Percentage of pilots saved by bailing out of aircraft

[Fatboy Coxy]

Hi all, is there any percentages or rule of thumb odds on fighter pilots, and air crew in aircraft, that survive by bailing out. I'm talking about surviving the destruction of the aircraft, not their capture if over enemy territory.

 

[pbehn]

Hi all, is there any percentages or rule of thumb odds on fighter pilots, and air crew in aircraft, that survive by bailing out. I'm talking about surviving the destruction of the aircraft, not their capture if over enemy territory.

There are, but it is very complicated.

 

[tyrodtom]

You've complicated the answer by wanting fighter aircraft pilot survival rates included with bomber crew survival rates.

It's a great deal easier, and quicker to abandon a non flyable fighter than it is a bomber.

On several bombers, many of the turret gunners couldn't even wear their parachute in the turret. So if the need to bail out happened, they had to turn the turret so they could exit it, strap on their chute, and make it to the nearest exit, probably in a aircraft out of control, and lots of time in the dark. Then the pilots of bombers many times sacrificed themselves keeping the aircraft as steady as possible to aid the rest of the crew in their exits.

Them to try a lump this together with a fighter pilots being able to exit by just taking his seat belt, shoulder harness loose, maybe oxygen and RT connections, open the canopy, roll the aircraft inverted, and drop out.

You put those together into one number you'd get a meaningless rule of thumb.

 

[pbehn]

You've complicated the answer by wanting fighter aircraft pilot survival rates included with bomber crew survival rates.

It's a great deal easier, and quicker to abandon a non flyable fighter than it is a bomber.

On several bombers, many of the turret gunners couldn't even wear their parachute in the turret. So if the need to bail out happened, they had to turn the turret so they could exit it, strap on their chute, and make it to the nearest exit, probably in a aircraft out of control, and lots of time in the dark. Then the pilots of bombers many times sacrificed themselves keeping the aircraft as steady as possible to aid the rest of the crew in their exits.

Them to try a lump this together with a fighter pilots being able to exit by just taking his seat belt, shoulder harness loose, maybe oxygen and RT connections, open the canopy, roll the aircraft inverted, and drop out.

You put those together into one number you'd get a meaningless rule of thumb.

In a Hampden the navigator had to wait for the pilot to leave before he could get out.

 

[pbehn]

Some things are simple. Your chances of getting out and surviving to fight again were much higher in a 1940s Spitfire than a Hurricane, but that is entirely dependent on being high enough to actually get out and open the parachute. Other things are more complicated, there are many ways of looking at statistics. You had a much better chance of getting out of a Stirling or Halifax than a Lancaster, but you were much more likely to need to get out of a Stirling or a Halifax. For Harris, in charge of Bomber Command on long distance raids he needed twice as many Halifax' as Lancasters to drop the same bomb load, so since any crew that baled out or were shot down were lost to the RAF anyway the Halifax cost him more than two times the crews per 100 tons of bombs.

 

[SaparotRob]

Thanks pben. Now I know the B-17 beats the Lancaster. To heck with range/payload/accuracy/altitude/etc.
The Rail Road motto: "We all want to go home."

 

[tyrodtom]

Plus with the fog of war in many cases you're just not going to know what happened, all you may know is somebody never came back.
Did they attempt to use their parachute , and it failed ?
Did they not have time, altitude ?
If no one was not fairly close, and with nothing to do but watch, there's just no way you're ever going to know.
The enemy may have more knowledge about what happened to your people than you do, but they are not likely to expend much extra effort to keep you informed.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Ok, Ok, i didn't word that very well, I can see that now.

So, looking separately at fighter pilots, and my interest is in British & Commonwealth (Australians etc) and Japanese, would a figure of 40% seem low or high for British aircraft shot down, who's pilots are able to bale out and survive. And the same question for Japanese pilots, who's percentage I would guess is lower, given the Ki27, Ki43 and A6M fighters having a tendency to burn, and having no armour around the pilot.

