RAF flying 109E during 1940

[kool kitty89]

Lockheed also converted one P-38E into a very nice looking two seater for aerodynamic test work and used in conjunction with the XF-90 model tests...

That's actually pretty cool looking.

 

[Hop]

The RAF was, supposedly, literally days away from ceasing to exist as an effective fighter force, when Goring snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by changing tactics.

In mid July, as German attacks were starting to escalate, the RAF had 568 serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes, and 1,365 fighter aircrew.

On the 10th August, a few days before the Luftwaffe launched their all out attack on the RAF, that had increased to 1,396 aircrew and 627 serviceable Spits and Hurris.

On the morning of the 7th September, hours before the Luftwaffe switched to attacking London, the RAF had 1,381 fighter aircrew and 621 serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes.

In other words, over the month that saw all the Luftwaffe focus on destroying the RAF, front line strength stayed the same.

The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, were suffering losses far heavier than they could replace. Numbers of serviceable aircraft in the Luftwaffe:

Type - 13 Aug - 7 Sept
Bombers 1008 - 798
Dive bomb 286 - 133
SE Fighter 853 - 658
TE Fighter 189 - 112

Luftwaffe pilot numbers were decreasing as well, from 869 fit for duty on 1st August to 735 on 1st September. (these numbers do not compare exactly with the RAF's, these are single engined pilots fit for duty, the RAF's are all fighter aircrew on strength. The figures do serve to illustrate the trends, though)

 

[Kurfürst]

Whats the source for these figures, the dive bomber figures for example look odd to me. The Germans were certainly not loosing anyhwere near over 150 dive bombers in August, yet your figures - if they are correct, which I doubt - suggest they did..

Also your SE fighter figures are of suspect, comparing apples and oranges, and some units appear not to have accounted for the in September figures, but were in August.

Something is fishy here.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Kurfürst,

>They did have and used 100 octane fuel, in fact it seems that something like half the 110s were running on it by the time of the Battle; 100 octane fuel doesn`t appear to be particularly news to the LW, given that the 100 octane aero engine, the DB 601N went into series production towards the end of 1939, according the engine`s datasheet.

From Petrick/Mankau's Zerstörer book, I got the impression that initially, the Me 110 units were give priority for conversion to the DB601N engine, but that this decision was reversed, with the Me 109-equipped JG 26 being scheduled for conversion instead. It seems that at least one Gruppe of JG 26 was converted before the end of the battle.

>Check the fuel triangle instructing to use '100' (octane fuel).

Roger! It fits the picture perfectly as the aircraft also has JG 26's "Schlageter S" emblem on the cowl.

I'm not any good with photo research, but it would be interesting to see if any Me 110 photographs with 100 octane triangle can be found.

Another thing I'm curious about is if there are pre-Battle-of-Britain photographs of Me 109 aircraft with a 100 octane triangle, as the higher boost pressure of the DB601Aa engine still is a bit of a mystery to me. Maybe this was the first subtype to use 100 octane fuel?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Kurfürst]

Yes thats my impression too, in early July 1940 they report 3 Gruppen of 110s and 1 Gruppe of 109s fitted with DB 601N. 110s appearantly had priority over 109s initially (and let us not forget in July the 109F production, that used 601N too, started!). This appearantly changed during the 2nd half of the year as at 1 Jan 1941 they report a lot more 109s with 601N than just one Gruppe.

Unfortunately, its difficult to track the numbers down, since this was mostly conversions and retrofits, so they dont show up in 'proper' production reports.. I understand a number of bomber types were also fitted with 601N.

Speaking of 100 octane, I remember reading some report the last week, it analysed the fuel content found in the tank of German fighters.

Curiously, it was reported to be 92 octane, and was stipulated that its some sort of mix of the lower (87?) and higher (100 octane?) fuel, and there was some guesswork that this shows that high octane supplies are at present still aduquate.

I believe the 601Aa could definitely rely on 87 octane. Olivier says all E-x/Bs and all E-7s had 601Aa, and on those you can see the 87 octane triangle.

I really wonder about the performance of the 110C / 601N. The 601A-1 powered version was consider good for something like 525 km/h at altitude, I wonder what the /N version would do?

Does anybody have a listing of 110 Gruppen in July 1940, to get some idea what % used 601A and 601N?

