Operation Rolling Thunder

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Zipper730

Chief Master Sergeant
4,430
1,023
Nov 9, 2015
There was a pilot by the name of Bill Sparks, who in a documentary (it was about Linebacker II of all things) mentioned that he thought Rolling Thunder wasn't a totally bad idea, but it was not implemented rationally in that it was started and stopped, particularly after it appeared anything useful was being done (something that also allowed damage to be repaired), and that there was no continuity, in that they didn't take out all bridges, in one area, or all of any specific set of targets in one area, instead opting to jump over to hit one thing, then something else.

I'm curious why they had such a weird policy...
 
From "Rolling Thunder" by Mark Berent.

Partway through the target request list, the President straightened up and stretched his back. He looked over to Major General Albert G. "Whitey" Whisenand and asked him, with obvious pride but in a manner that would brook no abstaining, what he thought of his, the President's, ability to prosecute an airwar. Whitey looked at the surroundings for an instant, then back to the tall man from Texas. "Sir, respectfully, I must point out that as a target officer you are unschooled in basic Douhet principles; principles which clearly stipulate that piecemeal application of airpower is imprudent. Coupling that lack with the use of airpower which lacks mass, surprise, and consistency and you have a situation that wastes lives and money. This, in turn, fosters further contempt for this non-war in the opinion of the American people, and those of the rest of the world, while accomplishing exactly nothing." There was shocked silence in the room.
...
The President stared steadily at Whitey then finally threw back his head and gave a great yelp of laughter. SecDef, SecState, Advisor, and Press Secretary breathed a sigh of relief; so did the CSAF. He had decided that it would do no good to echo Whitey's quite correct statements because as the CSAF, he could be of more benefit in these bad days by maintaining his own position. He believed that one of his more important duties was to serve as a buffer between the troops in the field and that combination of an intransigent and abusive Secretary of Defense and an equally domineering and dictatorial President of the United States.
"Whitey, you old fart, you don't back down an inch, do you?" the President guffawed. Whitey, wisely, remained silent while the room sprang back to life. Conversation resumed sprightly about everything except the President's use of Navy and USAF aircraft to send "messages" to Hanoi.
After a moment, the President looked straight at Whisenand and said, "Whitey, I"m going to tell you an old Texas story." The room fell silent again. "Back in the days of the depression, back there by the Pedernales River," he pronounced it `Purden-alice', "a new young teacher applied to the school board for a job. His papers were in order; but to test him, a member asked whether the world was flat or round. The young man thought for a moment and replied `I can teach it either way.'" Whitey grinned at the humor of the story, but not the current situation. He thought he knew what was coming.
The President went up and put his arm across Whitey's shoulders. "I've got to teach it both ways," he said quietly and in a manner indicating he was taking Whitey into his innermost confidence. "You understand I have the duty to satisfy the American people at home yet protect their interests abroad. Do you know what that means? Do you know the heavy responsibility I carry?" Without waiting for an answer the President disengaged his arm, strode to the table and banged his fist on a photo of the Thanh Hoa Bridge, and said, "I've got to tell Ho Chi Minh that unless he stops his aggression in South Veet-nam, that I'm going to hammer hell out of him; and at the same time I've got to tell, to convince, the American people, that I am not going to escalate this Veet-nam war."


Sorry for long quotation.
And even this long one tells probably just part of the story. I assume that the teaching was actually done "three ways" if not more. There were China and USSR whose intentions were not always clear and whose willingness to get involved directly was not tested yet.
 
