. in fact supplies continued to be shipped to Singora and khota throughout the campaign. There was no hurry for Force Z, why would there be more hurry for a carrier TG? The carriers could hit the beaches 200 miles short of the target, out of range of the Zeroes. British carrier strike a/c had already proven their ability to hit and sink shipping. I still think this was the japanese achilles heel .

the japanese thought so too. in response to the threat presented by Force Z they mobilized the whole of 22 air Flotilla.....60 strike a/c and 25 lr fighters of the special detachment yawata....not exactly overwhelming force, but all they could spare. They also had steaming south on an intercept course 2 Kongo class BCs and 8 cruisers (4 of them CAs), and about 24 DDs (6 flotillas). against this kind of force only a balanced TF with its own intrinsic aircover would have worked.

Allied Intell had a fairly accurate idea of japanese strength actually....thats why they could estimate forces needed to counter the threat.

 

[parsifal]

Sending British carriers v the Japanese in 41-early 42 would have been just multiplying the same historical error of underestimating the Japanese compared to the Italo-Germans. This was a problem in US and British approach to the Japanese, and it's telling that the same mentality is still prevalent in some people so long after

.

against the cutting edge first line carriers, I would agree. Against the forces that were available in indochina to opoose the british, i do not agree. matsunaga had at his disposal 22 air flottilla, a force of about 100 a/c, with no more than 30 lr fighters. The Brit carriers in the med were routinely opposed by 4-800 land based aircraft in that period. Sometimes there were setbacks, sometimes there were successes. Their opponents were good at their jobs...not as good as the japanese but much more numerous in number.

Besides the successes of RN carriers well beyond the range of enemy landbased fighters (the role the RN had mainly conteplated for them pre-war), they also had some success marginally within the range of such a/c in the Med.

Sorry but this is just plain wrong. the attacks on taranto required closure to less than 80 miles of the enemy coast and result4ed in the most succesful carrier strikes of the war (15 a/c sank or disabled 3 battleships, that a far better return rate for the ordinance expended including the japanese...plus it was done at night....)

Moreover, this was not an isolated incident. From memory there were 22 contested convoys through to the end of 1942, most of them opposed by mixed german -italian forces. counting the numbers of enemy a/c destrroyed is such a typically Ameican way of judging the success of these operations. And completely wrong. the critical issue was the interdiction of the axis lines of communication, and the key to that was getting supplies to malata, and the key to that was providing aircover ....to disrupt the axis attacks, not go jaunting off shooting down enemy a/c.

Operation of british carriers in range of enemy a/c was not an isolated event. it was almost routine ....and unlike the jaunts of the US carriers in the Pacific, critical to the outcome of the war.

But marginally. Early on, RN carriers operated in areas where *good interservice coordination by the Italians* would have made it too dangerous, but that cooperation didn't exist. A bit later, the dedicated German anti-ship strike units demonstrated the vulnerability of carriers (eg. Illustrious) that close to land based air which the carriers had no power to suppress, but those German units still didn't have strong or well coordinated single engine fighter support.

The italian flet suffered from a lack of proper air support, and an inability to fight at night. that made it a fleet of limited capability. The german anti-shipping forces were highly trained and dedicated to the purpose, and far more numerous than the japanese off malaya in 1941. They were in the TO from january 1941. The Italians after a slow start developed their torpedo groups to a competent standard as well. British carriers did have some setbacks against them, but their success far outnumbered the failures. Moreover, the japanese forces in the TO were far more limited than those ranged against the british in the far east in 1941. typically British carriers were battling 500-1000aircraft....the japanese could field about 100 in this hypothetical.

Later still, Italo-German strike units supported on paper by large single engine fighter contigents sometimes failed against British convoys covered by carriers (most importantly in Pedestal in August 1942). But in reality the short range of the single engine fighters and again only partial coordination meant that the escorts hardly in fact interfered with the small FAA fighter contingents. And, on average Italo-German antishipping a/c were simply far less effective per unit than IJN ones of late '41-early '42. The best German and Italian units were on a par, but there was lots of 'filler' of Italian, and German as well, bomber units which had quite low hit %'s v ships even after getting past fighters, as compared to JNAF units, even as shown v the RN (so it's not a question of USN ships being easier to hit or less able to defend themselves with AA).

