Nuclear Deterrence & Massive Retaliation

[Zipper730]

It seems that, by the time SAC was created (1946), that the assumption was that, the enormous destruction of such weapons would deter the Soviet Union, and any other country for that matter, from causing any trouble. The ideas seemed to vary from bombing city after city with nuclear weapons and firebombing when we didn't have nuclear weapons for to coerce a surrender, others called for unloading the whole enchilada all at once: LeMay, for example had proposed exactly this in 1949 (133 nuclear weapons, and firebombing raids when nukes were not available), and this basically would become the model for the Cold War after that point.

The Korean War came along, and it turned into a conventional conflict: While President Truman had threatened to use nuclear weapons as a posturing gesture, he never seemed to be seriously inclined in using them (McArthur did want to unload 30-50 of them on cities in China, possibly parts of North Korea), and their use explicitly required Presidential authority, though McArthur managed to secure release authority from the JCS before he was relieved of command.

After the Korean War, there was a concern about being able to maintain a powerful military without bankrupting ourselves, and concerns that the Communists could start conflicts and revolutions wherever they wanted, force our response over and over again, and in doing so, bleed us dry. So, we wanted the conflict to be at our place of choosing rather than theirs. There were basically two ideas in place.

1. Maintaining a nuclear bombing force for general war against the USSR, PRC, and the Communist Bloc, and a smaller, conventional force to deal with local conflicts
2. Overwhelming response: Basically, regardless of the infraction -- we bomb the USSR, PRC, and Communist Bloc into the stone-age.

The latter seemed to be the general way things went, and from a historical context, it kept the peace, but only at tremendous cost if things went sideways by a relatively small margin. It left little option for anything other than total war with nuclear weapons. By 1962, it was assumed that half a billion people would die in the conflict another half billion injured, and the nuclear winter and fall-out would probably wipe out the sizable remainder (if not the entirety of humanity).

To make it worse, our policy was also predicated on first-strike: To the guys in the Air-Force, this was probably a pretty natural step, as their ideas were based on those of Hugh Trenchard and Giulio Douhet, who both espoused offensive operations (almost to the exclusion of anything else) and pre-emptive strikes (without declaring war).

Nuclear-weapons technology also changed

• The first nuclear weapons were huge and could only be carried by a few bomber aircraft: This included the B-36 (required pretty much no modifications at all), the B-29/B-50, the B-47.
• Nuclear weapons eventually shrank in size to around 1500-3500 pounds, at which point they could be carried by both bombers and fighter-bombers; from there they would shrink further to some warheads going all the way down to 50 pounds (W54), and we'd see nuclear-tipped demolition munitions, bazooka's, and artillery shells as well as missiles.
• H-bombs started out as ideas (1945), to the Eniwetok Atoll test (1952), which were so heavy and bulky that they were unsuitable for use in aircraft, with the first using liquid tritium and deuterium followed up by a dry-design using lithium deuteride (as most all thermonuclear bombs later used). The first EC (Emergency Capability) devices were 'wet' designs however, requiring heavy insulation to minimize (and thermos flasks to replenish) losses in flight. While they were smaller and weighed "only" 39000-40000 lb., they could only be carried by the B-36's and, to make it worse: Some considered it unlikely the bomber would escape the blast if they were to ever be deployed.
• Eventually, they evolved into dry-weapons: The first one of this type was still so big, only a B-36 could carry it, but soon, the size came down to sizes that would be around 7600 pounds (Mk-15), then from there, to around 6900 pounds (Mk-39), and eventually down to amounts (Mk-28: 1975-2175 lb.) that would even allow fighters to deliver megaton level death and destruction upon demand.

Basically, they got smaller and more devastating, and more aircraft, and aircraft types could carry them. So basically, fighters were largely expected to carry nuclear weapons and air-superiority wasn't seen as all that important. In addition, the numbers of nuclear weapons grew at, what seemed like an exponential rate, and the USAF had a great proclivity for getting spectacularly large budgets for themselves -- they did this many ways, but one of the best was effectively trying to assign as many targets as they possibly could justify (even beyond military necessity), so that they could order more bombs, and then use the number of bombs to justify the ordering of more aircraft and weapons to deliver them.

