Operational Differences: RAF Bomber Command & SAC

Discussion in 'Post-War' started by Zipper730, Apr 15, 2017.

  1. Zipper730

    Zipper730 Member

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    I'm curious about the period between 1953 and 1968: The British first started fielding nuclear weapons in 1953, and the Korean War ended at this time, and in 1968, RAF Bomber Command became Strike Command.

    Provided it's not classified or in some way an OPSEC violation: I'm curious how SAC and Bomber Command compared in terms of training, tour-length, fixation on safety, and provision for innovation.

    SAC, for example encouraged little innovation at lower levels (squadron to air-wing level), employing heavy reliance on tactics being standardized. Everything was centralized out of Omaha such as targeting and planning, and overseas commanders ranging from squadron commanders, wing commanders, to numbered Air-Force units being little more than administrators, basically ensuring all the orders from Omaha are followed (in WWII, there were many operational commanders that had massive latitude to do things as they saw fit such as the 8th Air Force, the 15th Air Force, the 20th and 21st Air Force, as well as the 5th and 15th Air Force. The 5th and 15th even had depots to build their own drop-tanks).

    There was also a fixation on safety, which limited effective training: Did these problems apply with RAF Bomber Command during these periods?
     
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