Then I would ask the same for both nations operating twin engined aircraft, like the Blenheim, Hudson, Ki21, Ki48, G3M, G4M. Again the Japanese figure may be lower, as they also burnt easier, but I'm guessing a lower rate of survival all round here, or am I wrong?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The Japanese often flew without parachutes, at least on offensive operations, given the attitude to being captured, the stories of surviving Japanese airmen committing suicide rather than be taken aboard an allied ship for example, plus them executing prisoners. I do not know whether the data exists to look at Japanese aircrew casualties for defensive operations. The jungle terrain in Burma and the islands north of Australia would play a part in survival rates, also the number of bale outs over water. Think of all the different terrains and weather conditions around the world and their effect on survival rates of men who made it out alive, or alive but wounded.

So as I read the question, it is survival rates for the crew on board an aircraft that needed to be abandoned in the air, no ditchings or crash landings after which the aircraft was written off. As the others have pointed out the short answer is such a rate might be calculable but not very helpful. It needs to account for those found dead on the ground, decide what to do about those still classified missing and reconcile reports of X parachutes seen but a number less than X actually survived for example.

Aircrew survival rates depended importantly on the aircraft, what caused the damage to the aircraft, what emergency equipment the aircrew had how well they were trained in its use and altitude.

Using the 8th Air force data from 4,509 B-17 losses, about 37% of an average 9.74 man crew were KIA when lost to fighters, 32.1% of an average 9.2 man crew were KIA when lost to flak, however from the 170 8th AF B-17 lost to fighters to end June 1943, 53% of the men on board were KIA, and 41.7% of the men on board the 52 B-17s lost to flak in the same time period were KIA, average 10 man crews. Training and equipment were improved, things like a tether between a gunner and their parachute. Incomplete figures for the B-24 give almost half of the men on board being killed when shot down by fighters and it was about as dangerous to be on a B-24 shot down by flak as a B-17 shot down by fighters. The B-24 losses exclude those on operations Tidal Wave and Plunder, the low level missions. Then there are all the other causes of loss, collisions had the lowest survival rates, "mechanical failure" one of the best survival rates.

Using the Stephen Bungay data on the early Battle of Britain combats, In the July to early August 1940 fighting analysis some 25% of the RAF fighters hit by bombers were shot down versus the 63% by Bf109s. The Hurricane was more vulnerable, in a sample of the air combats in July 1940 the Bf109s hit 63 Spitfires and 63 Hurricanes, 31 of the Spitfires were destroyed, versus 45 Hurricanes. When it came to fire from Luftwaffe bombers 2 out of 25 Spitfires hit were destroyed versus 15 of 25 Hurricanes. While 10% of the pilots in RAF fighters hit by a bomber were killed, it was 50% for those hit by a Bf109. However, adding data from Wood and Dempster to the Bungay figures, some 269 Hurricane and 160 Spitfire pilots lost their lives, yet with around 605 Hurricanes and 388 Spitfires lost to all causes 12 July to 2 November 1940, there is only a small difference in average pilot survival rates of the two fighters over the course of the battle.

Part 2, the RAF bombers.

Using the Bomber Command War Diaries the Halifax over the course of the war loss percentage was 2.28%, the Lancaster loss was 2.2%, Stirling losses were 3.39%. In analysing the losses from the 1943 Hamburg raids, the Peenemunde raid and the 1944 Nuremberg raid the book notes 13.2% of the Lancaster crews, 21.9% of the Halifax crews and 24% of the Stirling crews shot down survived. Or the death rates were Lancaster 86.8%, Halifax 78.1%, Stirling 76%. These are the results from 126 Lancaster, 74 Halifax and 13 Stirling losses. The British Bombing Survey Unit notes the average bomb load for the war was Lancaster 9,186 pounds, Halifax 6,834 pounds, Stirling 5,626 pounds, by dividing the bomb tonnage dropped by number of sorties despatched, NOT attacking, so it is an underestimate of the average bomb load (footnote 3, page 42, chapter 8). The ratio of Lancaster to Halifax bomb loads is 1.34 to 1 in favour of the Lancaster. The ratio of crews lost is 1.11 to 1 in favour of the Halifax. The wartime loss rates are in favour of the Lancaster at 1.04 to 1, but it is also correct Lancasters tended to be sent to the longer range and more dangerous targets more than the Halifax. Lancasters required fewer sorties for the same bomb load, and so cut losses, but it was the most dangerous aircraft to its crews when shot down. To get to the Lancaster having twice the bomb load as the Halifax II the route needed to cover between 1,400 and 1,500 miles, for the Lancaster to have twice the bomb load of the Halifax III it was slightly over 1,600 miles (Air 24/269)