They got away with the boot-strapping tactic because they had a supercomputer that apparently helped them select targeting (and apparently not many people realized that computers can be programmed to do nearly anything -- garbage go in, garbage will also come out, and they probably used the secrecy card to hide their exact programming from anybody they didn't want to realize what they were doing -- while I think what they were doing was wrong, I gotta admit the idea had a certain simplicity and creativity to it)

Now most of you know all this, what I'm curious about was

1. Despite the fact that the proposal for a conventional force to handle local-conflicts, and nuclear forces to deal with general-war with the Soviet Union, China, and the Communist Bloc being proposed as early as 1953 (JCS), and overruled by the overwhelming force doctrine (1954), we still did retain a conventional force anyway, both in the USAF's overseas commands, and TAC: I'm curious if this was kind of a bureaucratic inertia thing (it takes time to phase things out and stuff), or simply because this would give the Army the ability to make grabs for assets needed for CAS and Air Superiority?
2. While the policy of Massive Retaliation and the New Look policy took effect in 1954, and involved the concept of a "spasm" or uncontrolled nuclear release that wouldn't stop until one side was completely, and utterly destroyed; by 1955 there was NSC-5440 that called for a conventional force to handle local conflicts, and a nuclear force to handle General War with the USSR, PRC, and the rest of the Communist Bloc: This plan was essentially similar to the Flexible Response plan that would be adopted by the US in 1961, and included options ranging from conventional force, to all-out nuclear-war. I'm curious why the USAF was able to disregard this memorandum and simply continue business as usual?
3. Starting around 1957: John Dulles had declared that the idea of a nuclear spasm would not necessarily occur, and proposals for "limited conflicts" could be considered, these plans were presumably nuclear, right? Also, did this policy annul the 1955 one?

Graeme GrauGeist M MIflyer mikewint T Token T tyrodtom Wurger X XBe02Drvr

 

[XBe02Drvr]

by 1955 there was NSC-5440 that called for a conventional force to handle local conflicts, and a nuclear force to handle General War with the USSR, PRC, and the rest of the Communist Bloc:

I'm curious why the USAF was able to disregard this memorandum and simply continue business as usual?

You gotta remember that, although the USAF kept Congress enthralled with their sleight-of-hand accounting and doomsday ideology thus guaranteeing huge budgets, they didn't have total autonomy in determining US defense policy. The President was an infantry soldier, intimately familiar with the implications, opportunities, and vulnerabilities of boots on the ground, and he came to power at the height of the Korean war. His henchmen, the Dulles brothers, were steeped in the alternatives of diplomacy, intelligence gathering, propaganda potential, and special ops warfare.
While they appreciated the potential of strategic air warfare, they had had their noses rubbed in its shortcomings in WWII, so they weren't prepared to worship it like the doctrine of SAC demanded. OTOH, Congress and the public bought LeMay's bill of goods, so too much curbing of the juggernaut would come off as ignoring "the will of the people", and Eisenhower considered himself the people's servant.
LeMay in SAC and Rickover in the Navy's nuclear propulsion program developed so much personal influence that they were able to erect "temples of worship" and designate themselves Head Priest, if not Ultimate Savior and Keeper of the Faith. Woe betide the young officer who didn't pay proper homage!
I was a kid growing up at this time, playing "duck and cover" when the siren wailed, listening to discussions of current events, foreign policy, and world politics, and reading everything I could get my hands on. Your typical nerdy egghead kid, with no Facebook, video games, or skateboards to monopolize my time.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Starting around 1957: John Dulles had declared that the idea of a nuclear spasm would not necessarily occur, and proposals for "limited conflicts" could be considered, these plans were presumably nuclear, right?