 

[claidemore]

Just wanted to point out that while RAF strength in pilots and fighter planes was still good, some of their 11 Group airfields were damaged or out of commission and they were in danger of having to operate from further away, and losing the advantage they enjoyed of combat time over target area. Leigh-Mallorys 'Big Wing' tactic might have still been effective if forced to operate from 12 Group airfields, but thats conjecture.

The Luftwaffe switching from targeting airfields is what saved the day for the RAF, not destruction of planes and aircrew.

 

[Njaco]

It was a manpower shortage that almost did in the RAF and as Claidemore said, the destruction of the airfields. That and the belief by the Luftwaffe for about a month that England was down to her last 50 fighters!

 

[plan_D]

The RAF was nowhere near as close to destruction as a lot of people like to believe. The area of combat was centered around the south-east of Britain, it seems to be too easy to forget about the rest of the RAF throughout island. The Battle of Britain has been discussed in some detail time and time again on this site, but for the Luftwaffe to be victourious they would have had to keep the 11 and 12 Group airfields out of action all the time or at least while the Germans landing forces disembarked and fought their way to London. Keeping that many airfields out of action is a lot of work, and probably too much for the Luftwaffe to handle.

 

[kool kitty89]

Not to mention the Naval force they'd need to keep the RN at bay. (though air strikes against the RN would help too, but they had the RAF to deal with as well) And don't forget that the Germans hadn't increased aircraft production until late in the battle, while the Brits had done so shortly after the Battle of France. (which allowed them to keep numbers up despite the high attrition rate) The LW might have been better to continue attacking radar stations, or maybe fly below radar.


I did some more reading and it seems that I was more thinking of the kampfzerstorer than zerstorer. Compared to the original kampfzerstorer competition lineup the 110 was the best and a step in the right direction. It differed greatly form the specification and the RLM even didn't fund it for this competition, but it proved that the Zerstorer concept was a better way to go. (the Ju 88 was probably the closest thing to making the RLM's vision of the Kampfzerstorer, even though it wasn't designed as such, the Mossie along similar lines)

The Fw 187 wasn't originally designed as a Zerstorer but a high performance long range fighter. It made a much better heavy interceptor than the Bf 110 as well though. One reason the RLM disliked it was that the 187 couldn't carry a defensive gun, but this was practically useless on the Bf 110 anyway. The secon seat and radio operator was really unnecessary and wasteful inless they were also to act as navigator or if a radar operator was needed. (Night fighter)


The Jumo 210G admitedly was not a good choice for the 178, but it was still better than the DB 600 powered 110, and much better in all performance (except roll) than the Jumo powered 109. When the 3 Fw 187A-0's were stationed in Norway those who flew them found the planes to be superior in almost every way to the Bf 110. If you want to argue that the DB 601 was in too much demand for the 109 (though the 110 used it), the 187 probably could have done well with the Jumo 211. (granted the unpressurized cooling system of most models limited altitude performance)



But this discussion on the 187 is moot in the terma of an escort as the 109 with drop tanks would have had sufficient range to escort bombers to most of there targets. Certainly to 11 and 12 group.

 

[Hop]

Whats the source for these figures,

The German ones? Richard Anderson, the Dupuy Institute.

the dive bomber figures for example look odd to me. The Germans were certainly not loosing anyhwere near over 150 dive bombers in August, yet your figures - if they are correct, which I doubt - suggest they did..

The dive bomber figures are odd, but I suspect that's due to the withdrawal of the Ju 87 from the battle. It's not just extra maintenance rendering more planes unserviceable, because the "on hand" figures are also down heavily. Possibly there was some upgrading of aircraft, or switching over to a new type, in anticipation of a return to battle later on.

Also your SE fighter figures are of suspect, comparing apples and oranges,

No, it's comparing serviceable aircraft on both sides.

and some units appear not to have accounted for the in September figures, but were in August.

What makes you think so?

Just wanted to point out that while RAF strength in pilots and fighter planes was still good, some of their 11 Group airfields were damaged or out of commission and they were in danger of having to operate from further away,

To quote Dowding:

That 13 aerodromes in the Group underwent a total of over forty attacks in three weeks, but Manston and Lympne were the only two that were unfit for day flying for more than a few hours

Manston and Lympne were both satellite airfields right on the coast, and within 30 miles as France, as such they were getting hit by low level raiders with no warning.