Note Bomber Command hit its halfway point of bombs dropped during July 1944 and half way point for bombs on Germany end September 1944 which helps explain the overall loss rates. The heavy bomber losses when attacking targets in Germany vary between 3.5 and nearly 6% January 1942 to August 1944, then drop to under 2%, some 90,000 sorties to mid August 1944, over 147,000 for the war.

Harris Despatch on War Operations notes that in Q2 and Q3/1943 there was a big difference in Halifax and Lancaster losses, so the Halifax was achieving 11.25 and 14.43 sorties per gross wastage for the two quarters, Lancaster 15.25 and 18.59. In 1944 the loss rates were equal to slightly in favour of the Halifax, put down to the Lancaster doing the deep penetration sorties against Germany. (Appendix F, paragraph 33) It also helped the Halifax II was replaced by the III and the II stopped being used for attacks on Germany.

 

[33k in the air]

Crew Position and Survivability in Bomber Command Aircraft, January–June 1943

Lancaster

. 9.6% = Pilot
13.8% = Navigator
11.9% = Wireless operator
12.4% = Flight engineer
13.2% = Bomber-aimer
. 8.5% = Mid-upper gunner
. 8.0% = Rear gunner

10.9% = Overall


Halifax

20.8% = Pilot
36.2% = Navigator
32.5% = Wireless operator
34.0% = Flight engineer
31.4% = Bomber-aimer
27.3% = Mid-upper gunner
23.4% = Rear gunner

29.0% = Overall


Wellington

14.6% = Pilot
21.0% = Navigator
18.5% = Wireless operator
18.5% = Bomber-aimer
14.6% = Rear gunner

17.5% = Overall

From The Crucible of War 1939–1945 (Volume III) by Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnson, and William G.P. Rawling (p.755)

 

[33k in the air]

Crew Position and Survivability in Bomber Command Aircraft, January–June 1943

From The Crucible of War 1939–1945 (Volume III) by Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnson, and William G.P. Rawling (p.755)

According to the endnote associated with the table, the source is:

Bomber Command Headquarters, 'An examination of the emergency escape arrangements from Bomber Command operational aircraft,' 19 May 1945, DHist 181.003 (D4598)

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Apologies for not coming back sooner, I'm mesmerised by current events

The Japanese often flew without parachutes, at least on offensive operations, given the attitude to being captured, the stories of surviving Japanese airmen committing suicide rather than be taken aboard an allied ship for example, plus them executing prisoners. I do not know whether the data exists to look at Japanese aircrew casualties for defensive operations. The jungle terrain in Burma and the islands north of Australia would play a part in survival rates, also the number of bale outs over water. Think of all the different terrains and weather conditions around the world and their effect on survival rates of men who made it out alive, or alive but wounded.

OK so for offensive operations, its unlikely there would be significant Japanese aircrew POWs on offensive operations, but I'll presume for defensive operations they would act like allied aircrew and try and save themselves.

