operation Market garden

[parsifal]

I thought the general idea after the successful capture of the bridges was to continue deep penetration, going as far and as deep as possible. Monty euphamistically talked about capturing berlin by christmas.

Of course, there would have needed to be some consolidation and widening of the salients shoulders, but why accept the smaller prizes of the ruhr, when the big prize, berlin was within the realm of possibility

 

[RabidAlien]

I was talking about Antwerp, yes, but misspoke: the port city was taken early on, yes, but Monty failed to clear the estuary and the island (Walcheren?) so that shipping could come in to the port unmolested. He also had the Germans on the run at one point, but once he got to Antwerp he just sat back and allowed them to get things back together again.

 

[starling]

But did Montgomery have enough supplies for both the schelt and img?,cheers.

 

[Njaco]

I think he might have meant Arnhem, not Antwerp.



correct.



They scenarios that you mentioned usually START with the inept airdrop operational plans of Brereton Browning.
A properly executed airdrop operation would have guaranteed Allied success.

Monty's plans for Market Garden were good, it was Allied Airborne command that screwed it up.
The strategic basis for the operation were also correct, which is why it needed to be done (rather than advance on patton's sector)

1.) A successful M-G allows the Allied armies to bypass the Westwall, and the casualties delays that they ran into. (Hurtigen Forest, Aachen etc)

2.) It would also allow for a left hook to isolate Holland, meaning that the (unsupplied) 15th Army could be captured more quickly, and prevent the Dutch winter famine.

3.) It would also capture the areas on the Dutch coast which had the V-1 V-2 launch sites

I'm not sure I would pin it all on Airbourne. Monty's single road dash for XXX Corps had its faults. The area especially from Nijmagen and Arnhem was very marshy and the high sihouette of the vehicles allowed German artillery to pick them off easily. 30,000 vehicles of XXX Corps took serious losses.

 

[starling]

I know what you mean,but brereton was out of his depth,my opinion of course.please feel free to put me right here,I don't hold grudges,cheers.

 

[robtmelvin]

From what I have read, Monty was bound and determined to get that plan approved and ignored some very critical intelligence that came in after the planning had been long underway, which was ignored. It also seems that some very legitimate practical considerations, such as moving 30 Corps. up a narrow, 1 lane at best road, were not given sufficient consideration. As it turned out, there were some very strong Wehrmacht and SS units refitting in the Arnhem area which resulted in much stiffer German resistance than Monty was "sure" would be met. I have read that Gen. Roy Urquhart was well less than complimentary of the entire plan in comments and interviews given after the war. I've always suspected that Ike approved that plan in an attempt to keep peace with the English elements of the coalition who felt that their number one war hero general was getting short shrift by the mostly American planners.

 

[Marcel]

From what I have read, Monty was bound and determined to get that plan approved and ignored some very critical intelligence that came in after the planning had been long underway, which was ignored. It also seems that some very legitimate practical considerations, such as moving 30 Corps. up a narrow, 1 lane at best road, were not given sufficient consideration. As it turned out, there were some very strong Wehrmacht and SS units refitting in the Arnhem area which resulted in much stiffer German resistance than Monty was "sure" would be met. I have read that Gen. Roy Urquhart was well less than complimentary of the entire plan in comments and interviews given after the war. I've always suspected that Ike approved that plan in an attempt to keep peace with the English elements of the coalition who felt that their number one war hero general was getting short shrift by the mostly American planners.

Monty actually thought the situation of Tuesday September the 5th would continue. The German army and their collaborators were in panic then and disorganized (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolle_Dinsdag). Unfortunately for him, the German army regrouped and order was restored before Market Garden. This was faithfully reported by the Dutch resistance, but unfortunately the Allied choose/was forced to ignore this info.

 

[starling]

Anyone else got any opinions on gen.brererton?.

 

[parsifal]

the ultimate blame for the failure has to rest with Monty. He was the man in charge, so even if he didnt know, he should have.


having said that one has to appraise the operation for what it was.....a gamble that didnt work out. Was it a crap shoot worth taking. My opinion, absoutely....if the operation had come off history would have recorded how the war ended in 1944, rather than dragging on through half of 1945. monty gets constantly berated for being an overcautious opinionated SOB. He was all of those things, but he could win battles as well. Market garden demostrated that he was prepared to take risks if there was chance for a big gain

 

[RabidAlien]

The general feel I've always gotten for Montgomery was that he did win battles....but only after waiting to build up an overwhelming advantage in men and materials. He had to make sure his flanks and supply lines were rock-solid secure before moving. Patton, on the other hand, would look at the situation and send whatever he had, and once the enemy was reeling, he kept sending everything he had to keep them reeling. He'd bring up supplies as fast as he could, but he seemed to think that the quartermaster's job was to catch up to the troops, not have the troops come to the quartermaster to requisition supplies. So, yes, Monty won battles....but, in some cases, waiting just wasn't the right option. Such as in Market-Garden.

 

[Freebird]

The idea was fine. The intelligence was bad. "IF" the intelligence was accurate, the offensive would probably had succeeded.

Also remember, the assault was successful initially. Had the British been able to secure and hold Arnhem, the whole operation would have succeeded.

Indeed it would have.

I know what you mean,but brereton was out of his depth,my opinion of course.please feel free to put me right here,I don't hold grudges,cheers.

I would agree with that, he had zero expeience with parchute operations, and his choices let down the whole operation.

From what I have read, Monty was bound and determined to get that plan approved and ignored some very critical intelligence that came in after the planning had been long underway, which was ignored. It also seems that some very legitimate practical considerations, such as moving 30 Corps. up a narrow, 1 lane at best road, were not given sufficient consideration.

Not true actually.
Monty suggested to Ike that with supplies running thin the allies needed ONE primary thrust to break through the westwall, be it US or British, and that a broad front approach would leave the allies stalled on the German frontier for the winter (which is what happened.)

This was faithfully reported by the Dutch resistance, but unfortunately the Allied choose/was forced to ignore this info.

To be fair, their was some question of the reliability of the Dutch intelligence. (There was a German double agent operating IIRC). The data was not confirmed until the 15th of Sept.