No, the fear at the time was that a conventional "brushfire war" could go nuclear and result in the ultimate "spasm" if the core assets of either side were threatened. The threat of firebrands such as MacArthur in Korea or LeMay in SAC, or their counterparts on the other side of the curtain going off the deep end and setting off a terminal conflagration had all responsible parties shaking in their shoes. They only relented and allowed the Army tactical nukes for the express purpose of detering a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe. And there the risk of escalation was always an existential threat.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[XBe02Drvr]

they had a supercomputer that apparently helped them select targeting (and apparently not many people realized that computers can be programmed to do nearly anything -- garbage go in, garbage will also come out

Garbage for sure, as the US was clueless as to what was going on behind the curtain. It wasn't until the deployment of the U2 at the tail end of the 50s and then the SR71 and satellite photography plus the submarine wiretaps, that we had much in the way of hard intelligence to base targeting on. Prior to that it was mostly smoke and mirrors. We could never hold a candle to the Soviets or the Chinese in HUMINT, and were slow to become sophisticated in the analysis of ELINT. A totalitarian society tends to produce more and better intelligence operatives, both in field and analysis work.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[swampyankee]

Eisenhower was also interested in two things: making sure the balloon never went up and minimizing federal spending, including defense spending. Pushing reliance for deterrence from conventional forces to nuclear ones saved money.

 

[Zipper730]

You gotta remember that, although the USAF kept Congress enthralled with their sleight-of-hand accounting and doomsday ideology thus guaranteeing huge budgets, they didn't have total autonomy in determining US defense policy.

It sure seemed as if they did...

The President was an infantry soldier, intimately familiar with the implications, opportunities, and vulnerabilities of boots on the ground, and he came to power at the height of the Korean war. His henchmen, the Dulles brothers, were steeped in the alternatives of diplomacy, intelligence gathering, propaganda potential, and special ops warfare.

Yes

While they appreciated the potential of strategic air warfare, they had had their noses rubbed in its shortcomings in WWII, so they weren't prepared to worship it like the doctrine of SAC demanded.

Smart

Congress and the public bought LeMay's bill of goods, so too much curbing of the juggernaut would come off as ignoring "the will of the people", and Eisenhower considered himself the people's servant.

So there was a limit as to what Eisenhower could do without appearing undemocratic?

LeMay in SAC and Rickover in the Navy's nuclear propulsion program developed so much personal influence that they were able to erect "temples of worship" and designate themselves Head Priest, if not Ultimate Savior and Keeper of the Faith. Woe betide the young officer who didn't pay proper homage!

And there was little ability to curb this tendency?

No, the fear at the time was that a conventional "brushfire war" could go nuclear and result in the ultimate "spasm" if the core assets of either side were threatened.

The problem is when the official doctrine is overwhelming response, some people saw that as a literal interpretation even when changes came along such as NSC 5440...

The threat of firebrands such as MacArthur in Korea or LeMay in SAC, or their counterparts on the other side of the curtain going off the deep end and setting off a terminal conflagration had all responsible parties shaking in their shoes.

Understandably so. I'm surprised somebody didn't try and cut the guts out of LeMay's power-base to ensure he wouldn't trigger an uncontrollable disaster we didn't want in the US.

They only relented and allowed the Army tactical nukes for the express purpose of detering a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe. And there the risk of escalation was always an existential threat.

That part of Europe was a powder-keg that fortunately didn't explode. I didn't know the issue of tactical nukes was such a big issue for the US Army?

Garbage for sure, as the US was clueless as to what was going on behind the curtain. It wasn't until the deployment of the U2 at the tail end of the 50s and then the SR71 and satellite photography plus the submarine wiretaps, that we had much in the way of hard intelligence to base targeting on.

Actually LeMay had done overflights of the USSR up to around 1954-55 it seemed. The RAF also carried out overflights on either their own or both our behalf. The U-2 seemed to takeover after around 1956.

That said, I'm not sure what estimates we had as to what to hit correctly. However, there was a tendency for the USAF to boot-strap as I described regardless of reason.

We could never hold a candle to the Soviets or the Chinese in HUMINT

I didn't now the Chinese were that good in HUMINT though Russia was legendary

A totalitarian society tends to produce more and better intelligence operatives, both in field and analysis work.

Assuming the population isn't dumbed down by the fears of the dictator...