Leigh-Mallorys 'Big Wing' tactic might have still been effective if forced to operate from 12 Group airfields, but thats conjecture.

Leigh Mallory was in charge of 12 Group, the "Big Wing" did operate from 12 Group airfields north of London.

but for the Luftwaffe to be victourious they would have had to keep the 11 and 12 Group airfields out of action all the time or at least while the Germans landing forces disembarked and fought their way to London. Keeping that many airfields out of action is a lot of work, and probably too much for the Luftwaffe to handle.

That's exactly the problem for the Luftwaffe. 11 Group had 7 large sector airfields and 17 fighter airfields. The Luftwaffe were managing to send over an average of 100 - 150 bombers a day in late August and early September. Spread that out amongst 24 airfields and it works out to about 5 bombers per airfield per day, assuming the Luftwaffe ignore all other targets.

Keeping those airfields suppressed was simply beyond them.

 

[Kurfürst]

The German ones? Richard Anderson, the Dupuy Institute.

The dive bomber figures are odd, but I suspect that's due to the withdrawal of the Ju 87 from the battle. It's not just extra maintenance rendering more planes unserviceable, because the "on hand" figures are also down heavily. Possibly there was some upgrading of aircraft, or switching over to a new type, in anticipation of a return to battle later on.

Oh, I see then, Richard must have probably made a typo then, especially considering the Ju 87 was never withdrawn from the Battle - quite the contrary, towards end of August, they relocated and concentrated around Calais, from more distant airfields, and kept bombing the Channel shipping.

It was the RAF that was put on a short chain and was ordered not to interfere with them, after the losses in July and August - orders were issued that RAF pilots may not operate over the Channel, too far away from the coastline.

No, it's comparing serviceable aircraft on both sides.

I am meaning between the two German figures at different dates. They dont include the same units.

and some units appear not to have accounted for the in September figures, but were in August.

What makes you think so?[/QUOTE]

The fact that I looked into it, and found that several Gruppen were re-designated, and some daylight fighter wings were relocated to Germany and become the first night fighters wings in the summer - and therefore were not counted amongst the daylight figther strenght in the automn, ie. they seem to have been 'lost', but in fact these are just administrative 'losses'.

In any case, these are snapshot figures, greatly influenced by the intensitity of that day`s fighting, and when the figures refer to (i.e. in the morning servicable aircraft would be high, in the evening probably very low, as even aircraft that only have a hole or two that can be patched up in minutes, or a holed fuel tank that can replaced in an hour with another are unservicable - until next morning).

I guess Richard`s figures are repeating the same error, ignoring the redeployment of units in the meantime, and some issues I have mentioned above.

 

[Hop]

Oh, I see then, Richard must have probably made a typo then, especially considering the Ju 87 was never withdrawn from the Battle - quite the contrary, towards end of August, they relocated and concentrated around Calais, from more distant airfields, and kept bombing the Channel shipping.

No, they were withdrawn from most operations. And Rich can hardly have made a "typo", as he gives the figures as:

13 August 347 on hand, 276 operational
7 September 161 on hand, 123 operational

Now I could understand a typo in the on hand figures, or in the serviceable figures, but not in both.

What's more, whilst he gives those figures for "stukas", he also gave separate figures for dive bombers:

13 August 365 on hand, 286 operational
7 September 174 on hand, 133 operational

So what's that, 4 "typos"?

I am meaning between the two German figures at different dates. They dont include the same units.

Source?

The fact that I looked into it, and found that several Gruppen were re-designated, and some daylight fighter wings were relocated to Germany and become the first night fighters wings in the summer - and therefore were not counted amongst the daylight figther strenght in the automn, ie. they seem to have been 'lost', but in fact these are just administrative 'losses'.

Um, some twin engined units were redesignated as night fighter units, but not single engined fighters. In fact the only group flying the 109 in the night fighter role re-equipped with 110s.

In any case, these are snapshot figures, greatly influenced by the intensitity of that day`s fighting, and when the figures refer to (i.e. in the morning servicable aircraft would be high, in the evening probably very low, as even aircraft that only have a hole or two that can be patched up in minutes, or a holed fuel tank that can replaced in an hour with another are unservicable - until next morning).