Using the Stephen Bungay data on the early Battle of Britain combats, In the July to early August 1940 fighting analysis some 25% of the RAF fighters hit by bombers were shot down versus the 63% by Bf109s. The Hurricane was more vulnerable, in a sample of the air combats in July 1940 the Bf109s hit 63 Spitfires and 63 Hurricanes, 31 of the Spitfires were destroyed, versus 45 Hurricanes. When it came to fire from Luftwaffe bombers 2 out of 25 Spitfires hit were destroyed versus 15 of 25 Hurricanes. While 10% of the pilots in RAF fighters hit by a bomber were killed, it was 50% for those hit by a Bf109. However, adding data from Wood and Dempster to the Bungay figures, some 269 Hurricane and 160 Spitfire pilots lost their lives, yet with around 605 Hurricanes and 388 Spitfires lost to all causes 12 July to 2 November 1940, there is only a small difference in average pilot survival rates of the two fighters over the course of the battle.

So, very crudely, taking 429 pilots lost (269 + 160) and 993 aircraft (lost to all causes) means 564 pilots saved, is just under 57%, so best case I'd say is a 50% chance for survival of a fighter pilot over home territory, and this would presumably apply to both Allied and Japanese.

 

[GregP]

I wouldn't make that presumption.

Japanese aircraft were not exactly as survivable as Allied aircraft, due in large part to the absence of self-sealing tanks coupled with lighter gauge aluminum skins, added to the fact that they were often seen much farther from base than Allied aircraft were. Also, data from the ETO are not anything like data from the Pacific.

You'd very likely hit land if you bailed out over Europe. In the Pacific, you will almost certainly hit water, and it's a BIG ocean to be found in. Also, there were many very large fights in Europe consisting of hundreds of planes. In the Pacific, it was mostly 4-on-4, 4-on-8, or 8 -on 4 fights. There were VERY few large aerial battles where many planes were involved in the same action.

 

[tyrodtom]

I've read a few articles about IJAAF pilots, even when they were flying over land , China, Burma, etc. tended not to bail out when damaged bad enough to not have a likely chance of returning to their base.
They would turn back toward enemy territory and evidently look for something to crash dive.
What their exact reasoning was no one knows, because dead men tell no tales.

Just a guess, ( and this was also their surviving comrades thoughts too) is that their reasoning was that to bail out over land would more than likely end up with them being captured by natives, at the best, who were in most cases not pro-Japanese.
So they saw that as a lost opportunity to do damage with their aircraft to the enemy, if they baled out to save their own life.
Especially since bailing out would just prolong a ordeal that would probably end in a painful death anyway.
They didn't value their own life over what they considered their duty.

 

[GrauGeist]

The myth that Japanese pilots "didn't wear parachutes" seems to persist.

They did by a large margin. Their parachutes were of high quality because of their access to silk, too.

Some pilots preferred not to wear it, but still needed the parachute in the cockpit, as the aircraft's seat was designed for a parachute clad pilot.

 

[Barrett]

Late to this thread but thought I'd share:
One of the contributors to my 15th AF history said "The army spent 9 months teaching me to fly an airplane but not one minute on how to bail out of one."

 

[wokelly]

Late to this thread but thought I'd share:
One of the contributors to my 15th AF history said "The army spent 9 months teaching me to fly an airplane but not one minute on how to bail out of one."

The training for USAAF crews was pretty hit or miss due to the massive need for manpower to man the rapidly expanding force. A lot of the gunner on 8th Air Force bombers early on basically were not taught how to aim, which is pretty incredible given how key they gunners were to keeping the bomber safe in daylight. It was only late in 1943 the Zone System or Position Firing rules started to be taught to gunners. I'm not surprised bailing out training may have been neglected.

 

[pbehn]

In the grim statistics of WW2 the further you are in the war and the further you bailed out into Germany the higher were your chances of being killed after landing. There are of course no proper records, but the effect would always be worse for the Lancaster as against the Halifax.

 

[SaparotRob]

Late to this thread but thought I'd share:
One of the contributors to my 15th AF history said "The army spent 9 months teaching me to fly an airplane but not one minute on how to bail out of one."

The power of optimism!

 

[pbehn]

The power of optimism!

Things obviously changed over the years. Bill Runnels recounted how he was sent on a ditching survival coursein which a section of a B-17 was immersed in water. Very similar to what is done in offshore survival courses for helicopters today.