Eisenhower was also interested in two things: making sure the balloon never went up

The balloon never went up? I assume you mean a mushroom-cloud?

minimizing federal spending, including defense spending. Pushing reliance for deterrence from conventional forces to nuclear ones saved money.

Yeah but it means you only have one option -- nuke 'em. Without a conventional force for local conflicts, you have little to fall back on.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

*** IGNORE THIS POST!! ***
FOR SOME REASON MY ANDROID DUPLICATED THIS POST WHEN I TRIED TO EDIT!!

So there was a limit as to what Eisenhower could do without appearing undemocratic?

Not "could", "would". Ike wasn't going to go to extreme lengths to publicly counter a program that Congress and the public were sold on. Besides, the hallmark of the cold war was uncertainty. Very few people besides the self-annoited prophets like LeMay and Rickover were absolutely sure what the real answers were. And the stakes for getting it wrong were immeasurable.

And there was little ability to curb this tendency?

Guys like these were like the weapons the advocated: valuable tools to have on your side, but dangerous to manage, as they could blow up in your face if mishandled.

I'm surprised somebody didn't try and cut the guts out of LeMay's power-base

Those that tried crashed and burned.

I didn't know the issue of tactical nukes was such a big issue for the US Army?

The Army felt the need to get on "the nuclear bandwagon" to preserve its prestige and funding, and had the sales pitch that it would reduce the expense of maintaining a huge mechanized army in Germany to counter the Warsaw Pact invasion threat. USN USAF& USAF bitterly opposed this, as it diluted their monopoly on nucs and released Armageddon triggers into "Irresponsible hands".

Actually LeMay had done overflights of the USSR up to around 1954-55 it seemed. The RAF also carried out overflights on either their own or both our behalf. The U-2 seemed to takeover after around 1956.

Very few pre-U2 overflights were successful deep penetrations. Most were peripheral overflights, and many were shot down. The vastness of the USSR and the capabilities of their air forces made successful overflight of targets in the heartland rare and costly.

Assuming the population isn't dumbed down by the fears of the dictator.

It's the very distrust, fear, and paranoia honed by growing up in a dictatorial police state that makes their Intel ops more effective than those raised in an open society. And believe me, those selected for that kind of work are promptly elevated above the general "dumbness" of the masses by training and education.
Cheers,
Wes

*** IGNORE THIS POST!! ***
MY DEVICE DUPLICATED IT WHEN I TRIED TO EDIT. CAN'T SEEM TO DELETE IT, EITHER!!

READ THE ONE BELOW.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

So there was a limit as to what Eisenhower could do without appearing undemocratic?

Not "could", "would". Ike wasn't going to go to extreme lengths to publicly counter a program that Congress and the public were sold on. Besides, the hallmark of the cold war was uncertainty. Very few people besides the self-annoited prophets like LeMay and Rickover were absolutely sure what the real answers were. And the stakes for getting it wrong were immeasurable.

And there was little ability to curb this tendency?

Guys like these were like the weapons they advocated: valuable tools to have on your side, but dangerous to manage, as they could blow up in your face if mishandled.

I'm surprised somebody didn't try and cut the guts out of LeMay's power-base

Those that tried crashed and burned.

I didn't know the issue of tactical nukes was such a big issue for the US Army?

The Army felt the need to get on "the nuclear bandwagon" to preserve its prestige and funding, and had the sales pitch that it would reduce the expense of maintaining a huge mechanized army in Germany to counter the Warsaw Pact invasion threat. USN & USAF bitterly opposed this, as it diluted their monopoly on nucs and released Armageddon triggers into "Irresponsible hands".

Actually LeMay had done overflights of the USSR up to around 1954-55 it seemed. The RAF also carried out overflights on either their own or both our behalf. The U-2 seemed to takeover after around 1956.

Very few pre-U2 overflights were successful deep penetrations. Most were peripheral overflights, and many were shot down. The vastness of the USSR and the capabilities of their air forces made successful overflight of targets in the heartland rare and costly.

Assuming the population isn't dumbed down by the fears of the dictator.