Partway through the target request list, the President straightened up and stretched his back. He looked over to Major General Albert G. "Whitey" Whisenand and asked him, with obvious pride but in a manner that would brook no abstaining, what he thought of his, the President's, ability to prosecute an airwar. Whitey looked at the surroundings for an instant, then back to the tall man from Texas. "Sir, respectfully, I must point out that as a target officer you are unschooled in basic Douhet principles; principles which clearly stipulate that piecemeal application of airpower is imprudent. Coupling that lack with the use of airpower which lacks mass, surprise, and consistency and you have a situation that wastes lives and money. This, in turn, fosters further contempt for this non-war in the opinion of the American people, and those of the rest of the world, while accomplishing exactly nothing." There was shocked silence in the room.
I guess they didn't expect somebody to be honest...
The President stared steadily at Whitey then finally threw back his head and gave a great yelp of laughter. SecDef, SecState, Advisor, and Press Secretary breathed a sigh of relief; so did the CSAF. He had decided that it would do no good to echo Whitey's quite correct statements because as the CSAF, he could be of more benefit in these bad days by maintaining his own position. He believed that one of his more important duties was to serve as a buffer between the troops in the field and that combination of an intransigent and abusive Secretary of Defense and an equally domineering and dictatorial President of the United States.

"Whitey, you old fart, you don't back down an inch, do you?" the President guffawed. Whitey, wisely, remained silent while the room sprang back to life. Conversation resumed sprightly about everything except the President's use of Navy and USAF aircraft to send "messages" to Hanoi.

After a moment, the President looked straight at Whisenand and said, "Whitey, I"m going to tell you an old Texas story." The room fell silent again. "Back in the days of the depression, back there by the Pedernales River," he pronounced it `Purden-alice', "a new young teacher applied to the school board for a job. His papers were in order; but to test him, a member asked whether the world was flat or round. The young man thought for a moment and replied `I can teach it either way.'" Whitey grinned at the humor of the story, but not the current situation. He thought he knew what was coming.

The President went up and put his arm across Whitey's shoulders. "I've got to teach it both ways," he said quietly and in a manner indicating he was taking Whitey into his innermost confidence. "You understand I have the duty to satisfy the American people at home yet protect their interests abroad. Do you know what that means?
He basically wanted to stop Ho Chi Minh, and send them a message, without worrying the American public: Why not just give his men the marching orders, and give feedback as need be?

I'm curious if he had a great distrust for his own military...

BTW: What's CSAF? There was no Chief of Staff of the USAF that had the name Albert G. Whisenand...
 
He didn't say Whisenand was CSAF; ".... so did the CSAF. He had decided that it would do no good to echo Whitey's quite correct statements because as the CSAF....." Probably General John Paul McConnell or this guy...Gen. John D. Ryan. Not up on American politics...or Canadian politics....or politics....
 
Last edited:
Just to note the obvious - that book by Mark Berent is great, but it is not documentary.
Makes sense to post a link:
https://amzn.to/2LEgL4L

This publication is also interesting.
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Mar/23/2001721069/-1/-1/0/LEMAY ON VIETNAM.PDF
Probably somewhat subjective and the personality of Le May should be taken into account and a lot of hindsight, as usual... Still worth to read.

Gen. David A. Burchinal: Curt, was there ever a time during Vietnam when the recommendation was made that we go up and burn down North Vietnam?
LeMay: Yes, when we finally got that target list through the Joint Chiefs.
Burchinal: Because that would have ended the war real quick, just like it did in Japan.
LeMay: We could have ended it in any ten-day period you wanted to, but they never would bomb the target list we had.
 
Last edited:
As an Amazon Associate we earn from qualifying purchases.
Would the incineration of Hanoi resulted in any of the following if it was implemented around 1965
  • Chinese hordes coming across the border
  • Other escalation of war
  • Outrage at home
 
Would the incineration of Hanoi resulted in any of the following if it was implemented around 1965
  • Chinese hordes coming across the border
  • Other escalation of war
  • Outrage at home
Incineration, as in a nuke ?? Surely you're joking.
Probably all three if that had been done in 1965, that would have been seen as a giant escalation on our part.
 
I'm curious if he had a great distrust for his own military...
He had an image of the military as harboring a distressing number of fire breathing warmongers (a la Curtis LeMay) who would get us in over our heads if not kept in check. He was not unaware of how Japan's Kwantung Army had, on its own initiative, gotten Japan embroiled in the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and China proper in 1937. He thought that was not a good example to emulate, and he had been a front row observer when MacArthur was sacked for advocating the nuking of North Korea.
So if not outright distrust, at least a healthy skepticism.
Cheers,
Wes
 
The most defining dialogue. Real insight.
Gen. David A. Burchinal: Curt, was there ever a time during Vietnam when the recommendation was made that we go up and burn down North Vietnam?
LeMay: Yes, when we finally got that target list through the Joint Chiefs.
Burchinal: Because that would have ended the war real quick, just like it did in Japan.
LeMay: We could have ended it in any ten-day period you wanted to, but they never would bomb the target list we had.





