Nusiance Bombers

[Elvis]

So we're all familiar with the Russian's idea of "nuisance bombing" the Germans with small biplanes.
"The Night Witches" and all.
Lately, I've been wondering how successful that idea would've been on the Pacific side, if we had done that with the Japanese.
...or did we?
I've never heard about this in the past and I've never found a reference to it anywhere, but what do you think?
How successful could this have been?....or maybe I should ask, how successful was it?
...and of course, the nuts and bolts question - what would we have used to accomplish this task?
I have found an airplane that is pretty close to the Po-2 that the Russians used and (apparently?) it was used as a flight trainer in a civilian capacity.
The Meyers OTW (specifically, the OTW-160).
However, it was not "officially" part of The Navy's inventory, so it may not have been pressed into that role.
So what then? N3N maybe?
Whatever it is, it should have good glide capability and should have the ability to have the engine re-started from the cockpit without the help of external devices and/or ground crew involvement.
Anyway, I thought it might make for a fun little conversation.
So what do you think?

Elvis

 

[Ascent]

I think a major issue with this is that deck space on the carriers was extremely precious. Do you fill it with a proper attack aircraft or a nuisance raider?
Not really a choice as I see it.
The other option of operating off islands bumps into the problem of range.

With the Soviets it wasn't diverting from the main effort and they could operate from rough fields close to the front, not an option in the Pacific.

 

[Shortround6]

The US did mount nuisance raids on occasion, only they didn't use small biplanes.
Just as "washing machine charlie" was often a twin engine bomber the US nuisance raids used larger aircraft.

Many years ago I read an account of one such "raid" in an old aviation magazine at my grandparents house (left over WW II magazine) about a B-17 that spent several hours over a Japanese base to keep the AA gunners and troops up all night prior to a day late raid by a formation of bombers.
Photos were included of such fun things as soda bottles taped to the fins of small bombs that were thrown out the waist windows.( several cases/crates). a few large bombs were carried (250lb ?? it was a lot of years ago) that were dropped singly and interspersed with the little bombs so the Japanese never knew what type of "bang" was going to be and the end of the long whistling drop.

Keeping ground troops awake only works if you are planning another action soon, like before they can get a few hours rest or in a long campaign like Guadalcanal to slowly wear down the troops. Most carrier actions were rather short an sharp, even the shore/Island bombardments.

 

[stona]

Surely the ultimate in nuisance raids were those carried out by the Mosquitoes of the LNSF?

I would particularly cite those of early 1945 on Berlin. 3,998 sorties, 3,766 attacks for the loss of 14 aircraft. Their effect can be gauged by the testimony of the Germans. The Directors of Siemens-Schukert estimated that these raids caused the loss of 1.5 million working hours in the last few months of the war, the Directors of Halske reckoned their loss at 2 million working hours.
That is a very good return on investment, something not usually acknowledged for any aspect of the strategic bombing offensive(s).

Cheers

Steve

 

[tyrodtom]

Once the Navy decided to take a particular island, they were shelling it day and night , plus during the day they'd send in carrier aircraft to bomb visible targets. I just don't see that a small aircraft nuisance bombing would add to that in any way, matter of fact you'd have to stop the shelling so it'd be safe for the aircraft to fly through the same airspace..
On the eastern front the Russians usually didn't have enough guns with the range to reach the German rear areas, so they used the small aircraft.

In the Pacific, the USN had their usual enemy surrounded on a island, with plenty of big guns.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Until the Allies could divert enough aircraft from the "Germany First" procurement timetables, virtually the entire Pacific campaign was based on nuisance raids. Starting with the USN carrier raids of early '42, through the shoestring air war in the Rabaul - New Guinea area, and the Aleutian campaign, the Allies rarely mounted an attack of more than a dozen aircraft. It was not until the end of the Buna campaign in New Guinea and the end of the Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomons in early '43 that enough airpower was concentrated to launch any sort of large scale air campaign. Carrier strikes are by their nature effective only for short term objectives. The need to refuel and replenish means that a seaborne force cannot sustain a drawn out aerial campaign. Land based airpower in the South Pacific was very weak in '42 with few units and severe shortages of aircraft, crew, fuel, ordnance and spare parts. Night bombing became the preferred method of putting pressure on Japanese bases with minimum exposure of risk to allied assets. B-17s flying from Australia would fly to Rabaul, then make several solo bomb runs over several hours,altering altitude and direction, then return to Australia via Port Moresby for refueling. The material effects of such raids were practically negligible, but kept the Japanese busy with repairs and defensive improvements. The Allied decision to bypass Rabaul meant that the Japanese resources invested in hardening Rabaul were virtually wasted. In the Central Pacific, the 7th Air Force, as well as the USN mounted long range nuisance raids from Midway vs targets in the Marshalls, Wake Island, etc., which forced the Japanese to dilute their forces to defend multiple targets against potential raids.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Not to slight the RAAF, they were also active equipped with Catalinas and Hudsons.

 

[Elvis]

Thank you, Greg....and speaking of Catalina's, what can you guys tell me about The Black Cats ?

 

[pbehn]

Prior to D Day most of the allied bombing campaign in France was nuisance bombing so as not to give away where the invasion would be.

