Pearl Harbor, 7th December 1939.....

[GrauGeist]

I'm not sure that the Japanese would want to stray out into the midwest, when a vast majority of thier needs could be met with West coast resources. Southern California was rich with oil, agriculture, cattle dairy resources. If they were able to entrench themselves on the west coast, they would be in a good position to negotiate terms.

It was mentioned earlier that the Rockies would make a good barrier against further eastward invasion, and I would imagine the invading forces would have see this, and even think of it as a defensive barrier against U.S. forces from the east as well.

 

[parsifal]

Quite possibly, but I'm just looking at following through on Yammamotos requirements for victory over the US, namely they needed to force the US to the surrender table if they declared war.

 

[Shinpachi]

The Way to the Pearl Harbour
==================
Author: Shinpachi


1840-42
First Anglo-Chinese War
China lost Hongkong to the Great Britain.
Western nations were to control China.

This news scared the Japanese goverment when they were enjoying dull peace and Japan was to collect further information about the incident from China directly and through Dutch to cope with the future threat from the western nations.

1853-54
A US fleet led by Commodore Perry visited Japan to demand open the country.
Tokugawa Government accepted a treaty which was called unfair-treaty afterward, with US and opened the nation but it brought no merits to Japan. The government was to lose its reliability and fall 15 years later.
This was the end of Samurai Era.

1868
Meiji Revolution
New Japanese government began quick westernization.

1870
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy were founded respectively.
Hypothetical enemy was Russia for the army and America for the navy.

1894
First Sino-Japanese War
Japan obtained Taiwan.

1899-1913
Philippine-American War
US obtained the Philippines as a colony.

1904
Japan-Russia War
Japan obtained South-Sakhalin.

1911
Japan combined Korea
This was considered effective to prevent Russia from their advancing to the south, toward China and Japan.

1914
First World War
As a member of the allies, Japan obtained Chin Tao in China from Germany

1918-1925
Siberian Intervention
The western allies and Japan joined but obtained nothing.
It was said an official sightseeing trip of the soldiers.

1937
Second Sino-Japanese War
It continued till 1945 when Japan was defeated

1938
Japan declared new control plan over the east asia.
This was to obstruct the US interest in China

1939
US announced abandonment of Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and it expired in Jan 1940 automatically.

1940
In September. Japanese troops advanced to the north French Indo-China to cut the US/British supply route for Chinese military.

Japan, Germany and Italia signed the Tripartite Pact in the same month.

1941
In July. Japanese troops advanced to the south French Indo-China to obtain the natural resources in the future

In the same month, ABCD Line was formed to make the economic sunction against Japan effective by
A for America, B for Britain, C for China and D for Dutch.
Embargo against Japan was taken place.
Japan was to lose 80% of the crude oil supply from US.

1941
In December, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour.



There were a range of war, war, war, war.........
There were Not no chances but NO INTENTION to avoid the wars in the both sides.

/End

 

[Night Fighter Nut]

I saw a training film once that showed how the Japanese were able to move through rough terrain quickly. It was like watching ants cover uneven ground by employing carried mini bridges. As I recall, the Japanese were also masters of camouflage at that time. Setting up in the mountains in covered and consealed positions would give them the advantage over troops coming across the plains and having to attack up hill. Americans didn't really use camouflage for the most part at that time as I understand.

 

[Night Fighter Nut]

Thank you Shinpachi san, much of this I didn't know. Some I've heard but not in any depth. Ok, so the first moves of Japan were defensive in wake of Western powers looking for colonies and empire expansion. That makes perfect sense. Do I understand this correctly Shinpachi san? So the first steps then to prevent later war could have been the introduction of business in China rather than conquering it and making it a colony. Nation building to further business interests. What do you think Shinpachi san?

 

[renrich]

Bottom line, to me, regardless of Japanese infantry capability, is that the japanese did not have the sea capability to land a large enough force and sustain it to be effective against the west coast. Torch landed about 100000 troops and could supply it because of light opposition, short distances and combined US and British sea lift. Was not the Stuart tank deployed in 1939? Nope it was not available in 1939!

 

[parsifal]

Ren

I cant say that I can be sure about any of this, but on the face of what I do know, I think I have to disagree with you on this issue.