You mean these figures show how many aircraft the Luftwaffe had available for operations on any day.

Note that these dates are not chosen at random, they are for the start of the Luftwaffe's main offensive, and for the day they switched to London. The RAF's serviceable figures, which likewise jumped around, are:

Force - 13 Aug - 7 Sept
Luftwaffe - 853 - 658
RAF FC - 579 - 621

Incidentally I have now spotted one possible problem, I gave the figures as single engined fighters and twin engined fighters. Rich gave the figures as "JG" and "ZG".

 

[Kurfürst]

No, they were withdrawn from most operations.

Of course not. You keep spreading that bullocks, despite you have been corrected on this many times, on several discussion boards.

Truth is, that Stukas kept doing the same operations against shipping as they did in July and August, operating now even closer to the British Isles from bases near Calais, and the RAF fighters were effectively forbidden to engage them over the Channel.

It was the RAF that was withdrawn from Stuka hunting, not the Stukas hunting shipping.

And Rich can hardly have made a "typo", as he gives the figures as:

13 August 347 on hand, 276 operational
7 September 161 on hand, 123 operational

Now I could understand a typo in the on hand figures, or in the serviceable figures, but not in both.

What's more, whilst he gives those figures for "stukas", he also gave separate figures for dive bombers:

13 August 365 on hand, 286 operational
7 September 174 on hand, 133 operational

So what's that, 4 "typos"?

Perhaps it would be best to see the origin of these figures. Where are they posted?

In any case, what is certain that these figures do not add up.

Simple fact is that the Germans didnt loose anywhere near that number of dive bombers in the entire August - they did write down 51 dive bombers on operations to all causes, and 7 more not on operations; 17 damaged on operation, 8 not on operations.

That`s 83 Stukas, even if I add all that up, forget that these losses refer to all of August, while Rich figures only for half of August plus a week in September (and in all of September, only 17 Stukas were written down/damaged, to all causes on/not on operations), that aircraft were repaired, and replacement aircraft were received.

Compared to that Rich claims, that the Germans had 191 less Stukas on strenght, and 153 less Stukas serviceable.

This doesn`t make any sense.

Um, some twin engined units were redesignated as night fighter units, but not single engined fighters. In fact the only group flying the 109 in the night fighter role re-equipped with 110s.

Please provide a source for this nonsense you`ve just made up.

You mean these figures show how many aircraft the Luftwaffe had available for operations on any day.

No, how could say LW figures for the evening for say, the 7th of September (after heavy fighting during the day and many aircraft just being patched up) give any clue how many aircraft the LW could send into battle on say, on the morning of 17th September?

Note that these dates are not chosen at random, they are for the start of the Luftwaffe's main offensive, and for the day they switched to London. The RAF's serviceable figures, which likewise jumped around, are:

Force - 13 Aug - 7 Sept
Luftwaffe - 853 - 658
RAF FC - 579 - 621

Which tells us little apart from how many servicable aircraft were there on those two given days.

And what time are these figures are valid?

Can it be that the RAF figures are for the morning, ie. before the fighting occured that day, and the LW figures are from the evening, ie. after all the fighting was done, planes were lost and damaged?

Incidentally I have now spotted one possible problem, I gave the figures as single engined fighters and twin engined fighters. Rich gave the figures as "JG" and "ZG".

In other words, it appears that neither you or Rich actually know what your figures are for... so what do they include, what do they exclude, and whats the source for them?

 

[Hop]

Of course not. You keep spreading that bullocks, despite you have been corrected on this many times, on several discussion boards.

Kurfurst, it's a choice between your opinion that the Stuka was performing well, and respect authors such as:

Hooton, Eagle in Flames:

The same day ended Stuka daylight operations over England when four fighter squadrons slaughtered Major Clemens, Graf von Schonborn's StG 77 during an attack upon Poling radar station, with 16 Stukas last and two damaged beyond repair (21% of the force) in what Seidemann justly described as "a black day"

Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin:

August 18th was the virtual death knell of the Ju 87s over Britain. Losses had been mounting at an alarming rate and, apart from a few isolated sorties, they were pulled out of the battle

Bungay, Most Dangerous Enemy:

Most unusually, Luftflotte 3's post-action report the next day (always called an Erfolgsmeldung - literally a "Success Report") commented on the losses of the Stukas. It attributed them to "British fighters gaining a local superiority due to particularly favourable weather conditions" and carrying out a pursuit up to 30km over the the Channel. StG 77's air corps commander, von Richthofen, confided to his diary that a "Stuka Gruppe has had it's feathers well and truly plucked".