 

[stona]

The official date for the transfer of Bomber Command's effort to pre-invasion targets was 14th April, but Harris had already made a start in late March. The ensuing programme cannot be described as nuisance raids, it was a major offensive against targets in France and Belgium. Of course Bomber Command was in on the deception plans, and to this end, for every bomb dropped on the railway system leading to Normandy, nearly as many were dropped further North to maintain the Pas de Calais bluff.

The night 18/19 April had good bomber weather:

273 Lancasters and 16 Mosquitoes attacked Rouen
202 Lancasters and 4 Mosquitoes attacked Juvisy
112 Halifaxes, 61 Lancasters and 8 Mosquitoes attacked Noisy Le Sec
139 Halifaxes, 24 Lancasters and 8 Mosquitoes attacked Tergnier.

847 bombers, hardly a nuisance. There were plenty of other similar nights.

Cheers
Steve

 

[pbehn]

Steve, I meant that the allies had to maintain a ratio (1-2 I think) between targets around Normandy and targets in the Pas de Calais, to hit all targets in Normandy and maintain this ratio many raids must have been to keep the numbers right.

 

[stona]

A lot of targets could be interpreted as being in support of either (Tergnier above being an example). The trick was to keep the Germans guessing, and pander to their prejudice, a much overlooked factor. It was the Germans who decided that it was Normandy that was the feint, even after the initial stages of the invasion started.
I don't know about any ratio, that would require an exhaustive analysis of all the raids from the end of March up until D-Day which would be quite an undertaking
Cheers
Steve

 

[pbehn]

A lot of targets could be interpreted as being in support of either (Tergnier above being an example). The trick was to keep the Germans guessing, and pander to their prejudice, a much overlooked factor. It was the Germans who decided that it was Normandy that was the feint, even after the initial stages of the invasion started.
I don't know about any ratio, that would require an exhaustive analysis of all the raids from the end of March up until D-Day which would be quite an undertaking
Cheers
Steve

Steve, the 2 to 1 ratio was part of Operation Fortitude South. For every bomb and strategic target attacked west (or south) of Dieppe, two bombs and targets should be attacked to the other side (east/north).

From here page 182 onwards.
The Pointblank Directive

 

[stona]

I'm not sure I can make the targets attacked in this period add up to that ratio. I am speaking only for Bomber Command, not the US strategic air forces.
From April until June targets attacked, excluding those in Germany, were.

Toulouse, Lille, Vileneuve-St-Georges, Tours, Tergnier, Laon, Aulnoye, Ghent, Juvisy, Noisy-Le-Sec, La Chapelle, Ottignies, Lens, Chambly (minor raid), Montzen, St-Medard-En-Jalles, Clermont-Ferrand, Somain, Acheres, Maintenon, St Ghislain, Malines, Chambly (properly), Lyons, Mailly-Le-Camp, Montdidier, Mante-La Jolie, Sable-Sur-Sarthe, Aubigne, Nantes, St Valery, Salbris, Rennes, Haine-St-Pierre, Brest, Morsalines, Berneval, Cap-Griz-Nez, Gennevilliers, Annecy, Bourg-Leopold, Boulogne, Hasselt, Louvain, Trouville, Colline Beaumont, Orleans, Amiens, Le Mans, Le Clipon, Merville, Mont Couple, Eindhoven, Antwerp, Angers, Trappes, Au Fevre, Saumur, Maisy, Ferme-D'Urville.

Some of these on more than one occasion. Not all are transport targets, there are factories, ports, ammunition dumps and coastal batteries among other things included.

I'll let you confirm the geography

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

Steve, it was a combined operation all raids from all forces neeed to be taken into account, as stated in the link Harris opposed it, as raids around Calais were just diversions. Having worked in Dunkerque Le Havre and Rouen I don't know how Calais is described as north of Dieppe and Normandy described as south.

 

[swampyankee]

The Doolittle Raid was just a large scale nuisance raid; it was expected to have no real effect.

 

[Ascent]

I think the Doolittle raid was more a statement of intent than anything else i.e don't think you're safe, we're coming for you!

 

[Shortround6]

I guess it depends on the meaning of "nuisance".

Going from the "washing machine charlies" which used a single plane (minimal resource/effort) to try to effect moral and/or readiness by sleep deprivation to large raids (large resource/effort) as part of a misdirection program which would result in the enemy shifting his resources to different areas.

Whatever the intent of of the Doolittle raid it did have the latter effect. The Japanese kept more aircraft/AA guns "at home" than prior to the raid.

 

[Peter Gunn]

I think the Doolittle raid was more a statement of intent than anything else i.e don't think you're safe, we're coming for you!

I reference the first 60 seconds of Captain Harvey Ross' speech from "Purple Heart":


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=au8Ynh-AREQ

 

[swampyankee]

I guess it depends on the meaning of "nuisance".

Going from the "washing machine charlies" which used a single plane (minimal resource/effort) to try to effect moral and/or readiness by sleep deprivation to large raids (large resource/effort) as part of a misdirection program which would result in the enemy shifting his resources to different areas.

Whatever the intent of of the Doolittle raid it did have the latter effect. The Japanese kept more aircraft/AA guns "at home" than prior to the raid.

To some extent, the Doolittle Raid was very high risk, and expected to be result in very high losses, with the intent to basically prick the Japanese military's feeling that they're not vulnerable; any actual physical damage was probably secondary. It did, true, have quite a long term effect, with the air defense of the Japanese homeland turned over to the Navy.