It's the very distrust, fear, and paranoia honed by growing up in a dictatorial police state that makes their Intel ops more effective than those raised in an open society. And believe me, those selected for that kind of work are promptly elevated above the general "dumbness" of the masses by training and education.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

*** IGNORE THIS POST!! ***
FOR SOME REASON MY ANDROID DUPLICATED THIS POST WHEN I TRIED TO EDIT!!

It's happened to everybody once or twice for one reason or another, I usually just deleted the post and put in something like DUPLICATE DELETED or something.

Not "could", "would". Ike wasn't going to go to extreme lengths to publicly counter a program that Congress and the public were sold on.

My guess is that they were sold on it because of the certainty of people like General LeMay? As for Eisenhower's unwillingness to publicly counter such a matter, I guess it would be that it'd appear undemocratic, unpatriotic, and probably creating an indecisive state of fear?

Regardless, NSC 5440 for example, wasn't public policy was it? The JCS knew about it, the President knew about it, and the Military knew about it right?

Besides, the hallmark of the cold war was uncertainty. Very few people besides the self-annoited prophets like LeMay and Rickover were absolutely sure what the real answers were.

The problem was that their "certainty" gave us an all-or-nothing option, and possibly deterring conflict, but if wrong would have catastrophic consequeces (after all the only options were posturing or hurling everything, including the kitchen sink, the pot and saucepan at them). Fortunately the consequences were so scary that they never occurred, but we came awful close in many cases

Guys like these were like the weapons they advocated: valuable tools to have on your side, but dangerous to manage, as they could blow up in your face if mishandled.

They seemed more like a liability...

Those that tried crashed and burned.

Even the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS?

The Army felt the need to get on "the nuclear bandwagon" to preserve its prestige and funding

Like what somebody (it might have been you) said about how in those days if you didn't have a nuclear weapon, you weren't seen as "legitimate"?

USN & USAF bitterly opposed this, as it diluted their monopoly on nucs and released Armageddon triggers into "Irresponsible hands".

Why would the US Army be irresponsible and the USAF/USN be responsible? Honestly it seems to fit the typical dynamics seen with power: The goal is to get to the top, than put every road-block in the way to ensure nobody else gets up there...

Very few pre-U2 overflights were successful deep penetrations. Most were peripheral overflights, and many were shot down.

Only one was shot down (5/1/60), as for unsuccessful deep-penetrations -- you mean they were forced to divert?

It's the very distrust, fear, and paranoia honed by growing up in a dictatorial police state that makes their Intel ops more effective than those raised in an open society. And believe me, those selected for that kind of work are promptly elevated above the general "dumbness" of the masses by training and education.

There was another thread I posted about what each nations had as advantages over each other, and one of them I added later -- intelligence and covert action capability: It requires the intellectual capacity of an academic, chess-master thinking, the physical capability of an athlete, the ability to flawlessly speak other languages, and a capacity for savage, yet dispassionate cruelty and violence normally only seen inviolent psychopaths, combined with the loyalty (or restraint) to not turn on their masters (that last party didn't always work but 4/5 ain't bad)

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I usually just deleted the post and put in something like DUPLICATE DELETED or something

I couldn't get it to delete. It wouldn't do it. And when I tried to erase it by backspacing all the way through, it just popped right back up.

Regardless, NSC 5440 for example, wasn't public policy was it?

The clue here is NSC. Back in the day, few in the general public knew what the NSC was or what it did, and it's documents WEREN'T published in the mainstream media. No internet, no social media; access to information of all kinds was more arduous, complicated, and limited. Most folks had heard of the National Security Advisor, but that was about it.

They seemed more like a liability.

Try telling THAT to their face!

Even the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS?

Those esteemed gentlemen were wise enough to pick their public battles. Those of less elevated status who chose to give battle generally met their comeuppance. LeMay and Rickover allegedly ate nails for breakfast and weren't averse to seasoning their meal with the occasional congressional committee chairman.

in those days if you didn't have a nuclear weapon, you weren't seen as "legitimate"?

"Hey Bro, you ain't got no nukes, you ain't sheeet, mon!"