What really struck von Richthofen were not the overall losses of the Stukas, which at 15% were high but bearable in the short term if they were achieving results, but the near destruction of one Gruppe, whose losses ran at 50%. This was on top of the losses of nearly 30% to another single unit, I/StG2, in the Tangmere raid on the 16th, and the loss of 70% of one Staffel of II/StG2 on the 13th. Earlier losses, such as those over convoy Peewit, had been heavy but acceptable. It was becoming clear, however, that any unlucky Stuka unit caught without its escort would be almost wiped out. It was also becoming clear there was at least one such unlucky unit on every major sortie. Some rethinking was called for.

Bungay again, quoting Goering:

"Until the enemy fighter force has been broken, Stuka units are only to be used when circumstances are particularly favourable." With this withdrawal of the Stukas from general operations, the only precision bombing instrument the Luftwaffe had left was Erpro 210

Cajus Bekker:

The main victim was I/StG 77. Of its twenty-eight aircraft twelve failed to return, and six others were so shot up that they only just reached French soil. Amongst the missing was the Gruppe's commander, Captain Meisel. Adding the casualties of the other Gruppen , thirty Ju 87s were either lost or severely damaged. The price was too high. The Stuka had to be withdrawn....

In early November the condemned Stukas were resurrected to attack British shipping once more in the Channel. Twenty Ju 87s of III/StG 1 under Captain Helmut Mahlke were protected by no fewer than two whole fighter Geschwader . On November 1st, 8th and 11th, diving in succession, they achieved manifold strikes on three large convoys in the outer Thames estuary. Three days later the Gruppe lost a quarter of its aircraft to attacks by Spitfires owing to the fact that its escort was not on the spot.

John Weal:

After the losses of 18 August VIII Fliegerkorps was transferred eastwards to the control of Luftflotte II. Concentrated in the Pas de Calais, they sat out the remainder of the battle as a sort of aeronautical "fleet in being", posing a threat by their very presence, and serving to indicate to the British that the invasion was imminent. But the reality was very different...

A number of Staffeln did remain in northern France, however, and in the first half of November 1940 they returned to square one by staging a few sporadic anti convoy missions around the Kent coast.

Now that's rather a lot of people saying that the Stuka was withdrawn, with Bekker and Weal specifically saying they were withdrawn in August and returned to action in November. Against that we have you repeatedly saying the opposite, but without any evidence to back it up.

Perhaps it would be best to see the origin of these figures. Where are they posted?

Axis History Forum • View topic - Seelöwe: German Air Operations and anti-ship Capabilities

The second set, showing "stuka" numbers, is earlier in the same thread, I think.

In any case, what is certain that these figures do not add up.

Of course they do. You just don't like them.

Simple fact is that the Germans didnt loose anywhere near that number of dive bombers in the entire August

No, but you don't have to lose aircraft to have less aircraft. Given that the Stukas were not active, it would be an ideal time to transition to newer types. I believe a new, longer range mark of Stuka was being introduced at the time.

Compared to that Rich claims, that the Germans had 191 less Stukas on strenght, and 153 less Stukas serviceable.

This doesn`t make any sense.

It does when you accept the reality that the Stukas were sitting out the battle.

Um, some twin engined units were redesignated as night fighter units, but not single engined fighters. In fact the only group flying the 109 in the night fighter role re-equipped with 110s.

Please provide a source for this nonsense you`ve just made up.

How about you apologise for, yet again, accusing me of making up information?

From The Other Battle, Luftwaffe Night Aces vs Bomber Command, by Peter Hinchcliffe:

It was becoming clear there was no place in the new night fighter organisation for the Bf 109, and gradually the pilots of III/NG 1 [renamed from II/NG 1] converted to the Bf 110, only 1 staffel of single seaters remaining until October [1940], when that was itself disbanded.