Last edited: Tuesday at 6:19 PM
 
Because uneducated and unqualified politicians were running the war.
That's the hallmark of the American system, and western democracies in general: civilian control of the military. It takes the existential threat of total war to put the military in charge, and then only temporarily. Even in the darkest days of WWII, the Army and Navy answered to the civilians at the top, and FDR wasn't a veteran, though his political career had given him a lot of exposure to military (especially naval) affairs. Certainly way more qualified to lead a war than LBJ/RJM.
Cheers,
Wes
 
The number of our politicians (and of our voting population) who have any military experience dwindles with each passing year. Painful as it sounds, I think our future requires that we return to a system of mandatory universal national service. And national service needs to be defined as more than just military. Peace Corps, VISTA, CCC, Medical Service Corps, forest fire service; the options are endless. What people today lack is a sense of participation and investment in something larger than themselves. Just look at the voter turnout records, and the number of people who don't show up for city council, school board, county legislature, and a whole host of other meetings that govern their lives, then complain about and feel persecuted by the results. Food for thought.
Cheers,
Wes
 
That's the hallmark of the American system, and western democracies in general: civilian control of the military. It takes the existential threat of total war to put the military in charge, and then only temporarily. Even in the darkest days of WWII, the Army and Navy answered to the civilians at the top, and FDR wasn't a veteran, though his political career had given him a lot of exposure to military (especially naval) affairs. Certainly way more qualified to lead a war than LBJ/RJM.
Cheers,
Wes
But I think we could agree Wes, this situation in Vietnam was over the top.
 
Incineration, as in a nuke??
No, I meant incendiary raids: Basically to destroy something by burning.
Surely you're joking.
Don't call me Shirley :p
(I know that's old, and kind of lame)

He had an image of the military as harboring a distressing number of fire breathing warmongers (a la Curtis LeMay) who would get us in over our heads if not kept in check. He was not unaware of how Japan's Kwantung Army had, on its own initiative, gotten Japan embroiled in the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and China proper in 1937. He thought that was not a good example to emulate, and he had been a front row observer when MacArthur was sacked for advocating the nuking of North Korea.

So if not outright distrust, at least a healthy skepticism.
So, this is why he wanted to have total control? Or was that just part of it?

With LeMay involved, nukes are very likely always an option.
Yeah, or he'd try and set in motion circumstances that would justify it.
 
Last edited:
I don't think we had enough airborne assets in the area to do it in 1965,, or enough munitions.

When I got to Asia in late 66 we were scrambling to locate old munitions left over from WW2 and the Korean war.
It was stored all around the Pacific rim, japan, Korea, Okinawa, Philippines , etc,.
Some of it was in pretty sorry shape. We had to grade it, recondition it, repackage it, and ship it off to Nam.

When I got to Thailand and Vietnam we were still experiencing a shortage, sometimes forced to use questionable munitions.
All this time American industry was gearing up to produce new munitions, but I don't think they ever caught up .
No matter how much they made, we could always use it up faster.
 
A complex and immensely frustrating subject. THE best book on the period probably is H.R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty, which excoriates the JCS during the Johnson regime. When I met HR in 04 he was preparing to take his armored cav regiment to Iraq though he said he wanted to complete the story with a companion volume covering the JCS through the end of the war. Obviously his later commitments prevented that.

Meanwhile, speaking of bombing bridges, at risk of committing Shameless Hype, this book was just released this week. Steve Coonts of course was a naval aviator in That Crazy Asian War, and his perspective is um forceful. We spent 5 years tracking down USAF, USN, USMC, Vietnamese, and other sources, some of which were unavailable in govt archives. The book debuted on Amazon in No. 1, 2, and 5 under aviation history. Amazon product ASIN B07H2B9SW5
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back