Why would the US Army be irresponsible and the USAF/USN be responsible

The Navy considered itself the senior service, while the Air Force was busily shedding the trappings of its Army roots and reinventing itself as an elite outfit. Both prided themselves as being selective and rigorous in the commissioning process and revered the pomp and refinement of "an officer and a gentleman". The Army, OTOH, was full of ROTC brats, some of whom (horrors!) were allowed to reach high rank and even worse, battlefield commissions and "mustangs" with (OMG!!) prior enlisted experience were not kept in the lower ranks where they belonged, but allowed to reach senior command positions. (Scary thought!)​

​

Only one was shot down (5/1/60), as for unsuccessful deep-penetrations -- you mean they were forced to divert?

We all know about Francis Gary Powers and the unused poison needle.
You missed the point. Prior to the U2, nothing we had could do a transcontinental overflight of the USSR and reliably survive. We used RB47s and P2V Neptunes for tangential overflights of the peripheries of the Soviet Union, and we lost quite a few of them. But the interior was a mystery until the U2, SR71, and eventually, satellite photography laid everything bare.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

I couldn't get it to delete. It wouldn't do it. And when I tried to erase it by backspacing all the way through, it just popped right back up.

Oh well

The clue here is NSC. Back in the day, few in the general public knew what the NSC was or what it did, and it's documents WEREN'T published in the mainstream media. No internet, no social media; access to information of all kinds was more arduous, complicated, and limited. Most folks had heard of the National Security Advisor, but that was about it.

I would have thought the President, and JCS would have known...

Try telling THAT to their face!

You don't tell that to somebody's face!

Those esteemed gentlemen were wise enough to pick their public battles. Those of less elevated status who chose to give battle generally met their comeuppance. LeMay and Rickover allegedly ate nails for breakfast and weren't averse to seasoning their meal with the occasional congressional committee chairman.

So, there was nobody who could (or would) hold them in line?

"Hey Bro, you ain't got no nukes, you ain't sheeet, mon!"

Jamaican accent

The Navy considered itself the senior service, while the Air Force was busily shedding the trappings of its Army roots and reinventing itself as an elite outfit. Both prided themselves as being selective and rigorous in the commissioning process and revered the pomp and refinement of "an officer and a gentleman". The Army, OTOH, was full of ROTC brats, some of whom (horrors!) were allowed to reach high rank and even worse, battlefield commissions and "mustangs" with (OMG!!) prior enlisted experience were not kept in the lower ranks where they belonged, but allowed to reach senior command positions. (Scary thought!)

So they viewed the US Army as rough, unrefined, and inexperienced?

You missed the point. Prior to the U2, nothing we had could do a transcontinental overflight of the USSR and reliably survive. We used RB47s and P2V Neptunes for tangential overflights of the peripheries of the Soviet Union, and we lost quite a few of them. But the interior was a mystery until the U2, SR71, and eventually, satellite photography laid everything bare.

The U-2's entered service in 1956 right?[/quote][/quote]

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I would have thought the President, and JCS would have known..

They did know, and so did anybody in the military and in government and students of same. It just wasn't discussed in the media, so wasn't high in the public consciousness. And war-fighting policy documents from NSC, JCS, DOD, etc were definitely NOT for public consumption!

So they viewed the US Army as rough, unrefined, and inexperienced?

...and undereducated, trigger-happy, and likely to start WW III. "They don't have any CLASS, Sir, no sense of global repercussions or responsibility!"

The U-2's entered service in 1956 right?

Yes, but there weren't many aircraft or trained pilots, and the elaborate top secret preparations for each mission, combined with weather constraints at launch, enroute, and recovery, kept the sortie rate low.
By 1960, the US was just starting to build a comprehensive picture of Soviet military and industrial infrastructure. Then came the drought of photographic intelligence in the early 60s at the height of the "missile race" until satellite photography became practical enough to take over.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Glider]

​

We all know about Francis Gary Powers and the unused poison needle.
You missed the point. Prior to the U2, nothing we had could do a transcontinental overflight of the USSR and reliably survive. We used RB47s and P2V Neptunes for tangential overflights of the peripheries of the Soviet Union, and we lost quite a few of them. But the interior was a mystery until the U2, SR71, and eventually, satellite photography laid everything bare.
Cheers,
Wes