Torch was an operation that was severely limited by the horrendous losses to shipping that had occurred up to that time. The allies had approximately 18 million tons of shipping, but needed at least 7 million tons to keep England on a subsistence economy. They needed another three million tons to keep worldwide trade going, about 1.5 million tons to keep the North African and middle eastern fronts afloat, about half a million tons (at that stage) to maintain the arctic convoys, about 4 million tons to maintain the Pacific Front. I am not entirely sure of the shipping available for Torch, but I doubt it was more than a million tons. And the re-supply line was back to the US, not England, because of the fuel and food shortages that Britain was suffereing at that time. Only by robbing some of these committments of shipping could the operation be undertaken, since allied worldwide shipping committments at that point were in deficit.

Added to this was the simple shortages of troops and the political considerations that influenced the force structure. The operation had to be seen as a primarily American operation, because of past clashes between Vichy and the british, but the Americans had only 5 Divs available that were combat ready, and some of these formations had to be retained stateside to act as cadrers for the further expansion of the army and others were already in the Pacific. I used to know (but cant recall precisely now) but the operation was limited to the three American Divisions, and some lesser number of British troops. The hundred thousand that you refer to incidentally is only the initial US units used in the actual landing. The operation had floating reserves and secondary reserves on top of that that rapidly expanded the bridgehead numbers.

Compare this to the hypothertical situation we are looking at....Instead of 1 million tons of shipping, we have about 6 million tons of shippiing. Instead of a 3 000 mile supply line, we have a supply line about 4500 miles. Instead of 10 divs of opposition (the Vichy garrison in French North Africa, with unknown intentions post landing) wehave two partially equipped defendeing divisions, initially not exceeding 50000 men. By my calculations the Japanese should be able to get considerable assets ashore in the first five days of the invasion. I think they were able to land in excess of 150000 men in the opening days of their southern drives, admittedly scattered halway across the Pacific. Why couldnt they repeat that on the west coast?. There would be huge floating reserves, admittedly, but once a port was captured, the inflow of reinforcements would happen extremely quickly. This is what happened in Norway...once Oslo and Kristiansand had been captured, German reinforccments just poured in such that within 7 days thay went from less than a division committed overall, to over 8 divisions landed, organized and attacking. That was a very short hop, across the Baltic, but also supported by something less than 300000 tons of shipping. Saying that the Japanese dont have the landing capacity ignores the achievements they did carry out historically. Saying they dont have the shipping under the circumstances I described is simply not adding up the logistic realities properly (when compared to other operations of a similar nature). I dont understand the thinking here.

Looking at the US AFV development pre-war is extremely depressing. They had less than 100 combat capable tanks overall, and fewer than 300 in total, including protoypes. Most of their tanks were armed with nothing better than an MG. Reliability remained very low. There were just 18 "modern, gun armed tanks, and no tanks were under production at the time the war broke out. The Stuart was developped from the M2A4 as was the M3. However development of the Stuart did not start until July 1940, and the M3 was even later than that. The 37mm gun of the M2 could penetrate about 1 inch of steel which was enough to deal with the types 95 and 89, but not really enough to deal with the Type 97. The vast majority of US tanks would have been hopelessly outclassed in this situation, since the Japanese mediums were equipped with heavier 57mm guns, short calibre, but still superior in AP performance to the 37mm weapon. The M2 only had armour protection of about 10mm (from memory), which meant it was even more vulnerable than the Type 95. There were no armoured formations as such, though the US Cavalry was partially mechanized, but mostly retained as horsed units with some motorized and mechanized formations mixed with those horsed units.

The Japanese had very successfully used an armoured brigadde with supporting Infantry and armour attached during the fighting in 1937-38. This formation had proven crucial to the breakthroughs and encirclements in China. It adopted extremely advanced ideas (for the time....it was formed in 1933, and consisted of three regiments of armour, equipped with Type 89s, later replaced by Type 95s and finally Type 97s, an Infantry regiment, artillery regiment, and engineer and recon company, all motorized). The Brigade had operated with great effect in the opening attacks on China, but had been broken up in 1938, after the Japanese believed it was no longer needed. That decision was immediately reversed after Khalkin Gol, with the Japanese planning to form no less than ten armoured Divisions. This was overly ambitious, and the Japanese had not formed any divisions by the outbreak of the war, though they had reformed a number of independant armoured regiments to support their Infantry. If they had been a little more realistic and reformed say two of the independant amoured mixed brigades, they would have enjoyed a massive advantage over the Americans in 1939.

