Peace under any negotiated circumstances ..?

[buffnut453]

Parsifal,

Your comments about Hitler's lack of clear objectives at the start of the war are valid, although they were broadly defined in the generic desires for autarky and "lebensraum". In short, Hitler did not want to depend on any other country for supplies and demanded "living space" for the Germanic peoples, this latter aspiration was entirely eastwards-looking: replace the Communist Slavic peoples with Germanic Nazis. Of course such fluffy words, such as autarky and lebensraum, don't define when enough is enough and, as was witnessed, whenever Hitler had an opportunity to consolidate or negotiate, he inevitably took the third course of action which was escalation. Failure to eliminate the Soviet Union spelled the end for Hitler's dream as the process of expansion rapidly changed into a fight for survival. Irrespective, I agree with the earlier post that, given the problems caused by the 1918 Armistice, the Allies would only have considered a negotiated peace if it included clauses that were inimical to Nazi war aims or even to the existence of the Nazi party. I therefore cannot envisage any terms that would have been acceptable to the Allies (in the post-Apr 41 period) other than complete neutering of the German war effort.

Cheers,
B-N

 

[parsifal]

I agree with your summation, but really, the comment that sparked this debate off, namely Rommels ideas on how to conduct and equip the wehrmacht in operations after 1942, was never about the likelihood of Hitler accepting a peace deal. Clearly, he (Hitler) was most reluctant to do so. The issue for Rommels comment was whether the germans would have been better off and in a better bargaining position if they had opted for a strategic defence rather than a continued offensive role. As 1942 wore on most senior commanders began to realize that Germany's ability to continue the offensive was increasingly difficult and outright victory increasingly unobtainable. hitler disagreed, and so the offensive continued. Was this the best policy for the germans? Clearly, things did not turn out so well for the germans by continuing to pursue offensive operations, until it was way too late. Would they have had a better chance, if somehow they did go on the defensive, and if so, what was the best time for them to do that, post 22 June 1941? As a supplementary question, where was the best place to place their main lines of defence, and how should they have orgnized their defences?

My tuppence worth is that the best time to consider going over to defence was prior to the full implementation of Fall blau....perhaps conquer Sevastopol, maybe even consider the destruction or capture of Leningrad, but then settle and consolidate a line behind major obstacles, by way of a series of fortified strong points with a network of connecting, but less intense defensive lines. Obvious choice in the South would be the Dnepr River, In the North Lake Peipus seemes to have possibilities. What other geographic advantages existed to enhance german defences. And what sort of army was needed in this kind of war. IMO a mobile reserve was needed in the rear, and Infantry with much enhanced AT defences. But im intersted to hear other POVs on the positioning, equipment and timing issues for the germans to adopt a succesful defence in the East. Was Rommels basic formula the right way to go, or was there a bettr formula?

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... the comment that sparked this debate off, namely Rommels ideas on how to conduct and equip the Wehrmacht in operations after 1942, was never about the likelihood of Hitler accepting a peace deal."

I know that .. but considering that Rommel was tangentially implicated in the assassination conspiracy of H, I found it interesting that he had a defensive strategy; and THAT is why I picked up on your factoid, Parsifal. And, by my opening comments, I suggest that the conspirators were naive to believe there would ever be a "negotiated" end to the war.

The 3 "peace" scenarios that you have just outlined are very interesting. I was not aware of them till now. Personally, I think Stalin was just jerking somebody's chain.
After December 11, 1941 with the USA firmly hooked into the cause, why would Stalin make peace? Lend Lease (aid) was already flowing from Britain and Canada and the taps
were about to gush from the US. Stalin had SURVIVED his worst moments of the war -- the week following June 22, 1941 (when he melted down and disappeared from sight).
After Stalingrad he knew his "numbers" - both in equipment and manpower - would always prevail [Kursk proved that] - so why would he deny himself anything less than what he got? And he was correct. Poised in Berlin in May 1945, all he had to do was wait for America to go home as it had done in 1918. The Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift seriously disrupted his plans and Germany and the Western Allies (sans La France) became new best friends. The first real check-mate-moves Stalin faced since before Bagration.

As for Defensive Lines and Mobile Reserves -- -- Job # 1 would have been to clear out the partisan activities. Germany's interior lines of communications and supply were
stretched and insecure.

Thinking ahead, when this thread dries up, why not discuss Europe after 1945 with no Marshall Plan and a failed or aborted Berlin Airlift? If Britain and the USA had said "screw
Berliners".

MM

 

[parsifal]

"... And, by my opening comments, I suggest that the conspirators were naive to believe there would ever be a "negotiated" end to the war."

I agree, but in the context of waretime Germany, remmber that hitler held many men in a akind of hypnotic spell. Many believed until the very end he had some master trick up his sleeve, some ace that would turn the whole thing around. A very large number of germans thought him a pure genius. Its the only way that his phenomenal sway over the country, in the face of such frightful knocks Germany was taking can be explained.


The 3 "peace" scenarios that you have just outlined are very interesting. I was not aware of them till now. Personally, I think Stalin was just jerking somebody's chain.
After December 11, 1941 with the USA firmly hooked into the cause, why would Stalin make peace?

In the first instance, he basically did not trust the west. From his perspective thay had screwed him over prewar, and he always suspected they were going to serve the USSR up on a plate to the Germans. Witness his song and dance about second front and stuff.