Kind of agree, but in order for the japanese aircrews to be considered a greater threat than the italo germn forces in 1941, they would need to be about 10 times more efficient. seems hardly possible.

with regard to aircover...matsunaga could count on just 25 Zeroes which in any case were tasked with flying aircover over their own forces initially. That means the 60 or so bettys and nells are ranged against 100+ RN fighters and fighter bombers (remember the parameters of my variant)

Aggressively committing the available RN carriers to the FE in earl '42, absent coordination with the USN carrier force (which is an interesting what if) would highly likely have meant simply losing them. The limited number of ships and small fighter contingents, partly of obsolete types like the Fulmar (as far as fighter combat, at least) were simply not enough to effectively defend them against the JNAF level of anti-ship capability and long range single engine fighter escort capability.

Why...there are no 1st line japanese carriers within a range of about 3000 miles in 1941, and an anti-shipping force amounting to less than 100 a/c.

 

[parsifal]

Just to give some examples of the perspective of British CAG effectiveness in 1941-2. The first arctic convoys provided with Carrier escort apart from the distant cover provided by Victorious in 1941-2, was by CVE HMS Avenger, which provided cover to PQ18 and the return convoy. These convoys involved 39 merchantmen, 6 cruisers (4 CA, 1 CL 1 CLAA) 20 DD, 2 armed merchant aa ships, 4 corvettes 3 minesweepers and 4 armed trawlers. Avenger had by this time 12 sea hurricanes and 3 swordfish.

Against them LF 5 could muster over 110 aircraft. Mostly Ju88 and He 111s, with some Me 110s as well. Avengers CAG was nrew, and inexperienced, compared to the experience of the big carriers

The following figures are comiled from post war verified sources, They arenot based on claims....

First combat occurred September 12 and 13 . Two shadowers were shot down. The first maassed attacksd occurred September 13, with German patrols dropping bombs from altitude. No hits, no losses. 90 minutes later the convoy was attacked by the first of three massed attacks that day. 55 He111s armed with two torpedoes each delivered determined attacks, pressed home to point blank range. 8 merchantment were hit and sunk. AA fire is believed to have shot down 5 attackers, whilst the CAP accounted for 3 a/c according to the Germans.

An hour later about 30 a/c hit again. This time the CAP was better used and no attacks were completed. 3 more a/c were shot down. An hour later again, and about 20 aircraft struck again. None of these attackers could penetrate the CAP, all were turned away more than 20 miles from the convoy.

U-Boats sank one merchantman that night. The Swordfish that night, using their ASV radar and working with one of th4e DDs sankone of the atacking U-Boats that night.

Air battle resumed at noon the next day when a strike of 20+ bandits were detected (actually according to the Germans the strike was launched with 37 attack a/c). Avenger scrambled 6 fighters in what is still a record for a CVE....Early warning had been hampered by the zero altitude approach of the attackers. The attackers split into two groups, half attacking the convoy, the other half attacking the carrier. The strikes included 16 dive bombers, and anvil attacks were employed.

The CAP shot down 8 enemy panes, with the flak accounting for 5 more. Whilst attacks on the targets were made, none found their mark, and the Avengers ships log notes how the fighters doggedly pursued their tartgets even within the flak zones. Ther arent many aviators that can claim that level of determination.

A second strike follwed 45 minutes after the first....too quickly for the airborne CAP from the first strikes to remain. There were 26 strike aircraft, all torpedo planes, and all concentrating on the Avenger. 4 fighters were airborne, but this time there was more warning, and another 6 scrambled to join in the defence. Some Ju88s peeled off to attack the convoy and sank one ship, 3 fighters were lost to friendly fire as they again followed the germans into the flak zone. There were no hits on the carrier.

Later tht afternoon the Germans delivered their last strike of the day at medium altitude, bombing through the cloud cover. totally innefective of course.

Next day the cloud cover persisted. This time 50 a/c were involved in the bombing effort, no results were obtained.

There was no further significant air activity until the 18th, though the Swordfish assisted in the sinking of two further U-Boats. On the 18th there was one final attack, resulting in the los of another merchantmen, bu the germans also lost 5 a/c to the CAP and 3 to the flak.

The British Carrier lost five a/c in exchange for downing 41 attackers (about half by flak)., I fail to see how that effort cannot compare in terms of its effectiveness to the very best efforts by the USN at that time, or that somehow, mystically the Japanese could sink the British carriers easily, but not get a glove to the USN carriers. It doesnt make sense, because it is a notion based on fantasy. British carriers were very effective at operating in disputed waters, moreso in early 1942 than the USN, when the aircraft numbers are taken into account. It was numbers, not ability that was the killer for the RN