 

[syscom3]

I saw a training film once that showed how the Japanese were able to move through rough terrain quickly. It was like watching ants cover uneven ground by employing carried mini bridges. As I recall, the Japanese were also masters of camouflage at that time. Setting up in the mountains in covered and consealed positions would give them the advantage over troops coming across the plains and having to attack up hill. Americans didn't really use camouflage for the most part at that time as I understand.

All infantrymen of WW2 could move quickly over rough terrain. Nothing special about the IJA about that.

But terrain dictates logistics. And the rougher the terrain, the more difficult it is to keep the troops supplied.

The topography of the US western states is so rough in every location, and is several hundred miles "deep", that the Japanese would need months if not years of engineering work and supply buildup to strike eastwads across multiple mountain and desert ranges, through many types of weather.

The only thing the Japanese could do is land their troops and watch them go no further than the coastal areas. And all the while, the US manpower and industrial engine revs up.

 

[renrich]

It is hard to believe that Japan had 6M tons of shipping to devote to one campaign in 1939. Are you sure of those figures? As far as distances all of Torch was not supplied from the US but also from the UK as well. Any invasion of the US west coast by Japan would have to be ready to deal with the likelihood of British and Commonwealth naval forces becoming involved also. Would a Japanese invasion force leave Hawaii in their rear? By the way the distance from Tokyo to Los Angeles is more than 5400 miles. In 1939, does Japan have the suitable tankers to keep a naval force fueled for that difference.

Further research shows that in 1941 the Japanese merchant marine comprised 6M tons of shipping total. Of that 3M tons was needed for the home islands. I doubt they had 6M tons in 1939. How do they get 6M tons for an invasion?

 

[parsifal]

It is hard to believe that Japan had 6M tons of shipping to devote to one campaign in 1939. Are you sure of those figures? As far as distances all of Torch was not supplied from the US but also from the UK as well. Any invasion of the US west coast by Japan would have to be ready to deal with the likelihood of British and Commonwealth naval forces becoming involved also. Would a Japanese invasion force leave Hawaii in their rear? By the way the distance from Tokyo to Los Angeles is more than 5400 miles. In 1939, does Japan have the suitable tankers to keep a naval force fueled for that difference.

Further research shows that in 1941 the Japanese merchant marine comprised 6M tons of shipping total. Of that 3M tons was needed for the home islands. I doubt they had 6M tons in 1939. How do they get 6M tons for an invasion?

I acknowledge your corrections concerning distances, and even acknowledge that some supply for Torch was drawn from England, though I maintain that the majority of supply was drawn from the US directly, and not England as such. This arrangement was repeated for Overlord as well, with replacements being shipped directly from New York rather than England as such.

If the Commonwealth gets involved the matter does change, but the assumption I have made is that the British would stay out of the fight. Australia barely knew the Us existed until after the fall of Singapore, and the ABD (later ABDA) alliance was not formed until after IndoChina was occupied.

If the Japanese pull out of China, and dont show aggressive tendencies toward southern Asia, they will be seen to be complying with a whole host of League resolutions. This would curry a lot of favour with the neutrals and the appeasement lobby of the times. Neutral shipping could be used under those circumstances to augment Japanese imports. Japan wiould have access to the southern areas resources, without the need for conquest.

With relations improving, resources flowing the Japanese would have access to an additional 7million tons, at least, of merchant shipping from the neutrals. With improved relations (following a pullout of China), the support of the neutrals, no treaty obligations to the US and no US membership of the League, this situation might find the US more isolated than you think. If the Japanese can keep the conflict isolated and limited to just the US and Japan, then all of the Japanese shipping fleet becomes available for this operation.