Now if the Russians were being decimated in assaulting a well prepred defence, it is at least plausible that Stalin would seek separate peace terms with the Germans. Russia was neither a bottomless pit of manpower, or resolve. Heavy casualties, no progress, a perception of betrayal by what were perceived as untrustworthy allies....pleanty of motivation to make separate peace there. The problem is that, as BN points out, if these conditions presented themselves, Hitler, the opportunist would take what BN has described as the "third option". I agree with him there.



Lend Lease (aid) was already flowing from Britain and Canada and the taps
were about to gush from the US. Stalin had SURVIVED his worst moments of the war -- the week following June 22, 1942 (when he melted down and disappeared from sight).
After Stalingrad he knew his "numbers" - both in equipment and manpower - would always prevail [Kursk proved that] - so why would he deny himself anything less than what he got? And he was correct.\

In the historical scenario, yes you are correct. But widen the issue to consider an enganced defence......a strong static line, behind good natural obstyacles on the one hand, versus a stronger attacking force by the Soviets.......who had lost more (as a proportion of national capabilities) between June 1942 and November 1943. Its a hard question, very subjective, but my opinion is that the Germans were losing in that period. If they had conserved their strength, made the russians pay a bigger blood price, would that have given the germans the opportunity to get out of the war in the East


As for Defensive Lines and Mobile Reserves Job # 1 would have been to clear out the partisan activities. Germany's interior lines of communications and supply were
stretched and insecure.

Partisans were a big problem, no argument, but not enough to turn the tide of battle. They tended to work in conjunction with successful offensives....if the success is taken out of the offensive, the level of partisan activity is going to drop....people are going to start to think the germans are there to stay.

Of course a bit smarter attitude towards the indigenous occupied Russians might have helped, instead of brutal extermination programs

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Of course a bit smarter attitude towards the indigenous occupied Russians might have helped, instead of brutal extermination programs"

Of course. But too late for that after the Germans reached the cities of the Ukraine.

".. From his perspective thay had screwed him over prewar, and he always suspected they were going to serve the USSR up on a plate to the Germans. Witness his song and dance about second front and stuff. "

Song and dance is the right description. After December 11, 1941 Stalin KNEW the US was in and he KNEW what he could get from them.
Soviet agents combed the USA for "stuff" that they wanted and (for the most part) got.

Like possible "peace" talks with Germany, Stalin was playing - egging on - the British and Americans to do more. It was a game. And it didn't work because (thankfully) both Britain and the USA pretty much stuck to their agenda for re-taking western Europe.

MM

 

[davebender]

Stalin controlled most of Europe by the end of the war.
Except for Spain and Portugual, all European nations strongly opposed to communism had been destroyed by 1945.
Stalin was given a free hand to murder and ethnically cleanse within territory occupied by the Red Army. 10s of millions were murdered.
Large numbers of Ukrainians and other such people who volunteered to work inside Germany to escape Soviet "liberation" were returned at bayonette point by Britain and the USA. Most died in the Gulag.
Stalin had his military-industrial complex rebuilt and enlarged during the war largely with American technical and economic assistance.
Stalin acquired a large amount of advanced technology from the USA and Britain including data necessary to build atomic weapons.
Stalin was given a dominant position in Asia that allowed him to topple the anti-communist KMT Chinese Government.
By 1945 the American entertainment industry was dominated by Soviet Agents. Actor Ronald Reagan got his political start fighting this Soviet influence.
By 1945 the American Goverment was thoroughly infested with Soviet Agents. The British Government had some also.
Soviet agent / U.S. Assistant Treasury Secretary Harry Dexter White provided plates for printing German occupation script. Some claim this currency scam netted the Soviet Union up to $200 million.

It appears to me that Stalin's "game" worked just fine. Post-WWII western leaders required 50 years to undo the damage.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Good points, davebender, I totally agree. WW2 was a once-in-a-lifetime chance for the Soviets to sink into the US industrial-cultural-background. For purposes of
gain and subversion.

MM

 

[michaelmaltby]

@ Parsifal: "... Partisans were a big problem, no argument, but not enough to turn the tide of battle. They tended to work in conjunction with successful offensives."

If Germany wanted to go on the defensive across the entire Eastern Front (Russian war zone) that front would have to contract to supportable distances. Once
defined, the key to supporting the front would have to be rail. The closer the rail is to the front the better it plays to German needs in defense. And "rail" is vulnerable as interior lines of supply -- always had been -- from the US Civil War -- to Lawrence -- to Les Maquis in France. And the Germans had nothing but enemies in their rear all the way back to Hungary.

No defensive line against the Soviets is sustainable after January, 1943.

MM

 

[davebender]

Russia built a series of massive fortress complexes in Poland prior to WWI. What part did they play in halting the Summer 1944 Red Army offensive?

 

[Readie]

Top thread chaps.
Good points made too.
Not too sure about Stalin controlling most of 'Europe'....
Once the Germans started what they could not finish there was no way out for them other than unconditional surrender. Such is war.
We forget the spoils of war, The British ( Lord Rootes) turned down the VW Beetle but, got the two stroke engines that would power BSA Bantams etc... The Americans did rather better with the rocket technology that gave NASA the edge. Good to see that German technology wasn't wasted.
Cheers
John
John