RAF Canberra's were used for deep penetration flights over Russia prior to the U2 often at the request of the US. Clearly we didn't have the numbers to do a comprehensive job but high priority areas were covered

 

[XBe02Drvr]

RAF Canberra's were used for deep penetration flights over Russia prior to the U2 often at the request of the US. Clearly we didn't have the numbers to do a comprehensive job but high priority areas were covered

That's interesting. Did you have the "big wing" high altitude version like the ones NASA flew here? How come a Canberra could survive SAMs and MIGs and an RB47 couldn't? And what about our B57s? Were they drastically inferior to your Canberras?
Our local Air Guard flew EB57s in the 70s in the Defense Systems Evaluation "Aggressor" mission in old tired Vietnam Vet birds which were a bitch to maintain, but they liked flying, and resented the mission. Their unit history was in interceptors, and they wanted back into the fighter fraternity.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Glider]

The Canberra was a remarkable aircraft with an ability to fly very high. Officially the service ceiling was about 48,000 ft but in 1957 one reached 70,000 ft so somewhere in the middle would be the real maximum.
RB47 had a much lower service ceiling one the Russians found very difficult to reach so an extra 10,000 ft would help ensure the Canberra safety. The B57 was a few years later in development, hence the advantages of using the Canberra.

There was a programme on this a number of year ago and one of the RAF pilots recalled their briefing which included the famous 'if anything happens to you we will deny all knowledge'. They simply refused to go unless this was rescinded in writing as they pointed out RAF pilots, in RAF flying gear in an RAF aircraft couldn't be just passed off, it was totally absurd. The Americans eventually gave in, and off they went.

Wiki also mentions this
The PR7 variant of the Canberra, equipped with longer, fuel-filled wings and the Avon 109 engines, executed a 1953 reconnaissance flight over the Soviet rocket launch and development site at Kapustin Yar, although the UK government has never admitted the existence of such a flight. Warned by either radar or agents inside the British government, the Soviets slightly damaged one aircraft.[58][59] Further reconnaissance flights are alleged to have taken place along, and over, the borders of the Soviet Union in 1954 under the code name Project Robin, using the Canberra B2 WH726. The USAF also used the Canberra for reconnaissance flights.[60] The aircraft were no longer required after June 1956, following the introduction of the US Lockheed U-2 purpose-built reconnaissance aircraft; Project Robin was then terminated.[61] These RAF Canberra overflights were later featured in the 1994 BBC Timewatch episode; "Spies in the Sky", and included interviews with some of the Soviet MiG-15 pilots who had attempted to intercept them.[62]

 

[Zipper730]

They did know, and so did anybody in the military and in government and students of same. It just wasn't discussed in the media, so wasn't high in the public consciousness. And war-fighting policy documents from NSC, JCS, DOD, etc were definitely NOT for public consumption!

Public consumption wasn't the point, Wes. Almost anybody would know that -- the fact is that those documents imply the intent of policy makers and it's important to ensure that the implementers of policy understand the official policy and agree to follow it (even if they don't like it).

...and undereducated, trigger-happy, and likely to start WW III. "They don't have any CLASS, Sir, no sense of global repercussions or responsibility!"

Were they?

Yes, but there weren't many aircraft or trained pilots, and the elaborate top secret preparations for each mission, combined with weather constraints at launch, enroute, and recovery, kept the sortie rate low.

Okay, that makes sense...

By 1960, the US was just starting to build a comprehensive picture of Soviet military and industrial infrastructure. Then came the drought of photographic intelligence in the early 60s at the height of the "missile race" until satellite photography became practical enough to take over.

And by around 1965, we seemed to have a full picture?

RAF Canberra's were used for deep penetration flights over Russia prior to the U2 often at the request of the US. Clearly we didn't have the numbers to do a comprehensive job but high priority areas were covered

While it might sound silly to ask, but when did these overflights start? I figure they ended around 1960 for the same reason ours did?