Finally you asked if Pearl would be captured as part of this . I think it should be, as should Wake and Midway and Guam. With the exception of Pearl, none of these places were defended in 1939. Pearl had about two battalions according to an article by Shelby Stanton that I have somewhere

 

[Shinpachi]

Thank you Shinpachi san, much of this I didn't know. Some I've heard but not in any depth. Ok, so the first moves of Japan were defensive in wake of Western powers looking for colonies and empire expansion. That makes perfect sense. Do I understand this correctly Shinpachi san? So the first steps then to prevent later war could have been the introduction of business in China rather than conquering it and making it a colony. Nation building to further business interests. What do you think Shinpachi san?

Your understanding is correct and no nation should not rely on their military power when they do business.
Japan was wrong on this point.

 

[parsifal]

All infantrymen of WW2 could move quickly over rough terrain. Nothing special about the IJA about that.

But terrain dictates logistics. And the rougher the terrain, the more difficult it is to keep the troops supplied.

The topography of the US western states is so rough in every location, and is several hundred miles "deep", that the Japanese would need months if not years of engineering work and supply buildup to strike eastwads across multiple mountain and desert ranges, through many types of weather.

The only thing the Japanese could do is land their troops and watch them go no further than the coastal areas. And all the while, the US manpower and industrial engine revs up.

Ah not true, though not entirely relevant either. Japanese personal kit in 1941 featured rubber soled, split toed canvas boots, far superior to the hobnailed boots issued to allied troops. Their uniforms were generally more practical and suited to conditions than those issued to the allies at that time. Their battalion artillery was man portable, something not generally available to the Us or westermn allies. Their trenching tools were also able to be used as an aid in rough terrain or in wet conditions, again something not available to the western allies until much later.

The Japanese also proved to be masters of using mechanized units in rough terrain. even at this early stage the advance of the mixed brigades Type 89s down the Peking Hankow railway in 1937 indicated the adeptness the Japanese could use armour in rough terrain.

Moreover, I dont think the Rockies are any significant impediment to a Japanese advance. I acknowledge that there was no interstate road system, but there were quite good local roads, and a number of rail crossing of the mountains. In where roads outside of the Beijing are were basically non existent for military purposes, the Japanese advanced more than 900 miles down the Peking/Hankow Railway, in conditions of heavy mud, crosiing several mountain ranges in the process, and then successfully defeated the Chinese (who outnumbererd them) to take the city of Hankpw and continue their advance southward. Later the Japanese tackled the even more difficult terrain in Burma and the Owen Stanleys which are even more formidable than the Rockies, with no infrastructure to support them and very nearly pulled it off.

I have attached the following images for consideration:

1) US Rail net - 1918
2) Chinwsw rail net 1933
3) Images of the terrain in Wisconsin
4) Images of the terrain typical in the region around Hankow

Saying the Rockies are an impenetrable barrier is akin to the french saying the Ardennes are impassable. Given the ability of the Japanese to overcome far worse terrain to defeat their enemies clearly demonstrates that the japanese would have had sufficient infrastructure in the form of the rail network and the local road network to undertake their crossing of the mountain regions you are now pinning you hopes on.

 

[Night Fighter Nut]

All infantrymen of WW2 could move quickly over rough terrain. Nothing special about the IJA about that.

But terrain dictates logistics. And the rougher the terrain, the more difficult it is to keep the troops supplied.

The topography of the US western states is so rough in every location, and is several hundred miles "deep", that the Japanese would need months if not years of engineering work and supply buildup to strike eastwads across multiple mountain and desert ranges, through many types of weather.

The only thing the Japanese could do is land their troops and watch them go no further than the coastal areas. And all the while, the US manpower and industrial engine revs up.

I agree there is nothing special about infantry moving quickly over rough terrain. I've done it myself. What was interesting was the way they did it through dense jungle. It was faster than how we currently do it now unless you continually drop daisy cutters and napalm. The western US is not rough in every location. You living in Orange county should know that. I use to live in Huntington Beach, Riverside, and Monterey. I've been up and down the coast highway 1. I agree there is plenty of rough terrain but there is also several open access that go inland. Monterey bay area is a deep harbor with gentle rolling hills and lots of agriculture. Not to mention all the roadway infrastructure so that farm machinery and trucks can get in and out. Then there is Hunter Ligget which is lots of rolling hills. I know because I was with the 7th Div. there and have walked those hills. No challange. And since there is lots of agriculture, ie trucks, chances are they would confiscate those that didn't get away or distroyed and use them to move men and equipment. Why walk when you can take and use what already exists?