Or what about German Air Force Air Defence Operations by Walter Grabmann:

Initially this group had Me 109 aircraft. Since they were found unsuitable for the purpose because of their small time in air capacities and their inadequate equipment for blind navigation, re-equipment of the group's squadrons with Me 110 aircraft commenced in December 1940.

At the end of 1940 the following night fighter forces were in existence:

He then lists Hq, 1 and 2 NG1 as equipped with the 110D, 3 NG1 equipped with the 109E and 110C/D. 1 NG2 had JU 88s and Do17s, 4 NG2 had JU 88s, and 1 NG3 had the 110D.

He gives night fighter strength for 2nd November as 207 aircraft authorised, 172 on hand, 93 serviceable.

Now, what about the apology?

No, how could say LW figures for the evening for say, the 7th of September (after heavy fighting during the day and many aircraft just being patched up) give any clue how many aircraft the LW could send into battle on say, on the morning of 17th September?

I very much doubt they were evening. What does it tell you about strength the following week? Not that much, but it does tell you a lot about strength at any particular point of time.

However, if you prefer, you could look at the number of aircraft present. Rich gave the figures for the JGs as:

13 Aug - 976
7 Sept - 831

Not quite as sharp a drop, but still a substantial decline. That shows that overall strength was declining, and the number of aircraft fit for duty was declining even faster.

In other words, it appears that neither you or Rich actually know what your figures are for.

No, I think Rich knows exactly what the figures are for. I suspect JG = single engined fighters, ZG = twins. Of course, you could always ask Rich if you don't trust the figures.

 

[Glider]

Of course not. You keep spreading that bullocks, despite you have been corrected on this many times, on several discussion boards.

Truth is, that Stukas kept doing the same operations against shipping as they did in July and August, operating now even closer to the British Isles from bases near Calais, and the RAF fighters were effectively forbidden to engage them over the Channel.

It was the RAF that was withdrawn from Stuka hunting, not the Stukas hunting shipping.

I take it you can support the above statements in particular that the RAF were withdrawn from Stuka Hunting?
I admit that I have always read that when RAF fighters, Hurricanes or Spitfires met Stukas they thought that all their Birthdays had come at once. My undersanding was that the Ju87 was withdrawn from the main effort in mid August and were kept for short range missions in the Channel and the British coast when they could be covered by a strong escort.
I have never heard of the RAF being pulled from attacking them.

Re the Numbers.
The figures I have give a Strength on the 29th June 1940 of 428 dive bombers.
Between then and the 30th September
59 lost to enemy action
10 lost on operations not due to enemy action
19 destroyed not on operations

This would I believe match reasionably well the figures given by Kurfurst but it should be remembered that they were laregly withdrawn from action in Mid August and were only in the front line for half the period.

 

[claidemore]

Even if all of those numbers are out by XX%, they still show the trend and general situation. Luftwaffe numbers are down, RAF numbers are up. Simple. Every source on the BoB states this, the exact numbers notwithstanding.

Luftwaffe pilots were discouraged by their lack of progress, and concerned about their losses, as evidenced by Goerings famous orders to protect the bombers better and Gallands frustrated retort to Goering about a squadron of Spitfires. This was the first time they had experienced anything less than quick and complete victory, a bit of a rude awakening to say the least.

As for Stukas hunting in the channel, very little shipping was going through the channel after the first few weeks of the battle, it was all diverted to ports out of range of German bombers. I doubt they found much of value to hunt, maybe a few fishing boats.

RAF fighters were not forbidden to hunt Stukas, they were limiting on their channel patrols and concentrating on airfield and factory defence to apply their resources in the most important areas.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Kurfürst,

>I really wonder about the performance of the 110C / 601N. The 601A-1 powered version was consider good for something like 525 km/h at altitude, I wonder what the /N version would do?

Here is an analysis I ran quite a while back. With a DB601N, the Me 110C would be faster than a Hurricane I on 100 octane above 4000 m.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[smg]

well the me 110 was only good because it was fast and had alot of armor an big guns, the me 210 and the me 210 same thing, and the me 410 was the best one bout it came to late to make a diferanse it manuber preatty good and was fast and had a hell of fire power o yea with 2 guns in the tail of the gun preaty kool controld by the guner in the caben