The Canberra was a remarkable aircraft with an ability to fly very high. Officially the service ceiling was about 48,000 ft but in 1957 one reached 70,000 ft so somewhere in the middle would be the real maximum.

I got a few questions around that if you can answer any

1. Was this the PR.7 or earlier variants?
2. Was the aircraft in typical reconnaissance configuration or was in some kind of stripped down layout for some kind of record-setting mission?
3. Was the aircraft able to fly efficiently at that altitude (though a bit pedantic: AoA increases as airspeed drops, and that increases drag and thrust down as you go higher)?
4. Was the airplane able to maneuver in any purposeful fashion or would it have basically stalled the instant you tried any turn?

RB47 had a much lower service ceiling one the Russians found very difficult to reach so an extra 10,000 ft would ensure the Canberra safety.

The B-47 seemed by different accounts able to reach around 45000 to 50000+. Some described it as able to outmaneuver a MiG-15 at altitude, and a MiG-17 needed an afterburner to have enough energy to either stay with it in protracted turns, or to simply reposition for a second shot. Others described the MiG-17 as able to maneuver with it without incident.

The reason I take the high altitude claims with some seriousness is some were made by a USAF interceptor pilot.

 

[fubar57]

Yikes.....we're havin' us a good ole fashioned quote off here

 

[Zipper730]

Yikes.....we're havin' us a good ole fashioned quote off here

I didn't see it as a competition, I just tend to respond to quotes in bulk. I'm not the only person to do this...

 

[Glider]

While it might sound silly to ask, but when did these overflights start? I figure they ended around 1960 for the same reason ours did?

I don't know for certain but the PR version of the Canberra entered service in Dec 1952 and the overflight mission quoted was in March 1953 so I assume they started as soon as the Canberra was available as to when they stopped as far as the US were involved it was when the U2 became available.

I got a few questions around that if you can answer any

1. Was this the PR.7 or earlier variants?
2. Was the aircraft in typical reconnaissance configuration or was in some kind of stripped down layout for some kind of record-setting mission?
3. Was the aircraft able to fly efficiently at that altitude (though a bit pedantic: AoA increases as airspeed drops, and that increases drag and thrust down as you go higher)?
4. Was the airplane able to maneuver in any purposeful fashion or would it have basically stalled the instant you tried any turn?

1) It was the PR7 that did the overflight
2) Standard configuration for the mission
3 + 4) Presumably it was able to fly efficiently or it wouldn't have been able to complete the mission

The B-47 seemed by different accounts able to reach around 45000 to 50000+. Some described it as able to outmaneuver a MiG-15 at altitude, and a MiG-17 needed an afterburner to have enough energy to either stay with it in protracted turns, or to simply reposition for a second shot. Others described the MiG-17 as able to maneuver with it without incident.

The reason I take the high altitude claims with some seriousness is some were made by a USAF interceptor pilot.

Personally I don't take a huge interest in record claims, as stripped down one off machines are not relevant, what matters is what can achieve in an operational combat role. In this case I was responding to the comment that deep penetration missions couldn't be undertaken safely prior to the introduction of the U2. Clearly the Canberra could, and did.

 

[Zipper730]

I don't know for certain but the PR version of the Canberra entered service in Dec 1952 and the overflight mission quoted was in March 1953 so I assume they started as soon as the Canberra was available as to when they stopped as far as the US were involved it was when the U2 became available.

The U2 entered service in 1956.

While doing a search, I found this image interestingly

I'm curious if this is the same thing you're describing. This describes a record setting flight involving a Canberra that was fitted with a rocket motor within it's bomb-bay. The aircraft turned on the rocket engine and zoomed up to 70,000 feet. Even as they were coming up on (or at) 70,000 feet, they were still climbing at 8000 feet per minute. The limiting factor was the coffin corner. They shut down the engine and head back down.

At some point the Canberra did reach around 65,000 or 65,600 feet, which might been either the prototypes or the high altitude PR.7. Needless to say, I wouldn't want to be tasked with intercepting such an aircraft in a MiG-15 or MiG-17 -- it'd be a mission that you'd be doomed to fail no matter how hard you try -- which is frustrating as fuck!