Santa Barbara is not deep but open. There are cliffs behind the town and one major roadway going North and South. Not worth taking but it can be held and used to bottleneck any reenforcements heading North in a delaying action. Not to mention ship artillary batteries pounding anything that comes up that road which would be out of range of anything the reenforcements could bring up that road. All they would need is a spotter and you would have a devil of a time finding him. The mountainous terrain of the Sierra Nevadas favors the defender. He who gets there first and holds it would be in a great position. Good prior planning would take this into account. Remember, any assualt is done after much planning. Looking at all the details.

 

[Night Fighter Nut]

Your understanding is correct and no nation should not rely on their military power when they do business.
Japan was wrong on this point.

Wrong perhaps but not unusual for the times considering the empire building that has plagued man since the dawn of time. I'm probably wrong but it is my feeling that only in recent history the idea of empire building by conquering other countries has deminished in some small degree. Then again Iraq took Quwait.

 

[Night Fighter Nut]

4)

Saying the Rockies are an impenetrable barrier is akin to the french saying the Ardennes are impassable. Given the ability of the Japanese to overcome far worse terrain to defeat their enemies clearly demonstrates that the japanese would have had sufficient infrastructure in the form of the rail network and the local road network to undertake their crossing of the mountain regions you are now pinning you hopes on.

Not to mention that Japan has lots of mountainous terrain in which to practice their tactics and movements. The mountains of South East Asia are steeper with very dense jungle. Although the Rockies are much more rugged than hills in Wisconson. I'm not sure about the Owen Stanleys. I believe that it has very think jungles around it but the Rockies had lots of snow and parts of it are only passible during certain times of the year. The mountain range in question now are the Sierra Nevadas. Much of California's coast are cliffs except in a few of the areas I mentioned earlier. If I was going to do a landing. I would go through Monterey. It has a deep port able to handle large ships if only a few at a time. The terrain slopes gradually into farm country for quick access to the rest of the state promoting rapid movement and it was very lightly, if at all, defended. There is also a naval academy there so there is opportunity for intel gathering.

 

[Freebird]

The Japanese never had the amphibious and logistical assets to ever invade Hawaii, let alone the mainland US. The concept of them having this hypothetical capability is more in the realms of fantasy than "what if".

The best they could do is station a bunch of subs near the main ports and then get results as good as, or even better than what the Germans got with Operation Drumbeat.

The main Japanese thrust must always be into SE Asia, followed by advances into the shipping lanes going to Australia. The Japanese desperately needed the oil resources of SE Asia before they committed any forces to a wild goose chase in Hawaii, let alone the mainland US.

I agree with Syscom, a massive invasion of the US was just not in the plans of Japan, even if it had been possible.

However, I could certainly see a "spoiler" attack of a few 1,000 men in some key locations, to freak out the West coast residents (and especially polititians), which would severely hamper overseas war efforts

 

[renrich]

A small landing on the west coast ala Dieppe would certainly have serious repercussions among politicians and constituents. LOL

The phto of the diesel units and container cars certainly looks strange. Very few diesel ngines in 1939. My father worked for the MKT (Katy) RR and they did not get any diesels until well after WW2.

 

[parsifal]

Its not a WWII picute, just trying to get some idea of the terrain in the Northwest. It is not that different to the topography around Hankow.

I agree that the Japanese were never planning to invade the continental US, and certainly had no reason to in 1939. They still believed they could win their war in China, and disdained the west as weak and inneffective. They believed they couold continue their war with no repercussions.

However this debate arose as a result of assumptions being made that the Japanese would act in a certain way, and then, given any circumstance, the Japanese could not undertake an invasion. The first assumption is very dangerous, the second is downright wrong.

If however Japan declared war in 1939, without making any adjustments to the situation in China, this would be an unmitigated disaster for the Japanese. They would simply be repeating the mistakes of Pearl Harbour allover again, two years earlier. They would be less prepred for the fight as the US was, and simply be driven to defeat the same as she was. Perhaps by extrapolation the Japanese would be defeated by 1943, rather than 1945.

 

[renrich]

The Pearl Harbor attack was an unmitigated disaster, for the Japanese.

 

[parsifal]

I agree Ren, finally we have some common ground.